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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers how successfully contemporary theories of 'cultural hybridity' 
can afford a position from which to identify possibilities for 'racially transgressive 
cultural change' within modem societies. To tackle this question, the thesis assesses 
the work of four influential cultural theorists (Stuart Hall, A vtar Brab, Paul Gilroy and 
Ali Rattansi) in the context of everyday, lived cultural realities. Two empirical studies 
conducted among South Asians in Britain are also presented: one examines trends in 
consumption of films on videotape; the other investigates negotiations of being 
Muslim. 
Data from the two studies show how negotiations of fragmented cultural experiences 
may in fact reinforce racial and cultural hierarchies as much as generate • new', non-
racialised cultural outlooks. Interrogating these empirical findings, the thesis proposes 
a distinction between two models of cross-cultural interaction: one model represents 
fixed interdependency of axes of difference, which results in 'exclusive' cultural 
identities; the other illustrates how axes of difference can influence each other's 
meaning without becoming interdependent, leaving open possibilities for the 
renegotiation of multiple co-ordinates of identity. 
In identifying the prospects for progressive cultural change the two studies underscore 
a need to extend hybridity theorists' preoccupation with 'migrant' cultures. The 
findings suggest that, until the dynamics and principles of 'cultural hybridity' are 
contested from the perspective of indigenous Western populations, the work of 
hybridity theorists will remain unable to provide an adequate framework for 
promoting racially transgressive cultural change. 
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Introduction 
The colonising mission of the British empire established 'race' as a pivotal marker for 
categorising human beings and making sense of their social and physiological 
differences. Since then, the organisation of 'races' along a superior/inferior continuum 
has provided the ideological foundation for a variety of racisms. Pseudoscientific 
racisms, which dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, presented 
biological differences to justify British rule in Asia and Africa l . More recently, 
'common sense' or 'new' racisms have shifted the focus to cultural differences to 
circumvent feelings of racial superiority/inferiority2. Underlying all these racist 
ideologies is the conception of 'races' as distinct incompatible wholes. Against this 
trend, a group of intellectuals, who are referred to throughout this thesis as 'hybridity 
theorists', have sought to re-think dominant representations of 'race'. Their work 
develops understanding of the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' to highlight 'race' as 
an open signifier asserting that a person's racial identity acquires meaning through 
interaction with other co-ordinates of identity. Over the last fifteen years the work of 
hybridity theorists has become firmly established as an alternative framework to 
mutually exclusive conceptions of 'race' and racial boundaries. This thesis examines 
theoretical conceptions of 'cultural hybridity', and assesses whether they can be 
productively mobilised to identify a counter discourse to essentialist notions of 'race'. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is drawn from the work of four contributors to 
contemporary debates about 'cultural hybridity' - Stuart Hall, A vtar Brah, Paul 
Gilroy and Ali Rattansi. Critical contestation of their respective conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity' is undertaken in the context of two case studies. The studies 
comprise empirical investigations into two contrasting aspects of South Asian cultures 
in Britain. The first study constitutes an audience survey examining patterns of taste 
lsee for example, Peter Fryer, Stayin& Power, (London, Pluto Press, 1984) 
Sander Gilman, Difference and Patholol:Y, (New York, Cornell University Press, 1985) 
Dilip Hiro, Black British. White British, (Bristol, Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd, 1971) 
2see for example, Martin Barker, The New Racism, (London, Junction Books Ltd, 1981) 
Errol Lawrence, 'Just plain common sense: the 'roots' of racism', in The Empire Strikes Back, Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies, (London, Hutchinson, 1982), pp47-94 
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and consumption of popular/mainstream3 and Indian films4 on videotape. The second 
empirical study investigates the trend amongst significant numbers of young Muslims 
of fore2roundin2 Islam in defining and structuring their everyday lives. Four 
observations clarify the contemporary significance of my overall research framework 
and its value for contesting established structures and conceptions of 'race'. 
Firstly, hybridity theorists argue that identities be interrogated within a broader and 
ongoing process of cultural mutation and change. More specifically, they examine the 
concepts of 'diaspora' and 'hybridity' to describe how identities are situated in a 
complex web of interlocking histories and fractured experiences of not just 'race' but 
multiple axes of difference including gender, class, and sexuality. This is more 
attuned to the dynamics of modern societies and their impact on the individual's 
'sense of self'. For instance, the deregulation of the marketplace has accelerated 
global interdependence, and the related phenomena of migration and global mass 
media have made the intermixing of cultures commonplace. This in turn has produced 
a pluralisation of sources of identity. Acknowledging the strengths of these 
arguments, the thesis draws on the work of hybridity theorists as presenting a more 
appropriate framework for examining modern identities than more established 
conceptions of 'race', which seek to contain identities to fixed origins. 
Secondly, growing disquiet towards the two ideological approaches, of 
multiculturalism and anti-racism, that dominated the British 'race' relations industry 
during the 1980s can be identified as an important precursor to the work of hybridity 
theorists. The character and limits of both approaches have been well documented 
elsewhere6• In sum, multiculturalism presented racial inequalities as an outcome of 
Yrhe term popular/mainstream is used to refer to texts from mainstream British film culture. 
"The term Indian films is used to refer to texts from popular Indian film culture. 
5Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identib', (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991) 
Stuart Hall, 'The Question of Cultural Identity', in Modernity and its Future. edited by S. Hall, D. Held 
& T. McGrew, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), pp274-316 
6see for example, Stephen May, ed., Critical Multiculturalism, (London, Falmer Press, 1999) 
Peter Braham, Ali Rattansi and Richard Skellington, eds, Racism and Antiracism, (London, Sage, 
1992) 
Sohan Modgil, Gajendra K. Verma, Kanka Mallick and Celia Modgil, eds, Multicultural Education, 
(London, Taylor Francis, 1986) 
Peter Foster, Policy and Practice in Multicultural and Antiracist Education, (London, Routledge, 1990) 
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lack of understanding between distinct unmeltable cultural groups and thereby 
reinforced mutually exclusive cultural boundaries. Anti-racism framed the struggle 
against racism in terms of inequalities in socio-economic circumstances between 
blacks and whites and thus accentuated boundaries of skin colour. Both models could 
accordingly be seen to operate within the same reductive framework of 'race' that 
underlies all racisms7 - the very framework they were struggling againsf. Addressing 
the limitations of these two approaches, hybridity theorists have reformulated the 
long-term anti-racist objective as developing fresh perspectives of 'race' for 
conceptualising more equal human relations. Indeed the texts examined in chapter 2 
form part of a larger body of work which since the late 1980s has received 
considerable commentary and debate contesting its value as a unique position from 
which to re-think modem experiences of 'race'. 
Thirdly, popular debates of theories of 'cultural hybridity' have tended to focus on its 
most innovative themes of 'cultural fragmentation' and 'fusion of distinct cultural 
forms'. This trend has not only created a new binary between 'old' and 'new' 
identities but left theories of hybridity vulnerable to reductive misreadings 
emphasising 'the resilience of black youth multi cultures overcoming adversity to 
Ali Rattansi, 'Racism, Culture and Education', in Race'. Culture and Difference, edited by J. Donald & 
A. Rattansi, (London, Sage 1992), ppll-48 
Paul Gilroy, 'The End of Anti-Racism', in 'Race'. Culture and Difference, edited by J. Donald & A. 
Rattansi, (London, Sage 1992), pp49-61 
Aoya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, Racialised Boundaries, (London, Routledge, 1992), see 
especially chapter 6 
7The point that all racisms propose a division between two or more groups should be distinguished 
from the idea that all racisms are the same, or, that they deploy easily identifiable modes of operation. 
The manner in which 'race' divisions are actually invoked can be varied, complex and subtle. 
8It was the tragic death of Ahmed UHah, a 13 year old Asian pupil murdered in the school playground 
in 1987 by Darren Coulburn, a 13 year old white pupil, that led to the first official condemnation of 
multicultural and anti-racist initiatives which had been 'vigorously' pursued by the school attended by 
both victim and perpetrator. The public inquiry into the murder (see Ian Macdonald, Reena Bhavnani, 
Lily Khan and Gus John, Murder in the Playeround, (London, Longsight Press, 1989» concluded that 
the school's policies had not only failed to reduce the atmosphere for racial hatred, but had in fact 
created a further polarisation of racially differentiated groups. This was grossly encapsulated in the 
school's decision to forbid all white pupils from attending the funeral on the presumption that their 
presence would be offensive to the victim's family. If the black/white divide, or its variation 
paki/white, was at the core of Darren Coulburn's fatal stabbing of Ahmed Ullah then the penetration of 
this divide had to form a crucial part of anti-racist strategies. Many more recent events, including the 
murder of the black teenager Stephen Lawrence, the '9/11' attacks on America, and the current 'War 
on Terror', have further reinforced the need to develop more complex conceptions of 'race' which can 
visualise and promote the permeability of racial boundaries. 
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seize the time and storm the citadels of cultural power,9. In response to this situation 
the thesis seeks a more comprehensive analysis of individual explorations of' cultural 
hybridity'. The critical review, which is presented in chapter 2, resists presenting an 
overview or the interconnections between all contemporary explorations of hybridity 
as a framework of analysis. Instead the focus is on the contributions of Stuart Hall, 
Avtar Brah, Paul Gilroy and Ali Rattansi whose respective works are examined 
individually to draw out their similarities and differences as well as bring to the fore 
aspects that have to date received little or no debate. The insights into 'cultural 
hybridity' provided by the four writers are used as a framework for contesting the 
empirical findings of the two case studies and vice versa. 
Fourthly, contemporary theories of 'cultural hybridity' have largely evolved through 
an examination of abstract cultural expressions such as films, music and literature10• 
As such debates about the transgressive potential of 'cultural hybridity' have 
remained limited to people's creative expressions, which are an inadequate context for 
understanding and challenging issues of 'race' and racism as they impact upon 
people's everyday lives". The thesis redresses this situation by choosing to examine 
the respective works through empirical investigation of two different aspects of the 
everyday cultural realities of South Asians in Britain - i.e. trends in usage of films on 
videotape and negotiations of being Muslim. By undertaking an empirical 
examination the thesis offers first hand insight into the relevance of applying theories 
of 'cultural hybridity' for understanding everyday experiences of' race'. The concern 
with people's cultural realities is also a more appropriate context, than abstract 
cultural expressions, for assessing the strengths and limitations of notions of 'cultural 
hybridity' to provide a basis for establishing a cultural politics capable of overcoming 
persisting racisms. 
9Phil Cohen, 'Through a Glass Darkly: Intellectuals on Race', in New Ethnicities. Old Racisms, edited 
by P. Cohen, (London, Zed Books, 1999), p7 
IOJonathan Friedman, 'Global Crises, The Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarrelling', in Debatina Cultural Hybridjty, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood (London, Zed 
Books, 1 m), pp70-89 
lIPhil Cohen, 'Through a Glass Darkly: Intellectuals on Race', in New Ethnjcities. Old Racisms, edited 
by P. Cohen, (London, Zed Books, 1999), p8 
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Theories of 'cultural hybridity' are essentially concerned with understanding the 
dynamics of modern cultural formations and cultural identities. The central argument 
of the respective works is that people's cultural experiences and cultural outlooks are 
not denoted by fixed origins or singular histories but evolve over time through 
interaction with other histories and cultural narratives. Further, the manner of 
interacting with multiple histories marks out the direction of cultural change. Thus, 
implicit in the work of hybridity theorists is a connection between cultural identity 
and cultural change. For hybridity theorists it is identities that interact and meld 
distinct cultural influences that symbolise and promote progressive cultural change, 
what I refer to in the thesis as 'racially transgressive cultural change', because they 
disrupt mutually exclusive boundaries of 'race' that underlie all racisms. Throughout 
the thesis I draw upon the theme of 'racially transgressive cultural change' to, on the 
one hand, assess the value of theories of 'cultural hybridity' for enhancing our 
understandings of the dynamics of 'race', and on the other, identify whether the 
empirical findings indicate a disruption or reinforcement of established structures of 
'race' and racial differences. 
Chapter 1 relates the interconnecting themes central to theories of 'cultural hybridity', 
of 'cultural identity' and 'cultural change', to the subject matter concerning the two 
case studies. With reference to the audience survey this task is substantially aided by 
drawing on material from the field of audience studies. The notion of the 'active' 
audience as developed by 'new' audience researchers is singled out as providing an 
appropriate framework for structuring the first case study. Specifically, the notion of 
the 'active' audience emphasises the process of meaning construction as variable and 
specific to the individual and context in which the act of viewing takes place. This is 
shown to correspond with hybridity theorists' conception of identity formation as 
fluid and open to contestation and review. The first case study is thus positioned as an 
investigation into exactly the kind of dynamics hybridity theorists identify as being 
conducive to 'racially transgressive cultural change'. With respect to the second 
study, contextualising the themes 'cultural identity' and 'cultural change' is 
approached through an exposition of the commentaries on Muslim identities offered 
by Homi Bhabha and Edward Said. Five observations are drawn from Bhabha and 
Said's analyses, which present Muslim identities as static and foreclosed to cultural 
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change. Thus, in contrast to the audience survey, the second case study is seen to 
examine a process of identity formation deemed antagonistic to the notion of 'racially 
transgressive cultural change' and therefore also to the principles of 'cultural 
hybridity' . 
It is important to note that the empirical research for both case studies was undertaken 
in the early stages of the thesis which has evolved over some ten years. This distance 
in time between research and reporting of the data means that the empirical findings 
relate to historically specific cultural trends and are thus presented with a notable 
degree of hindsight At the same time, it is possible to offer two observations which 
underscore the currency of the research findings for the purposes of this thesis. 
Firstly, the subject matter of the studies, of 'audience activity' and 'Muslim 
subjectivities' , remain two of the most popular focal points in media coverage and 
public debate alike for contesting the character and worth of modern identities. 
Secondly, within my own presentation of the empirical data I have attempted to show 
its relevance for understanding present day dynamics of 'race' by linking aspects of 
the two studies and the conclusions drawn to more recent events such as the exchange 
of ideas between the Indian and popular/mainstream film industries (see ppI82-186) 
and the events of '9/11' (see p279). 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed exposition of four individual contributions to 
contemporary conceptions of 'cultural hybridity'. The chapter examines in turn the 
work of Hall, Brah, Gilroy and Rattansi and identifies how specific aspects of their 
respective insights relate to and/or are used as points of analysis for examining the 
empirical data from the two case studies. Whilst there are areas of overlap, that the 
two studies examine contrasting aspects of South Asian cultures means that they 
highlight and contest different features of the work of hybridity theorists. In the first 
study, the juxtaposition of such distinct cultural texts as popular/mainstream and 
Indian films offers a line of enquiry which frames notions of 'diaspora' and 
'hybridity' within the context of 'negotiating multiple cultural influences'. As a result, 
points of analysis and debate between the empirical data and theories of hybridity are 
more weighted to such themes as 'cultural fragmentation', 'double consciousness' and 
'bicultural trends'. In comparison, the focus of the second empirical study on trends 
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amongst significant numbers of young Muslims of foregrounding Islam in defining 
and structuring their everyday lives, situates the work of hybridity theorists within the 
context of a people's 'desire for certainty and absolute truth'. As such, the 
presentation of the findings from the second study is centred around such notions as a 
'politics of location', 'authenticity' and the' search for stability'. 
Chapters 3,4,5 and 6 are devoted to presenting the two case studies. Chapters 3 and 5 
deal with issues of methodology. They describe and evaluate the design of each study, 
clearly delineating their scope and limitations. These chapters also address the value 
of quantitative and qualitative techniques respectively for the purpose of cultural 
analysis. 
The results of the audience survey are discussed in chapter 4. Analysis of the survey 
findings brings into sharper focus, and demands a more detailed assessment of, many 
of the central themes in contemporary hybridity theory. In particular, it raises 
questions as to the precise connection between' cultural fragmentation' or 'cross-
cultural location' and progressive cultural change. On the one hand, the popularity of 
both Indian and popular/mainstream films amongst significant numbers of South 
Asian respondents is seen to support hybridity theorists' emphasis on the need to 
examine modern cultures and identities for their transcultural character as opposed to 
their mutual exclusivity. On the other hand, the identification of a hierarchy of 
cultures through which respondents position the aesthetic qualities of 
popular/mainstream films as being superior to Indian films is seen to uphold, rather 
than overcome, established structures of 'race'. Thus, the survey data suggest that the 
intermixing of cultures does not necessarily result in the creation of 'new' cultural 
forms or outlooks which transgress racial boundaries. These observations are situated 
and discussed in a variety of related contexts ranging from generational differences in 
patterns of film consumption, accessing video merchandise, to the company in which 
Indian and popular/mainstream films are likely to be viewed. The discussion asserts 
that the process of hybridisation involves the interaction of distinct cultural forms that 
are already implicated in relations of power and competing identities. 
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More importantly perhaps, the findings from the audience survey highlight that in 
identifying 'racially transgressive cultural change' attention should be less on 
establishing the presence of multiple cultural influences, and more on evaluating 
whether the meaning or social position of particular cultural forms has been 
transformed to disrupt unequal relations of power and subordination. In this regard, 
my analysis of the trends in consumption of films on videotape amongst South Asian 
audiences specifically draws attention to how the ability to transgress racial 
boundaries through interaction with distinct cultural texts is significantly shaped by 
the dynamics of modern capitalism. On the one hand, modern capital encourages the 
increased visibility of previously marginalised cultural forms such that, for example, 
popular/Indian films become just as easy to access as mainstream/Hollywood films 
and this can be linked to Hall's conception of the 'new' logic of capital. At the same 
time modern capital also imposes a certain structure and framework of interaction 
which homogenises the cultures of production and consumption surrounding 
culturally distinct forms. The impact of these dynamics, as illustrated in chapter 4, is 
that the process of hybridisation itself is profoundly shaped by Western modes of 
economic and social interaction and it is the latter that, at least in the case of dynamics 
of film consumption amongst South Asian audiences, remain the overriding force 
behind cultural change. These findings provide a basis from which to begin to 
pinpoint particular dynamics of modernity, such as the 'new' logic of capital, through 
which contemporary negotiations of 'cultural hybridity' may circumvent established 
hierarchies of 'race' and culture. 
Chapter 6 presents the findings of the study on young Muslim identities. The 
discussion suggests that the particular questions being asked and confronted by young 
Muslims in their (re)negotiation of the teachings of Islam are the specific outcome of 
engaging, not resisting, multiple cultural locations. For instance, individuals are 
shown to be actively re-reading key Islamic texts to highlight that the use of corporal 
punishment goes against the teachings of Islam. Thus, whilst respondents' narratives 
are seen to confirm a foregrounding of religion over all other co-ordinates of identity, 
the thesis argues - against Bhabha and Said's position - that this trend is by no means 
at odds with the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' or 'racially transgressive cultural 
change'. The process and its outcomes may not be so visibly apparent as, for example, 
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an individual's use of Indian and popular/mainstream films, but its impact in 
transgressing racial and cultural boundaries may be just as significant. In drawing out 
the transgressive qualities of the respondents' negotiations of Islam the chapter makes 
connections with some of the more subtle and less talked about aspects of 
contemporary notions of hybridity. For example, Brah's exposition of the 'politics of 
location' as integral to the 'diaspora' condition is used to describe respondents' 
foregrounding of Islam as a process of re-reading, and not recreating, the past in order 
to deal with the very modern conditions of 'uncertainty' and' chaos' . 
Chapter 6 positions the racially transgressive potential of 'cultural hybridity' within a 
context of identity negotiation, i.e. the foregrounding of Islam, more commonly 
perceived as resisting cultural change and the interpenetration of multiple cultural 
locations. Additionally, the discussion illustrates how the progressive qualities of the 
'new' Muslim identities are undermined by dominant discourses through the 
imposition of a linear conception of time and space. For example, mainstream 
Western discourses position the veil as an outdated mode of female control for all 
times and all places even though in reality the veil acquires such contrasting meaning 
and significance that it is a form of female oppression for some Muslim women and 
empowerment for others. In effect, whilst personal negotiations of being Muslim 
contest established notions and practices of Islam these same identities are 
persistently represented as static and pre-modern within dominant modes of 
representation. Here then the transgressive potential of 'cultural hybridity' is 
suppressed by another feature of modernity of a linear conception of time and space. 
A critical appraisal of the empirical approach of the thesis is undertaken in chapter 7. 
This chapter draws on the methodological arguments within 'new' audience studies to 
identify the abstract nature of current hybridity theory as limiting its applicability as 
regards understanding people's everyday cultural realities. This point is underscored 
by linking the limitations of Bhabha and Said's commentaries on Muslim identities to 
their lack of first hand interaction with the voices and opinions of Muslim individuals. 
More critical engagement between hybridity theory and empirical research is deemed 
crucial for advancing the former as an ideological basis for developing more effective 
strategies against 'race' hatred and inequalities. The chapter also re-evaluates the 
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preference among 'new' audience scholars for qualitative ethnographic modes of 
investigation and emphasises that quantitative data are critical for identifying how 
precisely qualitative findings inform our understanding of cultural relations and 
overall trends in wider society. As such rather than preferring one technique over 
another it is more productive to assess how quantitative and qualitative methods may 
complement and accommodate each other's strengths and limitations. 
The conclusion draws on the main findings of the empirical research to argue that the 
'progressive' power of hybridity does not boil down to the ability to 'belong' or feel 
at ease in culturally distinct contexts, but lies in the ability to function outside of and 
in opposition to processes of racialisation. Crucially, much of the theoretical work 
examined constitutes a distinctly second generation black British perspective on 
'cultural hybridity'. In that sense there are a number of shortcomings in the existing 
works if in effect they are to act as a basis for developing more effective strategies 
against persisting feelings of racial hatred and deepening racial inequalities. 
Drawing on the contrasting findings from the two case studies about the racially 
transgressive potential of 'cultural hybridity' the conclusion proposes a distinction 
between two models of cross-cultural interaction. The first model describes an 
interlocking of multiple cultural locations which actually result in more exclusive 
cultural identities, such as the expectation that Muslims don't simply marry other 
Muslims but Muslims of the same nationality. The second model represents 
experiences and negotiations of multiple cultural influences where axes of 
identification move independently of one another yet impact on each other's 
meanings depending on how and in what contexts they collide. 
Addressing the role of dominant discourses in determining the impact of racially 
transgressive expressions of 'cultural hybridity' the conclusion further asserts the 
need to reconsider the central significance accorded to the 'migrant condition' as a 
prototype of the postmodern predicament. A new notion - the 'giraffe's perspective' -
is developed to balance the weight of emphasis between the 'migrant condition' and 
the role/influence of indigenous Western identities for establishing a cultural politics 
that effectively disrupts racial and cultural hierarchies. 
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Chapter 1 
Framing 'Cultural Hybridity' for Empirical Investigation 
As described in the Introduction, the central aim of the work of hybridity theorists is 
to contest modern identities for their capacity to transcend mutually exclusive 
structures of human relations and to stimulate cultural change. The nature of the 
interrelationship between 'cultural identity' and 'cultural change' can thus be 
identified as underpinning the concerns of hybridity theorists. The purpose of this 
chapter is to establish the central themes of cultural identity and cultural change as 
defining points of investigation and analysis for the two pieces of empirical research 
on which the thesis constructs its critical evaluation of 'cultural hybridity'. 
Reflecting the contrasting nature and subject matter of the two case studies involved, 
the chapter is divided into two sections. Each section relates and problematises the 
themes of cultural identity and cultural change in the contexts of 'audience activity' 
and 'Muslim subjectivities' respectively. 
With respect to the first case study (see chapters 3 and 4), which compares the use of 
Indian and popular/mainstream films on videotape amongst South Asian audiences, 
demarcating cultural identity and cultural change for empirical analysis is approached 
by examining empirical trends and debates from the field of audience research. The 
first section begins by outlining a conception of the subject that is sensitive to the 
dynamics of 'audience activity' and 'cultural hybridity'. Through a consideration of 
key shifts in the way in which broadcasters and academic audience researchers have 
perceived and responded to the racial heterogeneity of the British population the 
section identifies the notion of the 'active' audience as an appropriate mode of 
investigation for structuring the first case study. Its appropriateness is related to the 
emphasis on understanding audiences and their relationship with media texts as an act 
of cultural contestation in which meanings are negotiated and dependant on the 
particular context of viewing as well as the individual's interaction with various axes 
of identification such as 'race', gender, class etc. This is shown to be consistent with 
hybridity theorists' positioning of 'race' and ethnicity variables as 'open' signifiers 
which acquire meaning in different contexts and through interaction with other co-
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ordinates of identity. The discussion moves on to address the intricacies of measuring 
and interpreting the relationship between cultural identity and cultural change as a 
complex and fluid process by examining three empirical audience studies, i.e. 
Jacqueline Bobo's research into black women's readings of The Colour Purple, the 
Women Viewing Violence study, and Marie Gillespie's examination of the cultures of 
media consumption amongst South Asian families in Southall. By assessing each 
study's attempts to relate the significance of 'race' and ethnicity variables to audience 
activity the section underlines four key observations which inform the analytical 
framework for my own empirical research. The key observations demand that 
empirical analyses of audience activity, (i) take account of the individual's past 
experiences of media consumption; (ii) avoid use of categories of 'race' and ethnic 
identification (e.g. Asian, African Caribbean, white) as though they were homogenous 
and mutually exclusive; (iii) do not overestimate the 'cultural resistance' of meanings 
negotiated by viewers which challenge dominant readings of particular texts; and (iv) 
recognise that the act of media consumption itself plays a role in defining, as much as 
it is defined by, an individual's negotiation of his/her own identity. 
The second section contextualises cultural identity and cultural change in relation to 
debating Muslim identities which are the focus of investigation in the second case 
study (see chapters 5 and 6). This is achieved by examining Homi Bhabha and 
Edward Said's respective commentaries on the 'polemical' reactions of 'ordinary' 
Muslims to such events as 'the Rushdie affair' and the more recent 'War on Terror'. 
Bhabha and Said's observations are not presented as being representative of the 
position of all hybridity theorists with respect to Muslim identities. However, both 
writers have made significant contributions to the body of academic work promoting 
'cultural hybridity' as a forceful challenge to essentialist conceptions of 'race' and 
culture. Their contributions, like that of the four theorists discussed in chapter 2, are 
often cited and now well established reference points for debating the culturally 
fragmented character of modern identities and subjectivities12• Thus, recognised as 
12'J'he recent death of Edward Said introduces a more permanent sense of reading his work 
retrospectively compared to Bhabha, Hall. Brab. Gilroy and Rattansi who remain active in an ongoing 
personal dialogue with their writings. 
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they are as proponents of hybridity13, Said and Bhabha's comments provide a relevant 
focus for pinpointing a series of questions about the in/compatibility of Muslim 
subjectivities and the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity'. The section highlights five 
underlying assumptions through which Said and Bhabha posit the respective cultural 
outlooks of Muslims and hybridity theorists as proceeding from two contrasting 
conceptions of history and human experience. Each of these assumptions are utilised 
in chapter 6 to contest the cultural outlooks relayed by the Muslim respondents 
participating in the second case study and can be summarised as follows, (i) a 
devotion to Islam is the source of public unity amongst Muslims; (ii) as a scripted 
mode of thought Islam, and by implication Muslims, are foreclosed to cultural change 
making their outlooks 'static' and 'primitive'; (iii) with no capacity for cultural 
change Muslims are unable to generate new modes of governance and are bound to 
'barbaric' forms of discipline and outdated societal structures; (iv) being foreclosed to 
cultural change makes Muslims ethnically bounded; and (v) Islam promotes 
patriarchal relations and serves to subordinate women. 
My starting point for locating a suitable conception of the subject for the purposes of 
the first case study is to consider overall changes in the way in which the broadcasting 
industry has responded to the 'diversity' of the British audience. 
'Race', Ethnicity and Audience Activity 
The literature in the field14 would suggest that from the late 1960s onwards there have 
been three significant shifts in the way broadcasters have sought to cater for the 'race' 
and ethnic diversity of their viewers. My intention is not to undertake a 
comprehensive discussion of these here, but to highlight overall changes in attitude 
towards 'race' and ethnic differences. It should be noted that terrestrial television is 
the main focus of the literature being drawn upon. 
13see various essays in Pnina Werbner & Tariq Modood, eds, Debatina Cultural Hybridity, (London, 
Zed Books, 1997) 
14Commission for Racial Equality, Television in a Multi-Racial Society, (London, CRE, 1982) 
Therese Daniels & Jane Gerson, eds, The Colour Black, (London, BFI, 1989) 
Jim Pines, ed., Black and White in Colour, (London, BFI, 1992) 
John Twitchin, ed., The Black and White Media Show, (London, Trentham Books, 1988) 
13 
Popular television between the late sixties and seventies did not attempt to respond to 
the specific tastes of a racially diverse audience but was driven by the political mood, 
which at that time was characterised by an 'anxiety about the black presence' most 
notably conveyed in Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech. Jim Pines describes this 
period as a time when television was operating 'in tandem with the state in 
'managing' what was then perceived as the growing race relations crisis'ls. The state 
saw blacks and immigrants as a problem and this is how they were portrayed on 
television. A large number of multicultural documentary programmes were produced 
to explain 'aspects of so-called immigrant life' such as arranged marriages. Situation 
comedies were really the only other television genre to develop racial narratives, or as 
some have preferred to describe them, 'racist' narrativesl6. Programmes like Till 
Death Us Do Part, Love Thy Neighbour and Mind Your Language were extremely 
popular among the British population and the programme makers were accused of 
using racism to increase audience numbers. In spite of their racist disposition, it 
would be wrong to assume that black people never watched these programmes. 
Ashwani Sharma has described how in the absence of anything appropriate or 
appealing to him and his family they often ended up watching programmes that were 
insulting to them17. 
Kobena Mercer observes how the arrival of Channel Four in 1982, with its mandate 
'to provide for the unmet needs of various "minority" audiences', signalled a new era 
in which 'television as an institution [began] to rethink its attitude to the cultural 
diversity of its nationwide audience'ls. The corresponding policies to satisfy this 
diversity produced an increase in the number of black faces on television and in a 
wider variety of programmes. Current affairs programmes such as The Bandung File, 
Eastern Eye and Black on Black, as well as sit-corns such as No Problem, Desmonds 
and The Fosters, all resulted from a recognition of the diverse tastes of a multi-racial 
15Black and White in Colour, (London, BF!, 1992), p12 
16see Andy Medhurst's contribution 'Laughing Matters' in The Colour Black, edited by T. Daniels & J. 
Gerson, (London, BA, 1989), ppI5-60 
17'00 they Think We're Vloo?', in The Neilected Audience, edited by J. Willis & T. Wollen, (London, 
BA, 1990), pp61-65 
18Welcome to the Junile, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp77-78 
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British audience. It has to be pointed out that these programmes were not without 
their critics, many of them highlighting the tendency of the narratives to homogenise 
black culture and reinforce 'common sense' racist stereotypes19• In addition, the 
programmes continued to be produced without any substantial dialogue with, or 
research into, how black, or for that matter white, audiences felt about them. This has 
only begun to change in the last ten years or so. 
Empirical audience studies such as 'Black Minority Viewers and Television' and 
'Ethnic Minorities and Television', commissioned by the BBC and Channel 4 
respectively, signal the most recent trend in attitude towards audiences. Both studies 
were commissioned to consult black audiences and ascertain their opinions about 
television programmes and I refer to their findings in chapter 4 (see ppl44-146). Here 
it is important to note that the studies represent a conception of the audience as 
'active' consumers whose opinions are deemed important for identifying appropriate 
television schedules as well as measuring the success or failure of individual 
programmes to satisfy diverse tastes. 
Put crudely, whereas audiences were once regarded as a gullible 'mass', increasingly 
they are being treated as a fragmented and heterogeneous body of individuals with 
diverse tastes as well as sophisticated and complex means of 'receiving' media texts. 
Before addressing the implications of this shift for contextualising and measuring 
'race' and ethnicity variables in empirical research, I want to delineate further the 
notion ofthe 'active' audience which has been more centrally contested and 
established within academic audience studies. 
David Morley's study of The 'Nationwide' Audience20 is commonly recognised as 
marking the beginning of a 'new' era in academic audience research. Previously, 
academic perspectives on audience activity were dominated by paradigms 
emphasising either 'the power ofthe text', such as the 'effects' model and Screen 
theory, or 'the power of the viewer' such as the 'uses and gratifications' approach. 
19see for example Paul Gilroy, 'C4 -Bridgehead or Bantustan?',~, 24 (1983) no. 4-5, July-
October 
2OWndon, BFI, 1980 
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Ang, Morley and Moores have undertaken detailed comparative critiques of these 
various perspectives21 • In summary, they criticise approaches emphasising 'the power 
of the text' for 'inflecting the old 'mass society' thesis where the audience is subject 
to the ideological manipulation of media institutions'. By comparison, those 
approaches emphasising 'the power of the viewer' are seen 'to overplay the 'freedom' 
of the audience '22. 
The 'new' era in audience research represents a significant departure from previous 
perspectives on audience activity in that it contextualises the process of media 
consumption as a site of 'cultural struggle,23. From this position textual analysis alone 
is regarded as an inadequate indicator of the meanings conveyed by individual 
programmes and images. Further, the idea that audience responses to particular texts 
can be accurately predicted or categorised by homogenous categories of age, gender, 
class, 'race' and so on, is also deemed implausible. Instead meaning construction is 
conceived and investigated as a variable process which is contested and negotiated by 
the individual viewer. 
This delineation of audience activity as a field of cultural contestation and negotiation 
has led to the emergence of a body of academic work often referred to as 'new' 
audience research24• Two distinguishing features bind this work together. Firstly, it 
examines the process of meaning construction as a two way process, as the outcome 
of the specific interaction between text and aUdience25. Secondly, it proceeds from the 
21len Ang, Desperately Seekini the Audience, (London, Routledge, 1991) 
David Morley, Television Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992) 
Shaun Moores, Interpretini Audiences, (London, Sage, 1993) 
22Shaun Moores, Interpretjni Audiences, (London, Sage, 1993), pp5-7 
23len Ang, LivinK Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996) 
241 use the term 'new' audience research in the absence of an appropriate alternative. However, it 
should be noted that many audience scholars remain uncomfortable with its use perceiving it to be 
misleading in its suggestions that there is a wholesale break with previous approaches to audience 
research, or that the audience is a self-contained empirical entity (see for example Introduction in len 
Ang, LivinK Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996), ppl-15). 
2~he idea that products aren't simply made for people to consume but that processes of production and 
consumption inform each other's dynamics and outcomes is a central argument emerging from Paul du 
Gay et ai's book Doin~ Cultural Studies (London, Sage, 1997) which examines the changing 
production features of the Sony Walkman. 
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position that to gain an insight into the process of meaning construction it is necessary 
to investigate audience activity in its 'natural' setting. This emphasis on audiences as 
'active' negotiators has generated a whole set of academic debates and texts26 which 
underline the inadequacies of abstract theorising in understanding everyday cultural 
realities preferring, instead, ethnographic research to gain an insight into the structure 
and significance of people's daily routines. 
The empirical position advanced by 'new' audience researchers raises important 
methodological implications for this thesis and its concern with advancing abstract 
theories of 'hybridity' for understanding everyday dynamics of 'race'. These 
implications are explored in some detail in chapter 7 where I argue that empirical 
investigation and methodological scrutiny must be accorded critical significance in 
order for theories of 'cultural hybridity' to provide a meaningful framework through 
which to comprehend and challenge ongoing racial inequalities. The overall impact of 
this argument on the structure of this thesis is reflected in my own preference for 
empirical investigation as the central means for contesting the relevance of the work 
of hybridity theorists for understanding contemporary racial and cultural relations. 
Whilst the shift towards engaging the views of audiences is a welcome one, the 
question must be asked why both academia and the media industry in general have 
gradually moved from the position of virtually no dialogue with audiences to detailed 
analyses of their tastes and preferences. With respect to this it is useful to note len 
Ang's conception of the 'active' audience as 'both an expression and a consequence' 
of the emergence of a media industry driven by the principles of free market 
capitalism27• The audience is now treated as 'active' instead of 'passive' because the 
ability to exercise choice has prompted media producers to become concerned with 
identifying and targeting specific tastes, as opposed to churning out programmes for 
an 'anonymous mass'. 
26see for example, James Lull, Inside Family Yiewina, (London, Routledge, 1990) 
Ellen Seiter et aI, eds, Remote Control, (London, Routledge 1991) 
David Buckingham, ed., Readina Audiences, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993) 
Roger Dickinson et aI, eds, Approaches to Audiences, (London, Arnold, 1998) 
27Livina Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996), p.9 
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These shifts in the media industry's attitude towards audience 'diversity' are an 
example of how actively engaging the cultural identities of 'ordinary' people has 
become a significant feature of advanced capitalist economies. They also crucially 
highlight the shifting relations of power, or at least, how economic power has become 
interlocked with the lifestyles and opinions of 'ordinary' people. This would support 
Hall's identification of the 'new' logic of capital as producing a 'crisis of identities' or 
the 'global postmodern,28. Hall asserts that a direct consequence of the 'new' logic of 
capital is that 'migrant' populations, their identities and ways of life, once ridiculed 
by colonial administrations for economic domination, are now treated as highly 
valued attributes in the pursuit of economic growth. This aspect of Hall's work 
features centrally in his exposition of 'cultural hybridity' and is delineated in more 
detail in Chapter 2 (see pp66-69). 
With respect to the overall objectives of this thesis a crucial question arising from the 
above discussion would be, 'how is this newly found cultural power of 'migrant' 
identities articulated, and in what ways does it resist, challenge and effectively disrupt 
long established inequalities?' This is the central research question directing the 
purpose and structure of the first case study and is investigated vis a vis the notion of 
the 'active' audience. A detailed explication of the aims and objectives of the study, 
choice of methodology, its scope and limitations is provided in chapter 3. Here I 
identify how the study proposes to problematise and measure the main themes of 
cultural identity and cultural change. 
In my first case study I utilise the survey method to identify and examine patterns of 
consumption of popular/mainstream and Indian films on videotape amongst South 
Asian audiences. The study draws upon the notion of the 'active' audience to locate 
cultural identity within the particular tastes and preferences of the respondents. In 
doing so cultural identity is problematised as an act of negotiation and becomes a 
floating signifier in that it is not denoted by fixed ethnic markers such as nationality 
or place of birth, but located in the particular ways in which the respondents 
incorporate popular/mainstream and Indian films in their everyday lives. In this regard 
28'The Local and the Global', in Culture. Globalisation and the World System, edited by A. D. King, 
(London, Macmillan, 1991), pp19-39 
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it is appropriate to point out that both 'new' audience research and hybridity theorists 
proceed from a similar understanding of identity formation. 
For example, during the course of his' Nationwide' study Morley became alert to not 
only internal differences within each group, but also the possibility of 'a person 
making different readings of the same material in different contexts, and making 
different readings of material on different topics - oppositional in some areas, 
dominant in others'29. Morley was able to use the findings from his study to critique 
approaches which endorsed the idea that audience activity could be coded or 
interpreted through neat socio-economic categories such as male/female, 
married/single, and employed/unemployed. The 'Nationwide' study was the precursor 
for 'new' audience research and its particular conception of identities as being 
subjective, open to contestation and revision as opposed to fixed, inherited and stable. 
Philip Schlesinger presents this perspective succinctly when he argues that 'rather 
than starting with a set of pre-given objects or national cultures and investigating the 
effects that communication technologies have on them, we should begin by posing the 
question of identity itself and ask what importance communications of various sorts 
might have in its constitution,30. 
Similarly, Hall's conception of the' end of the essential black subject' and subsequent 
explorations of notions such as 'diaspora' and 'hybridity', both by Hall and other 
theorists, have emerged out of a recognition and engagement with the heterogeneous 
and fragmented nature of modem cultures and modem identities. This body of work, 
like the 'new' audience research, approaches its subject matter from the position of 
internal differentiations and intersections of various axes of identification including 
class, 'race', sexuality, gender, age and so on. 
On the basis of this connection the first case study, with its central positioning of the 
notion of the 'active' audience, can be seen to examine cultural identity in precisely 
the context hybridity theorists envisage as being conducive to the dynamics of 
'cultural hybridity'. This link is further underscored in the study through its 
2~levision. Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992), p 135 
3D'On National Identity', in Social Science Information. 26(2), (1987), pp2l9-264 
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juxtaposition of popular/mainstream and Indian films. Concerned with contrasting the 
use of these two categories of film the study affords a line of enquiry that locates 
cultural identity in the context of 'negotiating multiple cultural influences'. With 
reference to this it is appropriate to highlight that it is from within the encounter and 
intermixing of distinct cultural forms that hybridity theorists have located the 
emergence of new cultural identities which transgress fixed racial and cultural 
boundaries and in doing so disrupt the dominant social order. By examining the use of 
two categories of film which deploy distinct cinematic, linguistic and cultural codes 
the first case study provides an opportunity to scrutinise the link made by hybridity 
theorists between 'cross-cultural location' and the emergence of 'racially 
transgressive identities'. 
On the matter of relating the survey and its findings to the process of cultural change, 
I do not confine my approach to measuring the respondents' propensity to interact 
with both popular/mainstream and Indian films. In that sense, my analytical 
framework does not automatically link the tendency to interact with both 
popular/mainstream and Indian films as evidence of 'racially transgressive cultural 
change'. Rather, the implications of the survey findings for the process of cultural 
change are assessed in the context of identifying how the respondents' interaction 
with the respective texts disrupts or confirms dominant Western stereotypes which 
position Indian films as being inferior to popular/mainstream films. The study 
achieves this more complex contextualisation of cultural change in two specific ways. 
Firstly, the study undertakes to identify and contrast the patterns of interaction with 
the two categories of films in a variety of related contexts from accessing video 
merchandise to the company in which the films are likely to be viewed. As such my 
empirical approach remains sensitive to the dynamics of consumption specific to each 
category of film, taking account of their differing social and economic circumstances 
such as the much wider availability of popular/mainstream films compared to Indian 
films. Secondly, my interpretation of the survey findings is careful to relate any 
differences in patterns of consumption between the respondents to relevant social and 
historical contexts. This is most notably the case with respect to generational 
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differences where the study relates, for example, the contrasting 'high' versus 'low' 
levels of use of popular/mainstream films between younger and older respondents 
respectively to changing social circumstances, such as relations with the indigenous 
population and competence in the English language (see pp159-168). 
The effectiveness with which my empirical approach maintains a complex conception 
of not just cultural change but also cultural identity is ultimately dependent on the 
ability to mobilise and be responsive to the various axes of identification as open 
signifiers. Precisely how this is achieved cannot be relayed through fixed categories 
or terminology but is identified through a critique of previous audience studies and 
their particular attempts to measure 'race' and ethnicity variables in an empirical 
context. This is the focus of discussion for the remainder of this section. 
The discussion does not undertake to review every audience study that has sought to 
address issues of 'race' and ethnicity. A focussed discussion around three studies is 
preferred in order to highlight and devote attention to specific issues, obstacles and 
difficulties of investigating 'race' and ethnicity variables in an empirical context. The 
studies have been selected for the varying degrees of complexity with which they 
approach and problematise 'race' and ethnicity variables in their respective 
investigations. They are, Jacqueline Bobo's research into African-American women's 
readings of the film version of Alice Walker's novel The Colour Purplll; the Women 
Viewin/i: Violence study, which engages racially mixed samples in its analysis of 
female responses to media representations of violence32; and Marie Gillespie's inquiry 
into the audio-visual culture of South Asian families in Southa1l33• As noted in the 
chapter's introduction, my examination of the three studies highlights four 
considerations for developing an analytical framework responsive to the complex and 
variable process of identity formation and its relationship to audience activity. 
31'The Colour Purple: Black Women as Cultural Readers', in Female Spectators, edited by E. Deirdre 
Pribram, (London, Verso, 1988), pp90-l 09, and Black Women as Cultural Readers, (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1995) 
32Philip Schlesinger et ai, Women Yiewin& Violence, (London, BFI, 1992) 
3~eleyision. Ethnicity and Cultural Cham:e, (London, Routledge, 1995) 
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My critique begins with a combined review of Bobo's and the Women Viewine 
Violence studies to contrast and assess their respective insights into how negotiations 
of 'race' and gender interweave and impact upon women's responses to particular 
images and texts. The focus of Marie Gillespie's study shares a close affinity with my 
own investigation into the use of films on videotape amongst South Asian audiences. 
This connection warrants a separate and more detailed critique of Gillespie's work. 
Both Bobo's and the Women Viewine Violence studies can be seen to contextualise 
cultural identity as an open signifier in that axes of identification, such as 'race' and 
'sex' are not treated as operating independently of one another but are analysed for 
the ways in which they interact and influence each others meaning. Before 
undertaking a comparative critique to draw out their respective strengths and 
limitations, a description of each of the two studies is appropriate. 
Black Women as Cultural Readers 
Bobo's research, which combines textual analysis with group discussions, is 
suggestive of how meanings become 'differentially' entangled with historical 
representations of, and attitudes towards, the individual viewer's social group or 
community. Her initial study examined black women's responses to the film The 
Colour Purple and sought to understand the 'overwhelming positive response' from 
black female viewers towards a text deemed racist by many critics. In a subsequent 
publication Bobo extends her inquiry to examine responses to the novel on which the 
film is based, as well as two other texts by black women, i.e. Terry McMillan's novel 
Waitine to Exhale and Julie Dash's film Daughter'S of the Dust. Here I limit my 
discussion to Bobo's analysis of black women's responses to Spielberg's film version 
of The Colour Purple. 
The empirical data around which Bobo constructs her analysis is drawn from two 
discussion groups made up of women of African American background. The first, 
consisting of nine participants, was conducted in December 1987 in Northern 
California and the second, consisting of six participants, was held in October 1988 in 
the Pacific Northwest. In spite of the film's stereotypical representations of black men 
as hypersexual and brutal, Bobo found that the women in her sample did not only 
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enjoy the film but were empowered by the meanings they themselves had constructed. 
Bobo's findings are insightful in exposing how discourses of 'race' and gender collide 
to create vastly different responses to the same text. Referring to the hostile picketing 
against the film by organisations such as NAACp14 and the adverse criticisms of 
many black male reviewers, Bobo points out how black women's 'positive' responses 
were largely at odds with those of many black men. She locates the women's defiance 
of the call for 'a wholesale rejection of the film' in 'black women's resistant history'. 
Bobo's own textual analysis35 describes Spielberg's visual adaptation as a 'reversion 
to past racist works'. In relation to this the identification of a 'reconstructed meaning' 
amongst the women in her sample is central to her argument that the women's 
extraction of a 'progressive' and 'empowering' message cannot be interpreted as an 
acceptance of the stereotypical caricatures presented by Spielberg. For Bobo, the 
women's positive reaction needs to be understood within the broader context of their 
position as cultural consumers of mainstream texts in which they have been 
consistently marginalised and depicted in 'demeaning ways'. In Bobo's words, 'we 
have as evidence our years of watching films and television programmes and reading 
plays and books. Out of habit, as readers of mainstream texts, we have learned to 
ferret out the beneficial and put up blinders against the rest'36. 
The Color Purple breaks the pattern of previous racial imagery in Hollywood films 
for the simple fact that it has an 'all black repertoire'. For many black men that it 
reinforces and magnifies stereotypical conceptions of black masculinity makes the 
experience of watching this film little different from watching other mainstream texts. 
But for black female viewers the struggles of Celie, Shug, Sofia and Nettie resonate 
with black women's struggles against patriarchal structures and racial oppression. 
Bobo highlights these novel elements of 'an all black repertoire' and 'a focus on black 
women's struggles' as key features which make watching The Color Purple, for black 
women at least, a different experience from watching other mainstream texts. More 
34National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
35 Black Women as Cultural Readers, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995), pp61-90 
36'The Colour Purple: Black Women as Cultural Readers', in Female Spectators, edited by E. Deirdre 
Pribram, (London, Verso, 1988), p96 
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specifically, Hobo's empirical analysis suggests that the novel elements are exploited 
by black female viewers to create a 'reconstructed meaning' in which the comic and 
caricatured segments become edited out mentally. In place, the women's own 
historical and cultural knowledge is brought to bear on the process of meaning 
construction constituting, in effect, a 'discursive strategy' through which their own 
struggles 'to transform their lives in the face of oppressive circumstances'37 become 
transposed onto Spielberg's text. 
Women Viewing Violence 
Whereas Hobo's study sets out to examine the significance of 'race' and 'sex' in a 
specific audiences' reconstruction of a narrative so that it resonates with their own 
experiences, Women Viewing Violence contextualises issues of 'race' and 'sex' from 
a completely different perspective. The latter undertakes a comparative analysis of 
how women of different ethnic groups view dominant media representations of 
violence. A sample of ninety-one women was recruited from England and Scotland, 
with approximately equal numbers of respondents who had 'experience of violence' 
and' no experience of violence'. Three ethnic groups were represented and 
distinguished as white, Asian and Afro-Caribbean. The women were divided into 
fourteen viewing groups of no more than nine respondents and so that regional, class 
and ethnic membership, as well as 'experience' I'no experience' of violence remained 
consistent within each group. Using the same set format for each group, the 
respondents were shown different types of violence against women (including rape 
and physical assault) presented in various genres. These included a factual programme 
(Crimewatch); a soap opera (EastEnders); a television play (Closing Ranks); and a 
feature film (The Accused). After each screening the women were asked to complete a 
questionnaire followed by a group discussion sharing their opinions and feelings 
about what they had seen. 
As with Hobo's research, the Women Viewing Violence study affirms the 
significance of 'socio-cultural' factors and 'lived experience' in audience 
interpretations of a given text The study identified a 'patterned diversity' amongst the 
respondents where, in addition to 'experience of violence', 'ethnicity' was found to be 
37Black Women as Cultural Readers, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1995), p31 
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a strong differentiating factor in women's responses to televised violence. There were 
two particularly distinctive ways in which ethnic identity was seen to differentiate the 
women's reactions. Firstly, Afro-Caribbean respondents were particularly critical of 
the depiction of black people in programmes like Crimewatch and Eastenders 
pointing out that the images and characters tended to be 'uninformed, biased or 
bigoted'. This had the effect of 'alienating' the women in that it limited their ability to 
identify with the individuals on screen. The study also found that although the Afro-
Caribbean women could relate to the depictions of rape and domestic violence against 
white women, their reactions were tempered 'with reservations about equality of 
treatment between black and white that are based in the experience of racism,38. They 
were often drawn to consider how differently events may have unfolded if the white 
victim had been black. As one woman commented in relation to The Accused: 
I found myself saying that in the film [ ... ] if I change that woman into a black 
woman, it would be even more painful for me. Because I know that the whole 
line of the story would've changed [ ... ] and I know that the verdict could have 
been different. And I know that the support [ ... ] the sympathy would've been 
very different?9 
A second way in which ethnicity was found to be a strong differentiating factor 
between the different groups of women was with respect to the way in which Asian 
women's responses relayed a distinct sense of distance between their 'lived 
experience' and 'dominant white culture'. This manifested itself in, for example, their 
responses to The Accused, in that they were less likely than the other two groups to 
find the film to be 'believable' or 'violent'. In support of its assertion that Asian 
women were 'operating within a cultural perspective relatively detached from the 
mainstream '40, the study referenced quotes from Asian women emphasising 
differences in cultural codes, such as 'dress' and 'drinking', which were seen to be 
38Philip Schlesinger et ai, Women viewina Violence, (London, BFI, 1992), p143 
39jbid., p141 
4Ojbid., p141 
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indicative of their expectations about 'appropriate' male and female behaviour. The 
following two comments illustrate the point: 
If she's drinking too much, you know, that's why that happened. [ ... ] Drinking 
is bad and [we] learn Lthis] from that film.41 
See, it's an Islamic point [ ... ] that women [are] not allowed to wear this kind 
of dress, so other women looked at her and fancy her. That's why they say you 
cover yourself with your clothes so that other men don't look at you, or fancy 
where he wants you. It's against our religion.42 
Like the respondents in Bobo's study, the participants in the Women Viewin~ 
Violence research can be seen to transpose their own historical and cultural frames of 
reference onto the text in the process of meaning construction. However, a closer 
comparison of the two studies suggests that the relationship between ethnicity and the 
process of meaning construction is more narrowly framed in the Women Viewin~ 
Violence study than in Bobo's research. Two observations in particular can be singled 
out to illustrate this point 
Accounting for past experiences of watching mainstream texts 
The first observation is that Women Viewin~ Violence is less sensitive, than Bobo's 
study, to the significance of diverse experiences and established perceptions of 
mainstream texts as playing a role in the different reactions of its sample. For 
example, Bobo is careful to note that black women's positive responses to The Color 
Purple are dependent on finding elements within the film that deviate from previous 
Hollywood representations of black women. Ethnic identity thus becomes interwoven 
with the very act of viewing and the women's responses are measured in accordance 
with what they, from their position as black women, have come to expect from a 
mainstream text, and not in accordance with what critics and many black men thought 
of the film. By comparison, Women Viewing Violence makes a more simplistic 
4Iibid., p141 
42ibid., pl46 
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correlation between ethnic identity and audience readings. This is clearly illustrated in 
its assumption with reference to The Accused that, 'the fact that the film was 
American posed no difficulties for the women viewers and, in common with the other 
screenings, there were some strong and persistent reactions,43. That the respondents 
understood and responded to the narrative does not make the relationship between 
viewer and text unproblematic or uncomplex. The lack of sensitivity to this point 
leads to some rather reductive and inaccurate interpretations of the findings. This can 
be seen in the study's assertion that, 'in the case of Asian women, The Accused 
offered information about practices and values at a considerable distance from their 
lived experience, [ ... J their reading of the film validated their differences, showing 
them how their culture could operate to protect them from danger,44. 
This conclusion can be challenged by simply referencing voluntary sector groups such 
as Southall Black Sisters and Newham Asian Women's Project whose work stands as 
evidence against the notion that Asian culture can operate to protect Asian women 
from the danger of domestic/male violence. My point is not so much that the women's 
comments about 'dress' and 'drinking' are somehow invalid. Nor that if the study was 
to be conducted again that similar comments would not be forthcoming. My criticism 
is more simply that to take the women's responses out of the specific context in which 
they were made and present them as though they were an accurate or literal reflection 
of reality is problematic. As Bobo's study underlines, any analysis of audience 
readings needs to take account of established codes of reference associated with the 
specific context of viewing. In relation to this an important point to note with respect 
to Asian respondents' comments about The Accused is that situations of rape and 
domestic violence against Asian women are rarely portrayed in Hollywood texts, or 
for that matter on mainstream British television. As such some feelings of detachment 
from the 'popular' images of violence around which the Women Viewin& Violence 
study was constructed will have been inevitable amongst the Asian respondents. And 
such feelings would have been further compounded by the fact that none of the 
programmes chosen for screening had Asian characters. 
43ibid., pl3S 
44ibid., pl64 
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On the basis of these observations it might be argued that the 'cultural distance' 
conveyed in the comments of Asian women is perhaps suggestive of how, when faced 
with images that provide little personal identification audiences may draw on 
dominant' common sense' discourses of cultural difference to make sense of the texts. 
This does not mean that an Asian woman in a sari or salwar kameez is unlikely to flirt 
or be any less vulnerable to male violence than women of other ethnic backgrounds. 
In presenting the findings as indicative of how' Asian culture can operate to protect 
Asian women from danger' the authors appear to have confused 'Asian women's 
reactions to male violence' with 'Asian women's reactions to media depictions of 
male violence in a predominantly 'white' context'. Having said that, it does also 
appear that the study seems to have over-emphasised the 'cultural distance' conveyed 
by the Asian respondents. This brings me to the second weakness in the way Women 
Viewin& Violence contextualises ethnic identity which relates to its slippage into a 
framework of binary opposites to make sense of ethnically diverse reactions of its 
respondents. 
Avoiding mutually exclusive arrangements of ethnic differences 
The following edited extract involving a group of Scottish Asian women helps 
illustrate how Women Viewin& Violence lapses into presenting ethnic differences in 
mutually exclusive terms: 
Speaker 1: 
Speaker 2: 
Aye, she was leading them on, 1 think, just then. She had too 
much to drink, and the way she was dancing, and her clothes as 
well [ ... ] 
Her clothes have got nothing to do with it [ ... ] if I could give a 
quick summary of the film for me, it shows you how men 
portray women. It shows you how women think about women 
who wear short clothes and things like that, and think its 
provocation [oo.] But she was still in the right. She was still 
raped and she was still a victim of criminal solicitation. You 
know what I mean? It doesn't matter what you wear [ ... ] 
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Speaker 1: 
Speaker 3: 
I say the same thing as her [ ... J I mean, I think as well that she 
didn't provoke, but that's not what everybody will think [ ... ] 
[ ... ] That one particular scene of rape. To me it was, you know, 
for the guys - it was like an easy game [ ... ] When I was 
watching that, I wasn't watching it saying, 'She was wearing a 
mini-skirt, she was dancing and all that. ,45 
The study interprets this exchange as an indication of the 'cultural sensitivity amongst 
Asians towards questions of immodesty in dress'. Yet it goes on to contradict this 
assertion half a page later by pointing out that 'the views [ ... ] were by no means 
discrepant with the majority line taken in [other] groupS'46. Perhaps more 
significantly, the study fails to acknowledge how the above exchange actually 
challenges attitudes that view certain forms of dress as signalling sexual availability. 
Speaker 1 clearly begins by identifying the character's behaviour and dress as 
provoking sexual advances by men but changes her position in response to Speaker 
2's forthright denunciation of any blame being placed on the victim's appearance. 
Overall the conversation is clearly in opposition to perceptions that 'short clothes' 
provoke sexual abuse and therefore contests rather than supports expectations that 
women should behave modestly. 
This is but one of several examples illustrating the study's more general conception of 
ethnicity as a marker of fixed group boundaries. A narrow conception of ethnicity and 
its positioning within a framework of binary opposites manifests itself in an eagerness 
to identify holistic group differences. This is further highlighted by the study's 
tendency to view the similarities across the ethnic groupings as being irrelevant to 
ethnic identity. For example, the study found a 'universal' fear of rape amongst the 
respondents which it perceived as 'being associated with gender and the general 
commonalities of women's experiences rather than with class or ethnicity,47. 
45ibid., pl46 
46ibid., p147 
47ibid., pl66 
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The study is not wrong to highlight gender as a central factor in the women's shared 
fear of rape. However, just because a similarity cuts across various ethnic groups does 
not make it impervious to ethnicity. Rather it should be viewed as a commonality 
integral to each of their ethnic identities, or as A vtar Brah puts it 'ethnicities are 
always gendered'48. The study's failure to appreciate this underlines its reliance on 
binary opposites in interpreting the women's responses. One other point worthy of 
emphasis in this regard is the lack of commentary on data indicating similarities 
between white and Asian respondents, and between white and Afro-Caribbean 
respondents. Thus, for example, the authors discuss at some length how Asian women 
were less likely to identify with the characters in The Accused, but leave the similarity 
between white and Afro-Caribbean women of being more able to relate to the 
characters completely without interpretation. Similarly, there is no exploration of why 
Asian women and white women were twice as unlikely as Afro-Caribbean women to 
suggest that the rape scene should not be screened on television. Rather than be 
challenged into pointing out how the complex pattern of group responses highlights 
the inadequacy of understanding ethnicity within a framework of binary opposites, the 
study avoids comment altogether. 
My critique of Women Viewin& Violence has emphasised the importance of framing 
ethnic identity as variable and contingent and specific to the context of interaction in 
question. In this regard a significant contribution of Bobo's research is that it provides 
a clear illustration of the need to tailor questions of ethnic identity to the specific 
focus of investigation, in Bobo's case - the act of viewing a mainstream text Her 
approach is thus alert to the collision of factors as varied as respondents' expectations; 
how they have been historically represented in mainstream texts; the desire to extract 
pleasure that is integral to the act of viewing/consumption; personal experiences of 
the issues represented in the text, as well as cultural codes and frames of reference 
negotiated in the broader context of everyday relations. However, this more complex 
contextualisation of ethnic identity with the act of viewing is, unfortunately, not a 
consistent feature of Bobo's approach. Here a third key observation can be 
48Cartoiraphies of DiasPOra, (London, Routledge, 1996), p 126 
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highlighted with regards examining ethnicity as an open signifier which relates to 
interpreting the 'cultural resistance' of audiences. 
Keeping ~cultural resistance' in context 
There is a sense in which Bobo's eagerness to explain the 'overwhelming positive 
response of black women' overtakes her relationship with the respondents and her 
interpretation of both their comments and that of other audiences. For example, given 
that Bobo's own reading of The Color Purple is comparable to that of many black 
men who saw the film as reinforcing racist stereotypes, it is surprising that she is 
dismissive of the force of anger relayed in the comments from men whilst completely 
accommodating the women's positive reactions. She writes, 'that many black women 
clung tightly to their positive feelings about The Color Purple was significant in that 
it allowed them to extract meaningful elements when others were issuing decrees that 
there should be a wholesale rejection of the film'49. 
Bobo is right to oppose the men's demands for censorship but wrong to position their 
anger as the binary opposite of the women's positive engagement. The men's 
antipathy is as much a negotiated reading as the women's peremptory support, also 
involving past experiences as consumers of mainstream texts and therefore also 
requiring considered commentary and investigation. The drawback of Bobo's research 
is not that her empirical enquiry focuses on one particular reading, but that the subtext 
underlying her discussion positions this reading as simultaneously antagonistic and 
superior to others. Ironically black men's reactions are presented as irrational even 
though they are closer to Bobo's own textual analysis. References to white audiences 
are equally reductive for their embeddedness in the observation that the film was 
made for white audiences thereby implying that white people would uncritically 
accept the racist images. 
The complex interaction between black female audiences and The Color Purple that 
Bobo sets out to investigate becomes a defensive monologue highlighting the critical 
agency of black women. Bobo does in fact acknowledge that her small sample of 
mainly affluent, middle class African-American women 'cannot be used in a one-size-
4~lack. Women as Cultural Readers, (New York., Columbia University Press, 1995), p93 
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fits-all manner' so, but this acknowledgement does not prevent her from making 
'holistic' group comparisons. Perhaps more importantly, she fails to problematise the 
implications of the women's inattention to the racist stereotypes to the broader issue 
of 'cultural resistance'. As len Ang argues, 'what is at issue is not so much to give 
ordinary audiences a pat on their backs for doing so well in 'resisting'; what is at 
stake [ ... ] are the contradictions encountered and negotiated in the ordinary practices 
of living in a postmodem world,51. From this perspective it might be argued that, the 
identification of a 'reconstructed meaning' does not make black women's positive 
reading of a text which reinforces racist stereotypes of their own ethnic group any less 
contradictory, and should be evaluated as such. By failing to do this Bobo overplays 
the 'cultural resistance' signified by black women's positive reading of The Colour 
Purple. 
This is an appropriate point at which to introduce Marie Gillespie's work which 
develops a more complex understanding of the relationship between ethnicity and 
audience activity than both Bobo's research and Women Viewin~ Violence. The latter 
two pieces of work clearly illustrate that ethnic identity is a significant influence on 
people's readings of texts. But ethnic relations themselves remain unaffected by the 
act of viewing. Even in Bobo's study, which I indicated was more careful to tailor the 
question of ethnicity to the specific context of viewing, the critical dialogue between 
audience and text is projected as being one way. The women are shown to draw on 
their negotiated identities and frames of reference to deconstruct meanings from the 
text. But the study is unable to address any possibilities for cultural change because 
Spielberg's film and other mainstream texts are presented as being detached from the 
diverse tastes, experiences and opinions of their audiences. In this respect, Gillespie's 
study can be seen to highlight a fourth dimension to examining ethnicity as an open 
signifier in its assertion that ethnic identity and audience activity are interlocked in a 
reciprocal process of cultural negotiation and change. Before discussing this aspect of 
her work I introduce her study. 
SOibid., p91 
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Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change 
Gillespie's research into the televisual culture of South Asians living in the London 
Borough of Southall constitutes one of the few empirical studies that incorporate, 
within its own analytical framework, contemporary theories of 'hybridity'. She 
describes her research as bringing 'together for the first time: the cultures of migrant 
and diasporic communities; and the cultures of media consumption,52 and as such 
bears particular affinity with my own overall aims for this thesis. In this regard the 
following critique can be seen to act as a basis for establishing an empirical 
precedence for my own research and more specifically for identifying potential 
difficulties. 
Gillespie declares that her interest in the patterns of media consumption and reception 
amongst South Asians began in the early 1980s when she was a teacher in Southall. 
Her subsequent MA and PhD theses engaged in detailed ethnographic research and 
provided the content for several published essays53 which are brought together in her 
book Television. Ethnicity and Cultural Chan~e. It is her book that is the main focus 
for this critique. 
The fieldwork on which Gillespie constructs a 'cultural map' of her informants' use 
of the media was undertaken during 1988-1991. The term" cultural map' of the 
audience' is drawn from David Morley to refer to how patterns of media consumption 
and reception can help identify 'who shares which cultural codes and meaning 
systems and to what extent'54. Gillespie's overriding focus is on the 14-18 age group 
but not exclusive to it and she distinguishes three 'non-systematic' phases to her 
fieldwork for which she deploys 'a multiplicity of data gathering strategies'. These 
51'elevision. Ethnicity and Cultural Chan ie, (London, Routledge, 1995), pI 
53 see for example' Technology and Tradition: Audio-Visual Culture among South Asian Families in 
West London', in Cultural Studies 3/2, (1989) pp 226-239 
'The Role of TV in the Negotiation of Cultural Identities and Differences Among Punjabi Londoners', 
in The Portrayals of Ethnjc Minorities on Televisjon, edited by A. Millwood-Hargreave (London, 
Broadcasting Standards Council, Research Working Paper VII, 1992) 
'Soap Opera, Gossip and rumour in a Punjabi Town in West London', in National Identity and Europe: 
The TV Revolution, edited by P. Drummond, R. Paterson & J. Willis, (London, BFl, 1993) 
'Sacred Serials, Devotional Viewing and Domestic Worship', in To Be Continued, edited by R. Allen 
(London, Routledge, 1994) 
54David Morley, 'Reconceptualising the Media Audience: Towards an Ethnography of Audiences', 
(Birmingham, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1975), Occasional Paper 
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include a questionnaire survey, structured interviews, informal group discussions as 
well as recollections of conversations in 'naturalistic' settings such as the playground, 
morning registration, parties and weddings. The three fieldwork phases subtitled, 
'groundwork', 'immersion' and 'focussing' chart Gillespie's changing status from 
being, an outsider (seeking to establish relations of trust and a broad understanding of 
the peer culture and patterns of media consumption of her respondents) to, a regular at 
'peer and family' gatherings (able to access the wider social networks and settings of 
her informants and their interaction with the media), and finally, a casual listener and 
participant of everyday casual conversations of her respondents and their 'ritualistic 
post-mortems of last nights telly,55. 
Gillespie's presentation of the data gathered is not bound or structured by the distinct 
phases of fieldwork. Rather, she mixes quantitative statistics with qualitative 
comments to journey through various aspects of her respondents' audio-visual culture. 
For example, she examines the significance of the VCR in the domestic context and 
how, amongst other things, it enabled many families to have more control and choice 
of texts than that provided by British television. She also presents' a contrastive 
analysis' of one family's reactions to two televisual versions, one Indian and the other 
'western', of The Mahabharata - a sacred text of the Hindu religion, as an example of 
how two distinctive reservoirs of cultural knowledge and experience are mobilised to 
confront and negotiate issues of identity and difference 56. Another chapter examines 
young people's engagement with television advertisements which, along with their 
avid following and talk about soaps such as Neighbours, are seen to serve 'as 
resources for the reflexive exploration of cultural differences and for the articulation 
of both real and imaginary options,57. Gillespie's study is thus both wide-ranging and 
extensive. My critique is not organised around a comprehensive analysis of each 
aspect of her study but is selectively structured around two fundamental points. 
Firstly, how issues of 'race' and ethnic identity are contextualised and addressed 
ssrelevisjon. Ethnicity and Cultural Chanae, (London, Routledge, 1995), p64 
56'From Sanskrit to Sacred Soap: A Case study in the Reception of Two Contemporary TV Versions of 
the Mahabharata', in Readina Audiences, edited by D. Buckingham (Manchester. Manchester 
University Press, 1993), pp70-71 
STelevjsion. Ethnjcjty and Cultural Chanae, (London, Routledge, 1995), p27 
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within the methodological framework. And secondly, what insights into the process of 
identity negotiation, and more specifically the dynamics of cultural change, are 
provided by the findings. 
Gillespie acknowledges that her research sample does not constitute a 'neat equation 
between culture, community and geography ' 58. The vast majority of her respondents, 
like the overall population of Southall, are of Punjabi Sikh background with smaller 
numbers of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. In addition to religious differences the 
respondents are further differentiated by regional, caste, linguistic and socio-
economic background. Furthermore, global patterns of migration combined with 
modern communication systems have created and sustained a web of connections 
between families in Southall and those residing in various other parts of Britain as 
well as the world. 
To identify a methodological framework responsive to the transcultural and dispersed 
history of her sample Gillespie draws significantly on the work of Gilroy and Hall, 
amongst others, to develop a 'diasporic perspective' to capture the ways in which the 
identities of her respondents' have been and continue to be transformed through 
relocation, cross-cultural exchange and interaction'59. She describes the body of work 
'on 'black' British identities as being the most theoretically advanced within the 
whole field of cultural studies and more specifically in relation to postmodern debates 
about cultural identity,60. Within her overall framework, the work of 'diaspora 
intellectuals' is situated to clarify the objectives and specific contribution of her own 
study. Thus, she notes that her research is allied to Hall's view of constructing a 
'positive conception of ethnicity', effectively dissociating it from the discourse of 
racism and positioning it within the politics of difference. She also observes that the 
work of Hall et al occupies a 'theoretically privileged view' in as much as it is 
developed at an 'abstract level' through a focus on the 'expressive cultures' (of music, 
film, fashion etc) of black people in Britain. With respect to this Gillespie describes 
58ibid., p2 
5~bid., p7 
6Oibid., p6 
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her own work as adopting a novel approach to examining diaspora cultures. In place 
of abstract theorising she deploys ethnographic methods, and instead of examining 
'expressive cultures' she focuses on 'cultures of consumption'. A combination which 
she feels enables a 'clearer understanding of what the 'reinvention of ethnicity' means 
in practice [ ... ] as it is negotiated in everyday discourse,61. Indeed Gillespie's findings 
underscore the importance of undertaking empirical contestations of abstract theories 
of 'cultural hybridity' in order to assess the latter's relevance for understanding 
everyday cultural realities. This observation simultaneously informs and substantiates 
the methodological framework of this thesis and its own emphasis on empirical 
analysis (see chapter 7). 
It is the shifting conceptions of identity embodied within the notion of diaspora that 
Gillespie aims 'to identify and track' in the context of her respondents' engagement 
with the media. And her approach does provide some valuable insights into the 
relationship between ethnic identity and audience activity. For example, television 
and other communication technologies are identified as providing important contexts 
for 'self-narration and identity negotiation'. In other words ethnic identity doesn't 
simply inform/influence viewers' use and reception of the media, but media texts and 
technologies are themselves 'implicated in the re-making of ethnicity'. This is one of 
the central observations emerging from Gillespie's examination of the rapid 
popularity of the VCR amongst Southall's Asian population and can be marked out as 
the fourth key observation informing my own approach to investigate the relationship 
between negotiations of 'race' and ethnicity and audience activity as a complex and 
two way process. 
Responding to the signifICance of 'race' and ethnicity variables to audience activity 
as a two way process 
Gillespie notes how most Southall households acquired VCRs well in advance of 
many indigenous British households' as a response to the social and cultural 
marginalisation of minorities from the mainstream of British society,62. The VCR 
61ibid., p8 
62ibid., p79 
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transformed the weekend outing to local cinemas to watch Indian films by bringing 
them directly into the living room and establishing them as a central focus of 
everyday domestic interaction. By affording more choice and increased access to 
culturally distinct texts the VCR gave rise to a trend where culturally diverse media 
were increasingly being consumed within the same setting. Gillespie observes some 
fundamental outcomes arising from this situation with direct implications for the 
process of cultural change. This brings me to the second focal question for this 
appraisal of Gillespie's study - 'what do Gillespie's findings reveal about the 
dynamics of identity negotiation and its relationship to the process of cultural 
change?' 
I have already noted Gillespie's identification of her respondents' engagement with 
culturally diverse media as requiring competence in different linguistic and cultural 
codes. The negotiation between these competing systems of representation effectively 
involves the occupation of a plurality of cultural spaces. As Gillespie points out, what 
we have then is precisely the kind of context in which cultural change and negotiation 
of 'new' ethnicities becomes possible. The participants in Gillespie's study occupy a 
culturally hybrid location of simultaneously being 'Punjabi', 'British', 'Asian' and 
'Sikh' which are further cross cut by other 'axes of difference' such as gender, class, 
sexuality and so on. Interaction with such culturally diverse texts as Neighbours and 
popular Indian films encourages a manoeuvring between these different identities, 
thereby heightening awareness of cultural differences and fragmenting the 
individual's sense of self. As such, 'multiple subject positions' collide providing a 
resource through which individuals assess and (re)define their position in relation to 
their family, their peers and society at large. Gillespie's findings emphasise that there 
is no uniformity of response to these culturally fragmented encounters. 
For example she describes how the appropriation of Indian and American films across 
generations of family members in Southall represented a mixture of 'hardening' as 
well as 'dissolving' of cultural boundaries. Elders tended to use Indian films to 
'impart knowledge and to foster cultural and religious traditions (such as arranged 
marriages and strong family ties) while young people used them to deconstruct 
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'traditional culture' and to open up its contradictions'63. This process of refining 
conceptions of one's own culture and collective identity was not specific to images of 
the respondents' own community or group. Engagement with media representation of 
'others' was found to be equally significant. For instance, viewing and talking about 
'western' soaps, such as Neighbours, was identified as a main stimulus for everyday 
interactions in Southall. Within the daily retelling of storylines fiction and real 
experiences become interwoven such that, 'Southall family life is compared and 
contrasted with 'white culture on the box .. 64• 
We can see then that the media resources available in Southall households and the 
patterns of consumption charted by Gillespie's in-depth study echo the complex and 
culturally fragmented nature of modem identities emphasised by hybridity theorists. 
But what of the other themes that are integral to those 'abstract' expositions of 
modern cultural formations which advance the key concepts of hybridity and diaspora 
beyond a mere collision of cultures and into the realm of 'racially transgressive' 
cultural politics. This aspect of Gillespie's work is quite disjointed and some of her 
conclusions questionable. A number of contributory factors can be identified for this 
weakness which mainly relate to a lack of theoretical rigour as well as a lapse into the 
analytical deficiencies identified in my earlier examination of the Women Viewin& 
Violence and Bobo's studies. I deal with these first before exposing the limitations of 
Gillespie's conclusions. 
Earlier I noted that Gillespie foregrounds a 'diasporic perspective' to accommodate 
the internal differences amongst her respondents and the multiple sources of identity 
that fragment their common experiences as 'Asians'. Unfortunately the complexity 
that her theoretical framework demands is not adequately translated into her 
interpretation of the data. Two examples illustrate the respective deficiencies. 
Gillespie's awareness of the religious, linguistic and cultural differences in her sample 
does not prevent her from homogenising the diverse terms of reference that her 
respondents draw upon in their engagement with the media. This is most vividly 
63ibid., p87 
64ibid., p174 
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apparent in her attempts to track and discuss the appropriation and significance of 
popular Indian films in the domestic context To begin with she establishes a 
reductive description of Indian films by asserting, 'indeed, many film-makers and 
theorists claim that there are only two 'metatexts', the Mahabharata and the 
Ramayana, and that every film can be traced back to these sources,65. Leaving aside 
the issue of how in/valid this conception of Indian films might be, the more important 
issue for Gillespie's study is to what extent the perceptions of her respondents, and 
their specific points of engagement with Indian films, challenge or support the 
description she provides. But she fails to problematise this and what in fact unfolds 
are some highly confusing if not erroneous assertions about the relationship between 
text and subject. For example, she specifies that the films are used by elders to 'impart 
religious knowledge'. Yet the' metatexts' she locates at the centre of Indian films are 
specific to the Hindu religion whilst the majority of her sample is of Punjabi Sikh 
background with smaller numbers of Hindus and Muslims. How might Sikhs and 
Muslims use texts specific to Hinduism to impart knowledge about their own 
religion? I am not saying that this is an impossible outcome but it is rather more 
complex than Gillespie's discussion attests. Moreover, the erosion of difference that 
occurs as a result of her assertion serves to homogenise her sample and runs contrary 
to the analytical framework she identifies for her study through a fore grounding of a 
'diaspora perspective'. 
The lack of critical application and evaluation of a 'diaspora perspective' and its 
relevance to making sense of her respondents' use of the media is captured in the 
claim, 'these may be 'diaspora kids' but their aspirations for travel and lifestyle are 
essentially American ,66. The implication here is that' aspirations for an essentially 
American lifestyle' are at odds with the diaspora concept. Once again whilst this 
connection is not implausible, what Gillespie does not provide is any commentary on 
precisely why the' American aspirations' cannot be accommodated by abstract 
theories of diaspora and hybridity. But there is an even more fundamental point which 
Gillespie fails to engage: what her findings denote in terms of revisions or additions 
in order for the diaspora concept to adequately apprehend the everyday cultures and 
65ibid., p83 
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realities of her respondents. This is quite important if only to justify the use of the 
term 'diaspora kids' for describing a group of people in pursuit of 'an idealised 
American dream'. Having said that, Gillespie's identification of her respondents' 
American aspirations is itself dubious and requires some critical exposition as it raises 
some fundamental questions about the cogency of her overall interpretation of her 
data. 
Gillespie's postulation of the American aspirations of her respondents stems from a 
number of instances during fieldwork where various Western cultural products, 
practices, images and styles were projected as being superior to Eastern, or more 
specifically Indian, ones. She observes how, looking 'classy' or 'cool' was associated 
with combining expensive and well-cut clothes to exhibit a look resembling the styles 
in fashion magazines such as GQ and Arena for boys, and Just Seventeen and More 
for girls. Those considered to be at the bottom end of the fashion hierarchy were 
referred to as 'pendus' and were 'viewed disdainfully as 'modem versions' of their 
parents' wearing' strong, uncoordinated colours and inappropriate combinations of 
[ ... ] traditional 'Indian' dress with a version of 'western' style [ ... ] attempting - and 
failing - to look 'westernised,,67. The word 'pendu', meaning village, was also 
associated with Indian food which many of Gillespie's respondents deemed less 
appealing than food from outlets such as McDonalds and Pizza Hut. Interwoven into 
the preference for Western styles and products was an investment in the images of 
happiness, freedom, and 'racial harmony' with which the respective products have 
become conjoined through advertising campaigns launched by the likes of McDonalds 
and Coca Cola. 
In her concluding comments Gillespie argues that her respondents' investment in 
American representations of a utopian dream should not be understood as gullibility, 
but' as the desire for full integration into a pluralistic society where the social 
implications of cultural differences are minimal'68. To support this argument Gillespie 
presents extracts from her interviews in which the young people's discussion of 
66ibid., p40 
67ibid., p186 
68ibid., p204 
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American advertisements integrates a critical exposition of their own lives. Within 
their 'ad talk' they simultaneously express 'aspirations toward a greater participation 
in mainstream British society' and a 'desire to establish some degree of independence 
from the family culture,69. In other words it is the themes of 'autonomy' and 'utopian 
talk' of the Coca Cola and McDonald's ads to which the young people are attracted 
and not to the fact that they are American. 
In light of her own observations it is surprising that Gillespie collapses her 
respondents' lifestyle preferences as 'essentially American'. In effect, Gillespie does 
not do justice to the complexity of her empirical data and observations because she 
inflects a binary framework of cultural relations in the course of interpreting and 
presenting her findings. This becomes all the more apparent when we consider that 
her respondents' 'denigration of aspects of Indian culture' sits alongside critical 
expositions and often rejection of Western representations of 'Indian' or 'Asian' 
culture. The latter is notably illustrated in Gillespie's case study of the Dhani family's 
reactions to two culturally contrasting televisual depictions of The Mahabharata. The 
various members of the Dhani family expressed an overwhelming preference for the 
Indian version produced by the Indian television channel Doordharsan, perceiving it 
to be more sensitive to the cultural context of its subject matter. Their 'distaste' for 
Peter Brook's theatrical Western production was based on a critical appraisal alert to 
the flouting of visual and cultural codes which were seen to culminate in a text baldly 
ignorant of 'the social and ritual processes of Hindu culture and society'70. My point is 
simply that there is no clear-cut pattern in Gillespie's findings which supports the 
conclusion that the lifestyle aspirations of her respondents are allied specifically to 
'Western' or 'American' or 'British', or for that matter' Indian' , ideals. 
It is important to point out that these criticisms are not being asserted to dismiss or 
invalidate Gillespie's specific observations of the 'hierarchy of cultures' or the 
'denigration of popular Indian culture'. Indeed similar trends emerge from my own 
empirical research (see ppI59-168). What I am contesting is Gillespie's particular 
interpretation of the negotiations of cultural identity among her informants. 
69ibid., pp197-200 
7%id., p93 
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The weaknesses in Gillespie's work draw attention to the difficulties of 
contextualising abstract theories of hybridity to empirical investigation. They also 
highlight the force with which a 'common sense' analogy continues to dominate 
perceptions and attitudes towards specific cultural practices such as arranged 
marriage. Two observations clarify the point being made. Firstly, in Gillespie's work 
issues such as arranged marriage are established as markers for assessing and 
differentiating between individuals open to cultural change and those resistant to it. 
The problem of positioning these issues in such a way is that the dynamics of 'cultural 
hybridity' become framed in the same language as 'common sense' racism. All this 
achieves is to establish a hierarchy of diaspora or hybrid cultures ordered by the 
extent to which they oppose certain practices deemed 'backward' or 'outdated'. This 
is precisely what happens when Gillespie frames the conflict around arranged 
marriages as tradition versus cultural change. The second point is that issues such as 
arranged marriage and the desire for more autonomy are real issues being confronted, 
debated and negotiated by significant sections of the British Asian population. That 
their very mention evokes stereotypes about' Asian' culture should not excuse their 
analysis in the hope that one day they may dissolve into insignificance. As the 
findings from my own two case studies highlight, one of the challenges for empirical 
researchers seriously interested in charting and examining the complexity of modem 
identities is to reposition those same cultural relations previously colonised by the 
language of racism within a framework of continuously shifting conceptions of 
identity. Isn't this precisely the challenge posed by Hall's assertion of detaching 
ethnicity from the discourses of imperialism and racism? From this position we might 
disassociate the practice of arranged marriage as signifying an essentialist Asian 
identity and instead assess its shifting significance for different individuals within the 
Asian diaspora in different contexts. Advocating the practice of arranged marriage 
does not indicate a 'traditional' Asian any more than rejection of it indicates a 
'diasporic' individual. 
In many ways the first case study - but also the thesis as a whole - can be seen to be 
an extension of Gillespie's empirical enquiry into the process of cultural change 
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signified by the negotiations of cultural identity among South Asians in Britain. There 
are of course many differences in our research designs, most notably in that Gillespie 
maintains a focus on media consumption whereas my own focus shifts cultural realms 
from video usage to religious identities. In this respect the main strength of 
Gillespie's study is compromised in my own research in that the in-depth and long 
term aspects of her fieldwork are precisely what allow her to track how, over a period 
of time, media technologies and texts play an informative role in people's perceptions 
of who they are and how they differ from 'others'. By comparison, my own research 
constitutes two 'one-off', so to speak, encounters with the individuals participating in 
each study and cannot provide the in-depth insight into the process of cultural change 
that Gillespie is able to. However, the short-term nature of my empirical data 
collection has freed up more space than in Gillespie's discussion to scrutinise abstract 
conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' in much more detail. In that sense the limitations of 
Gillespie's work that were identified above are directly addressed in my own thesis by 
its emphasis on engaging an in-depth critique of the work of hybridity theorists (see 
chapter 2), but also crucially undertaking a direct dialogue with the empirical data and 
conceptions of 'cultural hybridity'. Thus, my own research objectives include 
contestations of, and where appropriate revisions to, abstract theorisations of 'cultural 
hybridity' in order that they are more attuned to understanding everyday realities. 
Whilst the discussion in this section has focussed on material from the field of 
audience research its particular contextualisation of mobilising 'race' and ethnicity 
variables in the 'natural' setting has broader significance for all empirical research. In 
this regard the discussion should be viewed as establishing a precedent for how the 
thesis as a whole understands and engages issues of 'race' and ethnicity across the 
two case studies. 
Muslim Identities and the (Im)Possibilities of Cultural Change 
In contrast to the quantitative approach of the first case study the empirical 
investigation into young Muslim identities constitutes a small scale qualitative 
enquiry. The reasons for preferring a qualitative investigation for the second case 
study are outlined in chapter 5 where I also assess its strengths and limitations. This 
section prepares the ground for establishing key points through which to assess the 
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in/compatibility of the narratives of the ten individuals participating in the second 
case study with the principles of 'cultural hybridity'. Bhabha and the recently 
deceased Said have been singled out as the focus for this discussion because within 
their written work they directly address how the cultural politics of 'ordinary' 
Muslims are aligned to their own investments in 'cultural hybridity'. My analysis of 
their commentaries identifies five overall themes, as outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter (see p 12), which position the cultural politics of Muslims as resisting the 
kind of cross-cultural encounters from which hybridity theorists envisage the 
emergence of a 'racially transgressive cultural politics'. The five themes provide a 
framework for organising the discussion in this section and I return to them in chapter 
6 to contest the Muslim identities emerging from my own empirical research. 
Before identifying and examining the five main points through which Bhabha and 
Said establish the static and culturally enclosed status of Muslims it is appropriate to 
describe the context in which each writer makes his observations. 
Bhabha's 'ascriptive migrants' 
Homi Bhabha's interpretation of the cultural politics of 'ordinary' Muslims is 
confined to a few pages in chapter 11 of his book The Location of Culture. The focus 
for his observations is the 'Satanic Verses affair' and he describes the individuals he 
is writing about, i.e. the protestors against Salman Rushdie's book, as 'Islamic 
fundamentalists'. Bhabha's understanding of the protests asserted by Muslims are set 
against and defined by his own reading of Rushdie's book. 
Within his overall thesis for The Location of Culture Bhabha positions The Satanic 
Verses and other works of Rushdie, such as Shame and MidniKht's Children, 
alongside Toni Morrison's Beloved. Nadine Gordimer's My Son's Story, Renee 
Green's Sites of GenealoKY and various other works, to expose 'a transnational and 
translational sense of the hybridity of imagined communities '71. For Bhabha it is a 
particular kind of 'encounter with 'newness" that links these various works. This 
'newness' refutes a neat 'past-present' continuum. Rather, it is reflective of an 'in-
between space' in which the relationship between past and present acquires a 
71The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), p5 
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contingent, as opposed to linear, character. Bhabha perceives the various works to 
which he refers as being concerned with the "re-telling of existing histories' which 
can be distinguished from the 'production of alternative histories'. In other words, the 
real value of the works thus referenced is that they exploit and speak from the position 
of interconnectedness of the histories of different cultures and 'races' to reveal an 
'intersticial intimacy' through which 'bridging the home and the world' becomes 
possible. 
In the case of The Satanic Verses Bhabha suggests that the conditions for' newness to 
come into the world' are created by Rushdie's reinterpretation of the Quran through 
the medium of the novel. The result is that' other enunciatory positions and 
possibilities in the framework of Koranic readingm are revealed. A sacred text is 
retold in the genre of melodrama and, in the process, the Quran' s close association 
with authenticity and tradition is displaced by 'a poetics of relocation and 
reinscription'. For Bhabha, the re-naming of the Prophet Mohammed as Mahound and 
the naming of prostitutes after the Prophet's wives might well be deemed 
'blasphemous', but in the sense of 'a secular transgressive act of cultural translation'. 
The notion of 'cultural translation' is Bhabha's central point of analysis for presenting 
Muslim protests against The Satanic Verses as indicative of how identities grounded 
in religious doctrine, in this case Islam, are resistant to cultural change. More 
specifically, the protestors' demands for Rushdie's book to be banned are interpreted 
as a refusal to engage an internally critical dialogue of Islam and a desire to protect a 
'pure' notion of their faith. 
In Rushdie' s novel the' act of cultural translation', and by implication blasphemy, 
becomes a survival tool for the central protagonist Saladin Chamcha who is first 
disillusioned with his paternal identity, and then fails to better his life in England as 
an assimilated migrant. Bhabha argues that Chamcha, 'caught in-between a 'nativist', 
even nationalist atavism and a postcolonial metropolitan assimilation [ ... ] stands, quite 
literally, in-between two border conditionsm. His predicament is resolved from 
72ibid., p226 
73ibid., p224 
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within the intersticial space that arises from 'the indeterminacy of diasporic identity' 
where he is no longer constrained by the idea of a purity of origins but occupies a 
more 'empowering condition of hybridity'. In Bhabha's schema the essence of 
Rushdie's novel, 'the anxiety of the irresolvable, borderline culture of hybridity,74, is 
precisely what becomes obscured in the arguments asserted by Islamic 
fundamentalists whom he describes as preoccupied with claiming 'the moral high 
ground'. He writes, 'the conflict of cultures and community around The Satanic 
Verses has been mainly represented in spatial terms and binary geopolitical polarities 
- Islamic fundamentalists vs. Western literary modernists, the quarrel of the ancient 
(ascriptive) migrants and modem (ironic) metropolitans,75. 
In Bhabha's projection of the relationship between the 'fundamentalists' and 'literary 
modernists' five assumptions in particular about the way in which he positions the 
cultural outlook of 'ordinary' Muslims can be extrapolated and questioned. I examine 
these after introducing the context in which Said makes his observations. 
Said's 'untutored masses' 
My analysis of Edward Said's perspective on the cultural outlook of 'ordinary' 
Muslims is based on his observations about the' Satanic Verses affair' as well as the 
more recent 'terrorist' attacks on America on September 11th 2001. Before embarking 
on this discussion it is appropriate to note that right up to his recent death Said's 
scholarly activities were driven by a devotion to deconstructing European colonialism 
and more specifically European 'deformations' of 'Islam' and the 'East'. In fact his 
most popular work Orientalism has been recognised as a founding text for releasing 
the study of colonial discourse76. Said's work can thus be acknowledged as emerging 
from a different critical focus than Bhabha's. I note this distinction simply to 
highlight the fact that Said's observations about Muslims ran in conjunction with a 
lifetime's commitment to critically analysing the historical relations between the 
'West' and 'Islam'. By comparison, Islam and Muslims do not occupy such a central 
74ibid., p225 
75ibid., p224 
76Gayatri Spivak, Outside in the Teachini Machine, (London. Routledge. 1993) 
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status within Bhabha's scholarly activities which are more critically driven by a 
concern with the 'migrant' condition. In that sense one might view Said's comments 
as being more critically informed about the dynamics of contemporary Muslim 
identities. 
With respect to his analysis of Muslim responses to The Satanic Verses Said 
highlights the 'drastic change' in Rushdie's status after the publication of the book. 
He begins, 
Before The Satanic Verses appeared in 1988, Rushdie was already a 
problematic figure for the English [ ... J, to many Indians and Pakistanis in 
England and the subcontinent, however, he was not only a celebrated author 
they were proud of but also a champion of immigrants' rights and a severe 
critic of nostalgic imperialists. After thefatwa [ ... J he became anathema to his 
former admirers.77 
Said goes on to suggest that the shift in attitude towards Rushdie is not 'intelligible' 
without reference to a world media system which has, 'through the production of out-
of-scale transnational images, very efficiently knitted together the various imagined 
communities that make up the world'. He is of course referring to the type of 
sensationalist media coverage which functions to present complex arguments in black 
and white and more often than not reinforces stereotypes that induce fear and hatred 
of the 'designated enemy'. In the case of ongoing widespread condemnations and 
fears of Islam, Said suggests that this has been primarily achieved through the 
overscale media images of 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism'. Such' gigantic 
caricatural essentialisations' are, Said argues, reductive but so powerful in 
maintaining systems of subordination that the 'enemy' is effectively seduced into a 
'border war' which becomes a mere 'expression of essentialisations': 
[ ... J these patterns of orthodoxy and self aggrandizement [ ... ] are answered 
alas, with corresponding finality by the designated enemies. Thus, Muslims or 
Africans or Indians or Japanese, in their idioms and from within their own 
nCulture and Imperialism, (London, Vintage, 1993), p373 
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threatened localities, attack the West, or Americanization, or imperialism, with 
little more attention to detail, critical differentiation, discrimination, and 
distinction than has been lavished on them by the West. 78 
In Said's analysis ofthe 'border wars' both sides of the 'them' and 'us' divide are 
bestowed with a 'blind patriotic' following. The mass support for 'early third world 
nationalisms' and the 'stunning acquiescence' of many Muslims against The Satanic 
Verses are just two examples of how the majority of postcolonial subjects are bound 
together by 'insensate polemic'. Further, because their actions in opposition to or 
defence of the various idioms lack critical engagement, the resulting 'border wars' 
become permanently locked in a stalemate. In mapping a more progressive response 
to what he calls deformations (for example 'the West' and 'Islam'), Said constantly 
references the work of secular literary and intellectual figures, from the more 
prominent such as c.L.R. James, Toni Morrison and V.S. Naipaul to the lesser 
known like the Arab poet Ali Ahmed Said (alias Adonis). 
The 'border wars' that Said identifies to describe dominant reactions to The Satanic 
Verses can also be seen to inform his observations about the '9/11' 'terrorist' attacks 
on The Pentagon and The World Trade Centre. Said's first written reaction to the Sept 
11th attacks was published within a few days of the event, in the September 16th 
issue of The Observer79• Just over a month later his three part essay titled 'The Clash 
of Ignorance' was the feature piece in the magazine The Nationso. In both essays Said 
devotes much of his attention to exposing how 'terrorists' and Western policy makers 
alike continue to draw heavily upon enormous entities such as the 'West' and 'Islam' 
to make sense of hugely complicated matters like identity and culture. Across both 
essays Said makes an attempt to distinguish the actions of not just 'ordinary' Muslims 
from 'terrorists' but also 'ordinary' Westerners from Western policymakers. But, as I 
illustrate more clearly below, there is no fundamental difference in Said's 
understanding of the political outlook of the 'terrorists' and 'ordinary' Muslims in 
78ibid., p376 
79titIed 'Islam and the West are Inadequate Banners' 
80published in the October 22nd 200 1 issue of The Nation 
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that both are seen to affiliate to a static homogenous conception of Islam which 
forecloses any possibilities for cultural change. Further, as in his discussion in Culture 
and Imperialism it is the position of the secular that is singled out as offering hope for 
overcoming 'border wars'. 
Four of the five assumptions underlying Bhabha's observations about Muslim 
identities can also be identified in Said's analyses which I now discuss. 
Devotion to Islam as the basis of iMuslim unity' 
A main feature of Bhabha and Said's respective commentaries is the suggestion that 
Muslims are bound together by their devotion to a totalising and holistic conception 
of Islam. In Bhabha's case this is achieved through his use of the term Islamic 
fundamentalism to describe those Muslims who protested against The Satanic Verses. 
Yet with respect to the identity of the protestors, how they related to and observed 
Islam in their everyday lives, Bhabha tells us nothing. In fact the only 'shared' 
characteristic that can be identified in Bhabha's discussion of the protestors is their 
objection to Rushdie's particular interpretation of the Quran. So we might presume 
from this that the term Islamic fundamentalist is deemed to be a relevant description 
of the protestors on the grounds of their unanimous aversion to criticism of their faith, 
what might be described as an 'irrational fundamentalism'. In relation to this Bhabha 
himself singles out the focus on the renaming of Mohammed as Mahound and the 
characterisation of his wives as prostitutes. Let's for arguments sake assume that these 
were the kinds of elements fuelling the anger of Muslims, then we must ask 'was their 
anger justified?'. In answer to this it is useful to point out that, for many Muslims, 
there is a very clear resonance between the examples singled out by Bhabha and racist 
media representations of Islam as illustrated by the following extract from The Sun 
newspaper: 
[ ... ] the government has decided to scrap the old A is for Apple, B is for Ball, 
e is for Cat method and introduce and introduce a new alphabet tailored to the 
needs of Muslim pupils. From next term all schools will be required to use the 
following system. 
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'A is for Ayatollah, B is for Baghdad, C is for Curry [ ... ], J is for Jihad, K is 
for Khomeini, M is for Mecca, N is for nan [ ... ], Y is for Vasser Arafat, Z is 
for Zionist Imperialist Aggressor Running Dogs of the Great Satan. ' 
The Sun, 12 November 199181 
The analogy I'm proposing here, between Rushdie's work and the rhetoric of The 
Sun, might be questioned for the reason that the track record and political intentions 
of the two are easily distinguishable. For example, as Said points out, before the 
publication of The Satanic Verses many Pakistanis and Indians in Britain and the 
subcontinent regarded Rushdie as a 'champion of immigrants' rights and a severe 
critic of nostalgic imperialists'82. By comparison, The Sun is generally recognised as 
having racist leniencies and in particular anti-immigrant prejudice. However, the 
analogy I am proposing is not being asserted to dispute the particular ethics and 
intentions of Rushdie or his book, but to draw attention to the fact that the protests 
against The Satanic Verses might need to be considered within the broader context of 
Muslim opposition to Islamophobia. This is the line of interpretation adopted by Peter 
van der Veer in his observations of the 'book burnings'. He writes: 
These Muslim readers are not necessarily fundamentalists at all; their religious 
ideas are just as hybrid and syncretic as those of the author. They, too, are 
migrants, but the sources of their identity are authenticated not by profane 
literary texts but by what are to them sacred religious traditions. It is ironic, 
therefore, to find that migrants who are at the vanguard of political resistance 
to the assimilative tendencies of the nation state, who have their own cultural 
project for living hybrid cultural lives in a non-Islamic nation - expressed for 
example in a demand for state-funded Muslim schools or an extension of the 
blasphemy laws - are condemned, while the postmodem hybrid novelist is 
celebrated by liberals and the state, extolled for his struggle against that very 
81Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Is1aroophobja. It's Features and Dan&ers, 
(London, The Runnymede Trust, 1997a), p13 
82Edward Said, Culture and Imperjalism, (London, Vintage, 1993), p373 
50 
oppositional resistance, against the supposed 'backwardness' of the 
'fundamentalist' British Muslim community.83 
Like Bhabha's, Said's interpretation of Muslim protests against The Satanic Verses 
firmly establishes 'pure' religious and ethnic identities as totalising systems which 
hinder progressive interaction between nation states and different cultures. Reflecting 
on the anger expressed by Muslims against Rushdie's book Said writes: 
Few people during the exhilarating heyday of decolonisation and early third 
world nationalism were watching or paying close attention to how a carefully 
nurtured nativism in the anti-colonial ranks grew and grew to inordinately 
large proportions. All those nationalist appeals to pure or authentic Islam, or to 
Afrocentrism, negritude, or Arabism had a strong response, without sufficient 
consciousness that those ethnicities and spiritual essences would come back to 
exact a very high price from their successful adherents. Fanon was one of the 
few to remark on the dangers posed to a great socio political movement like 
decolonisation by an untutored national consciousness. Much the same could 
be said about the dangers of an untutored religious consciousness84• 
Said's observations propose several distinct but interrelated characteristics about the 
cultural politics of , deco Ionised' populations. For example, Said identifies a 
propensity amongst postcolonial subjects to rally around pure religious and ethnic 
identities as an act of defiance against the subordinate status imposed upon them by 
colonial rule. Nationalist appeals are mobilised by a powerful few and rallied round 
by the powerless many. Further the support for 'nationalist' appeals is regarded as an 
'uncritical' response. In effect Said identifies a 'blind patriotic nationalism' as driving 
the action of the protestors which can be seen to be compatible with Bhabha's 
suggestion of an 'irrational fundamentalism'. Also like Bhabha, Said offers no 
evidence to confirm that a homogenous religious identity is in operation amongst 
those Muslims in power and those 'on the street'. This interweaving of the explicit 
83, 'The Enigma of Arrival': Hybridity and Authenticity in the Global Space', in Debatioi Cultural 
Hybridity, edited by P. Werbner and T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, (997), plO2 
84Culture and Imperialism, (London, Vintage, 1993), p371 
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religious rhetoric of Muslim leaders and regimes with the sensibilities of 'ordinary' 
Muslims also features in Said's analysis of the '9/11' events. 
In his three part essay for The Nation Said acknowledges that the terrorists have no 
'real mandate' for their actions but goes on to add that 'the poor and the desperate are 
often conned into the magical thinking and quick bloody solutions [ ... ] wrapped in 
lying religious claptrap' 85. This particular impression of the relationship between the 
cultural and political capital of 'ordinary' Muslim people and that of the 'terrorists' is 
highly contradictory, i.e. on the one hand the 'terrorists' have no mandate, and on the 
other 'Muslim' populations are easily seduced into the 'magical thinking' of the 
'terrorists'. The latter significantly resembles Said's earlier conception of a 'blind 
patriotism' in his book Culture and Imperialism. Once again an uncritical engagement 
with religion is identified as being seized upon by a few as a means for mobilising 
'collective passions'. In the process of making this connection Said's efforts to 
contain the 'terrorists' to a small group of individuals serves little purpose. In relation 
to this it should be noted that across the essays being considered here, as in his more 
detailed works, Said reminds us that Islam and its followers are not a single 
homogenous entity. Yet, within the context of his overall argument, this point is not 
contextualised in a manner that might challenge the discourse through which the 
'West' has sought to exercise power over the 'Orient'. Here it is useful to note Bobby 
Sayyid's observation that, '[Said] illustrates the hostility of orientalism to Islam, his 
'counter-writing' is directed towards negating orientalism, but the negation of 
Orientalism is not the affirmation of Islam. This has the effect of turning Said's 
negation of orientalism into a negation of Islam itself. There is nothing to suggest that 
he believes that Islam can exist outside the discourse of orientalism'86. 
The importance of Sayyid's observation is not that we should reject the idea that 
Muslims of various class and social backgrounds may unite behind a common cause, 
but that, just because they may unite behind a common cause does not make their 
religious doctrine a wholly homogenous one. This is an important point for the second 
case study to confront because the homogenising of Muslims has produced a 
85hUp://observeT.!:uardiao.co.uk/comment/storylO.6903.552764.oo.htID I ('Islam and the West are 
Inadequate Banners' in The Observer, September 16th 2001 issue) 
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'silencing' effect not too dissimilar from that identified by Hall in his appraisal of 
anti-racist struggles organised around a homogenous conception of black, or what he 
calls 'identity politics one' (see p69). There are some notable differences between the 
two instances with respect to 'who' imposes silence upon whom. With reference to 
'identity politics one' the silencing is to an extent self-imposed by anti-racists 
consciously organising behind a common struggle. By comparison, Muslims are 
homogenised and silenced by 'others', namely commentators who perceive their 
public unity as indicative of a homogenous identity. Here it is useful to provide an 
anecdotal example to highlight the acute and disabling impact of 'silencing' currently 
being experienced by Muslims. This came to my attention in December 2001 at a 
conference organised by the British Council87 • 
During the main plenary of the conference, Humera Khan, one of the four panellists, 
described how in the period after the 'September 11th terrorists attacks on America' 
she felt a distinct sense that people with whom she had joined in the anti-racist 
movement were now trying to silence the voices of Muslims like her. Whilst not 
offering specific details, she expressed frustration at the absence of a critical space for 
many Muslims who, like her, did not condone the terrorists' attacks but wanted to 
draw attention to the complexity of Muslim feelings which could not wholly endorse 
the response by America and its allies. Her own anger was intimated in her comment 
that, 'we've never tried to shut 'them' up in the struggle against racism so don't try 
and silence us now'. Khan was not referring specifically to figures like Edward Said 
or Homi Bhabha, but to her personal experience of participating in meetings 
organised to address the implications of the events of September 11th for 
'oppositional' movements. Khan's account indicates how the response of anti-racist 
movements has not always found it easy to accommodate the cultural outlook of 
Muslims. In this regard the focus of the second case study provides an opportunity to 
assess how the 'anti-racism' embedded in the work of hybridity theorists positions 
itself with regards to the cultural politics of Muslims. 
86 A Fundamental Fear, (London, Zed Books, 1997), p35 
S;-he conference titled 'Open Minds' was held on December 11th 2oot. 
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In making the connection between the homogenisation of Muslims within Bhabha and 
Said's commentaries and the 'silencing' of Muslim voices, I should make absolutely 
clear that it is not the persona of either writer that is being commented upon. It would 
be wholly unjust to propose that either writer has ever sought to deny Muslims, or any 
other group, the right to speak. But the dynamics of 'silencing' do not merely function 
at the level of having the opportunity to speak aloud. 'Silencing' occurs when an 
individual or group's voice is not taken seriously or accorded little or no critical 
value. This brings me to the second assumption embedded in the two writers' 
expositions of Muslim identities that, as a scripted mode of thought Islam, and by 
implication those who abide by its principles, are foreclosed to cultural change 
making their outlooks 'static' and 'primitive'. 
The 'static' and 'primitive' status of Islam and Muslims 
In Bhabha's case the 'primitive' outlook of Muslims is conveyed through his 
appropriation of the term 'ancient'. But he does more than simply attach a label. He 
depicts an image that actually endorses perceptions of Muslims settled in the West as 
being inferior to their indigenous Western counterparts. To unpack how this is 
achieved I briefly return to the earlier quote in which Bhabha portrays the actions of 
religious fundamentalists and literary modernists as being guided by two opposing, 
yet, equally constricting modes of thought. The main point to note is that at the same 
time as renouncing both sets of positions Bhabha accords each a distinctly different 
social and historical status. The adjectives 'ancient' and 'migrant' are referenced to 
qualify the stance of 'Islamic fundamentalists' and can be contrasted to the 
appropriation of 'modem' and 'metropolitan' which are allied to the outlook of 
'western literary modernists'. Muslim protestors are prescribed the status of an 
unchanging mass who have come from another time and another place (Le. ancient 
migrants). Theirs is a project of asserting a one worldly view which is 'backward' 
looking (Le. ascriptive) in that it attempts to replicate the past. The 'western literary 
modernists' are also seen to have a one worldly view but theirs is a forward looking 
project defined by a desire to discover new ways of living and being (Le. modem 
metropolitans). They speak not as migrants but as an indigenous mass belonging to a 
superior civilisation which fuels their arrogance (Le. ironic), safe in the knowledge 
that the rest of the world will have to follow suit. And so a linear conception of time 
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and space is transposed to highlight the mutual exclusivity of the two dominant 
reactions. 
Said also invokes a historically linear framework in his evaluation of the transgressive 
capacity of the cultural identities asserted by the 'terrorists' /'ordinary' Muslims and 
'western policymakers' /indigenous western populations. His association of the 
'terrorists" actions with words such as 'primitive', 'fanatical', 'deranged', 
'fundamentalists', 'religious zealotry' and so on depicts a harsh image of a group of 
individuals 'primeval' in their visions of life and 'barbaric' in their strategies for 
political struggle. And whilst Said is equally unconvinced of the West's commitment 
to building more inclusive and equal global relations, there is also a distinct absence 
of the kind of acrimonious value that he projects on to the position of the 'terrorists'. 
Also, there is no outrieht rejection of the underlying social and economic principles 
on which Western societies are built. Situated alongside the 'primitive' outlook and 
'barbaric' actions of the 'terrorists', Western societies and populations acquire some 
sense of 'modern' legitimacy. More to the point the principles of Western societies 
are projected as being open to cultural change even though the process of change is 
channelled to further selfish interests and so racially boundaried. By comparison, the 
outlook of the 'terrorists' offers no potential for cultural change. Admittedly this is a 
subtle and somewhat implicit concession in Said's writings, but its significance is 
manifold in its substantiation of a superior/inferior continuum which Said himself, as 
much as any other critic, has so convincingly exposed as the single most pervasive 
aspect of 'a system of thought' through which the 'West' has been able to exert power 
over the 'Orient'88. 
This is perhaps a very bold assertion to direct at an individual renowned for an 
unwavering commitment to alleviating the suffering, as well as challenging Western 
misrepresentations, of Arab Muslims and in particular the people of Palestine. Indeed 
it would be unfair to arraign Said's work for endorsing a superior/inferior continuum 
which reinforces colonial discourse without commenting on the fact that when he 
talks about 'crazed fanatics' and 'deranged fundamentalists' he invariably references 
phrases such as 'a small group' or 'a tiny band' to indicate he is describing the actions 
88Edward Said. Orientalism (London, Penguin Books. 1978) 
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of a relatively small number of individuals. But, his invocation of a historically linear 
framework does not remain confined to interpreting the 'position of the major players 
of the recent crisis (i.e. 'terrorists' and 'Western policy makers'). The same 
framework is re-invoked to understand the predicament and political sensibilities of 
the 'ordinary' people of the Western and Muslim worlds. 
For example, I established in the previous section that Said uses the notion of 'blind 
patriotism' to project an image of 'ordinary' Muslims as uncritical and easily seduced 
by the 'magical thinking' of the 'terrorists'. By comparison, Said's description ofthe 
reaction of American citizens to the 'Sept 11th attacks' provokes an image of a 
'wounded' people with genuine cause for grief and feelings of retribution. He adds, 
they are also a people who are in the main politically disengaged and thus lack the 
critical understanding that would route their anger to demand a more considered, long 
term and rational response from their government. In sum, Said identifies a political 
docility amongst 'ordinary' Americans which is exploited by the US administration in 
order that it may continue to 'pursue its interests systematically' and without fear of 
domestic opposition. If political docility is the weakness of American citizens then 
religious docility is what Said locates as the weakness of Muslim citizens. The firm 
association of religion with the reaction of 'ordinary' Muslims ensures their 
historically inferior position to their Western counterparts. 
The question is 'does the historically linear arrangement of the outlooks of Muslims 
and indigenous Western people necessarily matter given that Bhabha and Said 
perceive both positions as flawed?'. To the extent that, the value and effectiveness of 
any critique will to a large degree depend on an understanding of the position being 
critiqued in its full complexity, it matters a great deal. More importantly, questioning 
Bhabha and Said's projections of Muslims as a pre-modern people imposing their 
outdated practices onto their 'hosts' is paramount. To accept it would be to strip 
Muslim identities of all social and historical legitimacy to exist in the 'modern' age. 
Embedded in the 'static' and 'primitive' status that Bhabha and Said associate with 
Muslim identities are two further assumptions which can be marked out as separate 
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points of analysis for assessing the in/compatibility of Muslim identities and the 
principles of 'cultural hybridity' in chapter 6. 
'Barbaric' nature of Islam and Muslims 
The first observation implicit in the notion that Islam cannot provide a framework for 
its followers to respond to the challenges of the 'modern' era is the image of Muslims 
as being bound to 'barbaric' forms of discipline. This arises out of Bhabha and Said's 
choice of phraseology when characterising the actions of Muslims. For instance with 
respect to the '9/11' attacks Said utilises phrases such as 'unknown assailants', 
'deranged militants', 'religious or moral fundamentalists' and 'fanatical tyrants'. The 
motive and/or strategic thinking behind their actions is referred to as 'terror attached 
to religious and political abstractions and reductive myths'; 'gratifying acts of 
horrifying retaliation '; 'primitive ideas of revolution and resistance, including a 
willingness to kill and be killed', and so on. Said's terminology foregrounds a sense 
of both physical and mental violence as the modus operandi of the 'terrorists' and it is 
his specific connection to religion as the fundamental source driving the strategy of 
the 'terrorists' that widens the relevance of his description to all followers of Islam. 
Bhabha's notion of Muslim lifestyles as being unable to transcend violent modes of 
interaction is even more implicit and focussed on highlighting how the protestors 
against The Satanic Verses were unable to position Rushdie's text as an opportunity 
to be internally critical and instead confining themselves to protecting their right to 
maintain a 'pure' notion of their faith. Towards the end of his analysis Bhabha 
underlines the limitations of the strategic thinking of the protestors by noting their 
inability, unlike women's groups, to confront 'the politicized violence in the brothel 
and the bedroom '89. I do not expand on this particular observation here as I return to 
examine it later when I discuss Bhabha's suggestion that Islam and Muslims are 
unable to transcend patriarchal relations (see pp59-60). 
The point of analysis to be drawn from Said and Bhabha's conceptions that physical 
and mental violence are integral to Muslim lifestyles is whether it is Islam itself, or 
89yhe Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), p229 
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the interpretation of [slam, that is responsible for instances where Muslims support or 
carry out 'barbaric' acts. 
Muslims as a homogenous ethnic group 
Another characterisation of Muslims that arises from the perception that their 
identities and lifestyles are committed to preserving a 'pure' notion of their faith is 
that Muslims constitute a homogenous ethnic group. This is implied by both writers 
through their respective promotion of the secular position as overcoming the 
culturally enclosed condition of Muslim identities. Bhabha does this almost in passing 
when for instance he writes, "secular' blasphemy releases a temporality that reveals 
the contingencies, even the incommensurabilities, involved in the process of social 
transformation '90. The secular is therefore seen to encourage interaction across racial 
groups, different histories and different narratives of culture which is deemed to be 
absent in negotiations of being Muslim. 
[n Said's case, of the five categories of people interwoven into his analysis of '9/11' 
the 'secular' occupies the least space for discussion. But this does not diminish the 
'critical' worth that Said accords it and which he establishes in more detail in his book 
The World. the Text. and the Critic91 • [n short, amidst the mess of global cultural 
relations that September lith so vividly illuminated Said pinpoints the 'secular 
politics of reason' as the one position from which we might establish more peaceful 
and equal times. As in Bhabha's work, the concept of 'secular' is mobilised by Said to 
signify an oppositional mode of thought to essentialised conceptions of identity 
formation constructed around homogenous notions of 'race', nation and religion. With 
reference to this it is appropriate to acknowledge Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew 
Rubin's point that 'secular criticism' is not adopted by Said as a method 'to debunk 
organised religion'92. [n as much as Said's starting point for his understanding and 
exploration of 'secular criticism' is the entanglement and complicity of literary 
criticism in circulating ideas and perceptions that have shaped modem societies and 
9Oibid., p226 
91Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983 
~he Edward Said Reader, (London, Granta, 200l), p218 
58 
experiences, then yes, Bayoumi and Rubin's observation is not incorrect. However, 
Said's argument, and that of others promoting the secular position, appears not to be 
that an individual or groups quest for 'freedom' and 'equality' cannot be fulfilled 
through religious devotion. But that the 'freedom' and 'equality' arrived at only holds 
true for the individual or group concerned. 
In sum, the 'secular' argument implies that identities predicated on religious doctrine 
are ethnically enclosed with an entirely self-contained conception of 'freedom' or 
'equality' that has little or no regard for its implications for 'other' individuals or 
groups. In that sense religion cannot function as an adequate mode of thought for the 
structure of modem relations where the biggest challenge remains one of identifying 
more' utopian' transcultural relations. This point is specifically contextualised in my 
assessment of the Muslim narratives from my own case study by examining the racial 
composition of Muslims (see pp220-229) on the one hand, and by evaluating their 
interaction with the multiple cultural influences around them on the other (see pp246-
273). 
The subordinate status of women in Islam 
The final point I want to highlight from my analysis of Bhabha and Said's 
commentaries about the cultural politics of Muslims relates to the notion that women 
occupy a subordinate status in Islam. This point is specifically drawn from Bhabha's 
writings. 
For Bhabha an outright rejection of The Satanic Verses, authentic religious identities, 
Islamic fundamentalism, patriarchy and male chauvinism are all intricately linked. 
This becomes starkly apparent when, having dismissed the fierce anger directed 
towards the book as the action of religious fundamentalists fuelled by a desire to 
maintain a 'pure' notion oftheir faith, Bhabha ventures to the activities on the 
'margins' to identify the more progressive possibilities of the 'Rushdie episode': 
The most productive debates, and political initiatives, in the post-fatwah 
period, have come from women's groups like Women Against 
Fundamentalism and Southall Black Sisters in Britain. [ ... J Feminists have not 
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fetishized the infamous naming of the prostitutes after Mohamed's wives: 
rather they have drawn attention to the politicized violence in the brothel and 
the bedroom, raising demands for the establishment of refuges for minority 
women coerced into marriages.93 
Whilst Bhabha applauds the initiatives of women's groups as an alternative to the 
public denunciations against The Satanic Verses, it is never clear whether their 
position towards religion and more specifically Islam is radically different than those 
Muslims 'who took to the streets'. Is it inconceivable that any of them may have been 
Muslims themselves? Equally, does the 'productive' character of their chosen path of 
action necessarily cancel out the 'productive' possibilities of protests foregrounding 
other points of denunciation, such as that taken up by 'Muslims on the street'? Yet, 
this is something that the reader is led to assume from Bhabha's earlier equation of 
condemnations of The Satanic Verses as irrational, 'fundamentalist' and concerned 
only with winning a 'binary geopolitical' war. 
By maintaining a firm distinction between the more publicised reactions of Muslims 
and those taking place on the 'margins', Bhabha is unable to conceive of women's 
rights as ever being engaged with by individuals wishing to authenticate their Islamic 
faith and by implication those who demonstrated against Rushdie and his novel. This 
is a tenuous link, in as much as it cannot be assumed that just because the protestors 
against the book did not foreground the issue of women's rights, whilst other groups 
did, they were endorsing patriarchal systems and were wholly against equal rights for 
women. In emphasising this point I am not proposing that Muslims and Muslim 
societies have not played a role in creating systems of gender inequalities. However, 
as the narratives explored in chapter 6 testify, the situation is far more complex than is 
implied by the notion that 'Islam' subordinates women. 
In light of Said and Bhabha's status as key proponents of 'hybridity' theory it would 
be easy to interpret my examination of their comments as indicative of an 
incompatibility between identities foregrounded on 'Islam' and the constitution of a 
'hybrid' politics. This does appear to be Said and Bhabha's own critical position. 
9~he Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), p229 
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However, my focus in this chapter has been confined to assessing the validity of their 
respective commentaries about the cultural politics of Muslims. If, as I have 
suggested, that their conception of the dynamics that have drawn Muslims to unite 'in 
protest' is not wholly accurate, then this still leaves open the possibility of actual 
Muslim identities embracing the same' democratic' principles which Said, Bhabha 
and others perceive as inherent to a 'hybrid' politics. Thus, at this stage it would be 
premature to draw any conclusions about the in/compatibility between Muslim 
identities and' cultural hybridity' which is contested more rigorously in chapter 6 
through an examination of the narratives of ten Muslims. Here it is appropriate to 
highlight that Bhabha and Said in their respective commentaries fail to engage the 
actual voices and opinions of Muslims. In that sense their understanding of Muslim 
lifestyles is constructed in the abstract context and remains removed from everyday 
reality. This raises a degree of vulnerability about their conclusions which can be 
intimated by inflecting the same empirical question that Said poses to cast doubt on 
the socially inferior position accorded to Muslims in Samuel Huntington's 'The Clash 
of Civilisations' thesis which provides the focal point of Said's contribution to The 
Nation. 
The main thrust of Huntington's argument is that global politics in the 'new world' 
will be dominated by conflicts between people of different civilisations, most notably 
between Islam and the West. Huntington presents his thesis from a perspective and a 
confidence that Western civilisation occupies a superior status and must therefore 
'fend off all the others'. Questioning Huntington's interpretation of the intuition of 
Muslims with regards their social status Said states, 'Huntington writes that "the 
worlds billion or so Muslims are' convinced of the superiority of their culture, and 
obsessed with the inferiority of their power'." Did he canvas 100 Indonesians, 200 
Moroccans, 500 Egyptians and fifty Bosnians? Even if he did, what sort of sample is 
that?' 94. In the same vein, we might inquire 'on what empirical foundations does Said 
conceptualise a 'blind patriotism' through which Muslim populations draw 
reassurance from the 'terrorist's' agenda?' Of course Said's, or for that matter 
Bhabha's, line of interpretation is no more empirically grounded than Huntington's. 
94http://www.thenation.com!doc.mhtml?i=2oo] I022&c=2&s=sajd (part 2 of 'The Clash of Ignorance', 
in The Nation, October 22nd 200t issue) 
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As part of the discussion in chapter 7 to establish the importance of engaging more 
empirically grounded enquiries into the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity', I return to 
Said and Bhabha's work and expose in more detail how the limitations of their 
conclusions about Muslim identities are a direct consequence of their failure to be 
more empirically thorough. 
The discussion in this chapter has established more clearly the vastly different 
contexts afforded by the two case studies for debating contemporary conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity'. In doing so they foreground and confront very different aspects of 
the work of hybridity theorists. The discussion set around the first case study is 
concerned with the more readily debated features of 'cultural hybridity' including 
'cultural pluralism', 'fragmented identities', 'cultural mutation' and 'a sense of 
doubleness'. In contrast, the second case study with its focus on religious negotiation 
draws out the more subtle and less debated aspects of the work of hybridity theorists 
including the 'desire for location', 'authenticity' and 'anti-anti-essentialism'. Before 
presenting the two case studies it is necessary to examine in detail the component 
parts of the various conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' and draw out their similarities 
and differences. This is the focus of chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
Four Views of 'Cultural Hybridity': A Critical Review 
This chapter undertakes a detailed critical review of theoretical conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity'. A main aim of the chapter is to break away from the popular take-
up of hybridity theory which has tended to focus on its most radical elements of 
'fluidity' and 'floating signifiers' creating a new moral binarism between 'old' and 
'new' ethnicities95• This has been unhelpful for the specific purpose of developing 
more effective anti-racist strategies in that, as Paul Gilroy comments, 'the cultural 
saturnalia which attends the end of the innocent black subject ( ... ] in leaving racial 
essentialism behind by viewing "race" itself as a social and cultural construction, it 
has been insufficiently alive to the lingering power of specifically racialised forms of 
power and subordination '96. In response to these shortcomings, rather than provide an 
overview of the work of all hybridity theorists, I limit my focus to four individuals to 
establish a more complex understanding of the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' 
including those aspects which have yet to receive serious debate. 
The four writers chosen for discussion are, Stuart Hall, A vtar Brah, Paul Gilroy and 
Ali Rattansi. The main criteria for selecting these individuals was to focus on the 
work of British academics97• Homi Bhabha98 is a notable exception to the list and was 
not included for the reason that his comments are a substantial focus for 
contextualising Muslim subjectivities in chapter 1. This, I felt, would have introduced 
an additional element impinging on the critical value of his contestations of 'cultural 
95PhiIip Cohen, 'Through a Glass Darkly', in New Ethnicities. Old Racisms, edited by P. Cohen 
(London, Zed Books, 1999),p7 
~he Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), p32 
97 A number of American intellectuals have also made significant contributions to contemporary debates 
about 'cultural hybridity'. See for example, James Clifford, 'Traveling Cultures', in Cultural Studies, 
edited by L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. Treichler, (London, Routledge, 1992), pp96-112 
Henry Louis Gates, The Sil:nifyinl: Monkey, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988) 
bell hooks, Outlaw Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994) 
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London, Vintage, 1993) 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial 
Theory, edited by P. Williams & L. Chrisman, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatseaf, 1993) 
~he Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994) 
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hybridity' that would not have existed for the other individuals chosen for this critical 
review. 
It is appropriate to acknowledge that the work of the four writers presented in this 
chapter, along with that of other hybridity theorists, has attracted considerable 
attention and debate over the last fifteen years or so. This, albeit recent, history of 
critical contestation positions the respective works with a firm critical presence within 
debates about 'race', cultural identity and representation. In that sense the thesis can 
be viewed as a contribution to an established ongoing dialogue about the value of 
contemporary conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' for addressing the impact of 'race' 
as a marker of difference. 
Stuart Hall's work and in particular his notion of the 'end of the essential black 
subject' figure centrally in the work of the other writers under discussion. For that 
reason Hall's work is examined first and is seen to provide a good background to the 
social and historical context in which contemporary debates about 'cultural hybridity' 
have emerged. I then examine the work of A vtar Brah. Her contestations of 
'diaspora' / 'hybrid' cultural formations take the significant step of expanding the 
focus on 'migrant' cultural formations to address the role of indigenous Western 
cultures and their impact on fragmented experiences of identity and culture. The third 
writer chosen for discussion is Paul Gilroy. The historical amplitude of Gilroy's 
investigation, which examines the work of late twentieth century artists such as Soul 
II Soul and Toni Morrison alongside works by nineteenth century artists such as 
Martin Robison Delaney and the Fisk Jubilee singers, enables him to locate identity 
specific issues such as occupying two cultures at once, which others have described as 
unique to late- or post modernity, at the very inception of modernity. An analysis of 
Ali Rattansi' s examination of the dynamics of modem cultural formations completes 
my critical review of theoretical conceptions of 'cultural hybridity'. Rattansi's 
concern with identifying the possibilities for building racially transgressive relations 
is developed through an understanding of modem identities which brings into sharper 
focus the complex ways in which supposedly mutually exclusive subjectivities, such 
as racists and anti-racists, collide, interact and even draw alliances. 
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The individual sections on each writer are interspersed with references to my own 
empirical research sometimes to clarify how particular concepts relate, position or 
challenge the subject matter of each case study, and at other times to identify how 
specific points of analysis are used to inform my own examination of the findings. 
The contrasting nature of the case studies means that different aspects of the 
individual works carry different weight and significance across the two studies and 
this will become apparent as the chapter unfolds. I should emphasise that the 
overriding concern of the chapter is to establish the precise connections that each 
writer makes between 'diaspora'l'hybrid' cultures and a transgressive cultural 
politics. Thus, the discussion does not incorporate individual critiques of 'cultural 
hybridity' that have emerged in recent years99 though appropriate references to these 
are made in subsequent chapters. Also, except for the purposes of aiding the flow of 
discussion I do not make comparisons between the writers within their respective 
sections. Similarities and differences between the individual works are summarised at 
the end of the chapter. 
Stuart Hall 
Hall's essay 'New Ethnicities'!(JO is widely recognised as a 'path-breaking' text, 
signalling a new era in black cultural politics by asserting that the' black subject 
cannot be represented without references to divisions of class, gender, sexuality and 
ethnicity,IOI. For Hall 'new ethnicities', and more specifically the experiences of 
migrants settled in the West, provide an exemplary position from which to identify a 
~he individual critiques focus on specific aspects of the work of hybridity theorists as opposed to 
providing comprehensive analyses examining the full complexity of individual conceptions of 'cultural 
hybridity'. However, many are drawn upon within the discussion of the thesis in one of two ways i.e. 
(i) to help identify and evaluate the similarities across the work of hybridity theorists and (ii) to assess 
the usefulness of particular concepts or 'buzzwords' such as 'diaspora', ' hybridity', 'cultural 
translation', 'anti-essentialism' etc. See essays in Un/settled Multiculturalisms. edited by B. Hesse, 
(London, Zed Books, 2000), Hybridity and its Discontents, edited by A. Brab & A. Coombes, (London, 
Routledge, 2000), New Ethnicities. Old Racisms, edited by P. Cohen, (London, Zed Books, 1999) and 
Debatin~ Cultural Hybridity, edited by Pnina Werbner & Tariq Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997). 
For a summary of the competing perspectives see chapter 10 'Cosmopolitics: Boundary, Hybridity and 
Identity', in David Morley's, Home Territories, (London, Routledge, 2000), pp225-245 
l<Xljn Black Film. British Cinema, edited by K. Mercer, (London, ICA, 1988), pp27-31 
100David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds, Stuart Hall, (London, Routledge, 1996), p8 
See also Kobena Mercer, 'A Sociography of Diaspora' in Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg and Angela 
McRobbie, eds, Without Guarantees, (London, Verso, 2000), pp233-244. Also in the same volume, 
Lola Young, 'How Do We Look? Unfixing the Singular Black (Female) Subject', pp416-429 
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cultural politics that cuts across racial boundaries. His emerging argument and in 
particular his commitment to 'cultural hybridity' is spread across a number of essays 
which are the basis for this discussion. 
I begin my examination with an aspect of Hall's work that has received significantly 
less attention than his conceptions of 'new ethnicities' and the 'end of the essential 
black subject'. This aspect describes the contingent relations between identity 
formation and economic (re)organisation. It is important to understand this feature of 
Hall's work as it draws attention to the dynamics of the marketplace as centrally 
significant to understanding cultural identities and the process of cultural change in 
late modernity. 
The 'global post-modem' 
In his essay 'The Local and the Global'l02 Hall argues that the era when coherent, 
homogenous constructions of social and cultural identities dominated the way in 
which both nations and individuals made sense of their position in the world has been 
undermined by the erosion of nation states and 'the new dialectics of global culture'. 
He suggests that we are entering a new phase of globalisation where the expansion 
and success of capitalist enterprises is increasingly dependent on the ability to read, 
respond to and exploit the inner differences and contradictions of what were once 
considered to be the' great collective social identities' of class, 'race', gender, nation 
and so on. In the course of unpacking the entangled web of economic and cultural 
relations at stake here, Hall considers the changing status of a homogenously 
constituted 'English' identity. 
Hall describes the period when 'the image of a stiff upper lipped white middle class 
male' was the central component of a very narrowly defined and distinctly 'English' 
national cultural identity which stood for everybody in the British Isles. This image, 
by complementing Britain's material and economic muscle, helped secure its 
domination as an imperial power. But, Hall adds, the nation state as a homogenously 
constituted self-contained cultural entity is not able to deliver the kind of societal 
I02in Culture. Globalisation and the World System, edited by A. D. King, (London, Macmillan, 1991), 
pp19-39 
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vision that is now required to compete with the most advanced forms of modem 
capital. In late modernity economic success is increasingly dependent on the ability to 
work with and through difference. The premise on which Hall's argument is based is 
that in order for capital to advance it has had to develop and exploit new, more 
flexible strategies of accumulation which are still very much built on the logics of 
mass production and mass consumption, but which can also deliver a product or 
service that is tailor made to the specific requirements of each consumer!03. This is in 
stark contrast to the 'totally integrative and all-absorbent' perception of capitalism 
which Hall suggests is only a partial constituent ofthe 'logic of capital'. He states, 
'alongside the drive to commodify everything, which is certainly one part of its logic, 
is another critical part of its logic which works in and through specificity,I04. 
Considering the impact of the 'new' logic of capital upon the process of identity 
negotiation, Hall suggests that the 'cultural landscapes' (such as social class, gender, 
'race' or nationality) that once provided a 'stable sense of self' have been fragmented 
by modem globalisation processes, creating a 'crisis of identities' or the 'global post-
modem'. Thus, whereas in the past individuals were defined by one overarching axis 
of identification, the postmodern subject' assumes different identities at different 
times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self,,!05 but negotiated 
through interaction with a multitude of axes of identification. 
The connection proposed by Hall between the emergence of culturally fragmented 
identities and the 'new' logic of capital is supported by evidence from my first case 
study. The data, as I describe in chapter 4, indicate a disproportionately higher use of 
new media services in South Asian households compared to the indigenous 
popUlation. This is directly linked to the increased flexibility and choice provided by 
new technologies such as the VCR and cable/satellite television which afford access 
IOYrhe particular era of capitalist economy with which Hall is concerned can be more specifically 
identified as the shift from 'fordism to post-fordism' or 'economies of scale to economies of scope'. An 
exploration of these concepts is not relevant here but for a summary see Robin Murray, 'Fordism and 
post-Fordism', in New Times, edited by S. Hall & M. Jacques, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1989) 
lO4ibid., p29 
IOS'The Question of Cultural Identity', in Modernity and It's Futures, edited by S. Hall, D. Held & T. 
McGrew (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), p276 
67 
to culturally distinct texts (such as Indian films) often marginalised in mainstream 
British culture (see pp147-1S0). These trends are an example of how the cultural 
tastes and styles of migrant populations, once ridiculed by the West, begin to find 
expression inside Western societies as a direct result ofthe 'new' logic of capital in 
which economic growth is increasingly dependent on attending to the needs of the 
individual as opposed to the 'masses'. 
Hall qualifies his thesis to recognise that 'the loss of a stable sense of self' has 
produced a variety of reactions from nations, regions, groups and individuals. Some 
have retreated to more aggressive forms of nationalism and/or ethnic essentialism 
whilst others have embraced the challenge of engaging with the multiple co-ordinates 
of their identities as a way of negotiating and living with difference106• This 
observation is an appropriate point on which to make an overall connection with the 
empirical research presented in this thesis in that, Hall's identification of the opposing 
reactions to the 'loss of a stable sense of self' is precisely what I have sought to 
confront across the two case studies. On the one hand the identification and 
examination of the bicultural consumption of films captures the possibilities of 
assuming different identities at different times. The simultaneous usage of culturally 
distinct texts, as highlighted in my critique of Gillespie's study (see pp36-38), 
heightens awareness and negotiation of cultural differences thereby creating precisely 
the kind of conditions for the emergence of 'new ethnicities'. By contrast, the 
foregrounding of Islam over all other co-ordinates of identity for defining Muslim 
lifestyles is more representative of maintaining a 'stable sense of self. In this 
instance, as Bhabha and Said argue, the potential for cultural change through 
interaction with multiple cultural influences is thwarted because one particular axis of 
identification is privileged as the defining source of cultural location. For Hall, and 
other hybridity theorists, it is only identities which openly engage multiple axes of 
cultural identification and do not privilege one axis over all others that are able to 
negotiate a cultural politics capable of redressing the unequal relations of power and 
106ln this regard Hall remains dissatisfied with the phrase the 'global post-modem' and the ambiguous 
ways in which blacks are positioned within it acknowledging that. "the majority of the [world's] 
population have not yet properly entered the modem era, let alone the postmodem" (David Morley and 
Kuan-Hsing Chen, eds, Stuart Hall, (London, Routledge, 1996), p14). However, he also concedes that 
the 'global post-modern' is not a term that can be easily ignored as it registers certain 'stylic shifts' in 
economic relations which are crucial to understanding the cultural dynamics specific to postmodernity. 
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opportunity. This position is contested by my own empirical findings which, as we 
shall see later, propose that the foregrounding of religious doctrine need not impede 
cross-cultural interaction just as much as the simultaneous consumption of culturally 
diverse texts does not guarantee racially transgressive cultural dialogues. 
To understand Hall's investment in culturally fragmented identities over those 
predicated on one axis of identification I turn my attention to that aspect of his work 
concerned with profiling how identities grounded in essentialism are inimical to any 
movement concerned with eliminating structures supporting racial subordination and 
discrimination. 
Identity politics one 
In Britain, the formation of a collective black cultural politics achieved prominence in 
the sixties and seventies when the first wave of post-war migrants began to realise that 
they were not going 'back home'. Diverse histories and ethnic identities were 
submerged in favour of a singular encompassing notion of what it was like to be part 
of a migrant community, or family, settled in Britain. 
Within the specific context of 'race' relations in Britain during the seventies Hall 
acknowledges 'identity politics one' as a necessary and immensely empowering 
moment. He writes, 'I have the feeling that, historically, nothing could have been 
done to intervene in the dominated field of mainstream popular culture, to try to win 
some space there, without the strategies through which those dimensions were 
condensed onto the signifier 'black"I07. However, the question Hall poses and which 
is central to his investment in 'culturally hybrid' identities, is whether an essentialist 
black identity 'is still a sufficient basis for the strategies of new interventions,los. Hall 
introduces the phrase 'the end of the essential black subject' to describe the 
limitations of 'identity politics one' and supports his argument by highlighting the 
'silencing' effects of a collective black identity. 
The end of the essential billek subject 
107'What is This "Black" in Black Popular Culture', in Black Popular Culture, edited by G. Dent, 
(Seattle, Bay Press, 1992), p29 
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In 'Old and New Identities' 109, Hall outlines three ways in which constructing an 
oppositional politics around a narrowly formulated notion of 'black' can be silencing. 
Firstly, those involved in the anti-racist struggles of the seventies prioritised a 
definitive and uncontradictory 'black' experience, thereby silencing all other aspects 
of their cultural histories and experiences. Secondly, the investment in projecting a 
united front meant that those migrant groups and individuals who did not feel any 
affinity to the 'black' experience were unable to find a voice within this movement. 
Thirdly, the singling out of the experience of racism and marginalisation as the sole 
basis for a collective black politics resulted in a reticent attitude towards relations of 
power and prejudice (e.g. regarding questions of class, gender and sexuality) within 
black communities. 
Hall argues that the strategy of 'identity politics one' of simply replacing stereotypical 
negative black imagery with the unproblematic notion of all blacks as good, meant 
that the anti-racist agenda could not move beyond a struggle over the 'relations of 
representation'. The term 'relations of representation' is used by Hall to refer to the 
dynamics of power which distinguishes those individuals and groups who operate the 
'machineries' of representation from those who are the 'objects' of representation. 
The aim of 'identity politics one' was to challenge the situation where 'blacks' were 
simply the objects of representation and fight for their rights to operate the 
machineries of representation. Hall identifies a deeper, more serious consequence 
emanating from a 'black' politics confined to such a struggle. He states, 'the moment 
the signifier 'black' is torn from its historical, cultural and political embedding and 
lodged in a biologically constituted racial category, we valorize, by inversion, the 
very ground of the racism we are trying to deconstruct'llo. In other words, a 
homogenously constructed 'black' identity reinforced the equation 'their culture 
versus ours' which remains a central component of much racist sentiment and racial 
antagonism in the modern era. 
l~ibid., p29 
J09'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities', in Culture. G1obalisation and the World System, 
edited by A. D. King, (London, Macmillan, 1991), pp41-68 
1 JO'What is This "Black" in Black Popular Culture', in Black Popular Culture, edited by G. Dent, 
(Seattle, Bay Press, 1992), pp29-30 
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In Hall's schema, to advance beyond the position of simply allowing the margins II 
voice within dominant structures of society, and to actually disrupt the regimes of 
modern racisms, requires a shift away from the idea of the subject as a stable fixed 
coherent being, to a notion of the subject as fragmented, complexly positioned by the 
multiple co-ordinates of identity, constantly negotiating his/her location in a never 
ending 'war of positions'. In making this assertion Hall acknowledges that, so long as 
racism and racist practices prevail within a society, its structures and social relations 
then the struggle in which 'identity politics one' was so firmly anchored cannot be 
viewed as having reached a permanent conclusion. As such the shift to a cultural 
politics which is more sensitive and responsive to the fluid character of identity 
(re)formation, should be seen not as a substitution for but an extension to 'identity 
politics one'. In Hall's words, 'the shift is best thought of in terms of a change from a 
struggle over the relations of representation to a politics of representation itself' III . 
For 'black' cultural politics, specifically, Hall asserts that the 'politics of 
representation' demands a deconstruction of the notion 'black'. This necessitates a 
reconstitution of black politics vis a vis a transformation of the meaning of the term 
ethnicity in which ethnicity is dismembered from its strong association with the 
'sari's and samosas' style of multiculturalism that retains the configuration of distinct 
ethnic groupsl12. The 'politics of representation' demands a renewed understanding of 
ethnicity, one which doesn't try to contain difference but accepts the ongoing 
dialogue with and within differences. This decoupling of ethnicity from essentialist 
discourses is a constant theme connecting individual conceptions of 'cultural 
hybridity'. The specific ways in which a non-essentialist conception of ethnicity is 
maintained across the two case studies has been delineated in chapter 1 (see pp21-43). 
Many of the themes introduced by Hall's conception of the 'end of the essential black 
subject' are used as points of analysis for contesting the Muslim identities presented 
in the second case study. In specific response to Hall's concern about the 'silencing' 
•• hNew Ethnicities', in 'Race'. Culture and Difference, edited by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London. 
Sage, 1992),p253 
112'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities', in Culture. Globalisation and the World System. 
edited by A. D. King, (London, Macmillan, 1991), pp55-56 
71 
effects arising from homogenous conceptions of the subject, a crucial point for 
assessing the Muslim narratives from my study is to examine the extent to which the 
foregrounding of Islam has 'silenced' other points of identification. Taking on board 
Hall's qualification that where racism persists 'identity politics one' may still have a 
role to play, the issue of 'silencing' is approached as two separate concerns. Firstly, 
there is the issue of 'silencing' that might occur when Muslims unite around their 
common affiliation to Islam in order to fight racism or more specifically 
Islamophobia. And secondly, there is the' silencing' that might arise out of the 
foregrounding of Islam in individual negotiations of being Muslim. By examining 
these concerns separately the study is able to highlight that the 'politics of 
representation' should not be theorised exclusively from the position of 'black' or 
Muslim identities, but emphasises the need to address how mainstream 
representations respond to more complex conceptions of 'black' or Muslim subjects 
(see pp239-241). 
Hall accepts that maintaining 'difference' at the heart of any political objective or 
movement may appear impossible, a contradiction even. However, he professes that 
not only is such a politics possible but it is essential to the prospect of an anti-racist 
society. In exploring and detailing this dimension of his work Hall introduces 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony and Derrida' s concept of differance. 
Cultural hegemony and differance 
Hall suggests that a common misunderstanding of how hegemony works is that 
unification is made possible through the erosion of difference. But the objective of 
hegemony to unite people is not reliant on making 'everybody the same'. Rather, the 
emphasis is on 'the construction of a collective will through difference'll3. This is 
how Gramsci perceives hegemony describing it as the 'war of position' which from 
Hall's perspective is the only political game worth playing in the modem era. 
Hall highlights the strength of the' war of position' by distancing it from 'the war of 
manoeuvre'. The distinction between these two strategies is encapsulated in the way 
each engages the meaning of difference. For example, the 'war of manoeuvre' 
113ibid., pS8 
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achieves its objectives through a conception of difference 'as a radical and 
unbridgeable separation'. By contrast, the 'war of position' engages with difference in 
a manner more akin to Derrida's notion of differance. Central to the concept of 
differance is the idea that 'meaning is never finished or completed,114. Hence, our 
attention is drawn not to fixed oppositions such as male and female, but to the 
numerous different positions in between. This is the difference 'which is positional, 
conditional and conjunctural,115. Hall does, however, point out that Derrida's notion 
requires some qualification if it is to be a useful analytical tool. He states that 
Derrida's notion does not lose all association with the more popular appropriations 
which represent difference in mutually exclusive terms. As Hall points out, a politics 
can only be maintained if there is some kind of positioning. Thus, for the 'war of 
position' to even enter the game of politics it is necessary to conceive and respond to 
difference as both positionality and movement simultaneously. 'To think only in 
terms of difference and not in terms of the relational position between the suturing, 
the arbitrary, overdetermined cut of language which says something [ ... J is to lose 
hold ofthe two necessary ends of the chain' 116. 
Hall's conceptions of the 'war of position' and the 'war of manoeuvre' are utilised in 
chapter 4 to analyse differing patterns of interaction between popular/mainstream and 
Indian films amongst South Asian audiences. The overall trends I discover suggest 
that whilst the 'war of position' is more suitable for describing the constantly shifting 
and interchangeable use of distinct cultural texts, inside the 'war of position' there is 
evidence of a 'war of manoeuvre' in that binary opposites and notions of superior/ 
inferior cultures dominate conversations and opinions about the aesthetic qualities of 
the two categories of film (see pp193-195). 
Through a discussion of 'the war of position', Hall intimates that the value of the 
strategy of hegemony is that it makes intervention in the organisation and structure of 
114'Cultural identity and Diaspora', in Identity: Community. Culture. Difference, edited by J. 
Rutherford, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), p229 
IJ5'New Ethnicities', in 'Race'. Culture and Difference, edited by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London, 
Sage, 1992), p257 
116'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities', in Culture. Globalisation and the World System, 
edited by Anthony D. King, (London, Macmillan, 1991), p51 
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power possible without requiring individuals to declare allegiance to an 
undifferentiated and singularly defined identity which is dismissive of all other 
identities. This is the theme which features at the centre of Hall's conception of 'new 
ethnicities' . 
Understanding inew ethnicities' vis a vis the idiaspora' experience 
Throughout his contribution to the project of developing a progressive cultural 
politics Hall maintains a focus on 'black' cultural identities. This is in part due to his 
own background and interests, but Hall also perceives 'black' identities, and 
specifically the' migrant' experience, as an advantageous position from which to 
delineate the emergence of 'new ethnicities' which open up possibilities for racially 
transgressive change in the modern era. In fact, he describes the 'migrant' as 'the 
prototype of the postmodern condition' 117 and expands on this assertion by describing 
the 'black' experience as a 'diaspora' experience. 
Like the term 'ethnicity' Hall distinguishes his use of 'diaspora' from its position in 
essentialist discourses of 'race' and its more specific association with a hierarchical 
and pure conception of a Jewish identity. He notes that 'diaspora' has been more 
commonly used to describe a geographically dispersed population or group of people 
whose identity is predicated on shared historical experiences. In such a conception, 
membership of a cultural group is pre-determined by ancestral origins and fixed at 
birth. Hall asserts that this is a pure conception of identity and fails to provide a 
comprehensive picture. For Hall it is impossible to speak with any 'exactness' about a 
common or shared cultural identity' grounded in a mere recovery of the past' 118. The 
central tenet of Hall's argument is that migration, whether it be voluntary or enforced, 
is a concomitant part of the' diaspora condition'. The' migrant' subject is not only 
transplanted into another part of the world, slhe has to contend with living amongst 
other cultures. Thus, individuals with a migratory background are by implication 
'nomads' with a fractured sense of belonging. 
117'Cultural identity and Diaspora', in Identity; Community. Culture. Difference, edited by J. 
Rutherford, (London, Lawrence & Wishart. 1990), p234 
118ibid., p225 
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By highlighting the transient and unstable features integral to the 'migrant' experience 
Hall presses for a revised notion of 'diaspora'. He argues that the 'predisposition to 
travel' and movement inherent in the migratory process raises questions as to the 
feasibility of defining 'diaspora' cultures in homogenous terms, of imagining 
'diaspora' origins as rooted in one fixed location. The predicament of not belonging to 
anyone particular place suggests a plurality of cultural sources which imply that the 
'migrant's' identity and sense of belonging is as much influenced by new and 
impermanent cultural associations as it is by inherited ones. This set of circumstances, 
Hall argues, should not be interpreted as an irreconcilable conflict of mutually 
exclusive cultural codes and practices. Rather the 'migrant's' cultural predicament is 
better understood as a 'process of hybridisation'. 
The fundamental link identified by Hall between the experience of migration and the 
'diaspora condition' is not wholly consistent with the sample profile of my two case 
studies. The vast majority of respondents for both studies, like the majority of South 
Asians in Britain, were born in this country and have no direct experience of 
'dispersion' and '(re)settlement'. And this is representative of the generation of black 
Britons who are the predominant focus for hybridity theorists' delineation of a 'new' 
cultural politics of difference. This section of the black British population does not 
share the 'migrant's' 'predisposition to travel'. This discrepancy does not of course 
undermine the fact that despite being born here second and third generation black 
Britons are still overwhelmingly treated as 'outsiders' by the 'host' nation and their 
experiences will be significantly defined by this connection. At the same time, the 
discrepancy is highlighted here because the generational differences emerging from 
the two case studies emphasise that the concept of 'migrant' has a very different and 
shifting significance in the negotiation of 'multiple cultural influences' amongst those 
who have experienced migration first hand compared to those who were born to 
migrants. In the first case study this difference manifests itself in that the 
simultaneous consumption of culturally distinct texts is much more common amongst 
second and third generation South Asians born in Britain than first generation 
migrants. In the second case study it is the second and third generation of Muslims 
born in Britain that are identified as foregrounding one axis of identification over all 
others. The implications of these complex findings for theorising the 'migrant' 
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experience in understanding 'cultural hybridity' are addressed in the course of 
presenting the empirical findings (see chapters 4, 6 and conclusion). 
In Hall's framework the 'signifier of migration' provides a different way of thinking 
about cultural identity and is explored to establish a 'diaspora aesthetic' which is 
characterised by a 'necessary heterogeneity'. For Hall the negotiation of multiple 
cultural influences makes racially transgressive change possible precisely because it 
symbolises a position of 'cultural hybridity' from 'where the unthinkable might come 
to pass - it might be possible to be Black-and-British or Asian-and-British (or even 
British-and-gay), 119. 
Avtar Brab 
The second writer I have selected for discussion, because of her contribution to 
understanding modern identities through an exploration of complex intersections of 
multiple co-ordinates of identity, is A vtar Brah. Her investigation of modern social 
and cultural formations is presented in her book Cart0l:raphies of Diaspora. Whilst 
Brah, like other hybridity theorists, identifies the refusal to privilege a singular axis of 
identification above all others as the centrally transgressive feature of 'cultural 
hybridity', she resists the idea that the 'singular axis' is replaced by an in-between 
space or an indiscriminate position from where solutions to unequal relations of 
power and subordination readily emerge. From this position it can be argued that Brah 
is very cautious and particular in her location of the transgressive potential of 'cultural 
hybridity'. This is evident in her comment that 'while Hall's emphasis on de-coupling 
ethnicity from essentialist discourses of 'race', 'nation' or 'culture' is vital, the 
process of doing so is replete with enormous contradictions,J2o. Before discussing 
Brah's response to the issues concerned it is appropriate to point out that the structure 
and content of this thesis bears a significant similarity to Brab' s examination in that 
the experiences of South Asians in Britain are positioned centrally in both 
investigations. 
119'The Multi-Cultural Question', in Un/Settled Multiculturalisms, edited by B. Hesse, (London, Zed 
Books, 2000), pp237-238 
12°ibid., p242 
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In Brah's book four of the nine chapters are devoted to examining South Asian 
identities in post-war Britain. Two of these chapters are based on empirical studies 
conducted during the 1980s and examine un/employment patterns amongst South 
Asian youth and Muslim women respectively. In this thesis too two empirical 
investigations into South Asian cultures are the basis for critical analysis and insight 
into modern cultural dynamics. In Brah's work, however, whilst the empirical studies 
provide a background to her overall understanding of contemporary 'diaspora' 
cultures there is little direct dialogue between her empirical research and her 
theoretical exposition of 'diaspora' formations in that the two are presented in 
separate chapters and so there is no direct cross-referencing between them. The 
approach of this thesis is to undertake a direct analysis between theoretical insight and 
empirical evidence. I draw on abstract conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' to describe 
and make sense of the significance of people's everyday realities and what they relay 
about contemporary dynamics of 'race' and culture, and I draw on people's everyday 
realities to contest and where appropriate propose revisions to theoretical explorations 
of 'cultural hybridity'. 
The starting point for my examination of Brah' s work is her conception of 
'difference' which she establishes as a key organising theme for her investigation. 
Difference - replacing 'politics of primacy' with 'politics of intersectionality' 
Brah emphasises that understanding and tracking how 'difference' is situated in 
'diaspora' cultural formations is paramount because all our fates are linked within a 
global economic system where 'our precise position depends on a multiplicity of 
factors, such as gender, class, colour, ethnicity, caste' and so on l2l • She additionally 
argues that in order for a 'diaspora' politics to disrupt processes of discrimination and 
shift the balance of power it is necessary to formulate a notion of 'difference' that is 
able to maintain a 'sense of solidarity' without homogenising individual experiences. 
To provide a basis for her argument she distinguishes when 'difference' is organised 
hierarchically from when it is organised laterally. 
121ibid., p84 
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Briefly, a hierarchical organisation of 'difference' exists' where' difference' becomes 
the vehicle for the legitimation of dominance' 122. Examples of this would be racist and 
chauvinistic practices where categories of 'race' and 'sex' are ordered to create and 
reinforce inequalities. By comparison, a lateral conception of 'difference' functions to 
challenge and resist exploitation or oppression. In this instance individuals may unite 
behind a shared characteristic or symbol of 'cultural difference' in order to improve 
their subordinate position. 
Brah argues that despite its potential to 'constitute a progressive force', a lateral 
assertion of difference is not unproblematic. It too runs into difficulty when it 
signifies a 'politics constituted around the assertion of the 'primacy' of one axis of 
differentiation over all others as the motor force of history,t23. A 'politics of primacy' 
does not disrupt 'processes' of discrimination because its strategic objective is to 
improve the rights of specific sections of the population, placing them on a more 
equal footing with the more 'privileged' members in society. Brah suggests that, an 
effective challenge to the actual systems which create inequalities requires a 
somewhat different politics which she terms a 'politics of intersectionality'. 
Alongside an appreciation of what distinguishes particular forms of oppression there 
needs to be a commitment to understanding and responding to their interconnections. 
One of the examples through which Brah underscores this last point is by highlighting 
how 'racism is always a gendered and sexualised phenomenon'. She notes how 
colonial discourse constructed Bengali males as 'feminine' to establish their inferior 
status in relation to the 'macho British male'. In a similar vein 'masculine' traits were 
attributed to black female slaves positioning them as the uncivilised opposite of 
'white womanhood'. These interconnections make it impossible to tackle racism 
effectively without engaging and challenging gender and sexual constructions. 
From these observations Brah emphasises that the fragmented nature of identities 
means that individual experiences cannot be homogenised, yet on the other hand it is 
necessary to be able to draw on points of solidarity in order to mount a collective 
struggle against oppressive or discriminatory practices. To balance these points Brah 
122ibid., p90 
123ibid., p14 
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suggests that 'difference' be conceptualised in four ways. Very briefly these can be 
summarised as, (i) 'difference as experience' which recognises subject formation as 
always in process and unique to the individual; (ii) 'difference as social relation' 
which involves the interweaving of narratives through shared material and social 
circumstances which 'produce the conditions for the construction of group 
identities'124; (iii) 'difference as subjectivity' which acknowledges the play ofthe 
unconscious and its significance in drawing individuals to confront contradictions and 
question the 'rational' social constructions that pervade modern societies; and (iv) 
'difference as identity' which refers to how stability and coherence is established to 
give meaning to an individual's 'sense of self' indicating his/her location at a given 
moment with respect to a specific axis of differentiation. This multi-dimensional 
conception of 'difference' proposes that 'it is a contextually contingent question 
whether difference pans out as inequity, exploitation and oppression or as 
egalitarianism, diversity and democratic forms of political agency'125. 
A separate part of Brah's discussion, in which she examines changing constructions 
of 'the Asian' in post-war Britain, can be used here to underscore the importance she 
accords to 'contextually contingent' assessments of the impact that essentialist and 
non-essentialist conceptions of 'difference' may have in given circumstances. 
Challenging popular representations of inter-generational differences amongst Asians 
as a conflict between 'tradition and modernity' Brah makes a distinction between 
'age-group' and 'generation'. She explains that 'age-group' imposes a vertical 
arrangement of inter-generational differences in which a direct comparison of 
differences in opinion and behaviour between parents/elders and children/adolescents 
is made at a particular moment in time. In such a framework of analysis generational 
differences are easily presented in oppositional terms as one set of cultural trends 
(usually the most recent) become the marker for measuring each generation's 
un/willingness to embrace change. By comparison, 'generation' prefers a horizontal 
arrangement of generational differences which positions and examines inter-
generational differences within the social and historical context peculiar to each age 
group. Here, judgements about generational differences in cultural attitudes and 
124ibid., pl18 
125ibid., pl26 
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lifestyles are made on the basis of the particular challenges and experiences shaping 
the outlook and choices made by each group. 
Brah's distinction between 'age-group' and 'generation' is deployed in my first case 
study to resist the 'homogeneity versus diversity' dichotomy in interpreting 
generational differences in the consumption of films on videotape. The trends are 
analysed in the social and historically specific contexts specific to each age group 
such that the' monocultural' film culture of older generations is not positioned as the 
'static' opposite ofthe more 'fluid' 'bicultural' film culture of the younger 
respondents. For instance, by identifying the emergence of an Indian film culture in 
Britain as a direct result of post-war Asian migration notions of cultural power and 
racially transgressive cultural change are linked to the' monocultural' patterns of film 
consumption of first generation migrants (see pp163-165). These observations are 
noted as inviting a more critical assessment of the emphasis on 'cultural pluralism' or 
'cross-cultural location' and the progressive capacity of 'cultural hybridity'. 
For Brah the central challenge that a multi-dimensional conception of 'difference' 
poses for the 'politics of intersectionality' is that of developing a strategy through 
which it is possible 'to foster solidarity without erasing difference'. In identifying 
how this might be realised Brah turns her attention to the discourse of 'universalism'. 
Recasting 'universalism' to challenge 'commonalty of conditions' 
Whilst acknowledging 'the complicity of the discourse of 'universalism' with 
hegemonic projects of imperialism'126, Brah argues that redefining universalism as 'a 
situated and historically variable commonalty' makes it possible to work 'with' and 
'across' differences. Here 'universalism' is not counterpoised against 'historical 
specificity' but is seen to function in tandem with it. The result is an appreciation of 
the 'universal' within the 'particular' and vice-versa. Brah expands upon these initial 
thoughts about co-ordinating a collective struggle against the 'commonalty of 
conditions' in the context of what she calls' re-figuring the multi'. 
126ibid .• p92 
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The notion of 'multi' is introduced to inject into the concept of 'universalism' the idea 
of non-fixity of meaning. To clarify the point Brah draws on Derrida's notion of 
difference in which 'meaning is subject to the 'infinite' and 'limitless' play of 
differences, and hence is perennially deferred'l27. But, the idea that 'meanings remain 
in process' should not be interpreted as 'a permanent dissolution of meaning'. For 
Brah it is important to distinguish between process and signification of meaning 
production. The former refers to how all meanings are constructions which are open 
to contestation, clarification and revision. By contrast, the specific operations of 
signification involve the production of 'signs as if they embodied fixed meanings'. 
These meanings are of course contingent and relational, in that they are specific to a 
given moment and situation, but they are in effect what makes conversation and 
debate possible, what Brah calls the paradigm of articulation. In summary, the re-
casting of 'universalism' through the 'multi' demands that amidst all the 
fragmentation and 'indefinite play' we assess what precisely is being articulated by 
modern cultural formations and modern subjectivities. 
Brah centralises the themes discussed thus far and in particular the implications that 
the 'play of difference' poses for the 'paradigm of articulation', in order to assess the 
usefulness of the concept of 'diaspora' for understanding latter day social and cultural 
formations. In conducting this analysis Brah feels it imperative to distinguish between 
'diaspora' as a 'theoretical concept' and the 'distinct historical experiences' of 
'diaspora'. In support of her position she notes how since its initial association with 
the dispersion of Jews, the concept of 'diaspora' has been applied to social formations 
which have undergone significant transformations. Thus she comments, 'late 
twentieth century diasporas take ancient diasporas as a point of departure rather than 
as 'models". In accommodating this point Brah organises her own discussion around 
'specific features which may serve to distinguish diaspora as a theoretical concept 
from the historical 'experiences' of diaspora'l28. These features which include 
'diaspora space', the 'subtext of home' and the 'politics of location'. are used to 
organise the rest of this section. 
127ibid., p245 
12Rjbid., p179 
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Diasporas as 'composite formations' 
Brah notes that whilst the 'image of a journey' has been central to conceptions of 
'diaspora', not every journey, such as those constituting casual travel or temporary 
sojourns, is understood as 'diaspora'. She adds that diasporic fonnations have 
emerged out of circumstances as diverse as colonisation, indentured labour, 
persecution and global flows of labour. Another significant feature of many diasporas 
is that individuals are often settled in various different parts of the globe. Each one of 
these journeys will have its own history and peculiar circumstances. In this regard 
diasporas could be described simply as a 'cluster of migrations'. But, Brah asserts, it 
is more appropriate to think of diasporas as 'composite formations' in that what in 
fact is being signified by the 'diaspora' concept is the specificities linking 'the various 
components of the cluster'. These specificities may be economic, political or cultural 
and they have an adjoining effect in that they interweave the many disparate 
narratives so that they configure into one journey culminating in the construction of a 
common 'we'. 
Brah elaborates that constructions of the 'we' are often circumscribed by the image of 
'a single dominant Other' which has tended to engender and highlight bipolar 
oppositions such as black/white; male/female; Arab/Jew etc. The foregrounding of 
such binaries is complex and problematic in that they are constructions and not trans-
historical universalisms. And we do not need reminding of the centrality of binary 
opposites within racist and other oppressive discourses. However, Brab asserts, 
binaries acquire coherence and significance in 'historically specific, socio-economic, 
political and cultural circumstances'. As such 'they might be addressed fruitfully and 
productively as an object of analysis and a tool of deconstruction' 129. What Brah 
appears to be saying is that the construction of a binary essentially involves processes 
of signification and representation. By investigating how and in what circumstances a 
binary is 'constituted, regulated, embodied and contested' it is possible to deconstruct 
the dynamics of power and the structure of social relations in specific historical 
contexts. 
129ibid .• P 184 
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This identification of the role of binary opposites in the constitution of diasporas as 
'composite formations' is useful in clarifying the value and contribution of my first 
case study to understanding the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity'. This is important 
because the juxtaposition of Indian and popular/mainstream films might be perceived 
as essentialising the culturally fragmented character of South Asian identities in 
Britain into two opposing camps. As I acknowledge in chapter 4, the first case study 
examines individual responses to cultural texts produced by other people which is 
different to the central theme running across conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' of 
how elements of distinct cultural forms are extracted and fused to create 'new' ones. 
However, locating binary opposites as Brah does in the constitution of a collective 
'we' suggests that individual experiences of 'diaspora' are not constrained by binaries 
but are informed by them. In that sense the first case study confronts the kind of 
encounter of binary opposites that occurs and informs real experiences of 'diaspora' 
and negotiations of 'cultural hybridity'. 
The manifestation of binaries in actual negotiations of 'cultural hybridity' is 
illustrated more clearly in the first case study when I consider the tendency among 
respondents to compare and arrange both the aesthetic and audio-visual qualities of 
popular/mainstream and Indian films along a superior/inferior continuum. The data 
suggests that whilst respondents enjoyed the respective texts for very different reasons 
there was a tendency to privilege the strengths of popular/mainstream films for 
assessing the aesthetic and production qualities of both categories of film. This 
tendency is identified as mirroring the flow of ideas between Hollywood and Indian 
production companies and the changes arising as a result. In sum, the efficiency and 
production values of Hollywood are being used to identify and introduce changes to 
the Indian film industry such that the cultures of production and consumption of the 
latter are becoming increasingly like the cultures of production and consumption of 
popular/mainstream films (see pp175-186). These findings emerging from the first 
case study are quite crucial in assessing the racially transgressive qualities of 'cultural 
hybridity'. They highlight, as I outline in more detail in chapter 4, that the Willingness 
and ability to interact with distinct cultural forms does not necessarily diminish the 
significance of binaries and established hierarchies of cultures in how individuals 
perceive and respond to those cultural forms. 
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For Brah the precise constitution of binaries and how they are negotiated is 
historically variable and significantly influenced by the configurations o/power the 
dynamics of which are explored and clarified through the notion of 'diaspora space' at 
the end of this section. First I outline the other main features of 'diaspora' examined 
by Brah. 
The subtext of home 
Migration, travel and dispersion are well established focal points in contemporary 
debates of diaspora. Brah adds an important qualification to this by asserting that 
'diasporic journeys are essentially about settling down, about putting roots 
'elsewhere"130. She acknowledges that the 'experience of social exclusion' often 
prevents individuals from 'proclaiming' the country of settlement as their 'home'. 
Also the dispersed make-up of diasporas means that 'home' is often imagined and 
associated with more than one location, what Brah describes as 'the double, triple or 
multi-placedness of 'home". But for most people the place in which they live is a 
place of long-term if not permanent settlement. As such there is a degree of 
investment and sense of being anchored in one particular place which might be 
interpreted as 'the homing of diaspora'. 
Brah explains that this 'homing of diaspora' or 'homing desire' should not be 
confused with the desire for a 'homeland'. The latter is linked to the concept of fixed 
origins. By comparison the inscription of 'home' within diaspora formations is such 
that 'home' and 'dispersion' are in creative tension. By positioning them as variable 
features of the diaspora condition, Brah's framework demands that both 'settlement' 
and 'dispersion' are critically engaged in their specific contexts rather than simply 
noted as distinctive, almost taken for granted, characteristics of diaspora experiences. 
The significance of this point for this thesis is underscored by the observation noted in 
the previous section that the vast majority of the respondents to my two case studies 
were born in Britain (see p75). Brah's insertion of the 'subtext of home' is more 
responsive and able to accommodate the varying experiences of dispersion and 
settlement which have a different resonance in the lives of second and third 
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generation 'black' Britons than for many older members of their families who have 
experienced dispersion and migration at first hand. 
Transnational identifications and the 'politics of location' 
The combined local and global status of diaspora formations makes them 'networks of 
transnational identifications'. This 'transnational' condition rightly associates 
diasporas with the crossing of borders. But, for Brah, the crossing of borders does not 
necessarily mean a transgressing of borders beyond the physical sense. In constructing 
her argument she points out that the 'territory' that geographical borders demarcate is 
reinforced and 'policed' through social, cultural and psychic boundaries. Those 
constructed as aliens, or 'others', may be excluded from a 'territory' in the physical 
sense (i.e. by denying them entry to a country or region), as well as a social sense (Le. 
by identifying their group or cultural practice as belonging to another place). For Brah 
'border crossings' are most definitely a feature of diasporic identities, but, they do not 
afford a common or privileged standpoint. They generate contradictions which need 
negotiation and Brah expounds this theme through the concept of 'politics of 
location'. 
Informed by feminist debates Brah defines the 'politics of location' as a position of 
multi-axiallocationality. She clarifies that multi-axiallocationality does not 'pre-
determine' subject positions it merely signals the 'multiple semiotic spaces' that 
border crossings generate. How these spaces are engaged and negotiated is 
'essentially a question of politics'. To illustrate the 'political' ramifications of border 
crossings Brah makes reference to the 'paradox' of the migrant worker. She describes 
how the incongruous reception experienced by many migrant workers, (i.e. of being 
invited to contribute to the labour market and simultaneously reviled for doing so), 
captures how the same geographical space can embody such contraposed 
circumstances that 'home' can become a 'place of both safety and terror'. Brah's 
central point in incorporating the 'politics of location' is to assert that 'the probability 
of certain forms of consciousness emerging are subject to the play of political power 
and psychic investments in the maintenance or erosion of the status quo' I3J. In the 
130ibid., p182 
131ibid., p208 
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case of the migrant worker, precise location, or positionality, may involve matters 
such as weighing up whether the opportunity of earning a living is worth risking to 
protest against racism. 
On an analytical level the 'politics of location' is situated to ensure that the experience 
of location is not lost in an abyss of infinite migrations. It also crucially resists any 
conception of 'diaspora' formations representing 'free floating' and unproblematic 
archetypes of 'transcultural fusion'. If there are no guaranteed subjectivities emerging 
out of diasporic processes then we must ask to what extent a 'diaspora' politics can be 
usefully mobilised to identify and challenge 'commonalty of conditions'. This is the 
central concern directing the investigation of this thesis. In that sense the content of 
the thesis can be described as being more weighted towards the issue of 'location' 
than 'transcultural identification'. More specifically the 'politics of location' is a 
vividly recurring theme in the Muslim narratives presented in chapter 6. Many of the 
individuals openly express that pivotal to their decision to authenticate their religious 
identities was a desire to restore stability and certainty amidst the fragmentation and 
chaos arising out of being simultaneously influenced by more than one culture. At the 
same time their respective negotiations of religious doctrine have not reduced the 
diversity of Muslim subjectivities. These observations are seen to indicate an 
inversion of Brah's emphasis that 'location is not lost in an abyss of infinite 
migrations' and demand that 'fragmented and conflicting subjectivities are not 
overlooked in the midst of an overwhelming desire for location' (see pp263-267). 
Brah's own investment in the concept of 'diaspora' lies in its substantive potential for 
generating relationships of' solidarity without erasing difference', the implication 
being that by understanding the process of diaspora in its full complexity we might 
exploit its potential for the constitution of a 'politics of intersectionality'. Brah's 
contribution to this is the development of a new concept, that of 'diaspora space'. 
Dillspora space 
In Brah's words, 'diaspora space, as distinct from diaspora, foregrounds [ ... ] the 
'entanglement of the genealogies of dispersal' with those of' staying put" 132. By 
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implication, this entanglement, simultaneously situates and decentres the position of 
both migrant and indigene subjects within the same space. Their respective 
experiences, cultural codes and modes of living become enmeshed leading to 'myriad 
processes of cultural fissure and fusion'. Brah perceives 'diaspora space' as a site 
where 'the native becomes a diasporian as much as the diasporian becomes a native'. 
She clarifies, however, that this should not be interpreted as a situation where 
migrants and natives become equals or assume positions of 'undifferentiated 
relativism'. With respect to this Brah identifies the operation of a 'multi-axial 
performative notion of power' within 'diaspora space' where power is never subject 
to erosion but is the very means by which the similarities and differences between and 
within groups become defined. This raises an interesting point for the theorisation of 
power in delineating a transgressive cultural politics. For it suggests that power 
should not be contextualised in wholly negative terms because 'acts of resistance' just 
as much as 'acts of subordination' engage and exercise power to achieve their end 
goal in that each wants to pass its own interpretation or particular meaning as more 
substantive, more of a 'truth' than the other. Thus, diaspora space, through its multi-
axial notion of power, problematises the interaction between groups and individuals 
as an endless process of 'relational positioning'. 
Some interesting patterns of relational positioning emerge in the empirical research 
presented in chapters 4 and 6. In my first case study, where relational positioning is 
vividly and constantly shifting through the interaction with distinct cultural forms, the 
potential for disrupting the power of Western discourses is less forthcoming in that 
the hierarchical arrangement of popular/mainstream and Indian films is left intact (see 
pp 191-195). By comparison, in the second case study, where relational positioning is 
more implicit in that it is located inside the negotiation of one particular axis of 
identification, i.e. Islam, evidence of contesting not just dominant Western discourses 
but also established notions of Islam is more apparent. The Muslim respondents re-
read the teachings of Islam to challenge, for example, the use of corporal punishment 
in mosques as well as dominant Western conceptions of the veil as a form of female 
oppression (see pp251-253 and pp267-273). 
132ibid., p242 
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Brah concludes that 'diasporas ought not to be theorised as transhistorical 
codifications of eternal migrations' but 'should be seen to refer to historically 
contingent 'genealogies', in the Foucauldian sense of the word,}33. Significantly, 
Brah's theorisation of the intertwining of genealogies through the concept of 
'diaspora space' begins to expand the focus of analysis to incorporate and 
problematise Western discourses and the position of 'the native'. This formulation 
constitutes a vitally important intervention in that the position of indigenous Western 
subjects and their particular response(s) to the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' 
remains undertheorised across the work of hybridity theorists. Yet, if 'cultural 
hybridity' is to provide a basis for challenging unequal relations of power then the 
involvement and support of indigenous Western people will be crucial to the success 
of that project. 
Brah's incorporation of indigenous Western discourses and identities within her 
conception of 'diaspora space' can be distinguished as two separate concerns. The 
first involves examining how 'migrant' subjectivities confront, contest or confirm 
Western discourses and identities. The second is about identifying how indigenous 
Western subjects might themselves begin to confront and question their own identities 
in relation to 'others'. The focus in this thesis on South Asian cultural identities 
means that the first of these concerns is more integral to the main body of discussion, 
though aspects of the second concern are addressed and given prominence in the 
conclusion through the concept of the 'giraffe's perspective' (see pp309-31l). 
Paul Gilroy 
The third commentator whose work I have chosen to discuss, on account of its 
contribution to contemporary debates about 'cultural hybridity', is Paul Gilroy. His 
overall project and concern with displacing "race' as a device for categorising and 
subordinating human beings'l34 is spread across a variety of texts. But it is in his book 
The Black Atlantic that he devotes his attention to the cultural experiences and 
expressions of blacks settled in the West as a position from which to delineate an anti-
racist politics. The ideas presented in The Black Atlantic are the focus for discussion 
in this section although references are also made to Gilroy's other works. 
133ibid .• P 196 
88 
The uniqueness of Gilroy's contribution is that in the course of examining the 
potential of 'cultural hybridity' for challenging racism his work emphasises that the 
overriding concern should not be with exposing its ability to transgress racial 
boundaries, but with its ability to challenge those principles of modernity that allow 
racism and inequalities to go unchallenged. A critique of modernity is thus intrinsic to 
his discussion and he positions the modern principles of 'rationality' and 'progress' as 
central points for contesting the racially transgressive capacities of modern identities. 
In the course of examining Gilroy's contribution I identify how specific aspects of his 
work inform the framework and argument of this thesis. 
Two varieties of essentialism 
Gilroy welcomes the visible presence of more complex and differentiated black 
cultures in Britain and elsewhere, but does not feel that this has resulted in a 
progressive black politics in the public sphere. The development of such a politics is 
held back by the fact that the few spaces for political mobilisation have been 
monopolised by 'the seemingly insoluble conflict between two distinct but currently 
symbiotic perspectives'135 which Gilroy describes as 'two different varieties of 
essentialism' . 
The first is an ontological essentialism which functions within the framework of 
'ethnic absolutism' asserting that the subordinate position of blacks can only be 
redressed through the recovery of a homogenous black identity whose origins and 
ancestral home will always be Africa. This perspective, therefore, has a strong 
tendency 'to formalise and codify elements of cultural heritage'136. By comparison the 
pluralist standpoint is characterised by a strategic essentialism137• This perspective is 
decidedly committed to delineating a more complex notion of the black subject which 
is sensitive to the interplay of 'race' with other axes of identification such as class, 
I3~here Ain't No Black in the Union Jack, (London, Routledge, 1987), p218 
13-'The Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), p31 
136ibid., p33 
13This should not be confused with Gayatri Spivak's conception of 'strategic essentialism' which 
specifically refers to forms of collective resistance against oppressive circumstances. See her In Other 
~,(London, Methuen, 1987) 
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gender, age and sexuality. There is no desire to create an all-encompassing conception 
of the black community. Rather, all efforts are focussed on affirming 'blackness as an 
open signifier'. 
Gilroy suggests that neither the ontological nor strategic essentialists provide an 
adequate framework for grasping the 'reality' of black experiences and the persisting 
nature of modern racisms. He criticises the ontologically inclined essentialists for 
their comprehension of racial politics as manifestly consistent with the perspective of 
'the racist right -who approach the complex dynamics of race, nationality and 
ethnicity through a similar set of pseudo-precise, culturalist equations,138. In contrast, 
the weakness of the strategic essentialists is that, by directing all their energy into 
deconstructing the black subject, they have become powerless to confront and 
challenge racisms. Responding to the limitations of the two dominant perspectives, 
Gilroy advocates an anti-anti-essentialist position which recognises instances of unity 
and solidarity arising out of common experiences and struggles without reducing the 
individuals involved to a homogenous identity. The notion of anti-anti-essentialism is 
used in my analysis of the data from my second case study to distinguish between the 
political objectives relating to Muslim solidarity forged in response to Islamophobia 
and the assertion of a homogenous or 'fundamentalist' Muslim identity (see pp234-
238). 
In explaining his advocation of an anti-anti-essentialist position Gilroy argues that the 
conflict in perspectives between the ontological and strategic essentialists is 
representative of the tensions created by and peculiar to the present era we recognise 
as modernity. He adds that to overcome the inherent weaknesses of the two 
perspectives it is necessary to understand the dynamics of modernity and its impact on 
the predicament of the oppressed. 
Modernity and modem subjects 
Gilroy acknowledges how the trend towards a 'fusion of cultures' is identified and 
examined by postmodernists such as Habermas and Berman as an outcome of the 
dynamics peculiar to modernity. He quotes Berman, 'modern environments and 
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experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and 
nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense modernity can be said to unite all 
mankind,139, Whilst Gilroy shares Berman's suggestion that modern identities have a 
distinctly fragmented and cross-cultural element not experienced by pre-modern 
populations, he is resistant to the assumption that 'modernity can be said to unite all 
mankind', Such a conclusion can only be drawn from an all-encompassing and 
innocent view of modernity - all-encompassing in that 'all mankind' is affected in the 
same way, and innocent in that there is a singular positive 'unifying' outcome, 
Gilroy argues that a fundamental and regrettable weakness in postmodernist theory is 
that it projects a holistic conception of modernity which is combined with an 
unwavering faith in the enlightenment project. He notes that whilst postmodernists 
have not denied the persistence of unequal relations of power and subordination in 
modern societies, racism's inconsistencies with the values of democracy and freedom 
are regarded as 'pre-modern residues' yet to be apprehended and overpowered by 
modernity'S enlightenment project. In challenging this perspective Gilroy draws on 
the work of Hegel to establish the etymology of modernity as being located in the 
'dialectic between master and slave', 
For Hegel, 'slavery is itself a modernising force in that it leads both master and 
servant first to self consciousness and then to disillusion, forcing both to confront the 
unhappy realisation that the true, the good, and the beautiful do not have a single 
shared origin' 140, The significance of Hegel's observation is that it highlights how the 
encounter of individuals defined by two distinct ideological systems leads to the 'loss 
of a stable sense of self', In sum, the structural relations defining the encounter 
between master and slave draws both sides to become acutely conscious that their 
respective positions are circumscribed by opposing ideological frameworks, i.e. the 
slave's predicament is defined by the image of the primitive, uncivilised African and 
the master's position is based on the rational, progressive thinking European. Using 
Hegel's insight Gilroy emphasises that the loss of a 'stable sense of self' creates a 
fractious state of mind which is peculiar to modern subjectivities and is first and 
13&rhe Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), p34 
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foremost confronted by the slave. To support this assertion he draws on the work of a 
number of academic and literary figures including Frederick Douglass, Martin 
Robison Delaney, Sherley Anne Williams, c.L.R. James and Toni Morrison. One 
example, Toni Morrison's novel Beloved, is selected here to illustrate Gilroy's 
emerging argument. 
The storyline in Beloved is based on a real incident involving a female slave and her 
act of infanticide. The narrative presents the encounter between two opposite but 
interdependent constructions of the uncivilised savage (Margaret Gamer) and the 
enlightened master (Archibald K. Gaines) at its most intense. In short, Gamer 
attempts to free herself and her four children from bondage by absconding to the 
house of her mother-in-law who is a free slave. Their freedom is threatened when 
Gaines arrives at the house intent on taking them back to the plantation. On sighting 
Gaines and his team of slave catchers approaching, Gamer flees to the shed with all 
four of her children and begins to slay them with a knife. She succeeds in killing her 
daughter (Beloved) whilst her two sons and baby girl survive. The narrative's pre-
occupation with Gamer's infliction of extreme violence on her own children functions 
precisely to highlight the fractious impact that can result from a confrontation 
between such mutually opposed constructions as 'slave' and 'master'. Gamer's 
determination to save her children from the brutal and de-humanising experience of 
slavery culminates in finding freedom in'the state of death. 
For both Gilroy and Morrison, Gamer's actions and slave suicide in general, reveal 
much about 'the cultural contours of distinctly modem experience,141. This is 
encapsulated in the following comments made by Morrison during a conversation 
with Gilroy l42: 
Modem life begins with slavery [ ... ], black women had to deal with post-
modem problems in the nineteenth century and earlier. These things had to be 
addressed by black people a long time ago: certain kinds of dissolution, the 
140ibid., p50 
141ibid., p222 
142For a more comprehensive account of this meeting see 'Living Memory: A Meeting with Toni 
Morrison', in p, Gilroy, Small Acts, (London, Serpents Tail, 1993), pp175-182 
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loss of and the need to reconstruct certain kinds of stability. Certain kinds of 
madness, deliberately going mad in order, as one of the characters says in the 
book, "in order not to lose your mind." These strategies for survival made the 
truly modern person. 143 
For the purposes of my own research Gilroy's identification of the origins of 
modernity and modern subjectivities in the encounter between two opposing 
ideological systems can be referenced to establish more precisely the relevance of the 
second case study for advancing our understanding of modern cultural formations. 
Rather than dismissing the (re)emergence of Muslim identities in Britain (as Said and 
Bhabha do) as an instance of a pre-modern mode of being and seeing in a modern 
environment, Gilroy's framework can be used to argue that as distinct ideological 
systems the encounter between 'Muslim' and 'British' cultures is in fact a wholly 
modern encounter. In that sense examining how Muslim identities are negotiated in a 
distinctly Western setting can be seen to provide a very relevant insight into the 
dynamics of modern relations. 
Having established the origins of modernity in the experience of slavery, Gilroy joins 
Douglass and Dubois in insisting that the practice of racial terror and subordination 
need to be examined as constituent parts of the inner character of modernity. For 
Gilroy, the persistence of racism is further evidence that it may be necessary to look 
beyond the enlightenment project and the modern subject in the quest for equality and 
freedom for all. He develops this line of argument further by, firstly, linking the 
concepts of rationality and modern civilisation to the practice of racial terror, and 
secondly, by identifying the weaknesses and contradictions intertwined in modern 
black cultural politics and individual efforts to overcome racial inequalities. 
Delineating the first of these two points requires a return to Gilroy's analysis of the 
encounter between master and slave, also referred to as Hegel's allegory. 
The character and limits of modem {rationality' and {progress' 
Gilroy draws attention to the ruinous aspect of the concept of rationality by exposing 
how the use of racial terror by European masters and mistresses was strategic and 
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calculated to establish and maintain a system of domination. It is the centrality of 
racial terror within the rationale for 'civilising' the savage that makes 'occidental 
rationality and its objective, global civilisation, not merely compatible but cheerfully 
complicit with the histories of barbarity' \44. In addition, the slaves' response to his/her 
brute conditions further accentuates the cogency of violence in modern relations and 
modern experience, a point which Gilroy elucidates through a critical discussion of 
Hegel's allegory. 
Whilst he applauds Hegel for maintaining the dialectic of master and slave at the 
'natal core of modern sociality' Gilroy suggests that Hegel's interpretation of the 
psychological riposte of the two respective parties remains too narrow. In Hegel's 
explication of the confrontation between master and slave, the slave accepts his/her 
master's version of reality over the only option that would I:uarantee freedom from 
bondage, i.e. death. The slave submits and a 'metanarrative of power' is retained. 
Gilroy suggests that in fact an inversion of Hegel's allegory is required when making 
sense of the reaction of slaves, such as Margaret Garner and Frederick Douglass, who 
actively chose death over continued bondage. They were able to exercise human 
agency by taking away, and placing under their own jurisdiction, the one edict (Le. the 
threat of death) on which the master had relied to ensure his domination of the slave 
population. In that moment, the' metanarrative of power' was transformed into a 
'metanarrative of emancipation'. 
This modern and rational practice of human cruelty for economic and social 
domination on the one hand, and, the acquisition of human agency through violence 
on the other, leads Gilroy to question the idea of history as 'progress' where 
'progress' is firmly associated with more humane practices and equal relations. For 
Gilroy the' progress' of modern history is 'founded on the catastrophic rupture of the 
middle passage rather than the dream of revolutionary transformation,\45. From this 
perspective, the unequal order of racial difference and use of racial terror are not 
141'he Black Atlantic, (London Verso, 1993), p221 
144ibid., p56 
145ibid., p197 
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anathema to modernity but are problematised as part of the inner character of 
modernity, what Gilroy describes as the 'antinomies of modernity'. 
In chapter 6 of this thesis the concept of rationality is a key organising theme for 
reflecting on the overall patterns of identity negotiation from my second case study. 
The narratives of the respondents suggest that although religious texts are the primary 
source for defining a Muslim lifestyle this process does not constitute 'blind' 
submission to the words of the Quran and sunnah. The individual negotiations of 
being Muslim incorporate rational choices and debate whereby aspects of the Quran 
and sunnah are often re-read to challenge the particular interpretations of Islam 
imposed by 'molweesaabs' and dictatorial Islamic regimes. The discussion does not 
interpret the rational negotiations of Islam as necessarily' good' or 'bad' but identifies 
the presence of rational discourse as a position from which to consider the 
possibilities for according contemporary Muslim identities a distinctly modem status 
(see pp274-276). 
Having established his own position on the origins of modem identities and modem 
subjectivities, Gilroy turns his attention to addressing the issue of how to construct a 
cultural politics which is able to provide the foundations for democracy proper. His 
starting point is an examination of the culturally fragmented character of postslave 
black cultural politics. 
The black Atlantic 
The familiar theme amongst hybridity theorists of describing modem cultures as 
'mongrel' forms is explored, in Gilroy's case, through the notion the 'black Atlantic'. 
The reference to one of the world's seas as opposed to a country, nation or continent 
is made precisely to overcome the static and definitive traits (such as borders, nation 
states, racial typology) that have become overly associated with the latter. The sea and 
the related mode of transport the 'ship' are central chronotopes in Gilroy's theory of 
modem cultural identities. They evoke effigies of travel, movement and exchange and 
are positioned to encapsulate the effects of modem processes of migration (both 
voluntary and enforced) which have provoked 'special problems and relationships 
between "race," culture, nationality and ethnicity'. For Gilroy this is the moment that 
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marks the beginnings of modernity, 'when the histories and experiences of 'black' 
and 'white' people become entwined forever; when the languages of class and 
socialism become inadequate for making political sense of a world in which the 
concepts of nationality and culture have reached a fatal junction; when novel 
typologies and modes of identification emerge')46. 
Gilroy regards the black Atlantic as a specific consequence of these historical 
changes. In addition, the prefix' black' intimates a distinction in the experiences and 
responses to the dynamics of modernity between 'black' and 'white' people. Gilroy 
makes this clear when he writes, 'This book addresses one small area in the grand 
consequence of this historical conjunction-the stereophonic, bilingual, or bifocal 
cultural forms originated by, but no longer the exclusive property of, blacks dispersed 
within [ ... J the black Atlantic world,)47. The condition of occupying a vantage point 
that is informed by and/or composed of two or more cultures is described as a form of 
'double consciousness', a term borrowed from the work of W.E.B. Dubois. 
Double consciousness 
Double consciousness can be described as a response for dealing with feelings of 
fragmentation and displacement that arise when two or more cultural systems or codes 
are in co-existence. It is a kind of modus vivendi which enables cultures that may 
differ to live together both in the minds of individuals and in their daily practices. In 
this respect Gilroy argues that 'striving to be both European and black requires some 
specific forms of double consciousness' 148. This is a main theme in Gilroy's 
conception of modern black subjectivity which he describes as being 'simultaneously 
located inside and outside the West'. By holding this duality at the centre of 
understanding black identification it becomes possible to conceive how the struggles 
of the oppressed have tended to revolve in an implicit cyclical processl49. The desire 
146ibid., pp2-3 
147ibid., p3 
14I!jbid., pi 
14~n his more recent publications, see A~nst Race, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2(00) and 
Between Camps, (London, Penguin Books Ltd, 2(00), Gilroy makes this observation more concrete 
identifying dominant black cultural politics as being dogged by a 'camp' mentality which promotes 
ethnic particularity and in so doing reinforces mutually exclusive conceptions of 'race' what he refers 
to as 'modern raciology'. 
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to emancipate oneself from a subordinate position has resulted in political movements 
which have effectively exposed and challenged the uneven distribution of economic 
wealth and social prestige. But the desire 'to resemble the object' has meant that 
many movements have been driven by an end objective (which they may not achieve) 
of acquiring the power and wealth of the privileged. Gilroy exposes this more clearly 
through reference to Richard Wright's work and his use of Nietzsche's concept of 
'frog's perspective' which positions blacks as: 
[ ... ] looking from below upward [ ... ] a situation in which for moral or social 
reasons, a person or group feels that there is another person or group above it 
[ ... ] A certain degree of hate combined with love (ambivalence) is always 
involved L ••. ] He loves the object because he would like to resemble it; he 
hates the object because his chances of resembling it are remote, slighe50• 
These contradictory elements of double consciousness are supported by data from my 
first case study, where the simultaneous consumption of popular/mainstream and 
Indian films has not resulted in a corresponding disruption of the hierarchy of cultures 
in which Western cultural forms are seen to be superior to those of the East. 
Moreover, the notion of 'looking from below upward' is specifically reflected in the 
way in which respondents' comparisons and comments indicate a strong sense of how 
the strengths of popular/mainstream films might improve the quality of Indian films 
but not vice versa. These trends are used as a basis for problematising the precise link 
between diaspora cultural expressions and transgressive cultural change and are seen 
to confirm Gilroy's emphasis on the need to look beyond the enlightenment subject 
for disposing with systems of racial subordination (see pp169-172). 
In seeking to redress the conflicting dimensions of double consciousness Gilroy re-
opens the debate about the concepts of 'unity', 'tradition' and 'authenticity' and 
examines how they may be consolidated within a notion of 'diaspora' to provide a 
foundation for a coherent anti-racist politics. 
Re-locating unity, tradition and authenticity in dillspora politics 
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Gilroy suggests that the real worth of the concept of diaspora for informing a 
transgressive cultural politics lies, 'in its attempt to specify differentiation and identity 
in a way which enables one to think about the issue of racial commonality outside of 
constricting binary frameworks - especially those that counterpose essentialism and 
pluralism'lsl. He explores and apprehends 'the issue of racial commonality' through 
an interrogation and refinement of popular conceptions of unity, tradition and 
authenticity. It should be noted that these concepts are differentiated to illustrate 
different aspects of the theme of 'connectedness' or 'commonality', but in reality they 
function in a complex and interdependent relationship. 
Gilroy suggests that unlike the discourse of ontological essentialism in which 'unity' 
symbolises homogeneity, the concept of 'diaspora' accommodates 'unity' without 
compromising or rejecting difference. Gilroy refers to this more complex conception 
of 'unity' as 'a changing same' which he explains by describing the way in which the 
twelve inch single has been used to create various different 'mixes' of the same song. 
Once dubbing, scratching and mixing appeared as new elements in the 
deconstructive and reconstructive scheme that joined production and 
consumption together, twelve-inch releases began to include a number of 
different mixes of the same song, supposedly for different locations or 
purposes. A dance mix, a radio mix, a capella mix, a dub mix, a jazz mix, a 
bass mix and so on. On the most elementary level, these plural forms make the 
abstract concept of a changing same a living, familiar reality.ls2 
'Unity' is thus configured as an imperceptible sensibility, or vibe, existing amongst 
individuals who may not necessarily share visibly identical styles or codes of life. In a 
similar vein, Gilroy contests the concept of 'authenticity' so that its meaning is no 
longer reliant on fixed origins or common characteristics. In identifying such a 
concept he recalls the song 'Proud of Mandela' originally written by the Impressions, 
a black 'trio' from Chicago, as the hit 'I'm So Proud'. Its reincarnation as 'Proud of 
Mandela' was the creation of black Briton's of African and Caribbean descent and 
1SOibid., p161 
ISlibid., p120 
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was a testimony to the black South African activist Nelson Mandela. Gilroy suggests 
that ifthere is anything 'authentic' about this music it is in the fact that the various 
places within the black Atlantic world are brought 'seamlessly together', what Gilroy 
refers to as 'eccentric authenticity' and which he regards as promoting more subtle 
and subjective points of cohesion than those conveyed by 'blood' or 'roots'. 
In evaluating the relevance of 'tradition' to the formation of modern diaspora cultures 
Gilroy begins by acknowledging how dominant conceptions have tended to fall into 
the two opposing positions of 'anti-tradition' and 'pro-tradition'. The former sees 
'tradition' as modernity's antithesis symbolising styles and codes of life that belong to 
pre-modern eras. By comparison the second position regards 'tradition' as the key to 
black people's freedom and autonomy from white domination. Whilst the two 
opposing positions offer different judgements on the concept of 'tradition' their 
underlying definition of it is essentially the same. 'Tradition' is understood within the 
context of a linear idea of time in which the past and present are rigidly and 
sequentially ordered. 
Gilroy's location of 'tradition' within the notion of'diaspora' specifically functions to 
highlight the temporal aspects and to integrate them with the spatial characteristics of 
the diaspora idea. Diaspora temporality consists of such features as history, memory 
and narrativity and draws attention to the interactive relationship between the 
traditional and the modern. In doing so diaspora temporality disrupts the linear idea of 
time in a similar way that diaspora spaciality disrupts homogenously constituted 
categories of 'race' and culture. 
The theme of connectedness proposed in Gilroy's work, and more specifically its 
emphasis on non-linear conceptions of time and space, is applied in my second case 
study to make sense of 'the polyvalency' of the practice of veiling whereby the veil as 
an affirmation of male domination in some Muslim societies is transformed in Britain 
as a form of female empowerment. The two contrasting situations arise precisely 
because of the contextually shifting temporal and spatial dynamics through which 
veiling takes on a very different meaning and significance when it is under the 
152ibid., pl06 
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jurisdiction of the state (as in some Muslim societies) from when it is a matter of 
personal choice (as in Britain) (see pp267-273). The dynamics of time and space are 
also drawn upon to make sense of the contradictory trends in film consumption 
emerging from the first case study. This connection is described more specifically in 
the next section on Ali Rattansi who positions notions of time and space within his 
investigation in a similar way to Gilroy. 
The re-inscription of the terms 'unity', 'authenticity' and 'tradition' within the 
concept of diaspora is crucial to Gilroy'S framework for developing a model of 
identity which is neither a 'fixed essence' nor a 'wholly contingent construction'. 
More importantly the theme of connectedness, which runs through the revision of all 
three concepts, becomes imperative to his vision of global emancipation. Gilroy's 
investigation leads him to conclude that what is now required is a double edged 
politics that is reflective of the fractured experience of blacks in modernity. One side 
which he calls 'the politics of fulfilment' needs to insist that the positive outcomes of 
modernity should have a non-racialised effect. The other side 'the politics of 
transfiguration' engages with the' antinomies of modernity' . 
Ali Rattansi 
The last writer chosen for discussion in this chapter is Ali Rattansi whose contribution 
to understanding modem cultural formations is presented as a piece in progressl53• 
Rattansi's contribution can be distinguished from the insights provided by Hall, Brah 
and Gilroy in that questions of cultural identity and identifying notions for a racially 
transgressive cultural politics are not engaged by focussing on or privileging one 
group over another. Rattansi does have a particular investment and interest in certain 
groups, such as South Asians, but his theoretical framework is not constructed 
through a critical examination of the experienceS/CUltural expressions of a specific 
category of people (e.g. slaves; South Asians; migrants; black musicians). Rather his 
starting point is to contextualise the 'postrnodern condition' from which he theorises 
what he calls, a 'postmodern frame'. The purpose of this 'postmodern frame' is to 
153" Western' Racisms, Ethnicities and Identities in a 'Postmodern' Frame', in Racism. Modernity and 
Identity on the Western Front. edited by A. Rattansi & S. Westwood, (London, Polity Press, 1994), 
pp15-86 
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'enable new productive directions to be taken in the analysis of western racisms, 
ethnicities and identities' 154. 
The relevance of Rattansi' s approach for the arguments I develop below is that, like 
Gilroy's work, it demands that alongside identifying a position from which racially 
transgressive change becomes possible it is also necessary to ask why such a position 
has failed to take hold in an effective way. With respect to this Rattansi emphasises 
the significance of understanding the 'inner character of modernity' which is also the 
starting point for my analysis of his work. 
Modernity's idiosyncrasies 
Rattansi notes that the origins of modernity are commonly understood to be located at 
the point where the search for answers to questions about 'nature and humanity' are 
no longer governed by religion and a faith in God but through the rigours of scientific 
discipline and Reason. Whilst Rattansi accepts the suggestion of postmodern 
theorists, such as Giddens and Bauman, that 'industrialisation, urbanisation, 
commodification and [ ... ] rapid social change are constitutive of Western modernity, 
and that modernity is in diverse ways a global phenomenon,155, he registers two 
overall reservations which inform his more detailed interpretation of modernity. The 
first is that contemporary conceptions of modernity pay inadequate attention to the 
systematic regulation and control of human behaviour directly arising from modern 
capitalist social relations. Rattansi's second reservation about postmodernists' 
accounts of modernity is their profound ethnocentrism which he argues has left an 
aching gap and huge silence on the relationship between Western racisms and the 
project of modernity. 
With these two general criticisms in mind, Rattansi addresses and defines the more 
specific features and dynamics of the 'modem' condition for his own theoretical 
framework. He begins with a critical analysis of the suggestion that one of the main 
consequences of modernity's investment in science and Reason is a compelling 
pursuit and reliance upon systems of classification and social order. Drawing upon 
154ibid., p78 
155ibid., p23 
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Foucault's configuration of power/knowledge he describes how the movements of 
individuals and their bodies are regulated through surveillance and discipline carried 
out by a variety of modern institutions including prisons, schools, hospitals etc. In that 
sense 'the identities of Western modernity must be seen as constructed through 
processes of 'normalisation' but which have the effect of marginalising those Other 
populations - among a diverse group, the insane, the sick, the criminalised, the 
educational failures or the 'ineducables', and those workers labelled incompetent or 
disabled'I56. 
Rattansi views the antithetical or oppositional alignment of races, which is a key 
feature of modern racisms, as an example of grading and classification. He supports 
this assertion by noting Bauman's analysis ofthe Holocaust and how the Nazi 
objective to eliminate the Jews 'routinely involved' various features of modernity. 
The Nazi's effectively categorised the Jew as a contaminating alien threatening the 
national culture and therefore in need of being weeded out. Bureaucratic rationality 
and scientific Reason took away the need for moral and ethical debates. The Nazi 
objective to systematically categorise and exterminate Jews vividly illustrates the 
extreme consequences of that highly prized modem trait of 'rational' calculation. 
Rattansi points out that this mode of making sense of all things and all places through 
systematic categorisation does not monopolise modem thought and modem relations. 
Modernity's 'striving for classificatory order' co-exists with the contrasting processes 
of democratisation and globalisation which have the effect of stimulating' new forms 
of hybridisation, syncretism, fusion, difference and incommensurability,157. This has 
opened up spaces for a multiplicity of political associations and subjectivities to 
develop and be heard, thereby undermining the certainty of singularly constructed 
'truths' offered by the disciplines of science and Reason. The new economic, political 
and cultural formations know no boundaries of 'race', ethnicity, nation etc. 
Rattansi describes the conflicting features of modernity as representing a duality 
between 'order' and 'chaos'. His 'postmodern frame' acknowledges 'that modernity's 
subjects are able to occupy different discursive positions, to switch codes and 
156ibid., p26 
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registers, and to negotiate between different cultural modalities,I58. On the one hand 
'there is a striving for order' and on the other 'there is an excitement, exhilaration and 
anxiety produced by rapid change and the proliferation of choices' 159. My second case 
study offers an interesting insight into the tension between 'order' and 'chaos' and 
how it impacts upon the individual's' sense of self'. As has already been noted, a 
recurrent reason offered by the respondents in explanation for the singling out of 
Islam as the defining axis of identification is a yearning for stability and certainty. 
Moreover the precursor to this yearning for stability is related to the particular 
experience of chaos, of engaging multiple axes of difference which, as one respondent 
suggests, begins to 'blur the boundaries between good and bad'. Here the search for 
stability is directly linked to a quest for truth and reason which are also key principles 
associated with modernity (see pp274-276). These connections are used to accord the 
Muslim identities presented in chapter 6 a distinctly modern status. 
The tension between 'order' and 'chaos' is defined in Rattansi's postmodern frame as 
a 'heightened reflexivity' 160 and is identified as the feature which distinguishes the 
'postmodern' subject from the modern. In Rattansi's words, it is 'a mode of being 
both inside and outside modernity, of stepping back, or out, and looking in, while still 
having one foot and eye, so to speak, inside modernity'161. 
Decentring and de-essentialisation of the subject and the social 
The complexity and significance of modernity's conflicting features as regards 
analysing modern identities is unpacked in Rattansi's 'postmodern frame' through the 
157ibid., p28 
158ibid., p24 
159ibid., p25 
l~ttansi does acknowledge differences in interpretation of the concept of 'heightened reflexivity' 
amongst postmodernists. For example, Bauman perceives it as a phase in which the impossibility of 
modernity fulfilling its 'promise' to uncover the 'truth' is widely acknowledged. By comparison, 
Giddens interprets an increased 'reflexivity' as emerging from within modernity, as the 'self 
clarification' of modem thought and not a replacement or rejection of it. Rattansi does not adjudicate 
on the two positions and clarifies that it is the commonality between the two perspectives, in that 
neither writer is at odds with the idea of a 'heightened reflexivity', that informs his own usage of the 
term and which he defines as 'the critical reflection of the character, limits, and foundations of 
modernity'. 
161ibid., p19 
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concepts of 'decentring' and 'de-essentialisation'. The two concepts are interrelated 
and, generally speaking, take account of how the modern conditions of ambivalence 
and otherness position the subject in uncertain ways. More specifically, 'decentring' 
emphasises that there is no unique rational 'vantage point' from which all identities 
can be grasped and defined. 'De-essentialisation' extends this line of argument by 
drawing attention to the presence of numerous and variable elements that inform and 
affect identity formations. The decentring and de-essentialisation of the subject and 
the social is more clearly stitched into Rattansi's 'postmodern frame' through non-
linear conceptions of time and space. Here Rattansi draws upon the concepts of 
differance and dislocation, as used by Derrida and Laclau respectively. 
In summary, differance enables a conception of identity in which the idea of 'a pure 
origin' is replaced by 'the ever-present potential of a play of signification' 162. If 
identities can be located and defined at all it is always with the proviso that they are 
open to revision and reinterpretation at any time. In a similar vein, dislocation 'posits 
'[ ... ] a field of relational semi-identities in which "political", "economic" and 
"ideological" elements all enter into unstable relations of imbrication without ever 
managing to constitute themselves as separate objects"I63. What is implied here is an 
endless displacement and cross cutting of boundaries within which identities are 
(re )constituted. 
Building on the 'theoretical infrastructure' provided by Derrida and Ladau, Rattansi 
draws attention to the interrelationship between time/space characteristics. In the 
specific context of Western modernity he suggests that globalisation processes 
generate an erratic and continuous re-structuring of the' local' and 'global'. The ease 
and speed with which individuals and information can be accessed globally produces 
a 'shrinking of global spatiality' in which public conceptions of time and space 
become increasingly compressed and incoherent. Similarly, migration, another key 
feature of globalisation, is described by Rattansi as having a potentially 'explosive' 
impact for spatial organisation. Racially diverse populations on the one hand enhance 
the chances for cultural exchange and building new relationships, but on the other 
162ibid., p30 
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increase the potential 'for racialized conflict and violence' 164. What needs to be 
underlined here is that neither time nor space follow a neat linear sequence but are 
defined as products of a criss-crossing of 'old' and 'new' narratives and processes. 
Rattansi's theorisation of time/space dynamics closely resembles Gilroy's 
incorporation of the same themes in his understanding of 'diaspora'. As such the 
particular application of notions of time/space for examining Muslim subjectivities 
that was identified in the context of Gilroy'S work (see p99) is reinforced by 
Rattansi's insights. The respective pieces are also drawn upon in the first case study to 
expand the direction of analysis provided by Gilroy's understanding of double 
consciousness. Specifically, the non-linear conceptions of time/space are used to shed 
light on the dynamics behind the trends in film consumption which simultaneously 
fragment the cultural landscape of Britain (in that Indian films sit alongside 
popular/mainstream films) but leave the hierarchical arrangement of cultures intact (in 
that Indian films are still seen to be aesthetically inferior to popular/mainstream 
films). These findings are interpreted as providing an illustration of how 'old' and 
'new' narratives are interwoven into the process of cultural negotiation (see pp165-
168). 
Relations of the psychic and the social 
For Rattansi, the complex interweaving of 'old' and 'new' narratives is made still 
more complex by the play of the unconscious. In this respect he points to the 
usefulness of psychoanalytic approaches in conceptualising 'a subject whose 
unconscious desires, including sexual desire, constantly disrupt the conscious logic of 
intention and rationality'165. By way of illustration, Rattansi draws on a wide-range of 
writers, including Mason, Gilman, Mills, and Ware, to suggest that European 
constructions of black people as hyper-sexual, subhuman creatures were essentially a 
displacement of white European male sexuality l66. In short, the ability to dominate 
163ibid., p31 
164ibid., p33 
165ibid., 34 
l~ttansi acknowledges the significant contribution made by Bhabha in taking the work of Said's 
Orientalism a step further and exposing that the dynamics between 'coloniser' and 'colonised' are not 
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and subordinate the Other was dependent on the construction of an identity which was 
necessarily masculine, essentially rational and notably civilised. Everything that this 
identity could not be, such as sexual and emotional, was projected onto the Other who 
thus became the object of 'fantasy and desire' as well as 'anxiety and fear'. 
The intertwining of discourses of racial and sexual difference imbricated in modern 
structures and relations underlines how even the most seemingly uncomplicated 
modern identities are complexly located and defined and cannot be unpacked by 
strong classificatory frameworks. This, Rattansi suggests, is precisely the strength of 
the' postmodern frame', in that its deconstructive power provides' a framework that 
makes these problems intelligible'167. 
Deconstructive power of the {postmodem frame' 
The constant overlapping and cross-cutting of boundaries in the formation of modern 
identities leads Rattansi to conclude that 'ethnicity, racism and the myriad terms in-
between [ ... ] are permanently [ ... ] caught in the impossibility of fixity and 
essentialisation,I68. Responding to the need to replace water tight definitions Rattansi 
advocates 'foucauldian genealogical projects'. He unpacks the overall implications of 
this for his 'postmodem frame' through the particular appropriation of the concept of 
ethnicity. 
The 'postmodem frame' 'conceptualises ethnicity as part of a cultural politics of 
representation,169. In essence, ethnicity is problematised as a configuration arising out 
of a complex and volatile network of processes of identification and representation. 
Here identification is broken down as involving processes of 'self-identification', as 
well as forms of identification constructed by disciplinary agencies such as the state. 
Similarly, 'representation', within the notion' cultural politics of representation' , 
operates in a 'double sense'. On the one hand, it draws attention to the ethnic 
constrained by fixed divisions in that feelings of 'ambivalence' introduce more complex dimensions to 
the encounter. However, he adds that Bhabha's insight, like Said's, is limited in that questions of 'race 
and sexuality are rarely confronted directly'. 
1670p.cit. p59 
168ibid .• p53 
169ibid .• p57 
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identities or 'imagined communities' (re)produced and bonded together by visual and 
written narratives circulated by the various mediums of 'popular' and 'high' culture 
(such as newspapers; television; theatre; music; novels etc). On the other hand, 
'representation' also includes the articulations of ethnic identity asserted in 
'communal views and 'interests", with a particular emphasis on analysing the 
conflictual relations and manner through which 'communal interests' get debated and 
defined. 
In order to accommodate the complex ways in which processes of identification and 
representation unfold Rattansi advocates decentred and de-essentialised applications 
of the variety of terms related to modern subjectivities including ethnicity, 'race', 
racism, ethnocentrism and so on. In summary this amounts to appropriating the 
respective concepts in a non-definitive and unboundaried way so that the potential of 
'interpenetration' is always being accommodated/assessed. Rattansi illustrates the 
distinctive benefits of applying non-essentialist conceptions of identity negotiation in 
the context of challenging modern racisms. He suggests that anti-racist strategies have 
all too often oversimplified the dynamics of racism as a unified and consistent process 
of discrimination and inferiorisation. However, as has already been highlighted in the 
earlier discussions of ambivalence, racism arises out feelings of 'desire' and 'envy' as 
much as 'repulsion' and 'fear'. The underlying point here is that, it is only by 
retaining and responding to, as opposed to simplifying, the intertwining of racist and 
anti-racist sentiments that it becomes possible to tease out and challenge modern 
racisms more effectively than hitherto. 
This theme of the interpenetration of anti-racist and racist discourses in defining 
modern relations is identified across my two case studies. The respective findings 
reveal how feelings of superiority/inferiority are reinvented within 'diaspora' 
subjectivities because of the persisting and highly racialised climate in which they are 
negotiated and expressed. For example, the hierarchical organisation of Indian and 
popular/mainstream films amongst South Asian youth is found to have little to do 
with attaining more or less pleasure from one text over another. Rather the situation 
arises precisely because the interaction of the two categories of films does not exist in 
an independent or neutral space but one where even the most fundamental of 
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decisions of choosing one text over another often means choosing one peer group 
over another (see pp 180-182). The second case study provides a vastly different 
insight into the interpenetration of anti-racist and racist discourses in defining modern 
relations. The non Asian respondents recount how dominant' British' conceptions of 
Muslims as being of Asian origin means that members of the indigenous population 
often find it difficult to accept them as Muslims. As such their Muslim identities 
become a focus for interaction around behaviour deemed out of the 'norm' such as not 
handling pork or wanting to move homes in order to be near a mosque. My analysis 
describes how such dynamics contribute to heighten awareness and position 
negotiations of being Muslim in a highly racialised context (see pp222-225). These 
observations are used to highlight the resilience of the process of racialisation amidst 
dynamics of 'cultural mutation'. 
A 'new' cultural politics of difference 
Rattansi expands upon the benefits of the deconstructive approach of the 'postmodern 
frame' in the context of the 'phenomenon of new ethnicities'. The emphasis here 
shifts from identifying how the criss-crossing of boundaries and discourses interrupts 
and destabilises 'neat' classifications and 'rationally' constituted identities, to 
delineating how the criss-crossing of boundaries and discourses gives rise to new 
'hybrid' cultural configurations and a new cultural politics of difference. 
Drawing significantly on Hall's conception of 'new ethnicities' Rattansi notes the 
emergence of culturally transgressive and non-absolutist identity formations. Marked 
by the distinct characteristic of borrowing and fusing Western, Asian, African and 
other cultural practices, the 'new ethnicities' are described as signifying a transition 
from an essentialist cultural politics organised around 'unifying' concepts such as 
black, to a politics driven by an engagement with difference. As a result the relations 
between 'margin' and 'centre' are no longer governed by a 'struggle over the relations 
of representation' but by a 'politics of representation' (see earlier section on Hall 
pp70-71). 
The significance that Rattansi and Hall accord to a 'politics of representation' in 
overcoming mutually exclusive dynamics of 'race' and culture provides a key 
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framework for contesting the racially transgressive qualities of the Muslim identities 
presented in chapter 6. My analysis highlights two crucial points. Firstly, that the 
culturally fragmented contestations of identity negotiation which a 'politics of 
representation' emphasises are apparent in many of the respondents' negotiations of 
being Muslim and are specifically found in such instances as the re-reading of key 
Islamic texts to challenge patriarchal gender relations. Secondly, in order to defeat a 
neo-conservative Muslim politics it is necessary for the culturally fragmented 
contestations of being Muslim to be given more prominence in dominant discourses. 
In this regard, my discussion emphasises that the' politics of representation' needs to 
be engaged by both Muslims and non Muslims (see pp239-246). 
In essence Rattansi's investigation stresses the 'intertwining of discourses' as peculiar 
to the 'postmodern condition' which characterises the variety of contemporary 
subjectivities. From this position the racialisation process, like the process of 
hybridisation, is understood to be complex and fractured by feelings of ambivalence. 
Thus, essentialist anti-racist discourses are seen to be ineffective because they 
oversimplify the dynamics of 'race' and racism into two mutually exclusive positions 
of 'racist' and' victim'. This is what connects Rattansi' s position with other 
'hybridity' theorists in that racially transgressive cultural change is seen to emerge 
from non-essentialist conceptions of culture and identity. 
Summary 
Taken together, the four sections above highlight that contemporary conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity' have not emerged out of a single coherent theory or academic 
discipline. If the respective works share a point of origin at all, then that is 
encapsulated in Stuart Hall's conception of the 'end of the essential black subject' and 
its specific assertion that homogenous conceptions of 'race' and ethnicity are ill-
equipped to capture the culturally fragmented character of modern identities, let alone 
establish a non-racialised future. The themes of 'difference', cultural pluralism, loss 
of a 'stable sense of self, transnational identifications and so on, with which 'cultural 
hybridity' is more commonly associated, are given critical significance in each of the 
respective expositions. These overall similarities underline each writer's emphasis on 
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non-essentialist conceptions of 'race' as being vital to the constitution of a racially 
transgressive cultural politics. 
Beyond the overall similarities there are nevertheless significant differences in the 
social and historical contexts that provide the background for each writer's 
investigation. Hall develops his understanding of 'cultural hybridity' by examining 
the 'new' logic of capital and the 'migrant condition'. Post-war diaspora formations 
and the particular experiences of South Asians are the basis for Brah's analysis. In 
Gilroy's case it is the 'inner character of modernity' and the condition of 'double 
consciousness' that are the focus for discussion. Rattansi devotes his attention to 
unpacking the 'postmodern' condition. A main consequence of these distinctly 
different paths of analysis is that across the works there is no agreed position as to 
how exactly the process of hybridisation might be exploited for encouraging anti-
racist sensibilities. For example, Hall remains focused on exposing how a position of 
'cultural hybridity' interweaves distinct cultural narratives such that they can't be 
represented by fixed categories. Brah, on the other hand, tilts the balance of emphasis 
to addressing what exactly is being articulated and understanding the dynamics of 
power defining particular subject positions. For Gilroy, assessing the transgressive 
qualities of hybrid cultures means examining how they disrupt the 'antinomies of 
modernity'. Rattansi foregrounds the emergence of decentred and de-essentialised 
subjectivities that are responsive to the complex character of racism. The differences 
between the writers do not indicate different conceptions of 'hybridity' as such, but 
emphasise different concerns as to how best to establish its transgressive qualities. 
It is in the context of identifying how exactly 'culturally hybrid' subjectivities disrupt 
processes of racialisation that some of the writers develop and emphasise specific 
features and notions that are not so readily associated with 'cultural hybridity'. Brah 
and Gilroy's analyses provide the most vivid examples of this in their exploration of 
such concepts as 'politics of location', the 'subtext of home' and 'unity', 'tradition' 
and 'authenticity'. By undertaking a separate analysis of each writer's work this 
chapter has been able to give just as much prominence to the internal differences and 
relatively unexplored aspects of the respective works as their similarities. In providing 
this more balanced insight into contemporary conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' the 
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critical review has established a theoretical framework from which it will be possible 
to arrive at a more considered position about the value of 'cultural hybridity' in 
informing more equal structures of interaction between nations, cultures and 'races'. 
The strengths and limitations of the work presented in this chapter are now examined 
in the context of two social and historically specific case studies examining the 
everyday cultural realities of sections of the British South Asian population. 
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Chapter 3 
Quantitative Survey Design for Examining 
'Audience Activity' 
The next two chapters are concerned with discussing my questionnaire survey which 
examines the patterns of consumption of films on videotape amongst sections of the 
South Asian population in London. Chapter 4 provides a detailed interpretation of the 
survey findings. It draws upon the theoretical work presented in chapter 2 to identify 
the significance of the empirical data for providing an insight into everyday cultural 
realities, and uses the survey findings to contest the relevance of theories of 'cultural 
hybridity' for understanding everyday dynamics of 'race' and culture. In this chapter, 
my concern is to describe and evaluate my methodological approach relating to the 
survey design, questionnaire distribution and coding of the results. 
The chapter consists of four sections. The first three sections detail the various stages 
through which the specific objectives, structure and wording of the questionnaire were 
identified, revised and finalised. The fourth section outlines the process of 
administering the survey and addresses related issues including student assistance, 
methods of distribution, sample bias, data coding and the scope and limitations of the 
findings. Another related issue concerning the suitability of a quantitative survey for 
gaining an insight into everyday cultural realities is dealt with separately in chapter 7. 
This concerns the methodological stance of 'new' audience researchers who favour 
qualitative rather than quantitative research methods as the most suitable for 
investigating audience behaviour. Quantitative techniques are found to be inadequate 
because they reduce individuals and their behaviour to quantifiable units and are 
unable to respond to the complex and subjective elements which essentially give 
'meaning' to the act of viewing. In chapter 7 I review the methodological debates 
within 'new' audience studies and highlight the idea that quantitative research is 
crucial for providing a context through which to make sense of qualitative 
observations and their precise contribution to understanding the cultural dynamics 
characterising modern societies. Thus, I argue that rather than endorsing one method 
over another it is more appropriate to understand and exploit the differing strengths of 
each. 
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To return to the content of this chapter, the process through which the structure of the 
questionnaire and its administration were finalised can be subdivided into three 
stages. They are: initial conceptualisation; pre-pilot; and pilot. I give details of each in 
chronological order. 
Initial Conceptualisation 
Many of the established commentaries and practical guides on survey researchl70 
observe that the roots of inaccurate or meaningless data often lie not in the 
instruments of measurement or interpretation but insufficient design and planning. 
The degree of emphasis that should be placed on developing hypotheses for 
investigation and finalising research techniques is captured in Oppenheim's point that, 
'contrary to expectations, the fieldwork stage is often shorter than the preliminary 
stages'l7I. 
The specific objectives and structure of my own questionnaire survey were identified 
and refined over a period of 15 months. The initial conceptualisation172 had two broad 
aims. These were, firstly, to investigate black people's viewing practices regarding 
films on videotape; and secondly, to analyse critically the relationship between 
theoretical approaches to audiences and viewing on the one hand, and issues of black 
spectatorship on the other. The original conception also envisaged the empirical 
research eliciting quantitative data from a questionnaire based survey followed by 
more qualitative data derived from individual and/or group interviews. This 
provisional framework was developed prior to my appointment to develop the initial 
research idea within the specific context of undertaking a doctoral thesis. Further, the 
initial research conceptualisation was presented as being open to revision and change 
in light of my own interests and direction of thought. As I embarked on the work I 
170see for example, A.N. (Bram) Oppenheim, Ouestionnaire Desjan. Intervjewina and Attitude 
Measurement, (London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1992) 
Gerald Hoinville & Roger Jowell, Survey Research Practice, (London, Heineman, 1978) 
Duane F. Alwin, ed., Survey Desian and Analysis, (London, Sage, 1978) 
Herbert H. Hyman, Survey Desian and Analysjs, (London, Free Press, 1955) 
I7IQuestionnaire Desian. Interviewina and Attitude Measurement, (London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
1992), p8 
172r[he initial idea was conceived by Lola Young who at the time (1994) was Senior Lecturer and Head 
of Media and Cultural Studies at Middlesex University. With the support of Professor Alan Durant a 
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exploited the freedom to impose my own research priorities and interests, such that 
the overall objective and focus of the audience research and its position within the 
thesis were clarified and redefined in three significant ways. 
Firstly, the initial conception of conducting a study on 'black' audiences was more 
specifically narrowed down to South Asian audiences. This decision was made whilst 
undertaking a number of pre-pilot discussions and is described in more detail below 
(see pp115-117). Secondly, in the course of identifying a suitable theoretical 
framework through which to contextualise the subjects of my empirical research, i.e. 
sections of the black population, I was not surprisingly drawn to the body of work 
examining the identity politics of contemporary migrant cultures. My focus on the 
work of Brah, Gilroy, Hall and Rattansi is explained in chapter 2 (see pp63-65). The 
work of these individuals, who for shorthand I've referred to as 'hybridity theorists', 
became the focal point around which to construct the central concerns of the thesis, 
i.e. to assess whether contemporary conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' can be 
productively mobilised to establish a racially transgressive cultural politics. Within 
this framework the empirical audience research was to provide a specific context for 
evaluating the relevance of the work of hybridity theorists in understanding everyday 
cultural realities and experiences of 'race'. 
Thirdly, as I began to unpack the various theoretical expositions of 'cultural 
hybridity' I became increasingly interested in expanding my critique beyond the field 
of media audiences. The main reason for this was that I wanted to seriously 
problematise and address Jonathan Friedman's criticism about how the work of 
hybridity theorists with its predominant focus on literature, film and music constitutes 
an ethno-genealogical method which has little to do with 'identity on the street'173. 
For sure, media consumption is for most people in Britain an integral part of their 
daily realities and routines, but media texts are still abstract cultural expressions. 
More importantly, consumption is a site of cultural negotiation which is positively 
encouraged by Western democracies. In that sense the dynamics of 'race' in relation 
bursary was secured and advertised to appoint a research student to develop the initial research idea in 
conjunction with doing a PhD. I was appointed in April 1994. 
173'Global Crises, The Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Porkbarrelling', in Debatin& 
Cultural Hybridjty, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood (London, Zed Books, 1997), pp70-89 
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to media consumption are played out in a context where capitalist industry has a 
vested interest in responding to the tastes of both dominant and subordinate groups. In 
response to this I felt it pertinent to situate conceptions of' cultural hybridity' in a 
more contentious context of cultural differentiation and negotiation, i.e. a notion of 
identity deemed antagonistic to advanced capitalist democracies where the dynamics 
of 'race' would be positioned differently than in the context of media consumption. A 
study examining Muslim identities was an obvious choice not only because of my 
own background and interests, but because of the current rise in Western fears of 
'Islamic fundamentalism' and the corresponding increase in racism directed towards 
Muslims. There is an additional connection here with regards to the thesis' focus on 
South Asians in that the majority of Muslims in Britain are of South Asian descentl74• 
The benefit of expanding the empirical focus to include 'Muslim' identities was that 
by contesting 'cu1tural hybridity' in the contrasting contexts of media consumption 
and religious negotiation it would be possible to gain a more complex, and also 
realistic, insight into the relevance of 'cu1tural hybridity' for understanding modern 
dynamics of 'race'. To create space for a separate study on Muslim identities I 
narrowed the initial conceptualisation of the audience study to focus on examining 
overall trends in tastes and consumption of films on videotape amongst South Asians 
without additional investigation(s) into individual readings of texts and/or use of 
domestic technologies. In place of the qualitative interviews envisaged as a follow-up 
to the audience survey I undertook a small scale study on young Muslim identities 
(see chapters 5 and 6). 
To work out the details of how the revised objectives of the audience study were to be 
translated into a questionnaire survey a number of pre-pilot discussions with samples 
of potential respondents were organised. 
Pre-Pilot 
The ambiguities raised by the term black and its inclusion in the provisional title for 
this study, i.e. Black on Black: Audience, Ethnicity and Film, meant that the question 
of 'who is being researched?' needed to be clarified. Hall points out that whilst the 
174see Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain. (London, I.B. Tauris, ]994), ppIO-26 
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signifier black has functioned in a progressive way 'to win some space' for 
disadvantaged groups within mainstream discourses, it has done so by essential ising 
difference 175• The purpose of the pre-pilot discussions was to clarify 'who' the 
questionnaire was to be aimed at as well as identify key areas for investigation. In 
arranging these discussions I decided to focus on the two largest groups in England 
often embraced within the term black, i.e. people of South Asian and African 
Caribbean background. 
A total of 6 pre-pilot discussions were arranged in different parts of London with 
groups of different age, gender and religious background. The groups also differed in 
their size and social make-up. They included an elders' day centre, an extended 
family, a young women's group and the committee members of a community 
association. The exploratory purpose of these meetings meant that they were fairly 
unstructured and covered a wide range of issues related to consumption of films 
which I now summarise. 
The first three discussions were carried out with selected members of the South Asian 
community. The wealth of information raised by these first discussions already began 
to draw my attention to the possibility of focusing the questionnaire survey on just 
one of the two groups. The main reason for entertaining this scenario was the 
realisation that probing into some of the complexities specific to each group would 
have to be weighed against the opportunity for contrast. For example, the first three 
discussions established the huge significance of popular Indian cinema in South Asian 
households. By comparison, as the fourth pre-pilot discussion revealed, Indian films 
were not an integral part of the film culture of individuals of African Caribbean 
background who expressed a greater interest in 'black films'176 than South Asian 
respondents. In addition, whilst South Asian respondents were reliant on Indian video 
outlets to access Indian films, African Caribbean respondents were reliant on specific 
I73'What is This "Black" in Black Popular Culture', in Black Popular Culture, edited by G. Dent, 
(Seattle, Bay Press, 1992), pp21-33 
176, Black films' was defined by one of the group as films which had been black financed and directed 
whilst others used the term in a broader sense to include those films with a black cast Examples 
included Sugar Hill, Menace to Society, Crooklyn, Meteor Man, Sankoja and Unjorgiven. 
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cinemas, such as The Electric, for their access to and participation in a 'black film' 
culture. 
In identifying how best to proceed with the survey several options were considered. 
One questionnaire could still have been developed and distributed amongst both 
groups. However, to have accommodated the differences and multiple possible 
answers that had been relayed during the pre-pilot discussions would have resulted in 
a rather lengthy questionnaire with sections and options not applicable to all 
respondents and therefore likely to be off-putting. A more attractive option would 
have been to develop two questionnaires, each tailored for one group. The decision 
not to proceed with this idea was largely as a result of feeling daunted by the 
'simultaneous' responsibility of managing two separate, albeit interrelated, surveys. 
There were other practical considerations too. For instance, channelling all available 
resources on a survey of one broad ethnic group would directly increase the number 
of responses from that group, thereby enhancing the ability to make more significant 
observations and comparisons from the data collated. All things considered my 
personal conclusion was that to narrow the focus of the research to one group would 
be the most economical and effective for the purposes of the thesis. Choosing between 
the two groups was not too difficult given my own background and familiarity with 
South Asian culture and the ability to converse in two of the languages i.e. Urdu and 
Gujarati. This decision was taken soon after the fourth pre-pilot discussion and two 
additional appointments with individuals of African Caribbean background (a nuclear 
family, and a mixed sex youth group) were cancelled. 
Key areas for investigation 
The three discussions with South Asian groups had highlighted a number of areas for 
consideration in the drafting of the questionnaire, e.g. many respondents watched 
popular Indian films as often, if not more often, than mainstream English language 
films; significant numbers complained that the picture and sound quality of hired 
Indian films on videotape tended to be very poor; and those subscribing to cable and 
satellite television indicated significantly less recourse to rent Indian films than 
previously. The pre-pilot discussions also touched on a number of other issues related 
to the broader context of media consumption. Many respondents begrudged having to 
117 
buy a television licence because they felt that the BBC and terrestrial television in 
general failed to cater for the diversity of their tastes. At the same time respondents 
emphasised how there was always a noticeable degree of excitement amongst family 
and friends when terrestrial channels screened anything specific to "their" culture, 
such as The Mahabharata. 
As well as providing a kind of skeletal framework of the main areas for investigation, 
the pre-pilot discussions also highlighted the type and variety of categories that might 
be offered for particular multiple choice questions. These points along with those 
from reading around academic audience studies and comments from 
supervisors/colleagues were consolidated into the first draft of the questionnaire (see 
Appendix A). I have purposefully not discussed the content of the pre-pilot 
discussions in any great detail for the reason that they were not conducted to elicit 
data for critical analysis. However, I do refer to some verbatim quotes in chapter 4 to 
provide background information to help make sense of the statistical data emerging 
from the final survey. 
It should be noted that in drafting the questionnaire for the pilot stage I was keen to 
ensure that its content was as sensitive as possible to the 'new' audience argument, 
(albeit using a method of research not advocated by 'new' audience scholars), that the 
consumption of any medium, say television, should 'be seen, not in isolation, but as 
one of a number of information and communication technologies, occupying domestic 
time and space'177. In response to this the pilot questionnaire had sections on different 
types of media technologies. 
Before moving on to discuss the results of the pilot there is one methodological 
question raised earlier which deserves separate consideration: the question of 'who is 
being researched?' demanded an identification of how research subjects and their 
responses were to be categorised. In the following section I discuss the questions and 
categories which generated most debate around wording and summarise my reasoning 
behind the final choice of terms. 
177David Morley, Television Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992), p201 
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Categorisation 
In his analysis of research conducted in the United States, John H. Stanfield argues 
that much 'race' and ethnic categorisation is imbued with common sense notions of 
'race'. Although Stanfield's focus is North America, as he himself points out his 
observations are relevant to other Western nations where 'race' and ethnic categories 
pre-dominate in how individuals define themselves and are defined by others. He 
states, 
The vast majority of literature on racially defined populations in the United 
States is rooted in taken-for-granted objectified conceptions of racial identity. 
This has resulted in a number of fallacies in the meaning of racial group 
membership that have functioned more to legitimate ideologies regarding 
objectified notions of racial differences than to offer accurate empirical 
evidence regarding the complexities of human identity in race-centred 
societies. 178 
Stanfield goes on to point out that, as limited as they might be, the embeddedness of 
'race' and ethnic categories in people's everyday language and conceptions of who 
they are makes it impossible to eliminate them completely from empirical research. 
Stanfield offers two suggestions for sensitising his observations in research designs. 
Firstly, he argues that a great deal can be learnt about structuring research processes 
by considering literature which addresses the intricate ways in which dominant and 
subordinate relations become culturally and politically defined. With reference to my 
own survey this point was addressed in chapter 1. Through a critique of three 
audience studies I was able to identify the diverse and shifting terms of reference 
which impact upon the dynamics of 'race' and ethnicity within the act of media 
consumption. These included terms of reference as diverse as the historical 
representations of blacks in mainstream texts, as illustrated in Bobo's study, to the 
(re)negotiation of cultural practices such as arranged marriage, as identified in 
Gillespie's research. 
178'Epistemological Considerations', in Race and Ethnjcity in Research Methods, edited by J.H. 
Stanfield & R. M. Dennis, (London, Sage, 1993), pIS 
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Stanfield's second suggestion for developing empirical studies that are sensitive to 
internally differentiated concepts of 'race' and ethnicity is to invite input from 'human 
subjects who may call into question the theoretical assumptions or methodological 
strategies of the researcher' 179. The pre-pilot and pilot stages of the survey created the 
opportunity for both the overall hypothesis as well as the specific wording of the 
questionnaire to be informed by individuals fitting the subject profile of my target 
population. It is appropriate to explain more fully the reasoning behind some of the 
wording and categories used in the questionnaire. 
So far as ascertaining the 'race' and ethnicity of individuals was concerned I resolved 
that the best approach would be to use a combination of questions which would 
enable me to break the category of South Asian down. For the question asking 
individuals to indicate their ethnic group I utilised categories consistent with the 
different countries of the Indian sub-continent (e.g. Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan etc, 
see Appendix A question 4b). This was combined with several questions relating to a 
range of other aspects of people's 'race' and ethnic identities including place of birth; 
language(s) spoken; area of residence; religion and so on (see Appendix A questions 
4a, 5,6 and 7). These questions were clearly designed to collect factual differences 
and do not of course measure the subjective ways in which people construct and 
define themselves. Nevertheless some indication of internal group differences can be 
ascertained by crosstabulating responses to a variety of questions relating to social 
background. For example, where women indicate an overwhelming dislike of 
violence on the screen compared to men's indifference to it we might identify 'sex' as 
the underlying factor behind that difference. However, the precise way in which 'sex' 
functions to create this difference is not explained by the simple observation that men 
and women are two biologically different sexes. It has to do with the collision of 'sex' 
with a number of other variables including household structure; employment status; 
experience of violence; historical constructions of gender roles and so on. Aspects of 
some of these variables can be identified factually, such as occupation and type of 
household. This would appear to be Hall's point when in his delineation of 'new 
ethnicities' he writes, 'we all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, 
out of a particular experience, a particular culture, without being contained by that 
179ibid .• p32 
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position [ ... J. We are all, in that sense, ethnically located and our ethnic identities are 
crucial to our subjective sense of who we are.tso. 
The categorisation of other aspects of respondents' backgrounds such as class were 
resolved by adopting a similar strategy to that described above, i.e. identifying the 
various measurable elements which might give an indication of a person's class such 
as income levels, educational qualification, job status and so on. Aside from the 
personal detail questions, a significant amount of time was also spent debating the 
choice of terms to describe mainstream English language films and popular films 
from the Indian sub-continent. 
The pre-pilot discussions indicated that in their everyday conversations respondents 
invariably used the terms 'English films' and 'Hollywood films' to refer to texts from 
mainstream British film culture. Neither of these categories was deemed appropriate 
for the pilot questionnaire. The term 'English films' was rejected on the grounds that 
this would exclude non English films which had also made their way into the 
mainstream. The term Hollywood on its own was seen to raise similar problems. 
Recognising that Hollywood texts dominated popular British film culture the term 
'mainstream/Hollywood' was coined for the pilot questionnaire. This was revised 
again after the pilot (see pI28). Choosing the category 'Indian films' posed fewer 
dilemmas, as the other most popular terms used by respondents during the preliminary 
stages were 'Bollywood films' and 'Hindi films'. The former term was not seen to be 
suitable due to its underlying connotation implying that Indian films are inferior to 
Hollywood films. 'Hindi films' was also deemed inappropriate because of its 
emphasis on Hindi culture and language which is representative of the vast majority, 
but not all, texts produced by the popular Indian film industry. 
In terms of eliciting information about the features attracting individuals to particular 
types of texts the genre categories of Western films provided one framework. 
However, these were not appropriate for differentiating Indian films. As 
Rajadhyaksha and Willemen point out, 'a great deal more work needs to be done on 
the problems of defining, analysing and periodising genres in Indian cinema'. They 
lSO'New Ethnicities', in Black Film. British Cinema, edited by K. Mercer, (London, ICA. 1988), p29 
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add, 'many films deliberately combine, as in a menu, what in the West would be 
regarded as different genres (comedy, thriller, action, musical and so on)'181. Thus, the 
pilot questionnaire asked individuals to indicate not only which genres they preferred 
but also the kind of factors that influenced their choice of film, such as 
actors/actresses; storyline; language and so on (see Appendix A question 26a). 
When the first draft of the questionnaire was complete one final decision that needed 
to be made before piloting was whether to have it translated, and if so into which 
languages. In arriving at a decision the main points considered were the size of the 
financial budget available, the costs for translation and the most common languages 
amongst the population targeted. The three most common languages amongst 
potential respondents were identified as Gujarati, Punjabi and Urdu. For the small 
numbers to be involved in the pilot and the cost for one translation totalling over 
£400+, the decision was taken to proceed with one translation. Gujarati was chosen as 
it was the most common language across the two boroughs which I had already 
decided would be the main focus for the final questionnaire i.e. Newham and 
Kingston. In addition many of the older generation whose first language was Urdu 
and who had been through the school system in India were, as a result, literate in 
Gujarati. 
Pilot 
The pilot survey was conducted in the London Borough of Haringey and had four 
main objectives. These were to assess how people received the questionnaire in 
different contexts; how effective the wording and structure of the questionnaire was; 
what constituted the most successful strategies for getting individuals to co-operate 
and complete a questionnaire; and to gauge how many responses within what kind of 
timescale should be expected so that a realistic target of completed questionnaires 
could be established for the actual survey. The pilot proved to be a crucial stage of the 
preliminary work, in that it caused the final structure of the questionnaire to be 
drastically re-thought. I do not comment here on every detail that was altered but 
summarise the main ways in which the pilot informed and changed the final design 
and administration of the questionnaire. A more complete picture of individual 
lSI Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema, (London, BA, 1994), p14 
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revisions to the wording and structure of the questionnaire can be ascertained by 
comparing the first draft (Appendix A) with the final version (Appendix C). 
Distribution strategies and reception of questionnaire 
There are a variety of strategies for administering questionnaire surveys, the main 
ones being by post, telephone or through face to face contact. Whilst nothing had been 
definitely ruled out at the pilot stage, the length of the questionnaire always made a 
postal or telephone administered survey unlikely. The financial implications of these 
methods made them still less viable options. Equally, in order to ensure significant 
numbers of responses I knew I had to identify an approach by means of which I could 
address and distribute the questionnaire to groups of potential respondents as opposed 
to individuals. This was the reason behind my focus on community organisations, 
groups and classes aimed at sections of the South Asian population. 
Five community groups were identified through which the pilot questionnaire could 
be distributed and were selected on the understanding that between them they would 
provide access to a good cross-section of the South Asian population in terms of age, 
gender, language and ethnicityl82. A brief description of each group selected is given 
in Appendix B. The five groups differed hugely in their size and type of activity 
which meant I had to adjust my technique for making a request, in the first instance 
for people's attention, and ultimately their contribution to the study by completing a 
questionnaire. For example, one of the groups was a once weekly educational class 
and therefore it was inappropriate to ask individuals to interrupt their lesson to 
complete a questionnaire. What I was able to do was provide a brief outline of the 
research and its aims and leave questionnaires with the class tutor who agreed to take 
responsibility for their distribution and collection. A similar approach was taken with 
a luncheon club. A third group provided a drop-in service for young people and I was 
advised by the project leader to speak to individuals on a one to one basis and try and 
get them to fill in questionnaires within the session because they were unlikely to 
bring them back if given the option of taking them away. These three groups where 
either I or the group co-ordinator, or a combination of the two, had spent some time 
l~he ethnicity of the South Asian population in Haringey, and indeed across London, tended to be 
differentiated in accordance with the different national regions of the Indian sub-continent as broken 
down in question 4b of Appendix A. 
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encouraging individuals to complete questionnaires proved to be the most productive 
in terms of numbers of responses obtained. Between these three groups a total of 61 
questionnaires were distributed of which 27 were returned. 
The other two groups generated far fewer responses. A main reason for this was that 
members of both groups were spread across a variety of activities, such as sports, 
drama and language classes, which were going on at the same time. The co-ordinator 
of one, himself engaged in a badminton match, had very little time to speak to me 
even though he had had prior notice of my visit. With both groups the only real 
opportunity for approaching members was when they were taking a break from their 
activities when many, understandably, did not want to be bothered by talk about an 
audience survey. The co-ordinators of both groups indicated it would be best for me 
to distribute as many questionnaires as possible and return in two weeks time to 
collect any completed questionnaires. Out of a total of 31 questionnaires handed out 4 
were completed and returned to me a fortnight later. When compared with the first 
two groups, where it was equally inappropriate to expect questionnaires to be 
completed within sessions, but where the rate of return was far higher, it could be 
deduced that the enthusiasm and support of project workers/co-ordinators towards the 
research was central to getting individuals to co-operate. 
The pilot underlined the importance of face to face contact with both group co-
ordinators and group members in generating responses. As a consequence what little 
chance there had been of administering the questionnaire via post or telephone had 
now been completely ruled out. Other options for accessing respondents were 
suggested and considered in the post pilot phase such as via cinemas and clubs that 
attracted large numbers of South Asians. But this was not a questionnaire that could 
be completed in a queue. Nor was it realistic to expect people 'out for the night' to 
give up twenty or thirty minutes of their evening. Thus, although they could not 
always guarantee people's Willingness to participate, community organisations still 
comprised the most economical avenue for reaching and eliciting responses from 
significant numbers of people. One avenue that was incorporated successfully in the 
actual survey was distributing questionnaires via videoshops specialising in Indian 
films. Arrangements were made with two outlets to approach customers and offer 
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them a free video in return for a completed questionnaire. The idea of doing the same 
in mainstream videoshops such as Blockbusters was considered but not pursued 
because of the potential for friction arising from the fact that only customers of South 
Asian descent would be approached. 
The pilot was relatively successful in obtaining a research sample reflective of various 
age, sex and ethnic groupings. Out of thirty questionnaires returned 40% were 
completed by males and 60% by females. The age breakdown had adequate 
representation from the 14-25 (37%),26-40 (33%) and 41-55 (23%) age-groups. One 
disappointment in this regard was the absence of any responses from the 55+ age 
group. I had hoped that the luncheon club would provide access to this age group as I 
had been informed that significant numbers of its regular users were pensioners. 
Unfortunately I was not involved in the distribution of the questionnaires to members 
of this group and so could not pinpoint the exact reasons for their absence in the pilot 
survey. However, reflecting back on the pre-pilot discussions I found this age group 
to be the most co-operative and so was confident that with better planning and more 
emphasis on face to face contact that they would be represented in the actual survey. 
The ethnic composition of the sample was inclusive of the main South Asian groups 
and included Indians (70%), Pakistanis (10%) and Bangladeshis (10%). That the 
number of respondents of Indian background far outweighed the other two groups was 
in part intentional. The reason for this was that in order to make the most of the 
limited translation and interpreting resources, I had preselected areas for the actual 
survey where the South Asian population was predominantly of Indian background, 
and so it made sense to target the same group for the pilot. 
In as much as the pilot constituted a trial run of the actual survey, albeit on a smaller 
scale, it provided an opportunity to consider the purpose and effectiveness of the 
questionnaire from very different perspectives than previously. The pre-pilot 
discussions had been re-assuring in that individuals expressed an interest and 
willingness to participate in the study without much, if any, need to convince them of 
the value of the research or the importance of their input. By contrast, the rate of 
return of questionnaires during the pilot was about one third of all questionnaires 
handed out. 
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What I found, particularly from my visit to the drop-in centre for young people, was 
that the buzz and banter of a discussion was replaced by silence and intense 
concentration of filling in a questionnaire. Of course there was nothing to stop people 
from conversing with each other whilst they completed questionnaires but the format 
generally drew them to sit and think individually and in silence. This imposed a very 
different dynamic to their session which normally would be full of chatter and 
interaction. In the pre-pilot stage the noise of a discussion had tended to attract people 
to participate. In the pilot the silence of a questionnaire had made people curious 
enough to enquire what the person(s) sitting in silence were doing but less likely to 
volunteer their own input This was an important observation in alerting me to be 
more conservative about my expectations of people's willingness to participate. It also 
had the effect of widening my approach in the actual survey to include interview 
administered questionnaires. 
Rate of return and target for actual survey 
Across the five groups 94 questionnaires were handed out and 31 were returned of 
which one was virtually blank and therefore was discarded from the coding process. 
There was likely to be some variation in this figure in the actual survey, but on the 
basis of the pilot I estimated that I could expect on average about nine completed 
questionnaires per group visited. Taking into consideration time and resources a 
minimum target of 200 completed questionnaires was set for the full survey whilst 
always leaving open the possibility of increasing this figure further. In fact in the 
period after the pilot debrief, with the help of my supervisor, a small budget was 
secured to contract student help in the distribution and coding of the questionnaires. 
The effect was that 300+ responses were obtained - a 50% increase in the initial target 
figure. 
ClIlrifying and narrowing the focus 
I have already indicated how doing a trial run of the questionnaire critically 
positioned me in very different ways than any of the stages preceding the pilot. In this 
regard another particularly key moment was the process of coding and analysing the 
raw data. Whilst 30 responses were not enough to make any predictions, the act of 
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coding every response and making statistical comparisons drew me, perhaps for the 
first time, to seriously evaluate the contribution and worth of each question to my 
research objectives. 
As I have already noted, the overall objective of the survey was to identify trends in 
consumption of films on videotape amongst South Asian audiences which would 
provide a case study for contesting theories of 'cultural hybridity'. So far as the 
questionnaire was concerned its specific purpose was to gather information to 
establish patterns of consumption of films on videotape i.e. what kind of films on 
videotape individuals liked to watch; what factors influenced their choice of films on 
videotape; who did they prefer to watch films on videotape with; how other domestic 
technologies affected their consumption of films on videotape and so on. The pilot did 
not diminish any of these issues but brought to light the need to assess the way in 
which each had been incorporated into the questionnaire as well as their precise 
significance and weight for the overall study. For example, upon coding and printing 
the statistics I questioned how exactly knowing an individual's particular use of the 
computer (see Appendix A question 17) added to my understanding of their use of 
films on videotape. Similarly, what use would it be to know which radio stations or 
terrestrial programmes respondents liked or disliked (see Appendix A questions 15, 
47 and 48). For sure I may have been able to establish various correlations or 
associations, such as, 'people who liked science fiction films regularly watched 
science programmes such as Tomorrow's World', or that, 'people who watched a lot 
of films on videotape also regularly listened to radio stations'. The point is that each 
of the various sections and questions in the first draft of the questionnaire could 
somewhere, somehow be shown to be related to the broader picture of the use of films 
on videotape. But then so could other aspects of people's lives such as engagement 
with various domestic activities, demands of paid work and so on. 
In sum, on completion of the pilot I realised that the initial draft had lacked a specific 
focus and had been driven by an eagerness to accommodate the position of many 
'new' audience scholars that the use of media and media technologies should not be 
investigated in isolation, but contextualised and measured in relation to the variety of 
technologies within the home. Crucially, in using the various technologies as a 
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framework for structuring the pilot questionnaire I had compromised my ability to 
differentiate and make detailed comparisons of the trends in consumption of popular 
Indian and mainstream/Hollywood films on videotape. In hindsight this was 
misconceived in as much as the pre-pilot discussions had specifically highlighted 
these two culturally distinctive categories of films as occupying an invariably 
significant place in many South Asian households. In the process of re-drafting I 
focused on structuring the questionnaire such that I would be able to compare and 
contrast the patterns of consumption of popular Indian and mainstream!Hollywood 
films on videotape. This was achieved quite simply by using the two categories of 
films to structure the main body of the questionnaire. A revised version of the 
cable/satellite section was also included. The reason for this was that there had been 
strong indications emerging from the pre-pilot discussions that cable/satellite 
television had had a significant impact on the use of films on videotape, particularly 
Indian films. Other sections relating to terrestrial television, cinema, radio and 
newspapers, that had formed part of the pilot questionnaire, were removed altogether. 
Wording and structure of questionnaire 
The feedback received from respondents participating in the pilot suggested that the 
wording of the questionnaire had been easy to follow. However, one criticism relayed 
often was that the questionnaire took too long to fill in. Rethinking its structure and 
focus as described above reduced the average time taken to complete the 
questionnaire by a third, to twenty minutes. 
One significant aspect of re-wording was to the term 'mainstream! Hollywood'. 
Whilst no one participating in the pilot queried or sought clarification of the term 
'mainstream!Hollywood', in discussion with supervisors the question was raised as to 
whether some individuals may be constrained by this category to think only of those 
films made in Hollywood. It was important to note that although Hollywood texts 
predominated mainstream British film culture they did not occupy it exclusively. 
Thus, in the final draft 'mainstream!Hollywood' was replaced with 'popular/ 
mainstream' . 
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Translation 
20% of the responses returned utilised the Gujarati translation. If the same percentage 
was achieved in the actual survey the number of non English responses was likely to 
total about 60 questionnaires. Considering that the cost of one translation was about 
£400 I did not feel able to justify the translation of the questionnaire into a second 
language. As such I proceeded with only the Gujarati translation for the actual survey. 
Coding 
The coding of the raw data was done on SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) for Windows and was done in two stages. The first was to develop and 
input a code book. This essentially involved attaching a numerical code to each 
possible answer. There were three different types of questions each requiring varying 
degrees of thought when identifying the best coding frame. Coding was easiest where 
the questions required the respondent to tick only one box. In such cases coding of the 
question merely involved assigning a numerical value to each box. Question 2 is one 
such example and was coded in the following manner: 
2. Gender: Male 0(1) 
Female 0(2) 
Questions which invited the respondent to tick more than one box had to be coded in 
such a way that each box became a separate question. For example question 40 
appeared in the questionnaire as: 
40. What kind of films do you tend to watch at the cinema? 
(please tick all that apply) 
Indian films 0 
mainstream/Hollywood films 0 
Other(s) 0 
This question had to be entered into the code book as three separate questions. The 
following code for' Indian films' was repeated for the other two categories i.e. 
'mainstream/Hollywood' and 'other(s)': 
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What kind of films do you tend to watch at the cinema? (Indian films) 
Yes 0(1) 
No 0(2) 
This method of coding was employed for a substantial number of questions as the 
invitation to tick more than one box was a frequent feature in the questionnaire. The 
open ended question was the third type of question to be coded. Only a small number 
of such questions were included in the questionnaire. Few actually elicited enough 
responses to make post-coding feasible and therefore some were not entered in the 
code book. This non-response to open questions was unsurprising in that as 
Oppenheim notes, 'when it comes to an enumeration of items of behaviour, such as 
newspapers or magazines read the previous week or programmes watched on 
television, the open type of question produces a lower yield than the prompt-list kind. 
This is partly due to temporary forgetfulness and partly to the fact that some papers or 
programmes have low memorability,I83. 
Open questions that were entered into the code book were often coded using different 
categories than those offered by the respondents. For example, question 53 asked 
respondents to write down their favourite films. Instead of coding the name of every 
single film given in response to this question (which would have provided over 20 
categories) I decided it was more useful to code the question in the following way: 
Which are your favourite type of films: 
Indian films 
Mainstream I Hollywood films 
Indian and mainstream I Hollywood films 
other(s) 
0(1) 
0(2) 
0(3) 
0(4) 
Another useful facility offered by SPSS is the ability to record and distinguish 
missing values within the responses to each question. Missing values appeared in the 
pilot survey in instances where a respondent failed to provide an answer to a question 
1830uestionnaire Desian. Interviewjna and Attitude Measurement, (London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
1992), p114 
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or where the question did not apply to the individual concerned. During the coding of 
the raw data, where a question was 'not applicable' to the respondent this was coded 
as a 98, and where there was clearly 'no response' this was given the numerical value 
99. The significance of recording missing values was that it made it possible to 
interpret and present the data in accordance with the number of responses to a 
particular question as opposed to the number of individuals participating in the survey 
as a whole. 
The second stage of the coding was to go through each questionnaire and enter the 
code appropriate for each answer. Once this was complete the calculation of 
responses to all questions was done by SPSS which provided both numerical and 
percentage breakdowns. It was also possible to print bivariate and multivariate 
analyses i.e. the crosstabulation of two or more questions. 
My discussion of the various stages leading up to the actual survey has perhaps been 
overly descriptive but I think also necessary for the purposes of improving future 
studies and also for identifying the scope and limitations of this one. More 
specifically, as I argue in more detail in chapter 7, my experience and use of the 
quantitative survey has comprised a more complex process than that conveyed in 
many 'new' audience critiques which associate statistical data gathering techniques as 
'number crunching exercises' that have little to contribute to our understanding of 
human behaviourl84• Here it is useful to point out that, during the preliminary stages of 
research design I have had to address directly some of the central arguments integral 
to 'new' audience criticism of quantitative data such as collapsing the social 
background of individuals into particular categories. In doing so my attention has 
been drawn to the fact that many of the obstacles and difficulties encountered in 
quantitative research designs are not so easily overcome by simply adopting 
qualitative techniques. Stanfield encapsulates the point with respect to categorising 
research subjects when he states, 'researchers, no matter their methodological 
orientations, have no way of distinguishing whether an informant's expressed racial 
identification is a response to objectified categorisation derived from learning 
l84see for example David Morley, 'Towards an Ethnography of the Television Audience', in his book 
Teleyision. Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992), pp173-197 
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experiences in a race-saturated society or merely a sUbjective admission' 185. I draw on 
these observations in chapter 7 where I argue for a more serious consideration and 
(re)integration of quantitative techniques for the purposes of understanding modern 
cultural relations. 
The process of administering the survey and the effectiveness of its findings are now 
evaluated. The section should be read in conjunction with Appendix D which 
provides graphical illustrations of much of the data referred to. The visual graphs are 
to help balance the reliance on statistics which alone in numerical form may prove too 
tedious to follow. 
Survey Administration 
Student assistance 
The distribution of the questionnaire was spread over a three month period between 
July and September 1995. It was undertaken by myself and two undergraduate 
students recruited from the Media and Cultural Studies course at Middlesex 
University. Both students were female. One was white English and the other was of 
Mauritius backgroundl86• Both had completed the course module titled 'Media, Texts 
and Audiences' which had required them to design and undertake an empirical study 
involving a small number of individuals with a view to investigating their use/views 
of a particular medium or text. As such they came to the survey with some 
background knowledge of many of the debates dominating the field of academic 
audience research. 
In the initial stages of questionnaire distribution I intentionally arranged appointments 
with larger community organisations which the three of us visited together. Towards 
the end as the students gained in experience and confidence they attended some of the 
smaller groups on their own. Whilst I had sole responsibility for identifying groups 
and arranging appointments, in terms of actual contact with the respondents our roles 
len Ang, • Wanted: Audiences', in Remote Control, edited by E. Seiter et ai, (London, Routledge, 
1989), pp96-115 
ISS-Epistemological Considerations', in Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods, edited by J.H. 
Stanfield & R. M. Dennis, (London, Sage, 1993), pl8 
l86'fhe students were Launa Kennett and Nova Arnachellum. 
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were the same. Each of us approached individuals to tell them about the research and 
ask them if they would be willing to complete a questionnaire. Respondents were 
given the choice of completing questionnaires themselves or allowing us to interview 
them using the exact questions and structure of the questionnaire. 
Throughout the period of distribution I was in regular contact with the students who 
had been asked to note and report any dynamics or experiences relating either to 
respondents' reactions towards them, or respondents' answers to the questions. I refer 
to some of these points in subsequent sections but on the whole there was nothing to 
indicate that the experience of administering the questionnaire was significantly 
different between the three of us. 
As well as being involved in the distribution of the questionnaire the students also 
assisted in coding and inputting the responses onto SPSS. The contribution of the 
students was highly significant in terms of the number of responses elicited. Prior to 
securing funds to contract their help I had set a target of 200 completed 
questionnaires. The students' input helped raise this number in the actual survey to a 
total of 316 responses, an increase of just over 50%. 
Methods of questionnaire distribution 
The London Boroughs of Newham and Kingston-Upon-Thames were selected for the 
distribution of the questionnaire. They were chosen first and foremost for the fact that 
their respective South Asian populations were pre-dominantly of Indian background 
whose main language other than English was Gujarati. This was important in order to 
maximise the benefit of having a Gujarati translation available. The other main 
criteria for choosing the areas of Newham and Kingston were their contrasting 
statuses as a poor inner London area, in the case of Newham, and a more prosperous 
outer London area, in the case of Kingston. Lists of community organisations were 
obtained from the respective local authorities and used as a basis for identifying 
groups catering for sections of the South Asian population. As co-ordinators were 
contacted and meetings arranged, some offered to "put in a good word" with other 
groups with whom they were familiar. Sometimes these groups fell in neighbouring 
boroughs which did not prevent me from following up the lead. My reason for this 
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was that many ofthe groups within Newham and Kingston attracted individuals who 
travelled from outside of the respective borough and so the research was never strictly 
about South Asian residents within these areas. In fact as Figure 1 in Appendix 0 
illustrates the final sample was made up of individuals residing across a number of 
London boroughs with a handful from outside of the metropolis. The latter were either 
on holiday or were visiting friends/relatives at the time of the survey. Most 
respondents were residents of Newham (32.1 %) and Kingston (15.7%), or 
neighbouring areas such as Ilford (10.6%), Barking (6.8%), Tooting (3.4%) and 
Croydon (4.8%). 
Unlike the pilot, community organisations were not the only mode for accessing 
respondents. There were three additional avenues through which individuals were 
invited to take part in the survey. The first was via video outlets specialising in Indian 
films. Arrangements were made with two owners to allow one of the students to 
spend half a day in each of their shops. The agreement was that any customers willing 
to complete a questionnaire would be offered a video rent free. The charge for rental 
would be reimbursed to the owner from the project budget. Another avenue for 
locating respondents was via the canteens of two universities and one sixth form 
college. Students were simply approached during their lunch/refreshment break and 
asked if they had time to fill in a questionnaire. Finally, some responses were obtained 
via the 'snowball technique'. This was where respondents or colleagues volunteered 
to pass on questionnaires to their relative(s), friend(s), or fellow worker(s). 
Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the proportion of responses obtained from the 
various approaches thus described. Just over half the respondents (50.9%) were 
recruited from community/religious organisations, about 20% from educational 
institutions, a further 15% from video outlets specialising in Indian films and the 
remainder through the snowball technique. 
Sample bias 
The type of venues through which the questionnaire was distributed meant that the 
majority of respondents had regular contact with their families and/or the local South 
Asian population. Even in places like colleges and universities groups of South Asian 
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students were approached rather than individuals. It is possible to identify two 
specific implications of this on the idiosyncrasies of the sample and the dynamics in 
which the data was gathered. 
Firstly, a direct consequence of adopting the methods of sample recruitment described 
above was that the survey was not so representative of individuals who may not have 
close or regular contact with their families or sections of the South Asian population. 
This does not invalidate the findings as such. But it is imperative that any 
interpretations, or conclusions, drawn from the data are affirmed within the context 
that this was a survey that was overwhelmingly reliant on those social and cultural 
networks which specifically connect individuals who have migrated, or whose 
parents/elders have migrated from the Indian sub-continent to Britain. In this regard, 
the respective networks might be described as being 'ethnic' specific in that their 
memberships are overwhelmingly composed of individuals of South Asian 
origin/ancestry. At the same time these 'ethnic' specific networks are undoubtedly 
heterogeneous in character. They are simultaneously differentiated and cross-cut by 
language, religion, cultural practice or place of birth. 
A second form of bias arose from the spaces and dynamics in which the questionnaire 
was completed. The groups through which respondents were accessed comprised 
spaces which were overwhelmingly biased in their focus on aspects of South Asian 
cultures. It is likely that had respondents been completing questionnaires in other 
culturally distinct spaces, or, in the company of other racially diverse peer groups, 
then their responses to the questions may have been different This is illustrated by an 
observation made by one of the students whilst distributing questionnaires in Indian 
videoshops. She noted how many respondents would be reminded of films from the 
posters and information on the walls of the shop. Whilst this may have triggered 
individuals to think of certain films, it is necessary to acknowledge that the visual 
material on the walls would be selective and therefore there may have been other 
films that they weren't stimulated to think about. For example, if the questionnaires 
were being completed in mainstream videoshops then their thoughts and responses 
may have leaned more towards popular/mainstream texts. 
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Sample profile 
In arranging appointments with various community organisations I selected a 
combination of groups which would provide access to a good cross section of 
individuals with respect to sex and age. Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix D provide 
graphical breakdowns of how each of these variables were reflected in the final 
sample. In summary, there were approximately equal numbers of male and female 
respondents. With respect to age, the 16-19 age group was by far the largest group 
represented and comprised almost a quarter of the sample. Overall the representation 
was comparatively higher across the younger age ranges compared to the middle and 
older age groups. For instance, the first four categories which encompassed those 
aged 16-34 years commanded 62.5% of the sample. By comparison, the next seven 
age groups ranging from 35-65+ years constituted 37.5% of the sample. The 
implications of this variation simply means that making comparisons by age needs to 
be done with caution in that one category may constitute 71 responses whilst another 
may only consist of 16. 
There was one overriding characteristic of the sample that was specifically created by 
the criteria for selecting particular areas and groups for accessing respondents. To 
maximise the use of translation/interpreting resources the questionnaire was purposely 
distributed through groups where Gujarati was a main dialect amongst the South 
Asian popUlation. A consequence of this was that just over 70% of the sample were of 
Indian background, with smaller numbers of Pakistanis (10.9%), Bangladeshis (5.1%) 
and Sri Lankans (5.1 %) (see Figure 5). Having said that, the 1991 census indicates 
that the majority of the South Asian population residing in England are of Indian 
background (i.e. 50.8% compared to 27.7% Pakistanis, 9.7% Bangladeshis and 11.7% 
Asian Other)187. Many are now second or third generation and were born herel88 and 
this was also the case amongst the respondents. Figure 6 provides a summary of 
1871 have referenced the 1991 figures as these were the closest in date to the survey. The 2001 census 
suggests that in percentage terms the number of individuals indicating Indian as their ethnic 
background has decreased slightly in relation to the other South Asian groupings. The latest statistics 
indicate that of the entire South Asian population in England 45.7% are Indian; 31.4% are Pakistani; 
12.2% are Bangladeshi; and 10.6% are Other Asian (source: National Statistics website: 
www.statistics.gov .uk). 
1880ata from the 1991 census indicates that of the South Asian population in England. 41.1 % were born 
in England; 19.8% in India; 12.9% in Pakistan; 6.2% in Bangladesh; 9.7% in East Africa. and 10.2% in 
other countries. 
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respondents' place of birth and indicates that 35% were born in England, 27.3% in 
India and 17.4% in East Africa with smaller numbers born in Bangladesh (4.5%), 
Pakistan (6.1 %) and Sri Lanka (4.8%). 
The three most common religious groupings across the South Asian population settled 
in Britain are Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs189 and this was also reflected amongst the 
respondents participating in the survey. The precise spread of religious groupings is 
illustrated in Figure 7 and indicates that about half the sample were Hindu (50.5%), 
just under a quarter were Muslim (23.2%) and a similar percentage were Sikh 
(21.5%). 
Figures 8 and 9 present the type of accommodation and household structure in which 
respondents lived. This detail is useful in providing some indication of the degree of 
dependence/independence of respondents in terms of domestic space and relations. 
The vast majority lived with their families (82.6%) in owner occupied 
accommodation (74.4%). The most common household structure was the nuclear 
family (52.9%, of which 4.2% were single parent nuclear families) followed by the 
three generational extended family (18.5%). Only 4.2% actually lived on their own. 
Most respondents were either married (44.9%) or single (42.1 %). Another point 
worthy of note is that although most individuals taking part in the survey fell into the 
'low' to 'no' personal income brackets (see Figure 10), the households in which they 
lived fell more evenly between low to upper middle income brackets (see Figure 11). 
This would suggest that whilst many respondents themselves had little personal 
income at their disposal, they tended to live in households that were relatively 
independent in that they were privately owned with a level of income deemed 
'comfortable' as opposed to on the 'poverty line'. In the context of the survey, income 
levels are noteworthy in that they have a significant bearing on the ability of 
households to invest in media technologies and leisure activities in general, such as 
going to the movies and renting videotapes. 
18'1'he 1991 census did not include a question on religion but figures from the 2001 census indicate that 
of the entire population of England 3.10% are Muslim, 1.11 % are Hindu, and 0.67% are Sikh (source: 
National Statistics website: www.statistics.gov.uk). These figures, however, include individuals of non 
South Asian descent. 
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In summary, the above profile suggests that the survey sample was predominantly 
made up of individuals from the younger to middle age ranges, of Indian background, 
living within a nuclear family structure in owner occupied accommodation. 
Data analysis 
In addition to the responses to each individual question, bivariate and multivariate 
tabulations open up endless possibilities for presenting and discussing the data from 
any questionnaire survey. However, from a sample the size of my own survey, 
conducting multivariate and to a lesser extent bivariate analyses is in many instances 
negligible. This is because the more questions that are crosstabulated the more thinly 
the responses become spread across the various categories and so making it difficult 
to make meaningful comparisons. For this reason the presentation of the findings in 
the next chapter mainly constitutes a univariate analyses of the data with some 
bivariate evaluations. The process of selecting data for discussion is guided by three 
overall concerns which also structure the content of chapter 4 and so are identified in 
its introduction. 
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Chapter 4 
South Asian Audiences' Tastes and Usage of 
Films on Videotape 
With its focus on measuring the use of such culturally distinct texts as Indian and 
popular/mainstream films, the audience survey is presented in this chapter as a case 
study for evaluating the critical worth of those aspects of theories of' cultural 
hybridity' which relate to the more commonly debated themes of 'cultural pluralism' 
and' cultural fusion'. The focus and time period of the survey, which examines usage 
of films on videotape in 1995, inevitably positions the findings as being slightly out of 
date with current audience trends in 2005 where everyday conversations are likely to 
encompass more recent technologies such as DVDs and new media channels such as 
B4U. At the same time the survey provides an insight into an aspect of the 
contemporary phenomenon of audience activity. In that sense the study is presented as 
a historically and socially specific context for contesting modem dynamics of cultural 
interaction and negotiation. 
There are three broad areas around which the presentation of the survey findings is 
organised in this chapter. They are: firstly, access to technologies for viewing films in 
the home; secondly, trends in usage and perceptions of Indian and 
popular/mainstream films; and thirdly, the contexts of consumption of the two 
categories of film with specific reference to the process and patterns of obtaining 
videotapes and the company in which they are likely to be watched. 
In the first section, my concern is to establish a link between cultural identity and 
trends in the type and variety of media technologies available in South Asian 
households in the mid 1990s. To do this, I compare my own survey findings with 
national trends around the same time period in order to identify similarities and 
differences in 'ownership' and 'use' of media technologies in South Asian households 
compared to households in the United Kingdom as a whole. The findings suggest how 
relatively 'new' media technologies (such as VCRs, cable and satellite) have proven 
to be more popular amongst South Asians compared to the indigenous population 
because they provide access to culturally specific texts not available through 
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terrestrial provision. The power being exercised by South Asians to increase their 
choices and access to culturally diverse media is specifically linked to Hall's 'new' 
logic of capital to chart how the mechanisms of advanced capitalism have empowered 
previously marginalised voices. This increased visible presence of marginalised 
cultures has created a more fragmented national culture. 
The second section begins to address the issue of what the 'newly' empowered voices 
of the margins actually convey about the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' and the 
possibilities for racially transgressive cultural change. The section starts by presenting 
the overall trends in usage of popular/mainstream and Indian films as indicative of a 
bicultural film culture, in that there is a simultaneous engagement of both categories 
of films amongst significant numbers of respondents. Using Gilroy's conception of 
'double consciousness' I identify the overall patterns as significant cultural markers 
which, on the one hand, challenge contemporary 'race' ideologies that perceive 
cultures as homogenous entities, and on the other, endorse the central argument of 
hybridity theorists that modern cultural formations need to be understood as an 
outcome of the creolisation of multiple cultural sources. I then shift my focus from 
examining general trends to internal group differences which revolve around age and 
place of birth. The findings are seen to signify inter-generational distinctions 
manifested in the overwhelming tendency amongst the older generation to limit their 
diet of consumption to Indian films whilst their children/grandchildren readily interact 
with both popular/mainstream and Indian films. The contrasting generational trends 
are seen to bring into question the precise connection between 'cultural hybridity' and 
the 'migrant condition' in that it is not first generation migrants but their British born 
offspring who are more likely to interact with and combine distinct cultural forms. In 
clarifying the link between the 'migrant condition' and 'cultural hybridity' I challenge 
Gillespie's interpretation of similar findings emerging from her study as a conflict 
between 'tradition' (older generation) and 'modernity' (younger generation). Instead I 
emphasise the need to read both the bicultural trends of younger generations and the 
monocultural trends of their parents/grandparents as representative of the complex 
and contradictory ways in which the process of hybridisation unfolds. To develop this 
more complex understanding of the process of hybridisation I apply Brah' s distinction 
between vertical and horizontal interpretations of inter-generational differences to 
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illustrate that the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' and their impact on cultural change 
do not unfold in a neat linear sequence but need to be understood within social and 
historically specific contexts. To accommodate this point whilst assessing each of the 
generational trends for their capacity to institute racially transgressive change, I 
position the inter-generational differences in film consumption within a non-linear 
conception of time and space which is drawn from the work of Gilroy and Rattansi. 
Here the discussion identifies that the transgressive qualities of 'cultural hybridity' do 
not simply emanate from the ability to intermix two (or more) distinct cultural forms, 
but the ability to negotiate multiple cultural locations in a manner that is disruptive to 
the 'dominant order'. In this regard Gilroy's notion of the 'frog's perspective' is 
usefully deployed to elucidate that the intermixing of popular/mainstream and Indian 
films amongst second and third generation South Asians is unable to generate modes 
of being and seeing that threaten dominant/subordinate relations because at the point 
of intermixing, of comparing and contrasting, there is a tendency to concede a 
superior status to the aesthetic quality of popular/mainstream films. The second 
section uses these findings on inter-generational differences to conclude that 'cultural 
hybridity' never carries any guarantees but that its ability to transform racial and 
cultural inequalities is, to reference Brah' s assertion, contextually contingent. 
The third section aims to provide a more complex insight into how racial and cultural 
hierarchies become inflected and circumvented within the film culture of South 
Asians in Britain. It takes as its focus the differing ways of accessing videotapes and 
the company in which they are most likely to be watched. My analysis begins by 
establishing respondents' use of culturally distinct outlets for obtaining the two 
categories of films on videotape, i.e. Indian films are obtained from videoshops 
specialising in Indian films and popular/mainstream films are obtained from 
mainstream videoshops such as Blockbusters. The regular use of these cultural outlets 
is traced in their everyday conversations and identified as a focus for comparison and 
contrast through which they draw out the strengths and limitations of the respective 
merchandise. These observations are linked to Brah's description of the manifestation 
of binaries within everyday negotiations of diaspora. My examination of the binary 
comparison of videoshops highlights an arrangement of the dynamics of power that is 
similar to respondents' perceptions of the aesthetic quality of the two groups of texts 
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in that once again the strengths of popular/mainstream films are fore grounded and 
become the focus for identifying where change might occur. The implications of this 
for racially transgressive change are vividly illustrated by tracing how actual changes 
between the two film industries mirror the binary comparisons engaged by 
respondents. The result being a gradual 'homogenisation of cultures of interaction' 
where the processes of production and consumption of Indian films become 
increasingly like the processes of production and consumption of popular/mainstream 
films. This scenario is interpreted as encapsulating Gilroy's suggestion that modern 
black cultures and subjectivities are best understood as commentaries upon the 
'antinomies of modernity' where the creation of 'new' meanings and 'new' cultural 
outlooks is undermined, not so much by the erosion of culturally distinct forms but by 
the 'homogenisation of cultures of interaction'. This assertion that the dynamics of 
interaction determine the meanings drawn from specific cultural forms is developed 
further in the final subsection where I apply a revised conception of Bourdieu's notion 
of' group habitus' to describe how for many respondents choosing between 
popular/mainstream and Indian films often means choosing between one' group 
habitus' (e.g. immediate family; indigenous population) over another. Significantly, 
such choices are made in an atmosphere of conflict through the hierarchical 
arrangement of the two categories of films. I relate these dynamics as an example of, 
to use Hall's terms, a 'war of manoeuvre' within the 'war of position'. This proposes 
that the film culture of many South Asians may be inclusive of both Indian and 
popular/mainstream films, but as these two categories of films compete for the same 
time and space choices are made in a fashion that is consistent with the process of 
racialisation. 
Before proceeding with the first of the three sections outlined above I should point out 
that the survey data presented in this chapter are accompanied by graphical 
illustrations which are copied into the text. 
Access to Domestic Technologies for Viewing Feature Films 
This section describes the availability of domestic media technologies within 
respondents' homes and compares this data with national trends in order to help 
establish the significance of cultural background in shaping respondents' interaction 
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with media and media technologies. In measuring the number and type of media 
technologies available in respondents' homes the questionnaire focused attention on 
those items most commonly used to watch feature films. This included the television , 
video recorder and cable/satellite television. 
The results presented in Figure 12 indicate that the vast majority of respondents 
taking part in the survey had access to a television set (98.7%) and video recorder 
(94.3%) in their own homes. Most respondents lived in households with more than 
one TV (59. 1 %), and a smaller but substantial number with more than one VCR 
(28.4%). With regards cable and satellite services, 26.9% of the survey sample lived 
in households with one or more televi sion sets connected to cable, and 29.7% to 
sate II ite 190. 
Figure 12: No. of TV sets, VCRs and cable/satellite connections in household 
cable satellite 
TV set(s) VCR(s) box(es) connection(s) 
none 1.3% 5.7% 73.1% 70.3% 
One 39.6% 65.9% 19.9% 21.8% 
Two 32.9% 21.2% 6.0% 7.0% 
three 16.1% 6.1 % 0.6% 0.6% 
four 7.3% 0.7% 0.3 % 0.3 % 
more than four 2.8% 0.4% 0.1 % 0% 
valid cases 316 316 316 316 
Respondents with cable/satellite television were al so asked to indicate whether their 
households purchased any of the channels that had a separate subscription fee and 
which regularly screened popular/mainstream or Indian film. In thi regard as Figure 
13 suggests, the most popular additional channel purchased was Zee TV (formerly TV 
Asia) with 77.5% of cable/satellite subscribers in reception of this service, followed 
by Sky Movies (46.3%), The Movie Channel (35.5%), Sky Movies Gold (32.3%) and 
The Home Video Channel ( 15%). 
190It should be noted that orne hou ehold were connected to both cable and atellite. As a \ hole, the 
proportion of respondents living ill hOll chold wi th cable and/or atellitc wa 38.9%. 
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Figure 13: Subscription to additional channels with regular screenings of Indian 
or popular/mainstream ftlms 
Sky The Home 
Sky Movies Movie Video ZeeTV Other Movies Gold Channel Channel 
%tage of 
respondents 46.3% 32.3% 35.5% 15% 77.5% 13.2% 
with ... 
valid cases 121 121 121 120 120 121 
By contrasting the survey data thus presented with national trends it is possible to 
identify how the pattern of ownership and use of domestic media technologies in 
South Asian households in Britain compares with the population as a whole. To steer 
the discussion in this direction I want to introduce findings from a report by the 
Independent Television Commission (IT C) titled Television: Ethnic Minorities ' 
Views191 . 
The ITC report presents data collated in 1994 and was part of the lTC's annually 
commissioned survey examining public attitudes to televi sion. There are huge 
differences between my own survey and the ITC study, both in terms of the research 
designs as well as their respective aims and objectives. I do not wi h to elaborate on 
these except to point out that the central objective of the ITC survey was to ' bring out 
the similarities and differences in attitudes to television of the majority population and 
members of ethnic minorities '192. The suitabi lity of the ITC study for the purpo es of 
comparison here is marked by three features. Firstly, it is the on ly comparative 
analysis of media owner hip by ethnic group to be conducted within a year or so of 
my own surveyl93. I should point out that in its subsequent annual surveys the ITC has 
not undertaken to examine trends in media ownership by ethnic group, though in any 
191rT Re earch Publication, 1996 
192ibid. , pi 
19311 is appropriate to mention that another tudy conducted in the same year a m own, which i 
referred to in the ne ·t ubsection, is not cho en for a dctailed compari on becau e it main focu on 
tcrre trial televi ion u age in A ian household in Leicester doe not provide the ethnic compari on 
being ought for the di cu ion here. ee Jame HaJ loran, Arvind Bhatt and Peggy Gray,.tilllnk.. 
Minoritie and Television, (Univer ity of Leice ter, Report for hannel ur, 1995) 
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case the rapidly changing status and introduction of additional media technologies 
(e.g. DVD's) means that studies conducted around the same time are the most suitable 
for comparative purposes. Secondly, the main sample for the ITC survey was selected 
to be representative of the 16+ population of United Kingdom (with respect to age, 
sex, social class and employment status). As such the ITC findings can be used as a 
basis for establishing the patterns of media ownership emerging from my survey in 
relation to national trends. Thirdly, in addition to its main sample the ITC study 
included two separate samples representative of United Kingdom's Asian and African 
Caribbean populations. In this regard data from my survey can be contrasted with the 
ITC findings on Asian households to identify the generalisability of the conclusions 
drawn from my own study. 
Reading the ITC findings alongside data from my own survey highlights two distinct 
cultural trends between South Asian households and households in the United 
Kingdom as a whole. These trends relate to the domestic 'ownership' of media 
technologies on the one hand, and the 'use' of media technologies on the other. I 
summarise these trends before discussing how they support Hall's connection 
between the 'new' logic of capital and the increasingly visible identities of the 
'margins'. 
Distinct cultural trends in 'ownership' and 'use' of domestic media technologies 
The ITC figures for the proportion of Asian households with at least one TV set 
(100%) and VCR (92%) are not too dissimilar to the findings from my own survey. 
Comparing the statistics with the main sample the ITC report found that Asian homes 
were equipped in much the same way as the general population, except markedly 
more had a VCR (92% compared to 83% of the population as a whole) and fewer had 
a compact disc player. In addition, a higher proportion of Asian homes had 
cable/satellite television than the main sample. With respect to trends in subscription 
to additional channels regularly screening popular/mainstream or Indian films, once 
again, the ITC report paints a similar picture of its Asian sample to that presented in 
Figure 13 (although there is some variation in the exact percentages). Of the Asian 
respondents participating in the ITC survey and living in households with 
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cable/satellite television, 73% subscribed to Zee TV, 39% to Sky Movies, 34% to The 
Movie Channel, 29% to Sky Movies Gold and 7% to The Home Video Channel l94• 
The other main point of interest to this discussion raised by the ITC research is that 
whilst most respondents from all three samples used their VCRs to both time-shift 
programmes and watch commercially recorded films, there were huge variations 
between the groups in terms of the frequency with which these activities were 
engaged. For example, more than twice as many Asians (50%) as main sample 
members (24%) used their VCRs to watch commercially recorded films at least once 
a week. With regards time-shifting of programmes the picture is reversed. Almost 
three times as many individuals from the main sample (58%) used their VCRs two or 
more times a week for this purpose than members of the Asian sample (19%). 
Another study conducted around 1995 examining perceptions and patterns of 
television usage in South Asian households in Leicester supports these findings. The 
Leicester study also reports that Asian respondents were much more likely to use the 
video recorder for watching hired films, most notably Indian films, than to record and 
time-shift terrestrial programmes19S• 
From the above discussion it would appear that the ITC findings and my own survey 
data depict a similar pattern in terms of the proportion of South Asian households 
equipped with TV sets and VCRs. Both studies also established Zee TV as by far the 
most popularly subscribed to additional movie channel on cable/satellite television. 
One disparity between the two studies that is worth noting is the percentage of South 
Asian households subscribing to cable/satellite television. With respect to this the 
figures from my survey are notably higher than those provided by the ITC study. In 
my survey the proportion of households in reception of cable television was 26.9% 
and those with satellite 29.9%, compared to 9% and 16% respectively in the ITC 
study. This variation may in part be explained by differences in geographical 
l~elevision; Ethnic Minorities' Views. (ITC Research Publication, 1996), pp3-6 
195see James Halloran, Arvind Bhatt and Peggy Gray, Ethnic Minorities and Teleyision, (University of 
Leicester, Report for Channel Four, 1995). It is useful to point out that this study presents a pattern of 
ownership of media technologies in South Asian homes that is generally consistent with the trends 
identified by my own survey and that of the ITC - the Leicester study found that 99.9% respondents 
lived in households with one or more television sets; 90% with video facilities, and about a fifth with 
cable/satellite telev ision. 
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dispersion of the respondents participating in the two studies. The sample for the ITC 
research was selected from across the United Kingdom where variations in access to 
cable/satellite are much wider than those areas in London where respondents for my 
survey were recruitedl96• These differences aside, two fundamental observations 
emerge from reading my own findings alongside data provided by the fTC. 
The first is that the proportion of households with VCRs and cable/satellite was 
notably higher amongst South Asians living in the United Kingdom than across the 
population as a whole. The second is that the most popular use of VCRs and 
cable/satellite services amongst South Asians was to access information and 
programmes specific to South Asian culture, such as Zee TV and popular Indian 
films. Thus, as the ITC report suggests, the pattern of VCR use and reception of 
cable/satellite is such that South Asian households' may be significantly less satisfied 
with terrestrial television than the majority population' 197. At the same time the 
particular patterns of 'ownership' and 'use' of media technologies relays a degree of 
cultural capital and cultural power being exercised by South Asian audiences in that 
they are actively appropriating media texts and technologies to satisfy culturally 
specific tastes not provided for by mainstream media. This empowerment of South 
Asian tastes can be specifically connected to the proliferation of consumer choices 
that have arisen from the deregulation of the marketplace. In this regard, it is possible 
to highlight Hall's conception of the 'new' logic of capital and its predisposition to 
satisfy rather than suppress cultural differences (see p67) as a central impetus behind 
the emergence of the kind of culturally distinct trends in the 'ownership' and 'use' of 
media technologies described above. 
The ~new' logic of capital and the empowerment of 'migrant' cultures 
I'Jt'It should also be noted that the availability and patterns of consumption of media technologies are 
constantly changing and so the data presented is very specific to the mid 1990's. For example, since my 
survey additional channels specific to South Asian culture, such as B4U, have been made available on 
cable/satellite networks and have proved particularly popular amongst South Asian audiences. Another 
recent development, of direct relevance to the focus of my own investigation into the consumption of 
films on videotape, is the arrival of DVD's which will have impacted upon the home video market. I've 
already noted that since its 1994 survey the IIC has not provided a breakdown of ownership of media 
technologies by ethnic group for subsequent annual surveys. However, for the population as a whole 
the latest figures provided by the IIC suggest that whilst VCR ownership has stabilised, ownership of 
all other items measured by the IIC survey continued to rise (including personal computer, satellite 
dish, video games) see The Public's View 2002, (An IIC / BSC Research Publication), p14 
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As Hall himself points out, one of the main consequences of Margaret Thatcher's 
reign and her free market approach to the economy was an explosion of new forms of 
cultural communication l98• With the opening up of media markets to cable and 
satellite networks. terrestrial television ceased to monopolise domestic consumption 
of visual media. The biggest consumers of the additional services appear to be 
'migrant' populations in as much as they have expressed a disproportionately 'greater 
interest and willingness to invest in new media services' 199 than their indigenous 
counterparts. And as the above discussion would suggest, the greater popularity of 
new media services amongst migrant popUlations appears to be related to the greater 
accessibility they provide to culturally diverse programmes. Thus, in the context of 
production and consumption of domestic media technologies the 'new' logic of 
capital has decentred dominant cultural discourses in the way described by Hall, by 
encouraging 'the emergence of new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new 
regions, new communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms of cultural 
representation,2°O. This moment of 'the decentred cultural empowerment of the 
margins' is identified by Hall as a threat to homogenous national identities in that the 
newly empowered voices of the margins begin to fragment the dominant cultural 
landscape. 
With reference to media provision the cultural empowerment of South Asian cultures 
has fragmented the national cultural landscape in a number of ways. For example, 
until recently, information on Indian films could only be accessed through South 
Asian specific media. In the current climate, where capitalist enterprise is becoming 
increasingly responsive to distinct cultural tastes and styles, there appears to be a 
gradual but definite incorporation of listings and reviews of Indian films alongside 
popular/mainstream films by sections of the mainstream British media. such as 
l"Televisjon: Ethnic Minorities' Views. (ITC Research Publication, 1996), pp 15-16 
198'The Local and the Global', in Culture. Globalisatjon and the World System, edited by A. D. King, 
(London, Macmillan, 1991), pp27-28 
1~levision; Ethnic Minorities' Views. (ITC Research Publication, 1996), p16 
2°O'The Local and the Global', in Culture. Globalisation and the World System, edited by A. D. King, 
(London, Macmillan, 1991), p34 
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weekly entertainment publications like Time Out and The Guide201 . Individual films 
like Asoka have also begun to feature on the long established BBe film review 
programme now hosted by Jonathan ROSS202. In addition, the narrative content and 
style of Indian films are the central basis for the most recent Andrew Lloyd Webber 
musical Bombay Dreams to be staged in London's West End at The Apollo. 
This visible co-existence of distinct cultures challenges 'common sense' racist 
ideologies which propose that in order for 'migrants' to live in harmony with the 
indigenous population they should simply assimilate the dominant culture and way of 
life. In this instance not only can South Asians in Britain be seen to be asserting their 
own tastes and styles, but in doing so they have helped reshape the national culture 
which is increasingly cosmopolitan in outlook. In the next section I expand upon how 
the patterns of film consumption emerging from the survey challenge 'common sense' 
and 'assimilationist' conceptions of cultural interaction (see ppI52-154). To conclude 
this section it is necessary to comment on how the culturally fragmented patterns of 
media consumption amongst South Asians might be interpreted as evidence of 
racially transgressive cultural change. Ang problematises this point well when she 
states that the proliferation in choice and availability of diverse media and texts has 
certainly led to more 'active' involvement of audiences. However, she adds, the 
manifestation of 'active' audiences 'does not guarantee any critical purchase, let alone 
resistance or subversion'203. To assess the issue of racially transgressive cultural 
change with reference to trends in consumption of popular/mainstream and Indian 
2011n recent years there has also been a noticeable growth in textbook literature on 'Bollywood' 
originating from writers and publishing houses in both India and Britain. The content has ranged from 
guides and reference books. historical overviews of the industry, its role in creating a national identity 
and sense of community. relationships and dynamics 'behind the scenes'. as well as detailed narration 
and analysis of individual films and personal experiences. See for example, Guizar. Govind Nihalani 
and Saibal Chatterjee, eds, Encyclopaedia of Hindi Cinema. (New Delhi. Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 
2003); Ashok Banker. Bollywood the Pocket Essentials. (London, Pocket Essentials. 2001); Lalit 
Mohan Joshi. Bollywood: Popular Indian Cinema. (London. Dakini Books Ltd. 2002); Rachel Dwyer 
and Divia Patel. Cinema India. (London. Reaktion Books. 2002); Vijay Mishra. Bollywood Cinema. 
Temples of Desire. (London. Routledge. 2002); Nasreen Munni Kabir. Bollywood. The India Cinema 
StQn:. (London. Pan MacMillan Ltd. 2001); Gayatri Chatterjee. Mother India. (London. BA. 2002); 
Rachel Dwyer. rash Chopra, (London. BA. 2002); Chris England. Balham to Bollywood, (London. 
Hodder & Stoughton. 2002); Justine Hardy. Bollywood Boy. (London. John Murray Publishers Ltd. 
2002). 
202Asoka was reviewed by Jonathan Ross on the Film 2001 programme broadcast on 25th October 2001 
on BBCI. 
203Uvini Room Wars. (London. Routledge. 1996), pl4 
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films on videotape amongst South Asians, it is necessary to establish the cultural 
status enjoyed by the texts in question and whether they are being appropriated in a 
manner that disrupts prevailing social and cultural hierarchies. The next section 
begins to address this point by examining the popularity of Indian and 
popular/mainstream films in terms of the frequency with which the two categories of 
films were watched and the critical worth accorded to each. 
Usage and Perceptions of PopulariMainstream and Indian Films 
The survey data suggests that both Indian and popular/mainstream films were 
watched by significant numbers of respondents. A percentage breakdown of the 
related statistics is presented in Figure 14 and indicates that a larger proportion of 
respondents (82.3 %) watched Indian films than did popular/mainstream films 
(65.] %). 
Figure 14: %tage of sample watching Indian and popular/mainstream films on 
videotape 
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In terms of the frequency with which the different texts were watched, the scatter 
diagram in Figure 15 indicates that both popular/mainstream and Indian films were 
most likely to be watched 2 to 3 times a month. And, once again, a comparative 
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analysis of the data denotes that Indian films were watched more frequently than 
popular/mainstream films. Of those respondents who watched Indian films 46.9% 
watched one or more a week compared to 36.6% for popular/mainstream films. 
Figure 15: Frequency of watching Indian and popular/mainstream films 
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These overal l patterns of consumption relay a process of cross-cultural interaction, as 
opposed to self-contained or mutually exclusive cultures, in that both categories of 
films on videotape are regularly viewed by significant numbers of individuals. As has 
already been pointed out, this response amongst South Asians to their encounter with 
different cultures runs contrary to 'common sense' and 'assimilationist' conceptions 
of the dynamics of identity formation which understand cultures and' races ' as 
homogenously constituted. It is appropriate to establish this argument more clearly as 
it substantiates the underlying theoretical position shared by hybridity theorists that 
modern identities signal the ' loss of a stable sense of self' in that they are not bounded 
or defined by a homogenously constituted racial or cultural identity. 
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Bicultural trends not mutually exclusive cultures 
As various commentators have outlined204, in Britain since the late 1960' s 'common 
sense' ideologies of 'race', nation and identity have formed the basis for policies of 
anti-immigration and racial purity pursued by racist right groups such as the BNP and 
National Front. Such ideologies perceive racial groups as distinct cultural entities 
characterised by mutually exclusive ways of life which make the 'clash of cultures', 
or racial conflict, inevitable within societies with multiracial populations. The 
simultaneous consumption of popular/mainstream and Indian films signals a video 
film culture that is culturally diverse and fragmented as opposed to culturally 
homogenous. In this sense the survey findings are evidence that cultures need not 
function in mutually exclusive terms. 
A variant to the anti-immigration position of the racist right is the 'assimilationist' 
view which proposes that in order to achieve racial harmony it is necessary for 
'immigrants' to adopt the culture and way of life of the dominant population. During 
the sixties the 'assimilation' of 'migrants' became formal government policy and was 
most notably pursued through the education system where the emphasis was on 
building a system 'capable of absorbing black children; [such that] 'race problems' 
would literally die away with the older generations,205. The assimilationist approach206 
shares the same motive as the racist right in that the underlying aim is to protect the 
British way of life from 'alien' cultures. However, it has often been legitimised on the 
grounds that the cultural traditions of 'migrant' populations will inevitably erode as 
their children prefer and adopt the culture ofthe 'host' nation which is seen to afford 
204see Martin Barker, The New Racism, (London, Junction Books, 1981) 
Errol Lawrence, 'Just Plain Common Sense: the 'roots' of racism', in The Empire Strikes Back, Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1982), pp47-94 
Phil Cohen, 'The Perversions of Inheritance', in Multi-Racist Britain, edited by P. Cohen & H. Bains, 
(London, MacMillan, 1988), pp9-118 
John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, (London, MacMillan, 1989) 
Aoya Anthias and Nira-Yuval Davis, Racjalised Boundaries, (London, Routledge, 1992) 
205Hazel Carby, 'Schooling in Babylon', in The Empire Strikes Back, Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1982), pl85 
2<XThough no longer formal government policy the principles of 'assimilation' continue to inform and 
direct government procedures for dealing with immigrants to Britain. For example, in February 2002 
the home secretary David Blunkett announced compulsory 'citizenship tests' for immigrants wanting to 
become UK citizens. Included in the tests are an exam to assess English language proficiency as well 
as a formal oath or 'citizen's pledge' affirming that the individual will embrace 'British' laws and 
customs. 
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more freedom and autonomy and therefore 'superior,207. This perspective is also 
strongly refuted by the survey findings which suggest that it is becoming increasingly 
commonplace amongst South Asians in Britain to interact with, and incorporate into 
their daily lives, aspects of both 'British' and 'South Asian' cu lture208. The supporting 
data for this is presented in Figure 16 which provides a breakdown of the 
consumption of Indian and popular/mainstream films by age group. Amongst the 16-
19 age group 84.5% watched lndian films and 85.9% watched popular/mainstream 
fi lms. Thus, the film culture of large sections of South Asian youth cannot be 
described as exclusively ' British' , nor exclusively 'South Asian', because it is equally 
inclusive of both popular films from the West and the Indian subcontinent. 
Figure 16: %tage of sample watching Indian and popular/mainstream films on 
videotape by age group 
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207see Errol Lawrence, ' In the Abundance of Water the Fool is Thir ty', in The Empire Strikes Back, 
Cen tre for ontemporary Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1982), pp95-142 
208From his own research , Roger Ballard also argues that far from reflecting a process of culLUral 
a similation the emerging cultural trends amongst the outh Asian population in Britain are reflective 
of bi- or multi-cultural competence. ee Ballard' , 'The South Asian Presence in Britain and its 
Transnational Connections', in Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, edited by B. Parekh , H. 
Singh, and S. Vertovec , (London, Routledge, 2003), and Desh Pardesh : The South Asian Presence in 
Britain, (London, C. Hurst and Co., 1994) 
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It should be noted from Figure 16 that across the age ranges there is a huge disparity 
in trends in consumption, and this is particularly so for popular/mainstream films 
which seemingly decline in popularity and usage amongst the older respondents. I 
return to examine these statistics when I broaden out discussion to consider the 
internal group differences embedded in the overall patterns of video usage amongst 
the respondents (see pp159-168). The overall patterns suggest that there is a definite 
shift towards a bicultural film culture amongst South Asians in Britain. This 
represents a significant cultural marker which can be indexed as an example to 
support the central assertion running through the work of hybridity theorists that 
modern experiences and processes of identity negotiation are racially and culturally 
fragmented. To illustrate this connection more clearly I want to interpret the bicultural 
patterns of film consumption in the context of Paul Gilroy's exploration of the 
concept of 'double consciousness' which describes the cultural outlooks of blacks 
settled in the West as an outcome of a process of interaction and mutation of distinct 
cultural forms. 
Multiple cultural locations and the dynamics of 'double consciousness' 
In as much as popular/mainstream and Indian films represent culturally distinct styles 
of filmmaking it could be argued that their popularity and combined consumption 
represents an instance of 'multiple cultural locations' or 'border crossings'. Further, 
the regular consumption of culturally diverse films would appear to represent an 
ability to traverse and create meanings from very different cinematic, linguistic and 
cultural codes. This could be interpreted as an example of what Gilroy describes as a 
'sense of doubleness' and which he identifies as being central to the experience of 
contemporary black Britons who, 'like all blacks in the West, stand between (at least) 
two great cultural assemblages,209. Of course the mere consumption of distinct 
cultural forms does not in itself confirm an appreciation or understanding of culturaJly 
distinct perspectives. In this regard it is important to distinguish between the 
interaction with cultures as commodities or objects, from the interaction with cultures 
as different ways of being and seeing. This point is underscored later in this chapter 
when I note how the popularity of aspects of Indian culture, such as food and clothes, 
amongst indigenous British people has not resulted in a corresponding decline in 
2~he Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), pI 
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racist attitudes towards Indians (see pI87). With reference to the survey it is possible 
to cite additional data to further support the claim that the bicultural patterns of film 
consumption amongst South Asians in Britain are illustrative of occupying 'a vantage 
point made up of distinct ways of being and seeing'. The data in question relates to 
factors influencing respondents' choice of films. 
Combining information elicited from the pre-pilot and pilot stages, questions 9 and 21 
(see Appendix C) asked respondents to indicate the features or aspects of films they 
were most likely to consider in deciding which films to watch. Their responses 
suggest both substantial similarities and differences in the factors most likely to 
influence their choice of popular/mainstream films compared to Indian films. I deal 
with the similarities first. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the similarities converged around those aspects recognised as 
essential ingredients in the making of all films and related to the categories 
'themes/issues', 'storyline', 'actors/actresses' and 'director'. These categories carried 
differing levels of significance in respondents' choice of films on videotape but in 
relatively similar proportions for both popular/mainstream and Indian films. For 
example, as Figure 17 indicates, 'storyline' was indexed as an influential factor by 
70.5% of viewers of Indian films and 87% of viewers of popular/mainstream films. 
The numbers identifying 'actors/actresses' as an influential factor on their choice of 
films were slightly less, though again the proportion for both categories of film were 
similar, i.e. 61.6% of viewers of Indian films and 64.2% of viewers of 
popular/mainstream films. The other two features were less of an influence on 
respondents' choice of texts, but once again this was in relatively similar proportions 
for both categories of film, i.e. 44.2% of viewers of Indian films indicated 
'themes/issues' was an influential factor compared to 55.4% of viewers of 
popular/mainstream films. The 'director' was identified as an influential factor by 
22.1 % of viewers of Indian films compared to 35.2% of viewers of 
popular/mainstream films. 
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Figure 17: Factors most likely to influence respondents' choice of film 
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The pattern of similarities in the factors identified by respondents as influencing their 
choice of popular/mainstream and Indian film is not so much a coincidence but 
corresponds with those attributes that are made most prominent across the production 
and marketing stages of all feature films. In that sense, and a is apparent from 
publicity posters for Indian and popular/mainstream films , whilst the role of the 
'director' is essential to the production of both categories of films he/she does not 
often feature as prominently in the marketing of films as the main character(s) or 
genre/storyline. However, it would be a mistake to suggest that a wholly identical 
framework was being deployed by respondents to guide their choice and enjoyment of 
films regardless of their cultural specificity. For, alongside the similarities there were 
also huge disparities which are consistent with tho e characteristics regarded as the 
distinguishing hallmark peculiar to the cultural styles of each category of film and 
relate to the features' ongs ', ' music' , 'dance ' and ' special effects ' which I now 
describe. 
156 
The percentage of respondents indicating 'songs', 'music' and 'dance' as being 
influential on their choice of Indian films were 75.6%, 70% and 46.9% respectively. 
By contrast, these same categories were much less important in the choice of 
popular/mainstream films for which the percentages totalled 24.4% for 'songs', 
38.9% for 'music' and 19.2% for 'dance'. With reference to 'special effects' the 
pattern is reversed in that many more respondents (63.7%) indicated this as a feature 
impacting upon their choice of popular/mainstream films compared to Indian films 
(23.6%). These trends depict an overall picture which suggests that particular criteria 
occupy a distinctly different status or degree of relevance in respondents' selection of 
Indian films compared to popular/mainstream films. Moreover, these differences are 
reflective of the codes and styles of narrative that mark the two categories of film 
apart. 
For instance, the quality of 'songs' and 'music' is likely to figure centrally in viewers' 
choice of Indian films because these are aspects that are integral across the range of 
popular Indian cinema. They are not, however, integral features of all 
popular/mainstream films and so are less likely to be identified by respondents as 
playing a pivotal role in their choice of those texts. Similarly, the quality of 'special 
effects' is a much more debated and valued feature of popular/mainstream films than 
Indian films and so is more likely to playa central role in attracting individuals to 
popular/mainstream texts. These findings are in no way at odds, rather they concur, 
with the link I'm trying to make here with Gilroy's observation of a sense of 
'doubleness' that characterises the outlook of black Britons. In making this 
connection, what is important to note is that the respective categories of film are not 
only distinguishable by differences in language and regional focus 
(popular/mainstream films being dominated by American and European 
history/experiences and Indian films with that of the subcontinent), but also by their 
respective modes of storytelling, visual codes and narrative conventions. As such the 
two categories of films in question are one manifestation of culturally different ways 
of seeing and being. Crucially, the central assertion in Gilroy's exposition of the 
concept of 'double consciousness', of the emergence of 'bifocal' or 'bilingual' 
cultural realities, is reflected not just in the simultaneous usage of two culturally 
distinct texts but also in the respondents' appreciation of the different cultural 
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perspectives, or ways of being and seeing the world, represented by each category of 
film. 
This particular link between the concept of 'double consciousness' and the overall 
trends in film consumption emerging from the survey endorses the shared emphasis of 
hybridity theorists on the need to approach modern identities as racially and culturally 
fragmented as opposed to racially and culturally bounded. Having said that, the 
processes of cultural fragmentation and mutation are intricately unpacked by hybridity 
theorists to draw attention to the complex and sometimes contradictory outcomes of 
'cultural hybridity' with regards to overcoming dominant/subordinate relations. For 
example, Gilroy himself introduces the concept of 'frog's perspective' to describe the 
contradictory elements of 'double consciousness' which generate (amongst the 
oppressed) simultaneous feelings of 'hate' and 'love' for the privileged position of the 
oppressor (see pp96-97). In order to assess these more complex insights into the 
dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' through an analysis of the survey findings, I now 
shift my focus from the overall trends to the internal group differences in usage of 
films on videotape amongst South Asians. 
Given the statistical nature of the survey data the internal group differences in the 
patterns of film consumption amongst the respondents are best highlighted by 
crosstabulating the consumption of each category of film with specific axis of 
identification (i.e. sex, age, and birthplace). In this regard there were no notable 
differences between the numbers of males and females that watched the two 
categories of films. As Figure 18 illustrates the percentage of viewers of 
popular/mainstream films was virtually identical for both sexes, whilst the number of 
females watching Indian films was approximately 6% higher than males. The 
significance of this data is that it challenges dominant representations which position 
female migrants as less open, than male migrants, to 'outside' cultural influences 
because of their confinement to the home through patriarchal structures. The 
relatively high and similar percentages of male and female respondents watching 
Indian and popular/mainstream films suggests that interaction with different cultures 
cuts across gender divisions in that the everyday realities of South Asian women in 
158 
Britain are just as likely as South Asian men to be fragmented by multiple cultural 
i nft uences. 
Figure 18: %tage of sample watching Indian and popular/mainstream films 
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Although, no notable statistical differences were revealed in the patterns of film 
consumption by sex , crosstabulating the patterns of consumption by age and place of 
birth highlighted significant distinctions across the sample. In offering an 
interpretation of these distinctions I introduce and assess the value of other concepts 
interwoven into the work of hybridity theorists beginning with the ' migrant 
condition ' . 
Rereading the ~migrant condition? through an analysis of patterns of film 
consumption by age and place of birth 
A breakdown of the trends in consumption of films on videotape by age group was 
noted earlier and interpreted in relation to overall trends. I now return to the data 
presented in Pi gu re 16 to reft ect on some of the acute differences acro the age 
groups. Overall the use of Indian films remains relatively high for all the age groups 
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whereas the use of popular/mainstream films declines sharply as age increases. 
Amongst respondents aged 65+, 66.7% watched Indian films compared to 16.7% for 
popular/mainstream films. This contrasts with the 16-19 age group where the 
percentage was consistently high for both Indian (84.5%) and popular/mainstream 
films (85.9%). These generational differences draw into question the precise 
connection between the 'migrant condition' and the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' 
in that it is the film culture of the children of migrants, as opposed to migrants 
themselves, that is inclusive of culturally distinct forms. The importance of clarifying 
this connection is underscored by the fact that the 'migrant condition' has been 
accorded central significance in the emergence of hybrid cultural formations and, in 
Hall's case, is described as 'the prototype of the postmodern' (see p74). 
For Hall the 'process of hybridisation' is fundamentally linked to the dynamics of 
migration in that it is precisely the displacement of people from one homeland and 
their settlement in another that results in the intermixing of multiple cultural realities. 
In light of an acceleration in global migratory trends Hall perceives the 'migrants' 
predicament, of having to negotiate multiple cultural influences, as becoming an 
increasingly common experience amongst postmodern populations. Yet, what is 
proposed by the survey results is that it is not so much the people who have migrated 
but their children, who have lived their whole lives in Britain, that display a readiness 
and ability to be more directly engaged with the culturally distinct forms that surround 
them. This distinction is emphasised further by the link between the place of birth of 
respondents and their propensity to watch both Indian and popular/mainstream films. 
The relevant data is presented in Figure 19 and suggests that of those respondents 
born in England significantly high proportions watched both Indian films (73.4%) and 
popular/mainstream films (82%). By contrast, of the respondents who were born in 
India the percentage watching Indian films (85%) was 41 % higher than 
popular/mainstream films (44%). Similarly, of those born in East Africa the 
difference is 25% in favour of Indian films. The number of valid cases for the other 
three birth places, of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are too few to be able to 
make meaningful comparisons. But even within these less representative categories 
Sri Lanka is the only one where the percentage of respondents watching Indian films 
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is lower than those watching popular/mainstream films and even then the difference is 
only 7%. 
Figure 19: %tage of sample that watch Indian and popular/mainstream films by 
place of birth 
Sri East 
England Bangladesh India Pakistan Lanka Africa Other 
Indian films 73.4% 100% 85% 84% 93% 85% 
valid cases 109 14 85 19 15 54 
popular/ 
mainstream 82% 57% 44% 47% 100% 60% films 
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Some may be inclined to interpret the crosstabulations of trends in film consumption 
by age and place of birth as confirmation of how elders are less open to cultural 
change whilst their children are much more embracing of the cultural intermixing 
implied by such concepts as 'double consciousness', ' cultural fragmentation', 'the 
loss of a stable sense of self' and so on. This is the argument projected by Gillespie in 
her assertion that, 'the video cassette recorder (VCR) has been appropriated by many 
parents and grandparents ('elders') in Southall as a means of recreating cultural 
traditions in Britain; but, 1 ... 1, their efforts are both subverted and 'diverted' by young 
people'21o. I challenge Gillespie's assertion in more detail later when I argue for non-
linear frameworks for assessing the process of cultural change (see ppl64-175). Here 
it is important to note that Gillespie's particular interpretation of inter-generational 
differences in patterns of media consumption amongst South Asians identifies the 
'migrant' as someone who is resistant to cultural change. This in effect renders the 
central connection between the 'migrant condition' and the emergence of hybrid 
cultural expressions as somewhat precarious. In response to the implications of 
Gillespie's analogy I want to propo e that a fundamental link between the 'migrant 
condition' and the' process of hybridisation ' needs to be mai ntained. However, such a 
connection requires more complex delineation than the image of a per on, or group, 
21<7elevision. Ethnicity and Cultural Chan~e, (London, Routledge, 1995), p78 
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93% 
15 
73% 
15 
moving from one homeland to settle in another and in the process readily combining 
and fusing a variety of cultural codes and styles. The consequences of ignoring this 
complexity are summed up by Ashwani Sharma who, in criticising lain Chambers' 
positioning of migrancy as a metaphor for the postmodern condition, argues that the 
migrant becomes undifferentiated, 'decontextualised out of her socio-economic and 
historical situation', which pacifies the threat of difference to 'the legitimacy of 
narratives of dominant white masculine bourgeois Western culture'2l1. 
Reflecting on the survey findings, perhaps the most obvious way of retaining the 
changing significance of the 'migrant condition' to the 'process of hybridisation' is to 
position the different generations of South Asians as playing out necessary yet 
separate roles within the same process. In crude terms this would mean that the act of 
migration is undertaken by one generation who, by establishing a particular cultural 
lifestyle in another country fragment its cultural make up, whilst the actual 
negotiation of multiple cultural realities is promoted by the lifestyles of successive 
generations. However, I want to resist this line of interpretation and suggest that the 
defining feature of the 'migrant condition', as Hall envisages, of having to negotiate 
distinct ways of being and seeing holds true for both generations. In doing so, I am in 
effect asserting that the largely monocultural trends of film consumption amongst 
South Asian elders are as much an outcome of the 'process of hybridisation' as the 
bicultural trends of younger generations. Reading the 'migrant condition' in this way, 
of locating its significance in the cultural negotiations of both the younger and older 
generations, is crucial in order to get to grips with the uneven and contradictory 
outcomes of 'cultural hybridity' for the process of cultural change. This is a complex 
argument and I unpack it in three stages. These stages were outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter and involve firstly, applying Brah's distinction of 
horizontal and vertical comparisons of inter-generational differences; secondly, 
assessing the inter-generational differences for racially transgressive change within a 
non-linear framework of time and space; and thirdly, identifying the operation of the 
'frog's perspective', as conceived by Gilroy, within the bicultural film culture of the 
younger respondents. 
2II'Sounds Oriental: The Impossibility of Theorising Asian Musical Cultures', in Dis-OrientinK 
Rhythms, edited by S. Sharma, J. Hutnyk & A. Sharma, (London, Zed Books, 1996), pp18-19 
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Distinguishing 'horizontal' from 'vertical' comparisons of inter-generational 
differences 
In her study of modern diaspora formations, Brah notes how vastly different 
conclusions can be drawn from inter-generational differences depending on whether a 
vertical or horizontal comparison is preferred (see pp79-80). By way of illustration 
she distinguishes between 'age group' and 'generation'. She suggests that "age 
group' is a category that delineates a vertical relationship between subjects at a 
specific stage of a lifecycle (e.g. adolescents and their middle-aged parents), whereas 
'generation' is a unit of analysis articulating a horizontal relationship [ ... ]lwhich] is 
indexed and calibrated in relation to large units of historical time'212. Thus, within the 
definition of' age group', the differential patterns of usage of popular/mainstream 
films by age are likely to be construed as indicating young people's willingness to 
embrace cultural change, in contrast to elders' resistance to cultural change. What 
results is an oppositional inflection of generational differences, presenting a conflict 
between 'homogeneity versus diversity', or 'tradition versus modernity'. However, 
working within the definition of' generation' demands that the same patterns of film 
consumption are positioned and interpreted within the social and cultural context 
peculiar to the generation to whom each trend relates. 
It is not possible to provide a detailed insight here but the kinds of social and cultural 
dynamics that might separate and distinguish migrant experiences of 'British' society 
from that of their offspring are connected to a whole range of issues including 
language, relations with the indigenous population, disposable income and so on. For 
example, the status of 'British born' and 'British educated' has meant that many 
young South Asians have been integrated into the fabric of British society in a manner 
that has resulted in more direct contact with the indigenous population and 
mainstream 'British' culture. By comparison first generation migrants from the 
subcontinent have had a far more detached experience of 'British' culture in that not 
only were their childhood experiences grounded in an altogether different place, but 
their arrival in Britain was characterised by more overt racism denying them 
212Carto~ra.phies of Diaspora. (London, Routledge, (996), p43 
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fundamental rights in employment and housing. This served to create a more distant 
encounter between first generation migrants and the indigenous population and their 
way of life. 
Essentially, the meaning of 'generation' challenges the 'homogeneity versus 
diversity' dichotomy, by simply shifting the focus to more fundamental differences in 
the social profile between age groups. With respect to the survey, we might simply 
argue that popular/mainstream films have been more accessible and more integral to 
the experiences of young South Asians than their parents/grandparents. However, the 
more important observation to be made from inflecting a horizontal as opposed to 
vertical interpretation of inter-generational differences is that it emphasises the 
internal contradictions and constantly shifting power relations that characterise the 
dynamics of 'cultural hybridity'. In effect this means, as Brah observes, that it is not 
possible to have one model of diaspora, or hybridity, because actual experiences of 
diaspora unfold in complex and contradictory ways and are historically and socially 
specific. 
To illustrate more clearly how vertical comparisons of generational differences 
oversimplify the dynamics and outcomes of 'cultural hybridity', whilst horizontal 
analyses provide a more complex insight into how the 'process of hybridisation' is 
experienced and negotiated I want to briefly return to Gillespie's study. Gillespie 
adopts a vertical analysis of the generational differences emerging from her study and 
thus provides a useful context for distinguishing and developing a horizontal 
interpretation of my own survey findings. 
In the earlier reference to Gillespie's work the cultural outlook of South Asian elders 
was presented as fixed, resistant to change and concerned with the preservation of 
tradition. In Gillespie's schema, the apprehension of many qualities associated with 
'cultural hybridity', such as 'a fragmented sense of self' and 'the fusion of cultures', 
are projected as relatively recent phenomena emerging from the cultural 
pronouncements of the younger generations. At the level of a more visible and ~ 
embracement of distinct cultural forms it is possible to comprehend the reasoning 
behind Gillespie's line of thought. For example, with reference to the results from my 
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own survey, the video film culture of older respondents compared to that of younger 
respondents can be presented as a shift from a static essentialist cultural location to a 
more hybrid one on the simple basis that the former is predominantly monocultural 
and the latter is bicultural. Gillespie's representation of this argument is made all the 
more convincing as she intricately weaves parents' use of the media with their 
investment in such 'outdated' systems as arranged marriage, kinship duty and a 
nostalgia for home, which she contrasts with young people's outlook for 'an open 
expansive sociability' as manifested in their engagement of the media as 'an entirely 
real 'escape' into a new social and communicative space, in which [they] can actively 
redefine their culture'213. 
Gillespie's argument not only presents cultural change in linear terms, but also 
situates young people's culturally fragmented location as embodying an instance of 
'cultural hybridity' from which 'real' progressive change might emerge in the form of 
overcoming structures and traditions that are restrictive to individual choice and 
freedom. In depicting such a picture the cultural identities of South Asian elders are 
positioned as being external to the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' and stripped of the 
ability to contribute anything to the emergence of racially transgressive change. This 
is an overly simplistic understanding of the origins and manifestation of 'cultural 
hybridity'. It can be challenged by preferring a horizontal interpretation of 
generational differences which I develop by applying Gilroy and Rattansi's non-linear 
conceptions of time/space dynamics. 
Assessing generatiolUll differences within a non-linear framework of time and 
space 
As described in Chapter 2 both Gilroy and Rattansi emphasise that identities do not 
evolve in a neat linear sequence. Gilroy expands on this by (re)integrating into his 
understanding of diaspora formations the concepts of' unity', 'authenticity' and 
'tradition' which have tended to be regarded as signifying the opposite of the 
fragmented character of diaspora or 'hybrid' cultural formations. For Gilroy the 
respective concepts represent a theme of 'connectedness' that is defined by an 
interactive relationship between 'past' and 'present' (see pp97-1(0). If traces of the 
213TelevjsiQn. Ethnicity and Cultural Cban~e, (London, Routledge, 1995), p206 
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'past' can be found in the 'present' then it becomes difficult to conceive of time and 
space as evolving in a neat linear sequence where the 'present' signals a complete 
break from the 'past'. In a similar vein, Rattansi draws attention to the 'decentring' of 
'subjects' and 'the social' highlighting how both represent an endless process of 
displacement and crosscutting of boundaries in that they are influenced by multiple 
cultural perspectives of the world. What results is an interweaving of 'old' and 'new' 
narratives which by definition undermines the linearity often associated with temporal 
and spatial dynamics (see pp103-105). 
Gilroy and Rattansi's respective insights are consistent with a horizontal organisation 
of generational trends in that they demand that instead of a direct comparison or linear 
arrangement of inter-generational identities, it is more appropriate to examine each 
identity formation within its own historical and social contexf14. Applying this 
framework to interpret the generational differences emerging from my survey 
discloses the 'seemingly' monocultural film culture amongst South Asian elders as 
playing a key role in fragmenting the cultural make-up of films shown in British 
cinemas. This can be briefly illustrated by tracking the origins of Indian films and the 
role played by first generation migrants in establishing the presence of Indian films 
within mainstream British culture. 
The introduction of films as a leisure activity in India can be dated back to 7th July 
1896 when the Lumiere Brothers' Cinematographe was shown at the Watson's Hotel 
in Bombay. This was succeeded by other imported shorts from Europe which played 
to packed houses. Three years after the screening of Cinematographe, H.S. 
Bhatvadekar became the first filmmaker indigenous to India to make short films. 
These were followed, in 1905, by the first Indian features made by J.P. Madan's 
Elphinstone Bioscope film Company of Calcutta21S. Since then, the growth in terms of 
214It is worth pointing out that a non-linear understanding of cultural difference and identity negotiation 
is central to Homi Bhabha's illustration of the transgressive possibilities opened up by the dynamics of 
'cultural hybridity'. He writes, a 'disjunctive temporality is of the utmost importance for the politics of 
cultural difference' and is 'effective because it returns to displace the present' thereby providing a 
'basis for non-ethnocentric, transcultural judgements' (The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 
1994), pl77). Bhabha specifically refers to the 'disjunctive temporality' as a 'time-lag' or 'temporal 
split'. see also Bhabha's essay 'Culture's in Between', in Multicultural States, edited by D. Bennett, 
(London, Routledge, 1998), pp29-36 
2l5Firoze Rangoonwalla, A Pictorial History of Indian Cinema, (London, Hamlyn, 1979) 
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turnover has been such that popular Indian cinema has come to be recognised as the 
largest in the world releasing on average two and a half feature films a dall6• The 
appearance of Indian films on British cinema screens can be traced back to the early 
1950s as the main leisure activity shared by the first wave of post-war migrants. Due 
to the composition of the consumer market for Indian films, cinema screenings in 
Britain were confined to areas with a dense population of South Asians2l7. The 
availability of the VCR in the seventies, and the more recent introduction of 
cable/satellite television, have drastically increased the accessibility of Indian films 
amongst its British audience. It is no longer necessary to travel to, or live in the 
vicinity of, particular cinemas in order to be part of the Indian film audience in 
Britain. 
This brief chronology of the birth of Indian cinema and its presence in British society 
identifies the intermixing of Western and Indian cultures as predating the post-war 
migration of people from the Indian sub-continent. As such it adds some weight to the 
emphasis emerging from Gilroy's work that the historical significance of 'cultural 
hybridity' should not be located in the late twentieth century but at the inception of 
modernity marked by the encounter between coloniser and colonised (see pp90-93). 
These observations are worthy of more detailed consideration than I am able to do 
justice here because they highlight that a comprehensive insight into the changing 
character and significance of hybrid cultural formations would need to delve into the 
histories of centuries past. To return to my own focus on contemporary South Asian 
film cultures, the point I wish to stress from the preceding paragraph is that, the 
establishment of popular Indian film culture within British society can be 
overwhelmingly attributed to the unapologetic assertion of culturally distinct tastes by 
post-war South Asian migrants amidst an atmosphere of 'race' hate and disdain 
towards 'alien' cultures. Framed in this way we might emphasise the cultural resolve 
of South Asian elders who did not succumb to the 'dominant way of life' and in doing 
216Ashish Nandy, 'Indian Popular Cinema as a Slum's Eye View of Politics', in The Secret Politics of 
Our Desires. edited by A. Nandy, (London, Zed Books, 1998), pi 
217Ziauddin Sardar's autobiographical account touches on how, in the sixties, watching Indian films at 
the Scala in King's Cross or the Cameo Theatre in Walthamstow was a once weekly 'occasion' 
enjoyed by many families from the subcontinent. See his essay 'Dilip Kumar made me do it', in ~ 
Secret Politics of Our Desires, edited by A. Nandy, (London, Zed Books, 1998), pp19-91 
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so changed the cultural landscape of Britain forever. This particular interpretation of 
the monocultural pattern of film consumption amongst South Asian migrants and its 
impact on the' dominant culture' enables a more precise understanding of firstly, the 
connection between the 'migrant condition' and 'cultural hybridity', and secondly, 
where our focus should be when assessing the transgressive qualities of the 'migrant 
condition' or indeed' cultural hybridity'. 
On the one hand it is the pivotal role played by the 'migrant condition' in the 
transportation of cultures that highlights its direct linkage to the dynamics of 'cultural 
hybridity'. For, it is precisely by making cultures mobile, by encouraging their 
movement across national borders, that the' migrant condition' , like the dynamics of 
'cultural hybridity', brings about the possibility for 'old' and 'new' narratives to 
interweave. On the other hand, the connection between elders' monocultural 
consumption of films and the fragmentation of British culture stresses that the 
transgressive qualities of the 'migrant condition' or indeed' cultural hybridity' does 
not in fact lie in the ability to operate within, or consume, culturally distinct forms. 
Rather it lies in the ability to negotiate an identity amidst a plurality of cultural 
influences in a manner that is disruptive of the 'dominant order'. In this regard, it is 
important to acknowledge that the bicultural film culture of young people is unlikely 
to have emerged had their parents/grandparents not been so undeterred from asserting 
their own styles and cultural preferences. 
There is an additional perhaps more important observation to be made from the 
survey which reinforces the argument that in locating the transgressive qualities of 
'cultural hybridity' the focus should overwhelmingly be on the capacity to disrupt the 
'dominant order' as opposed to the ability to intermix distinct cultures. In relation to 
this it is possible to cite evidence to suggest that, although bicultural in form, the 
critical evaluation of Indian and popular/mainstream films amongst young South 
Asians has perhaps not been so disruptive to Western feelings of cultural superiority. 
To develop this part of my argument I draw on Gilroy's reading of the 'frog's 
perspective' to describe the structure of interaction characterising the simultaneous 
usage of popular/mainstream and Indian films amongst younger generations of South 
Asians. 
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Negotiating 'cultural hybridity' from the 'frog's perspective' 
Informal conversations during the distribution of the questionnaire indicated that 
amongst many young respondents who regularly watched both Indian and 
popular/mainstream films, there was a tendency to critically assess Indian films in 
more homogenous ways than popular/mainstream films. The latter were more likely 
to be criticised with reference to the genres and narratives specific to each individual 
text. By comparison, Indian films were more communally criticised with comments 
such as the 'storylines are all the same' and that 'the fighting and dance sequences are 
prolonged and unrealistic'. When attention was drawn to the fact that fantasy and 
unreal scenes were also integral to many of the popular/mainstream films that were 
identified as their favourite type of films (such as Die Hard and Terminator), 
respondents would comment that the latter were of a much higher standard and more 
believable. Gillespie's study also corroborates this tendency to describe Indian films 
as being inferior to popular/mainstream films. This is captured in a quote from an 18-
year-old boy which is worth reproducing: 
With the standard of media appreciation in the west it's hard to understand the 
sort of psyche that would appreciate these kinds of films again and again and 
again [ ... J. If you've been exposed to a film culture based on complex plots 
and detailed cinematography then you'd expect the same from the other 
culture and if it doesn't match up to that standard you don't want to see it 
anymore [ ... J it's like driving a Morris Minor after you've driven a Porsche?18 
These very open condemnations of Indian cinema have to be considered alongside 
data discussed earlier (see Figure 16) which presented young South Asians as equally 
avid consumers of both Indian and popular/mainstream films. In making sense of this 
contradictory data, one line of argument could be that it is perfectly plausible for 
respondents to find aspects such as fighting and violence aesthetically more pleasing 
in popular/mainstream films. Indeed such a theory appears to be supported by a 
comparison of respondents' identification of aspects they found most appealing in 
21!7elevision. Ethnicity and Cultural Chanae, (London, Routledge, 1995), p83 
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Indian films and their favourite genres of popular/mainstream fil ms2l9. The relevant 
survey findings are presented in Figures 20 and 21. 
Figure 20: Elements respondents liked to see in Indian r.Ims 
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2Jl)In the previous chapter the difficultie of mea uring con umption of Indian film by genre were 
highlighted and so it is not po ible to make a like for like compari on using only genre categorie . 
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Figure 21: Popular/mainstream genres respondents liked to watch 
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The graphs in Figures 20 and 21 indicate that whilst comedy (77.6% for Indian films 
and 80.2% for popular/mainstream films) and romance (64.8% for Indian films and 
56.1 % for popular/mainstream films) constitute ingredients that a large majority of 
respondents like to see in both categories offilm, the least appealing aspects of Indian 
films i.e. violence and fighting (only 18.4% and 21.2 % respectively liked to see these 
in Indian films) are a central feature of three of the top six most liked genres of 
popular/mainstream films i.e. horror (47.1 %); thriller (62.7%) and action (66.1 %). It 
is perhaps unsurprising that a clear preference for particular narrative conventions, or 
the manner in which specific themes are depicted by one category of films, becomes a 
reference point when commenting upon the aesthetic qualitie of another category of 
films. However, of most significance to thi s discussion is the fact that the critical 
discourse being used by respondents to asse popular/main tream films was often 
being used as a yardstick to evaluate the aesthetic ucce of Indian film but not vice 
versa. At no point did anyone evaluate popular/mainstream films within a framework 
that privileged tho e elements most likely to encourage respondent to watch Indian 
films e.g. songs and music ( ee Figure 17). In fact, out of all the genre categorie from 
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which respondents were asked to identify which popular/mainstream films they liked 
to watch, 'the musical' was identified by the lowest percentage of respondents (only 
18.1 % indicated that they liked to watch musicals). Yet, unlike the open 
condemnations of depictions of fighting and violence in Indian films, respondents did 
not so much as comment on how popular/mainstream films might utilise songs and 
music in more appealing ways. In summary, whilst respondents were clearly 
operating within different critical frameworks when selecting and drawing pleasure 
from the two categories of films, their artistic qualities were often measured according 
to dominant Western discourses, on what respondents most liked to see in 
popular/mainstream films. In order to assess the implications of these findings for the 
process of cultural change it useful to link the survey data to what Gilroy describes as 
the 'frog's perspective'. 
Gilroy incorporates the 'frog's perspective' into his understanding of modern black 
cultural formations, and more specifically 'double consciousness', to highlight how 
amongst previously colonised populations there is a certain amount of (often 
unconscious) desire to resemble the colonising subject. This tendency of' looking 
from below upward', argues Gilroy, is a fundamental obstacle to establishing more 
enduring relations of equality in that the struggles of the oppressed are simultaneously 
driven by the desire to emancipate oneself, and the desire to acquire the power and 
wealth of the privileged (see pp96-97). The condition of 'looking from below upward' 
is implicit in the bicultural patterns of film consumption amongst South Asian youth 
in that it is easy to ascertain from their comments what Indian cinema might valuably 
learn from popular/mainstream films. It is not, however, so easy to identify what 
popular/mainstream films might learn from Indian cinema. These findings confirm 
Gilroy's observation that modern black subjectivities have tended to reflect, rather 
than overthrow, the' antinomies of modernity' and I develop this line of thought 
further in the next section (see pp182-187). 
At this stage it is useful to summarise the direction in which I have taken the meaning 
of 'cultural hybridity' in this section. There are three points in particular that I want to 
highlight which support Brah's observation that it is a contextually contingent 
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question whether individual negotiations of 'difference' end up contributing towards 
more equal or subordinate relations. 
Contextually contingent outcomes of the 'play of difference' 
The first observation to be highlighted from the discussion in this section is the need 
to look beyond an open, or wholesale, embracement of distinct cultural forms as the 
defining feature of 'cultural hybridity'. My analysis of the inter-generational 
differences emerging from the survey demanded that the film cultures of both South 
Asian youth and their parents/grandparents be recognised as having evolved out of a 
'sense of doubleness', amidst a position 'between two cultural assemblages'. The 
collision between the respective cultural influences has been very differently 
structured across the generations and with very different outcomes. Thus, rather than 
being seen to represent the difference between 'homogeneity' and 'diversity', or 
'tradition' and 'modernity', the generational differences in film consumption might be 
more properly understood as the differing ways in which the different age groups 
have been introduced, positioned and have interacted with 'British' and 'South Asian' 
culture. And as the preceding discussion highlights it is not possible to accord one 
position as being more racially transgressive than the other. This links to the second 
point which relates to the 'play of difference' as it unfolds in individual negotiations 
of 'cultural hybridity'. 
By reading the monocultural consumption of films amongst the older generation as 
providing an insight into the 'process of hybridisation' it has been possible to argue 
that just because someone is not seen to embrace more than one culture does not mean 
their lives are wholly uninfluenced by cultural differences, or are somehow external to 
the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity'. This assertion is illustrated more vividly and in 
more detail in chapter 6, in the context of young Muslim identities, where I argue that 
whilst respondents openly foreground Islam over all other axes of difference in 
defining their lifestyles, the meaning of 'Islam' itself and of being 'Muslim' have 
evolved through personal experiences and interaction with' British', 'Asian' and 
'Muslim' cultures (see pp246-273). With reference to the survey I simply assert that 
the monocultural consumption of films amongst elders can only be described as 
'essentialist' if the focus is on identifying interaction or fusion of visibly distinct 
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cultural texts, as opposed to the negotiation and establishment of an Indian film 
culture amidst a political climate committed to 'cultural assimilation' and a social 
climate openly racist to anything non' British' . 
A third important observation to be drawn from this section is the non-linear 
dynamics and outcomes of 'cultural hybridity'. This is not to deny that certain cultural 
trends or styles succeed or precede others. However, what does need to be questioned 
is the positioning of more recent cultural expressions (such as the bicultural film 
culture of South Asian youth in Britain) as necessarily more progressive than those 
preceding them (such as the monocultural film culture of first generation South Asian 
migrants). This can only be avoided by foregrounding non-linear frameworks of time 
and space when understanding and comparing different cultural trends. 
Taken together, the above three points identify the 'play of difference' as being 
central to the experiences of South Asians in Britain. Whether it be in relation to the 
monocultural trends characterising the film culture of first generation migrants or the 
bicultural trends of subsequent generations, 'cultural differences' have had to be 
confronted and negotiated. More importantly, the different implications for the 
process of racially transgressive cultural change that is posed by each of these trends 
confirms Brah's observation that it is always contextually specific as to how exactly 
particular negotiations of' difference' impact upon social and cultural inequalities. 
The significance of this assertion for the broader concerns of this thesis, of assessing 
whether 'cultural hybridity' can be productively mobilised as a counterdiscourse to 
racialised forms of power and subordination, is crucial. For, it suggests that' cultural 
hybridity' never carries any guarantees but always poses both negative and positive, 
or, progressive and regressive, outcomes for racial and cultural relations. I return to 
address this point in the conclusion of this thesis. 
I now shift my focus, in the last section of this chapter, to examine the contexts in 
which the two categories of films are consumed. In doing so I to draw attention to 
some of the dynamics external to the narrative of individual texts that also have a 
bearing upon the way in which Indian and popular/mainstream films come to be 
compared and judged. 
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Contexts of Consumption 
In her study Gillespie remarks that the culturally inferior status accorded to Indian 
films, 'does not confirm a 'truth' ... [r]ather it exposes a common frame of reference 
based on dominant western (Hollywood) film-making practices' 220. My own findings 
do not contradict Gillespie's reasoning. However, I would like to consider two aspects 
external to the narrative of texts but integral to the process of interaction with films on 
videotape to suggest that the picture is far more complex than simply an assimilation 
of, what is effectively, a 'false' conception of Western cultural forms as embodying 
'superior' entities. The two aspects involve, firstly, the different outlets from where 
films on videotape were obtained, and secondly, the company in which videotapes 
were most likely to be watched. 
Disparities in provision and quality of video merchandise as a basis for 
~superior'l ~inferior' cultures 
The survey indicates marked differences in accessing videotapes of Indian and 
popular/mainstream films. As illustrated in Figure 22, the most common place for 
renting Indian films was from videoshops specialising in Indian films, with 85.4% of 
those respondents that watched Indian films using this outlet. By comparison, 
popular/mainstream films were most likely to be obtained from mainstream 
videoshops such as Blockbusters with 81.6% using this outlet. In addition, 'family 
and friends' were a common source for exchanging and obtaining videotapes of both 
Indian (73.1 %) and popular/mainstream (74.6%) films. Places such as public libraries 
and local shops, which sold and/or rented videos as an aside rather than a main feature 
of their respective service, were not such ubiquitous avenues for accessing tapes. 
22<>relevision. Ethnicity and Cultural ehanKe, (London, Routledge, 1995), p83 
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Figure 22: %tage of sample using various outlets for obtaining films 
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The above data establishes the proportion of consumers of each category offilm using 
the respective outlets. An idea of the actual slice of the video market commanded by 
each outlet can be gleaned by considering the regularity with which the various 
sources were used. In this regard the statistics presented in Figure 23 indicate that, 
across the sample, the most common sources for obtaining videotape were also the 
most frequently used. For example, of those who watched Indian film 48.1 % 
obtained videotapes from ' Indian videoshops ' once a fortnjght or more, compared to 
28.5% from 'family/friends ', 15.4% from ' local shops' and 9 .2% from ' public 
libraries ' . In the case of popular/mainstream films the statistics read , 30.3% from 
' mainstream videoshops', 27.9% from ' family/friends ', 13.4% from ' local shops ' and 
6% from ' public libraries ' . 
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Figure 23: % tage of respondents using various outlets fortnightly or more to 
rentlloan films 
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That videoshops are places from which videotapes are most likely to be obtained is 
hardly surprising given that their services are concentrated around the provision of 
video merchandise. What is of interest to this discussion is the existence and use of 
distinctly different videoshops for the two categories of film. They constitute much 
more than two retail outlets specialising in different cultural products. As 1 describe 
later, popular/mainstream and Indian videoshops represent very different structures of 
business enterprise resulting in a distinctly different 'cultural encounter' for their 
customers (see pp 182-187). The point I wish to underline here is that the 
imultaneous usage of Indian and popular/mainstream video hops amongst significant 
numbers of South Asians in Britain is a source for cultural comparison and contrast. 
This first came to light during the pre-pilot discussions where the focus for contrast 
and comparison overwhelmingly revolved around the quality of videotapes supplied 
by the respective outlets and the rental price charged. A recurrent critici m of 
merchandise supplied by videoshops specialising in Indian films wa that the picture 
and ound quality were of a significantly poorer standard compared to that supplied 
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by popular/mainstream films. By contrast respondents were more dissatisfied with the 
rental price of popular/mainstream films on video compared to Indian films. These 
observations were consolidated and incorporated into the survey questionnaire and the 
responses are presented in Figures 24 and 25. 
Figure 24: %tage of respondents dissatisfied with audio-visual quality of films 
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Figure 25: %tage of respondents dissatisfied with the rental price of films on 
videotape 
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The data presented in the above graphs confirms the pattern of dissatisfaction relayed 
during the pre-pilot discussions. 50.4% registered their dissatisfaction with the picture 
and sound quality of Indian films on videotape compared to a mere 9.2% for 
popular/mainstream films. Notably, dissatisfaction with the price of videotapes was 
higher for popular/mainstream films (29.4%) than Indian films (15%). Both these 
trends can be shown to be consistent with the comparative strengths and weaknesses 
of hiring videotapes of Indian and popular/mainstream films. For example, the far 
higher degree of dissatisfaction with the picture and sound quality of Indian films is 
reflective of the much wider circulation of poor quality pirated copies of Indian films 
compared to popular/mainstream films221. As one participant commented, "sometimes 
the quality of the tapes are so bad that you can ' t even distinguish whether it's a man 
or a woman on the screen". Similarly, at the time of the survey, Indian films could be 
rented for around 75p to £1.00 making them approximately three times cheaper than 
popular/mainstream films and so again it is unsurprising that respondents were more 
likely to express dissati sfaction at the price of popular/mainstream films than Indian 
films. These instances of contrast and comparison support Brah ' s observation of how 
binaries come to playa fundamental role in individual experiences of diaspora. She 
121Manjeet Kipalani and Ron Grover, ' Bo llywood ', in Bus iness Week Internationa l, December 2, 2002 
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adds that by unpicking how binaries are constituted and contested it is possible to 
begin to understand the dynamics of power and structure of social relations in a given 
context (see pp82-83). Here I respond to Brah's suggestion by considering where 
change is likely to occur on the basis of the kind of binary comparison of video 
merchandise being articulated by the respondents. 
Manifestation of binaries and the dynamics power 
First and foremost it is important to distinguish the manifestation of binary opposites 
being examined here from the conception of binary opposites associated with 
essentialist discourses of 'race'. In relation to the latter, binary opposites are 
constructed to prevent cultural intermixing altogether, to keep racial identities 
mutually exclusive (see ppI51-153). By contrast, the framework of binary 
comparisons through which respondents to the survey identify the strengths and 
limitations of Indian and popular/mainstream films is not an obstacle to cultural 
intermixing. Rather it is the means through which cultural intermixing takes place and 
is negotiated. My concern here is to understand the particular arrangement of power 
relations being invoked within the binary comparisons of video merchandise. To do 
this the point I wish to focus on and examine is the huge difference in the degree of 
ferocity with which individuals pursued their respective criticisms. My findings 
highlight Rattansi's observation of the intertwining of racist and anti-racist discourses 
in the formation of modem cultures and subjectivities. 
The intertwining of racist and anti-racist discourses 
For instance, expressions of dissatisfaction with the rental price of 
popular/mainstream films was something respondents willingly registered but made 
no further references to in their critical assessment of the service offered by 
mainstream videoshops. By comparison, dissatisfaction with the picture and sound 
quality of Indian videotapes seemed to become entangled with an overall sense of 
mocking of the Indian film industry. Respondents' criticisms were directly related to 
the 'backward' and 'chaotic' nature of the Indian film industry and the 'haphazard 
and unprofessional way in which things were done by "these" people'. 
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As I've already noted the intense criticisms of the audio-visual qualities of Indian 
videotapes are not unjustified but the context in which this situation has emerged is 
more complex than the reasoning offered by respondents. For example, regulatory 
bodies such as the British Board for Film Classification and authorities working to 
eradicate pirated goods, although gradually increasing their involvement, have to date 
been less responsive and ill equipped to deal with the Indian film market than the 
popular/mainstream film market. As such there has been more room for the 
circulation of lower quality merchandise within the Indian video market which may 
be deemed unacceptable by statutory standards. Perhaps, a more fundamental reason 
behind the wider circulation of poor quality Indian videos is the unequal levels of 
financial backing invested in the market for Indian films compared to 
popular/mainstream films. This is vividly illustrated by the fact that the most 
expensive Indian film ever made was Devdas released in 2002 at a cost of $15 
million, whilst the production costs of the 1997 blockbuster Titanic, the most 
expensive Hollywood film to date, totalled $200 million. The disparity in financial 
capital available to the two film industries will inevitably result in differences in the 
overall technical and production qualities of the end product put out by each, as 
manifested in the vast differences in quality of video merchandise available to 
customers. 
The reduction of these more complex factors behind the disparity in quality of Indian 
and popular/mainstream videotapes to a situation of superior/inferior cultures 
corresponds to the pattern of commentary about the aesthetic quality of the two 
categories of film presented in the second section of this chapter. Both instances 
represent Rattansi's identification of how modern cultural identities often reflect the 
intertwining of racist and anti-racist discourses. For example, respondents seem to be 
well attuned to the strengths and weaknesses that set Indian and popular/mainstream 
films apart, whether that be specific to the styles of narrative or the quality and price 
of video merchandise. But, in both instances a relatively higher degree of 
dissatisfaction and criticism is expressed against Indian films and in a manner where 
the focus of criticism consistently foregrounds those features that are perceived to be 
strengths of popular/mainstream films. This scenario, as highlighted earlier in the 
chapter, is consistent with Gilroy's conception of the 'frog's perspective' of 'looking 
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from below upward' (see pp169-172). It is also reflective of Brah's assertion that the 
negotiation of multiple cultural locations necessarily involves a struggle over relations 
of power. With specific reference to the bicultural film culture of South Asians in 
Britain, the dynamics of power are weighted in favour of the dominant 'Other' in that 
specific characteristics of the dominant 'Other' are singled out as markers of progress 
and become the principle driving force directing the process of cultural change. 
In as much as audio-visual features are essential interactive components of all films it 
could be argued that not being able to distinguish the characters on screen is not only 
bound to attract intense criticism, but, by bringing their respective technical qualities 
on a par with each other the propensity to arrange popular/mainstream and Indian 
films along a superior/inferior continuum might lessen. In that sense Gilroy's concern 
that the 'frog's perspective' thwarts the struggles of the oppressed from overcoming 
racialised forms of power and subordination is not immediately apparent in the 
example under discussion. The survey itself does not extend its focus to examine how 
exactly bringing the quality of Indian video merchandise on a par with 
popular/mainstream videos will impact upon dominant/subordinate relations. 
However, the character of respondents' criticisms about the provision of video 
merchandise is largely consistent with the flow and exchange of ideas between film 
production companies in Hollywood and India. As such I describe and use this 
process and the changes arising from it as a basis for beginning to reflect upon what 
exactly is being gained and lost when the process of cultural change is being driven 
by the condition of' looking from below upward'. My findings support Gilroy's 
identification of how the diaspora cultures of blacks settled in the West are best 
understood as reflections of the' antinomies of modernity' . 
Diaspora cultures as reflections of the ~antinomies of modernity' 
In their article titled' Bollywood,222, Manjit Kipalani and Ron Grover report on how 
the Indian film industry is trying to 'professionalise' through the gradual 
incorporation of Western business sense, practices and capital. The language in which 
Kipalani and Grover describe and refer to the two respective film industries echoes 
that used by respondents in both my own survey and Gillespie's research. For 
example, Kipalani and Grover suggest that whilst 'flops' are not unusual in 
Hollywood, the Indian film industry is in a 'class by itself'. This kind of comparison 
clearly resonates with the comments of respondents quoted in earlier sections of this 
chapter. I do not wish to elaborate on this in any detail except to point out that the 
superior/inferior dichotomy dominating everyday comparisons of 'Hollywood' and 
'Bollywood' by individuals participating in my survey, is also reflective of the 
exchange of ideas and relations between the two industries. In both cases the 
production values and practices of Hollywood are envisaged as the most advanced 
and therefore positioned as markers for the Indian film industry to aspire. In this 
regard Kipalani and Grover's article traces such changes as Indian production 
companies modelling themselves on U.S. companies such as Miramax, plans for 
multiplex screens to replace the existing 'dilapidated' movie houses, and Hollywood 
companies like Twentieth Century Fox signing contracts to market and distribute 
'Bollywood' films. There is a long way to go before the Indian film industry begins to 
match, as Kipalani and Grover put it, 'the efficiency and production values of 
Hollywood', but the initial indications chart a process of change that is predominantly 
driven by specifically Western principles of capitalism. The result being that there is a 
gradual homogenisation of the cultures of production and consumption surrounding 
the two categories of film. 
Here we can begin to identify how the transgressive potential of 'cultural hybridity' is 
weakened because the non-linear arrangement of time/space dynamics that is seen to 
enable 'new' identities and 'new' cultural outlooks to emerge is thwarted by the 
homogenisation of 'cultures of interaction' defined by the principles of capitalism. 
This would correspond with John Kraniauskas' assertion that capitalist 
reterritorialisation presents itself today' as the production of the new subjects of a 
socio-cultural order which is both specifically transnational (postnational) and one in 
which, from the point of view of time, the disavowal of coeval ness that structures 
narratives of progress and development is being tendentially undermined by the new 
technologies allied to capital itself'223. With respect to the survey I want describe the 
process by which 'cultures of interaction' become homogenised by considering how 
222Manjeet Kipalani and Ron Grover, • Bollywood', in Business Week International, December 2, 2002 
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the changes charted by Kipalani and Grover are likely to affect mainstream and Indian 
videoshops which at present constitute very different structures of business enterprise 
posing distinct 'cultural encounters' for their customers. I should clarify that the 
phrase 'cultures of interaction' is used here specifically to refer to the style and 
structure of conversations and personal relations involved in the process of obtaining 
and watching films on videotape. 
The different business structures and styles of mainstream videoshops and those 
outlets specialising in Indian films can be presented as the difference between a large 
scale corporate set up and a small scale, often family run, business. These differing 
entrepreneurial approaches evoke different styles of interaction and structures of 
feeling which constitute another aspect, alongside the interaction with texts, of 
operating within distinct cultural codes and styles that is integral to the video film 
culture of many South Asians in Britain. The survey data itself does not provide an 
insight into the differences, but comments from the pre-pilot discussions can be used 
to establish an overall picture. 
Those contributing to the pre-pilot discussions tended to describe their visits to 
mainstream video outlets in somewhat impersonal terms. Many pointed out that 
information about the latest releases was readily available from monthly magazines 
provided by the shops thereby allowing for some degree of pre-planning. In fact, trips 
to mainstream videoshops were often made after deciding which film(s) to hire. Many 
respondents would take part in deciding what to watch but would then ask, or 
sometimes 'toss' a coin with, another member of the family as to who would go to the 
shop. On the whole respondents' comments depicted a largely functional encounter 
with mainstream videoshops which is consistent with the underlying objective of the 
management style adopted by such outlets. For example, many, as epitomised by 
Blockbusters, devote a great deal of attention to detail ranging from role of staff. 
structure of the shop, customer relations, and processing of merchandise. All of these 
aspects are broken down in minute detail with set procedures that are directed and 
monitored by a central office. As with other corporate run services, such as 
McDonalds. the aim is to create one brand name and image which can be recreated 
223'Hybridity in a Transnational Frame', in Hybridjty and its Discontents, edited by A. 8rab & A.E. 
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any number of times in any number of places and which can deliver a product as 
quickly as possible to as many people as possible. The expectations of service are 
clearly marked out for people on both sides of the counter. There is a set timescale for 
the hire of videotapes, with the imposition of a penalty should that timescale be 
breached. This is the business style that dominates the popular/mainstream video 
market. The result is a highly structured operation with a somewhat formal 
relationship between customer and provider. 
In contrast to their experiences of using mainstream outlets, respondents' comments 
indicated that their trips to Indian videoshops involved much more personal 
interaction with the owners/assistants. Visits were often impromptu and made whilst 
'passing by', and not always with a view to hiring but simply enquiring if 'any new 
films had arrived'. In the absence of printed material listing and describing individual 
texts for hire, background details to Indian films were often obtained (or confirmed in 
instances where respondents had already learnt about a new release from a 
programme, magazine or friend) directly from the owner/assistant. Again 
respondents' accounts of using Indian videoshops can be connected to their structure 
and management style in that most Indian outlets adopt an informal approach to 
service provision, many not even enforcing the membership cards that are a central 
feature of Blockbusters. The majority are individual or family run businesses and so 
each outlet has its own personal style and layout. There are few stringent rules of hire 
with many customers not returning tapes for several days or even weeks without 
incurring penalties. One woman in the pre-pilot discussions stated, "Sometimes I 
don't return the videotapes for weeks and the shopowner doesn't say anything or 
charge me extra". 
These contrasting accounts of the experience of using Indian and mainstream video 
outlets help to visualise how current interventions to improve the production and 
marketing of Indian films, as described by Kipalani and Grover, are likely to lead to a 
homogenisation of 'cultures of interaction'. For example, the introduction of Western 
business sense and production values to the Indian film industry is likely to improve 
the quality of merchandise supplied to Indian videoshops. At the same time better 
Coombes, (London, Routledge, 2(00), p252 
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quality merchandise is also likely to mean higher production costs which is likely to 
result in an increase in rental price. These changes are likely to place the management 
and structure of videoshops under close scrutiny with the aim of introducing new 
systems designed to attract more customers and encourage a higher turnover of stock 
in order to recuperate the increased costs. Under such conditions it is unlikely that the 
informal cultural relations that are currently the norm between customers and 
owners/assistants of Indian videoshops will survive, and are likely to become more 
and more like the formal cultural encounters characteristic of mainstream videoshops. 
Of course these predictions are premature and it may even turn out that mainstream 
outlets become the main points of access for Indian films in Britain. Whatever the 
exact outcome, on the basis of current trends it is likely that the cultures of production 
and consumption of Indian films will become increasingly like the cultures of 
production and consumption of popular/mainstream films. The implications of this 
trend for the possibilities of racially transgressive outlooks to emerge from the 
'process of hybridisaton' are highlighted by John Hutnyk in his examination of the 
increasing popularity of 'World Music' which brings together diverse sounds from all 
parts of the globe for an increasingly diverse audience creating a musical 
'multiculture,224. Hutnyk coins the phrase 'homogenisation of social relations,22S to 
describe how the musical 'multiculture' is effectively brought together by capitalist 
relations through which the different social, political and cultural contexts of the 
various musics are squeezed down to the material marketable features226 .. 
As provisional as my analysis of the impact of current interventions within the Indian 
film industry has been, it provides a useful position from which to begin to understand 
Gilroy's assertion that contemporary black cultures might be usefully examined as 
224, Adorno at Womad: South Asian Crossovers and the Limits of Hybridity-Talk', in Debatjni Cultural 
Hybridity, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), ppl06-136 
225'Magical Mystical Tourism', in Travel Worlds, edited by R. Kaur. & J. Hutnyk, (London, Zed 
Books, 1999), pp94-119 
2261n his book Aiainst Race, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000), Paul Gilroy also identifies 
corporate capitalism as the main terrain for black cultural representation within mainstream discourses 
and through which black culture has lost much of its political dynamism being reduced to mere 
symbols. A similar argument is proposed by Sara Ahmed's notion of 'stranger fetishism' which she 
coins to describe the West's encounter with the cultures of 'stranger's' where it is overwhelmingly 
differences that can be assimilated into the process of consumption are valued whilst those that can't 
carry little value. See Ahmed's Strap" Encounters, (London, Routledge, 2000). See also chapter 2 
titled 'Eating the Other' in bell hooks' Black Looks, (London, Routledge, 1992) 
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commentaries upon the 'antinomies of modernity'. In essence Gilroy suggests that, 
rather than simply applauding the increasing visibility of black cultural expressions in 
the West as a sign of racial equality, focus should be on how the structures and 
ambivalences of modernity are challenged or kept in place (see p89). My discussion 
of the cultures of videoshops and the kind of changes taking place has highlighted the 
subtle ways in which the 'frog's perspective' unfolds whereby there may be no sign of 
the erosion of culturally distinct forms but a gradual homogenisation of the dynamics 
of 'cultural interaction'. What emerges is a situation akin to Gargi Bhattacharyya's 
description of how 'multiculturalism enters mainstream logics in ways that might not 
touch racism at all, but which still shape everyday narratives of ethnicity,227. 
I am unable to draw on empirical evidence to examine how exactly the 
homogenisation of 'cultures of interaction' diminishes the ability of the bicultural film 
culture amongst South Asians to evolve in a manner that is disruptive to the 
'dominant order'. However, it is possible to provide some indication of the point 
being made by referring to the integration of other aspects of Indian culture within 
mainstream British society, such as food and clothes. Indian food, in particular, has 
become so popular in Britain that the dish chicken tikka masala has now displaced 
fish 'n' chips as the nations favourite dish. Yet eating Indian food has not made the 
British any less racist towards Indian people. David Parker's examination of the 
relations over the Chinese takeaway counter provides a more detailed insight into how 
the British appetite for 'so-called ethnic cuisines' signals a celebratory 
multiculturalism which is fraught with structures of racialised domination228• In a 
similar vein, the capacity of an Indian film culture in Britain to disrupt the 'dominant 
order' significantly diminishes as the 'cultures of interaction' through which Indian 
films are accessed and consumed become increasingly aligned with those of 
popular/mainstream films. That is not to suggest that the possibility for improving the 
quality of Indian videos should be compromised in order to preserve a particular style 
227'Riding Multiculturalism', in Multicyltural States, edited by D. Bennett, (London, Routledge, 1998), 
pp252-266. Leela Tanikella makes Bhattacharya's observation much more concrete in her description 
of how the appropriation of 'cultural hybridity' as a metaphor for overcoming racial tensions in the 
Caribbean has in fact served to reify racial differences and leave structural inequalities in tact. See 
Tanikella's essay, 'The Politics of Hybridity: Race, Gender and Nationalism in Trinidad', in Cultyral 
Dynamics, Vol. IS, No.2, (London, Sage, 2(03), pp153-181 
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or 'culture of interaction'. The point is rather to draw attention to the need to identify 
ways in which Indian films might benefit from the technical advances of 
popular/mainstream films without also having to succumb to a particular process and 
style of interaction that is distinctly Western. To do this, as I argue in the concluding 
chapter, it may be necessary to question the particular framework of cultural relations 
that is imposed by the 'new' logic of capital (see pp301-302). 
I began this chapter by suggesting that an increasing trend towards bicultural patterns 
of media consumption amongst South Asians in Britain challenged mutually 
exclusive relations of 'race'. As the chapter has progressed my analysis of the survey 
findings has emphasised that culturally fragmented identities and lifestyles may in 
fact reinforce racialised structures of power and subordination if the respective 
cultural fonns are positioned and contested within the same framework of cultural 
interaction. I want to end the chapter by expanding upon the notion that the dynamics 
of interaction determine the meaning drawn from particular cultural fonns a little 
further, by examining the company in which respondents are likely to watch Indian 
and popular/mainstream films. This time I apply Bourdieu's conception of 'group 
habitus' to the survey findings in order to develop my argument. 
'Group habitus' and the operation of the system of distinctions 
Bourdieu's conception of 'group habitus' is explored in the specific context of 
consumption which makes it directly applicable to my own focus on the consumption 
of popular/mainstream and Indian films. More specifically, Bourdieu introduces the 
tenn 'group habitus' to describe the process by which people intemalise and 
reproduce rules for behaviour. Since the habitus varies with 'different conditions of 
existence' individuals of different class backgrounds acquire different frames of 
reference for social action which create group distinctions in tastes and lifestyles. 
Bourdieu sees this process of socialisation as functioning 'below the level of 
consciousness and language, beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny or control by 
the will ,229. 
228'The Chinese Takeaway and the Diasporic Habitus: Space, Time and Power Geometries', in 
Un/settled Multiculturalisms, edited by B. Hesse, (London, Zed Books, 2(00), pp73-95 
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To illustrate and develop his argument Bourdieu examines survey data on French 
people's cultural tastes and preferences. Through a comparison of consumer lifestyles 
in areas such as diet, exercise and tastes in music, Bourdieu demonstrates how the 
social distance between bourgeois culture and the cultural activities of lower classes 
isn't always marked by a preference for different products, but is often manifested in 
the social value and meanings consumers attach to the product(s), i.e. how the object 
of consumption is appropriated. He writes, 
Owning a chateau, a manor house or grange is not only a question of money; 
one must also appropriate it, appropriate the cellar and learn the art of bottling, 
[ ... J, acquire trophies, the secrets of fishing, the skills of gardening, 
competences which are both ancient and slowly learned, like cooking or 
knowledge of wines, appropriate, in a word, the art of living of the aristocrat, 
or country gentleman, indifferent to the passage of time and rooted in things 
which last.230 
Bourdieu's work has been criticised on a number of fronts, not least for its privileging 
of class relations and its overly functionalist approach which renders it unable to 
comprehend a route out of the subordinate positions experienced by the lower 
classes231. For my own purposes here I want to suggest that the strengths of 
Bourdieu's theory of consumption may be extracted by adding a qualification to his 
conception of 'habitus'. 
The bicultural patterns of film consumption amongst many South Asians in Britain 
suggest that it is not necessary to choose one 'group habitus' over another. Rather by 
inhabiting different 'habitus' it becomes possible to engage and occupy cultural 
locations which are often placed in opposition to one another. The idea that it is 
possible to occupy not one but several 'group habitus' breaks with Bourdieu's 
229pjstjnction, (London, Routledge, 1984), p466 
23Ojbid., p281 
23lsee for example, Paul du Gay et at Doina Cultural Studies (London, Sage, 1997) 
Paul Connolly, 'Racism and Postmodernism: Towards a Theory of Practice', in SocjolOKY after 
Postmodemism, edited by D. Owen, (London, Sage, 1997) 
Diane Reay, 'They Employ Cleaners to do That: Habitus in the Primary Classroom', in British Journal 
of SocjoloKY, 16,3 (1995), pp353-371 
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definition which functions in a singular manner. For example, from Figure 28 it can 
be ascertained that Indian films were most likely to be watched individually or with 
members of the immediate family, with the percentage being highest for on your own 
(16.6%); spouse/partner (16.22%); parents (14.29%) and other family ( 15.44%). By 
comparison , whilst the statistics are relatively similar (although there is a slight 
decrease) for the proportion of individuals most likely to watch popular/mainstream 
films on their own (12.37%), with a ' spouse/partner' (13.92%) or with ' other family ' 
(12.9%), there is a significant decrease in the number of respondents likely to watch 
popular/mainstream films with their ' parents ' (5. 15%). This is accompanied by a 
corresponding increase for the category ' friends' (19.07% compared to 6.17% for 
Indian films). 
Figure 26: Company in which films on videotape are most likely to be watched 
25% 
20% 1 
15% 
10% 
5% ' 
0% 
on own spouse / 
partner 
. Indian films 
valid cases 259 
• Popular/mainstream films 
valid cases 194 
parents children other 
famil y 
friend other depends on 
type of film 
The differences in the company in which Indian films and popular/mainstream films 
are watched lends orne force to Bourdieu' s argument about the ocialisation process 
through which individuals internalise and reproduce rules for behaviour. The data is 
also consistent with my own as ertion earlier about how South Asian youth are likely 
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to have learned from their families the linguistic and visual codes neces ary to make 
sense of Indian films and a large percentage continue to watch Indian films with 
members of their immediate family . In addition , through socialisation outside of home 
they have also obtained the cultural competence required to understand 
popular/mainstream films which are more likely to be consumed with friends or 
family members of the same age group. This is by no means to sugge t that the 
consumption and cultural competence of engaging with popular/mainstream films is 
only learned outside of the family , and that of Indian film in ide, nor that this process 
is unitary. But what can be established from the survey is that consumption and access 
to cultural commodities is, with varying degrees, limited/enhanced 
encouraged/discouraged by the way in which individuals relate to and are positioned 
by the various 'group habitus ' through which they experience their everyday lives. 
Each 'group habitus ' defines and redefines its own dynamics of con umption and at 
times the multiple locations may require some negotiation or 'choice ' to be exercised, 
similar to what Brah describes as relational positioning (see p87). In thi respect, the 
different' group habitus' to which an individual may belong do not function in their 
own independent or exclusive space. For example, with reference to the urvey, we 
might note that on the most fundamental level the two film cultures are in effect 
competing for the same leisure time. This is substantiated by the data in Figures 29 
and 30 which mark out weekends and evenings (between 8p.m.- 11 p.m.) a the most 
popular times for watching both Indian and popular/mainstream film. 
Figure 27: Days of the week when films are most likely to be watched 
weekdays Saturdays Sunday no pecific day 
%tage of respondents 
likely to watch Indian 11 .4% 49% 42% 32.2% films on .. . 
valid cases 255 255 255 255 
%tage of respondents 
likely to watch 
popular/ mai nstream 21 % 45.1 % 37.9% 32.8% 
films on ... 
valid cases 195 195 195 195 
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Figure 28: Time of day when film are mo t likely to be watched 
morning afternoon early evening evenmg 
9a.m.- 12p.m. 12p.m.-5p.m. 5p.m. -8p.m. 8p.m. - llp.m. 
%tage of 
respondents likely 
to watch Indian 5.8% 16.3% 33.9% 75.9% films between ... 
valid cases 257 257 257 257 
%tage of 
respondents likely 
to watch 
popular/mai nstream 4.1% 13.3% 33.3% 83.1 % 
films between ... 
valid cases 195 195 195 195 
The above data does indicate two significant differences in that a notably higher 
proportion of respondents (about 10%) watched popular/mainstream film on 
weekdays compared to Indian films. AI 0 the proportion of re pondents that watched 
popular/mainstream films (40.5%) after 1] p.m. was more than twice as many as for 
Indian films (16.3%). These two differences aside the overall picture is one where 
Indian and popular/mainstream films are consumed within a imilar time frame but in 
the company of different people or different ' group habitus'. Thu , we might assume 
that for many individuals regularly consuming both categories of films, choo ing 
between a popular/mainstream and Indian film is often not simply a matter of 
preferring one text over another. The decision i interlinked to a variety of other 
issues such as choosing one ' group habitus' over another, or, ecuring control over the 
respective domestic technologies from other members of the hou ehold. Conversely, 
an individual may end up watching a film at a time not of hi /her choo ing but 
determined by another member of one or other ' group habitus ' . 
It is in the context where variolls 'group habitu ' compete for the ame time and space 
that power relations come into play, where multiple subject po ition and narratives 
intersect creating contradictions and tension . And it i in thi ituation of inter ecting 
subjectivities that hybridity theorists locate the 0 sibilit for ' new ' more racially 
transgres ive identitie and frame of reference to emerge. ru ially. 0 far a the 
survey i concerned, the contestation of competing identitie i more ften re olved 
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16.3% 
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40.5 % 
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through the hierarchical arrangement of the two categories of film in question in a 
manner that is consistent with the process of racialisation. With regards to the 
theoretical expositions of 'cultural hybridity' this situation might be presented as the 
'war of manoeuvre' being enacted within the' war of position' . 
A {war of manoeuvre' within the {war of position' 
In chapter 2 I outlined how Hall distinguishes between the 'war of position' and the 
'war of manoeuvre' as the manifestly dissimilar ways in which each engages the 
meaning of difference. In summary, the 'war of manoeuvre' conceives of difference 
as a mutually exclusive and unbridgeable separation, whereas the 'war of position' 
sees difference as a 'sliding signifier' emphasising the numerous in-between positions 
which disrupt conceptions of such categories as 'male' and 'female', or 'black' and 
'white', as fixed opposites (see pp72-74). The bicultural patterns of film consumption 
amongst young South Asians, signifying as it does the engagement of distinct cultural 
forms, might be interpreted as an example of the 'war of position' . One product has 
not been wholly preferred over another. Rather, a position has been negotiated which 
engages both Indian and popular/mainstream films. However, within this 'war of 
position' we might still also identify a 'war of manoeuvre' as captured in the 
following comment made by two of Gillespie's respondents, "It doesn't hurt to watch 
an Indian film with the parents.' 'No, it kills yoU.',232 
In effect, what I am emphasising here is the social reality surrounding the everyday 
negotiations of diaspora identities, where the collision of cultures does not happen in 
some neutral or objective space in which the subject is free to negotiate the various 
cultural influences as if they were somehow devoid of all power relations. So far as 
the survey is concerned, this contestation of time and space is resolved through a 
prevailing prominence of what Bourdieu describes as 'the aesthetic sense as a sense of 
distinction', where, 'tastes (Le., manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation 
of an inevitable difference. It is no accident, when they have to be justified, they are 
asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes'233. The earlier quotation of 
231"elevisjon. Ethnjcity and Cultuml ChanKe, (London, Routledge, 1995), p81 
233Pjstinction, (London, Routledge, 1984), p56 
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two boys expressing 'grave' reluctance at watching Indian films with their parents 
would certainly fit Bourdieu's assertion. 
The presence of an inferior/superior dichotomy embedded in the critical appraisal of 
Indian and popular/mainstream films was a point established earlier. A qualified 
application of Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' has enabled me to illuminate the 
dynamics under which such dichotomies might become invoked within contemporary 
diaspora experiences234. This is a central argument of this thesis, that the various 
cultural forms to which diaspora subjects are exposed are already imbued with 
relations of power, of competing identities, of struggles to justify preference for one 
cultural form over another. 
The audience survey has captured one particular example of modem cultural 
interaction specific to trends in audience activity amongst South Asians in mid 1990's 
Britain. Reading the survey findings in the context of theoretical conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity' has been insightful for establishing the value of hybridity 
theorists' focus on culturally fragmented subjectivities as a position from which to 
identify a racially transgressive cultural politics. It might be argued that what I have 
done in this chapter, by making a direct comparison between popular/mainstream and 
Indian films, is in effect homogenise different aspects of South Asian identities. 
However, it is also one reality of the diaspora experience of being engaged in distinct 
cultures in socially dissimilar often conflicting circumstances. To put it another way, I 
have stripped the reality of one particular diaspora experience right down to the 
foundations - to the origins of the encounter of distinct cultural forms - and 
highlighted, perhaps even accentuated, the disparate character and status of those 
foundations. In that sense the survey is not an examination of the creativity, or 
culturally hybrid expressions, emerging from the contemporary British South Asian 
population. Their responses to the survey are in fact responses to other people's 
234David Parker offers a slightly different re-working of Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' in his analysis 
of everyday encounters in Chinese takeaways. Parker stresses the need to take account of 'power 
geometries' that are integral to mundane experiences of diaspora and which have tended to be 
overlooked by cultural theorists favouring an analysis of the arts. He develops the concept of 
'diasporic habitus' to describe the racial harassment which becomes a contestatory element of 
multiculturalism as it is experienced and negotiated by Chinese individuals servicing white customers 
over the takeaway counter. see 'The Chinese Takeaway and the Diasporic Habitus: Space, Time and 
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cultural expressions and cultural outlooks. The importance of undertaking such an 
examination as part of a project for understanding the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' 
is underlined by the fact that it is only by identifying an individual's critical, or for 
that matter, uncritical position with respect to specific forms of cultural expression 
that we might begin the real challenge of assessing how any subsequent fusion of 
those cultural forms mayor may not overcome structures of feeling that circumvent 
racial and cultural hierarchies. 
Power Geometries', in Un/settled Multicylturalisms, edited by B. Hesse, (London, Zed Books, 2(00), 
pp73-95 
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Chapter 5 
Qualitative Research Design for Examining 
'Muslim Subjectivities' 
As already outlined in chapter 1, the investigation into young Muslim identities shares 
a common purpose with the audience survey in that the principal concern of both 
studies is to assess conceptions of racially transgressive cultural change charted by 
hybridity theorists in the context of everyday cultural realities. At the same time, 
within the overall structure and emerging argument of the thesis the study on young 
Muslims is positioned as a contrasting context of cultural negotiation to media 
consumption which shifts the focus of discussion from the themes of 'cultural 
pluralism' and 'fragmentation' (which were central to interpreting the data from the 
audience survey) to that of 'cultural location' . This shift is made apparent in chapter 
6, where notions such as 'anti-anti-essentialism', 'homing desire', 'yearning for 
stability' and 'identity politics one' acquire prominence in the course of presenting the 
narratives of the Muslim respondents. The concern of this chapter is to describe and 
evaluate the methodological approach through which the empirical data on young 
Muslim identities was elicited. 
The empirical research into young Muslim identities consisted of two interlinked but 
separate pieces of fieldwork. The first was a group discussion with six people and the 
other a video project consisting of nine individual contributions. The data gathered 
was of a qualitative nature and thus of a very different scope and character from the 
audience survey. The implications of this in terms of the contrasting contributions of 
quantitative and qualitative research for understanding everyday cultural realities is 
addressed in chapter 7. The methodological structure and quality of the two studies 
can be more specifically distinguished by their differences in research design 
(including aims and objectives); sample recruitment; relations between the researcher 
and respondents; and data processing. These themes organise the first four sections of 
this chapter. The fifth section comments on the scope and limitations of the findings. 
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Research Design 
In identifying an appropriate research method for my investigation into young Muslim 
identities my main consideration was that the study's objective was to enquire how 
the foregrounding of Islam mayor may not constrain the possibilities for racially 
transgressive cultural change envisaged by hybridity theorists. In that sense I was not 
concerned with disputing the claim that Muslim identities are predicated on one axis 
of identification i.e. Islam. This was in fact the starting point for the study in that it 
was only interested in individuals for whom Islam was the defining source of their 
everyday lives. In as much as there is no one homogenous conception of Islam it was 
necessary for the empirical research to focus on the particularity of individual 
experiences of being Muslim. As such, quantitative research methods, which would 
have been limited to producing statistical evidence indicating overall patterns of 
identity negotiation, were ruled inadequate for the second case study. What was 
required was data of a qualitative nature providing an insight into individual realities 
of negotiating an Islamic way of life in Britain and so a small scale qualitative 
investigation was preferred. 
As well as choosing qualitative research methods, which I describe in more detail 
later (see pp210-213), there were three other key decisions taken that influenced the 
research design. These were, firstly, to focus on the identity negotiations of Muslim 
youth; secondly, to include individuals of diverse ethnic backgrounds; and thirdly, to 
make a video recording of the respondents' comments in addition to a group 
discussion. I explain each of these decisions in turn. 
Focusing on Muslim youth 
In Britain, since the 'Rushdie affair' it is predominantly young Muslims who have 
been at the centre of much media attention and political debates about an 'Islamic 
revival' and the dangers posed by 'Islamic fundamentalism.,23s. For example, the 
image of young Muslims burning a copy of The Satanic Verses has come to 
symbolise Muslim feelings during the 'Rushdie affair'. In addition, in the aftermath of 
the events of September 11 th it has become commonplace for the faces and names of 
Muslims from Britain associated with 'terrorist' activity to make headline news. 
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These individuals have tended to fall in to the 20-35 age group and have included 
Richard Reid, Asif Hanif and Omar Sharip6. The currency of this trend in 
representations of Muslim identities in Britain made young Muslims an obvious and 
historically relevant choice for my own investigation. 
Another equally influential factor in the decision to focus on the younger age group 
relates to the fact that the cultural expressions of second and third generation black 
Britons have been a significant focus for hybridity theorists in their delineations of 
racially transgressive cultural change. In relation to this the majority of young 
Muslims in Britain were born here but also belong to post-war 'migrant' 
communities. Most of them are of South Asian background with family' origins' in 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan237• The simultaneous status of British born with 
'migrant' background situates many young Muslims in an 'in-between space', of 
standing between distinct cultural assemblages238, of having to negotiate genealogies 
of dispersion with those of staying pU~9. That significant numbers are foregrounding 
Islam as the primary source for negotiating their identities suggests a trend that is 
contraposed to hybridity theorists' emphasis on the culturally fragmented character of 
'migrant' identities. In that sense ratifying the in/compatibility of contemporary 
Muslim identities with conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' provides a useful context 
from which to assess the relevance of the work of hybridity theorists for 
understanding modern experiences of 'race' and culture as well as evaluate the 
23~ariq Modood, 'British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair', in Race. Culture and Difference, 
edited by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London, Sage, 1992), p271 
236Richard Reid (from South London) was nicknamed the 'shoe bomber' following his attempt in 
December 2001 to bring down an American airliner, on route from Paris to Miami, by igniting 
explosives in the soles of his shoes. He was tried in the US and jailed for life in January 2003. Asif 
Hanif (from North London) was identified as being responsible for a suicide attack in Tel Aviv in April 
2003. His accomplice was named as Omar Sharif (from Derby) who had initially escaped the scene of 
the bombing after his explosives belt failed to detonate. Weeks later Sharif's body was found washed 
up on a beach in Tel Aviv. 
237For a detailed statistical breakdown and discussion see Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain, (London, I.B. 
Tauris, 1994), pp 10-26. For a background to the history of Muslim migration to Britain see Steven 
Vertovec, 'Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain', in Muslims in the West, edited by Y. 
Yazbeck Haddad, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2(02), pp19-35 
238Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993) 
239Avtar Brah, Carto~mphies of Diaspora, (London, Routledge, 1996) 
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racially transgressive qualities of the cultural outlooks of the current generation of 
young Muslims. 
An ethnically diverse sample 
The group discussion and video involved Muslims of diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
This needs explanation given the thesis' focus on South Asians in Britain. The 
decision to include individuals who were not of South Asian descent was more an 
'opportune' decision than something I had clearly defined or pre-planned. In the 
course of recruiting respondents for the group discussion one individual offered to 
approach a friend who was white English and who had converted to Islam. My initial 
reaction was that the thesis was specifically about South Asians and therefore it was 
not appropriate to include Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds. After further thought 
I reconsidered this decision. Foremost in my mind was that identities are not 
negotiated in isolation but through interaction with other identities. For example, as I 
describe in the first section of chapter 6, experiences of being Muslim in Britain are 
not simply defined by an individual's interpretation of Islam. They are also influenced 
by, for instance, the way in which dominant representations position Muslims in 
relation to 'other' identities, and/or the ways in which non Muslims perceive and 
interact with what they consider to be defining features of Muslim lifestyles (see 
pp219-229i40• With reference to my overall objectives for the second case study two 
observations in particular determined my decision to include Muslim respondents of 
diverse ethnic background. 
Firstly, one of the prominent features distinguishing the identities of young South 
Asian Muslims in Britain from their elders is that their negotiations and practice of 
Islam is not so firmly intertwined and demarcated by national and cultural boundaries 
related to country of 'origin'. For instance, the respondents participating in my study 
were critical of mosques established by elders where membership tended to be 
24<1'he potential for a diverse sample to generate data providing a more complex insight into the process 
of identity negotiation is highlighted by an ethnographic study undertaken by David Gauntlett and 
Annette Hill titled TV Liyjna (London, BFI, 1999). Their study examined TV diaries of a sample of 
500 individuals broadly representative of the UK's population, by age, class, region and gender. The 
ability of the authors to make comparisons of the use and impact of television across different 
generations, classes, genders and regions, enables them to describe the role of specific axis of 
identification in people's interaction with television, and vice versa, as being even more complex than 
studies which have preferred to focus on a particular category of audience (such as children or women). 
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overwhelmingly dominated by shared ancestral 'origins' (see p259). Similarly, the 
expectation imposed by parents that their children should marry not just any Muslim 
but a Muslim whose family was of the same country of origin was also fiercely 
contested (see pp258-259). I felt the most effective way for the empirical research to 
encourage and reflect the ethnically diverse relations integral to the negotiation of 
Muslim identities amongst young South Asians was to include respondents of 
different ethnic backgrounds. 
Secondly, as Avtar Brah notes, 'Racism directed against South Asians in post-
Rushdie Britain 1 ••• 1 represents a reconstitution of 'the Asian' [ ... ) through a 
foregrounding of 'the Muslim'241. Again I felt the best way to establish the 
significance of this dynamic in defining and shaping Muslim identities in Britain was 
to make direct comparisons of the narratives of individuals of diverse ethnic 
backgrounds. Chapter 6 presents the narratives of non South Asian respondents to 
highlight the operation of a racialisation process which means that being a Muslim in 
Britain is as much influenced by 'common sense' perceptions that interweave 
stereotypes of 'Asian' and 'Muslim', as it is by the individual's specific interpretation 
of Islam (see pp219-229). 
Group discussion and video recording 
As has already been noted the empirical research relating to the study on Muslim 
youth consisted of a group discussion and video. Both took place at Middlesex 
University and were conducted within three months of each other in April and June 
1997 respectively. The group discussion involved 6 individuals and took the format of 
a semi-structured depth interview, similar to what Oppenheim calls an exploratory 
depth interview242. By this I mean that prior to the actual group discussion I had 
identified a few topics and questions as possible points of conversation and debate. 
These were assembled under five headings and were also used as a basis for a handout 
which is reproduced in Table 1. The five headings were identified in the course of 
24lCartoKmphies of Pjaspora, (London, Routledge, 1996), pl69 
2420uestjonnaire PesjKn. Intervjewjnl: and Attjtude Measurement, (London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
1992), see chapter 5 
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reading related literature243 as well as in conversation with respondents during the 
recruitment process. 
Table 1: Discussion Handout 
Discussion: Islam and Young British Muslims 
Date: 9th April 1997 
Areas for possible discussion: 
l. Role of Islam in individual's life. 
- including significant changes in personal observance / practice of Islam. 
2. Similarities and differences in practice / observance of Islam between the 
individual and immediate family. 
3. Reaction(s) of others directed to personal observance of Islam. 
e.g. from friends / fellow students / staff / employers / family / general 
pUblic. 
4. Media representations of Islam. 
- Is it fair? ; indifferent? etc. 
5. "Fundamentalism" 
- Does it have a progressive role in furthering the cause of Islam? 
- Its effect on prejudice / respect for people of differing religious, sexual 
orientations? 
Bilkis Malek 
Middlesex University 
2"1'ariq Modood, 'British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair', in Race. Culture and Difference, 
edited by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London, Sage, 1992) 
The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims, Islamopbobia. It's Features and Danaers, (London, 
The Runnymede Trust, 1997a) 
Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain, (London, 1.8. Tauris, 1994) 
Edward Said, Coyerina Islam, (London, Vintage Books, 1981) 
Edward Said, Orientalism (London, Penguin Books, 1978) 
Akbar Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, eds, Islam. Globalisation and Postmodemjty, (London, 
Routledge, 1994) 
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The handout was distributed to each respondent at the beginning of the group 
discussion. As part of my introduction to the discussion I explained that the handout 
was not to be used as a formal structure or guide for the discussion but should be 
viewed as indicating possible points for dialogue. I also emphasised that it wasn't 
essential for the discussion to cover all of the topics and respondents should feel free 
to raise additional topics not indicated in the handout. The idea was to allow the 
individuals to direct the course of the discussion in a manner that they would interact 
with each other as much as with me, and convey their narratives in their own words 
and in accordance with their own experiences and convictions. The benefits of this 
'open' or 'freestyle' format are noted by Ann Grar44 in relation to both her own 
research and that of other feminists. Gray notes how the 'open-ended conversational 
interview' facilitates a style of interaction in which respondents can express their 
opinions spontaneously and in doing so are able to raise relevant topics and issues 
which the researcher may not have foreseen or probed for. The dynamics of the group 
discussion are commented on further in a subsequent section titled 'Relations between 
Researcher and Respondents' (see pp206-209). 
The video followed a different format from the group discussion in that the 
participants did not interact with each other but spoke individually and directly to a 
camera. Five of the individuals who participated in the group discussion also 
contributed to the video. An additional four individuals were recruited to take part in 
this second stage of the empirical research. As with the group discussion those 
contributing to the video were invited to share their perceptions and experiences about 
being Muslim in Britain. In anticipation of the impersonal set up of speaking directly 
to camera the respondents were asked to give some prior thought to what they might 
want to say, and if they deemed it useful to make written notes. Some used prepared 
notes whilst others identified particular questions which I used to conduct short 
interviews. All the contributions are straight forward' head and shoulder' shots filmed 
from the same tripod-fixed camera (a format similar to the conventional vox-box set-
up). The idea for producing this visual record germinated in the course of organising 
the group discussion, and in particular relation to 'planning ahead' with regards to 
presenting the research findings. More specifically, I wanted to overcome the 
244-yjdeo Playtime, (London, Routledge, 1992), chapter 1 
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'physical invisibility' of subjects in the post-fieldwork phase, something I now 
explain in more detail. 
Addressing the invisibility of research subjects 
In the vast majority of written and verbal accounts of empirical research the 'physical 
invisibility' of subjects is inevitable for the simple reason of protecting the identity of 
individuals. More often than not it is also not practical to pursue the inclusion of 
visual representation in that most social researchers do not have the necessary 
equipment and skills at their disposal. A more ethical consideration is that cameras 
and sound equipment may introduce unnecessary artificial elements to the interaction 
between subjects and their environment which in the end are more of a distraction and 
hindrance than providing additional empirical value to the study. Perhaps the 
prevalence of these points across much social science research is why the 'physical 
invisibility' of respondents in the post fieldwork stages has come to occupy the status 
of a 'silent presumption' devoid of any serious debate or review. Of course there 
remain numerous practical, ethical and moral reasons, such as the ones thus 
highlighted, why visual records may still be wholly inappropriate for the vast majority 
of empirical investigations. However, by delineating the benefits for my own study I 
hope to underline why there may be occasion to give serious consideration to the 
inclusion of visual material. Two points highlight the overall advantages for my own 
study. 
The first point relates to Kobena Mercer's observation of how stereotypes that shore 
up dominant discourses on 'race' begin to breakdown when they are confronted with, 
not so much a 'monologic opposition' as a 'hybridized accentuation' of a plurality of 
voices and experiences245• In the present historical moment it is perhaps fair to suggest 
that Islam and Muslims are at the forefront of some of the most virulently phobic and 
stereotypical attitudes. 'There is crude colour racism, since most Muslims are 
perceived to have black or brown skins, and also anti-immigrant prejudice, since 
Muslims in Britain are perceived to have alien customs, specifically 'Asian' 
customs,246. With reference to dismantling this specifically British form of 
24SWelcome to the Junale, (London, Routledge, 1994) 
2<11"r[he Runnymede Commission on British Muslims. Islamophobja. Its Features and Dan&ers. (London, 
The Runnymede Trust. 1997a), p 12 
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'Islamophobia' I realised that some of the most thought provoking features of my 
study were visual. Most notably, the respondents were clearly differentiated by 
physical markers of 'race'. The sample included both white and black Muslims of 
African, Caribbean, Asian and English descent. In addition, the female respondents 
wearing hijab were clearly as articulate and confident as the male respondents as well 
as the women who did not 'cover'. Finally, the Western accents of those individuals 
who may have been deemed to fit the conventional images of the 'bearded male' and 
'veiled female', firmly associated their identities with 'the West' as much as with 
Islam. Of course these differences could have been narrated both verbally and in 
writing, but Hanif Kureishi sums up what might have been lost when he comments, 
'You can see people's faces in a way that you can't in a novel, because you have to 
imagine them through words. And the other thing is that you can see the scenes. You 
get ( ... J all the details, you know, [ ... J the clothes and the era. You couldn't write all 
that down'247. Kureishi's comments suggest that some physical markers are so firmly 
associated with stereotypes that they are just too difficult to dispel through the use of 
words. 
A second advantage of including a visual record for my study was that it provided a 
more effective tool than verbatim quotes for displacing the locus of 'power' or 
'authority' to speak from the researcher back on to the respondents. Ang underlines 
the importance of addressing this issue when she states, 'we should try to avoid a 
stance in which 'the audience' is relegated to the status of exotic 'other' - merely 
interesting in so far as 'we', as researchers, can tum 'them' into 'objects' of study, 
and about whom 'we' have the privileged position of acquiring 'scientific' 
knowledge,248. I felt this point to be doubly significant for the study on young 
Muslims, because as Anthias and Yuval-Davis argue, the issue of 'representation' has 
become particularly problematic with reference to marginalised or subordinated 
populations in that particular individuals or 'community leaders' are often singled out 
and assumed to be 'representative' of a whole 'community,249. By interspersing my 
see also Steven Vertovec, 'Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain', in Muslims in the West, 
edited by Y. Yazbeck Haddad, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2(02), pp 19-35 
247Laurence Chua, 'Double Feature', in Black Film Bulletin, Volume 2, Issue 3, (1994), pl8 
248Uvini Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996), p45 
249see Chapter 6 in Racialised Boundaries, (London, Routledge, 1992) 
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presentations with audio-visual extracts of the respondents I hoped to underline the 
multitude of voices and subjectivities embedded within the data. 
In summary, the objective of the video was not so much to replicate or extend the 
group discussion but to re-create an audio-visual presence of the respondents. I should 
emphasise that whilst it brought definite advantages by adding a visually provoking 
element to the overall study, I do not deem the video as enhancing the 'validity' or 
'objectivity' of my study. Its production and use has been subject to as much editing 
and selection as the group discussion and so is open to all of the points of 
methodological scrutiny that might be directed at the latter. 
Recruiting the Respondents 
Across the two pieces of research a total of ten respondents were involved. I was very 
fortunate in recruiting the respondents in that an additional seven contacts 
'snowballed' from the four personal approaches that I had initiated. Out of these 
eleven only one who was due to take part in the group discussion did not show up. 
Thus, the experience of sample recruitment, in this instance, was not plagued by 
'blind alleys' as can so often be the case. I do not wish to detail the precise process of 
locating each and every respondent. However, to give some insight into my approach 
and to address its implications for the data elicited I describe the recruitment of one 
particular individual and the subsequent contacts attained. 
I met the individual concerned whilst attending a seminar at the University of London. 
We had in fact met two years earlier when I had sat in the canteen of another 
university seeking individuals to participate in the audience survey. At that time she 
(Noshin) was an undergraduate and was now studying for her Masters. Both our 
meetings happened purely by chance brought about simply by being in the same place 
at the same time. In a small perhaps even tokenistic way, Noshin's participation in 
both pieces of research signifies some continuity between the two studies. The 
university 'setting' was central to our chance encounters and acquired a heightened 
significance for the recruitment of respondents for the study on young Muslims which 
needs to be highlighted. 
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When I met Noshin for the second time I mentioned my intentions of conducting a 
study on young Muslims and she expressed her interest in being involved. Some 
weeks later I phoned her indicating that I was now looking for individuals willing to 
take part in a small group discussion and asked if she would think about being 
involved. She confirmed that she was happy to contribute and asked if she could bring 
a friend. Her friend (Shagufta) was an undergraduate at the University of East 
London, where Noshin and I had first met. On the next occasion that I phoned in order 
to co-ordinate dates, Noshin's sister Ayesha answered the phone. Inevitably, we got 
talking about the research and she too expressed an interest in coming along. Ayesha 
was an undergraduate at the School of Oriental and African Studies. After the group 
discussion and in the course of organising the video, Ayesha provided another three 
contacts all of whom were attached to a higher educational establishment. 
In delineating the unfolding of this particular line of contacts what I've tried to draw 
attention to is, firstly, how the respondents and I were essentially interconnected via a 
network of educational establishments and, secondly, that the university or higher 
educational 'setting' was a significant part in all of our lives at the time of research. 
The implications of this for the scope and limitations of the findings are addressed in 
the last section of the chapter (see pp211-213). 
Relations between Researcher and Respondents 
There is much debate about how best to conduct interviews. From a 'positivist' 
perspective the 'ideal' interview requires interviewers to remain 'neutral' at all times 
and to "switch off their own personality and attitudes,250. The underlying argument 
behind this 'positivist' outlook, that respondents will react to the interviewers' 
attitudes and demeanour, is an important point to which all interviewers must remain 
alert. But in as much as all interviews are interaction situations, respondents will be 
influenced by a distant interviewer who shares few personal opinions as much as one 
who is overtly expressive about their personality and views. And it is difficult to see 
how one will necessarily elicit more 'objective' or 'valid' responses than the other in 
all interview situations. 
2S00uestiQnnaire Desi~n.lnterviewin& and Attitude Measurement, (London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 
1992), p66 
206 
Jean Converse and Howard Schuman251 propose a very different approach for 
conducting interviews. They assert that interviewers need to achieve an appropriate 
balance between the contrasting roles of 'diplomat' and 'boor'. The 'diplomatic' role 
is important for establishing rapport and putting the respondent at ease. However, the 
purely 'diplomatic' interviewer can feel uneasy about asking questions that are 
personal or may create embarrassment. As such a degree of 'boorishness' is required 
where the interviewer is less concerned with 'pleasing' the respondent and so is 
unhindered at putting questions that may be deemed controversial or threaten rapport. 
Schuman and Converse come from the perspective that it is pointless for interviewers 
to occupy the role of 'neutral' observer because respondents are complex 'subjects'. 
Accordingly a complex and contradictory process needs to be engaged in order to get 
an insight into people's diverse attitudes and opinions. 
Ang resolves to describe the contradictory nature of the research situation as a 
discursive process of interaction. From this position the results or findings presented 
in empirical studies are never definitive, but constitute historically and culturally 
specific forms of knowledge based on specific discursive encounters between the 
researcher and his/her informants. For Ang, rather than being concerned with 
defending the research 'validity' or 'accuracy' of the findings, the ultimate political 
responsibility of the researcher is to construct 'lived realities', not in the form of 
transparent reflections, but, in the form of interpretations252• 
From these various methodological projections it is possible to single out the views 
and opinions of informants as the single most important consideration that defines the 
role of any interviewer. As such the first and foremost challenge for the interviewer is 
to maintain the focus of the dialogue on the respondents and to 'keep them talking'. I 
might add that, in my own research, 'personality and attitude' were quite crucial in 
'keeping them talking'. For example, there were times where I openly shared in the 
laughter of the group. At other times I expressed surprise at some of the experiences 
and information relayed. Still other times I openly spoke of my own experiences as 
251Conversations at Random, (Michigan, John Wiley & Sons, 1974) 
2S2Livin& Room Wars. (London, Routledge, 1996), pp46-47 
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someone who had had a Muslim upbringing. All of these aspects might be viewed as 
contravening the' non-controversial' and' neutral' approach advocated by 
'positivists' . 
For my own part, my expressions of laughter, surprise and personal reflection were 
deployed, at times consciously and others unconsciously, to generate and contribute to 
an atmosphere of mutual respect and curiosity. In relation to this I would agree with 
Ang's observation that the subjectivity of the researcher is not separate from that of 
the respondents. In contributing my own experiences to the group discussion I simply 
came from the position that it was futile to deny the curiosity of the respondents, or 
try to suppress a particular level of identification I shared which would have been 
apparent through my familiarity with certain words such as 'molweesaab' and 
'sabaq'. To have suppressed this intersubjectivity would have given cause for 
suspicion and distrust. 
The atmosphere of 'mutual respect and curiosity' encouraged an open engagement 
with the various intersubjectivities present amongst the individuals participating in the 
group discussion. This impacted on the character and dynamics of the discussion in 
two quite distinct ways. Firstly, as the transcript (see Appendix E) illustrates, the 
respondents were interested in learning about each other's narratives as much as 
describing their own experiences and opinions. In fact, a significant number of 
questions are posed by the respondents to each other. Arising from this was a second 
equally significant implication for the group dynamics. As respondents posed 
questions to other respondents they effectively generated a sense in which each of 
them became positioned as the experts of their own knowledge and experiences. That 
they felt a degree of confidence in expressing their thoughts/curiosity openly and 
without the need for pleasing each other is highlighted by the fact that on a few 
occasions respondents disagreed with each other or posed questions to challenge other 
respondents' interpretations of certain events or practices. At times they also 
challenged my understanding of their relationship with Islam, as is conveyed in the 
following comment asserted by Ayesha in relation to the handout: 
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A: ( ... ( I mean (holds up discussion handout drawing attention to title J you know 
Young British Muslims, you know is should the focus be on the British or 
should it be on the Muslim because it's just like for me I'm just a Muslim in 
Britain. 
In as much as the vast majority of the dialogue is occupied by the respondents I might 
feel a good deal of success in fulfilling my objective of' keeping them talking'. In 
addition, the discussion and video covered all of the topics indicated on the handout 
and touched on others that weren't. With respect to the latter the respondents made 
considerable comments about the appropriation of Islam in Muslim societies and the 
position of Muslim women. At the same time some of the topics were not covered in 
as much depth as others. Thus, the study constitutes a 'partial' reflection of the 'lived 
realities' of the respondents and I return to this point in the last section of the chapter. 
Data Processing 
The group discussion was transcribed using an adapted and shortened version of the 
Jefferson notation system which is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Transcription Key 
J: initial identifies the person speaking 
I I words in square brackets provide additional/non-verbal information to either 
indicate the mood of interaction (e.g. [giggles)), or to clarify the context of 
dialogue (e.g. [referring to AD 
= equals sign denotes that there is no discernible gap between the end of one 
speaker's contribution and the start of another 
single square bracket indicates the beginning of overlapping dialogue 
The original Jefferson notation system developed by Gail Jefferson253 is much more 
detailed than that presented in Table 2 and includes symbols denoting such varied 
2S3For a comprehensive version see J. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage, eds, Sb'uctures of Social 
~,(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
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details as a rise or fall in vocal pitch, in-breath and out-breath, and timed pauses. This 
amount of detail, which ventures into notating differences in speech styles and 
emphasis on the use of certain words or phrases, was not deemed to add anything 
significant to my own analysis of the data. My examination of the data elicited was 
wholly focused on the content of the dialogue and the interaction between the 
respondents, and the notation symbols were selected accordingly. 
In much social science research it is common practice to protect the identities of the 
respondents. In my study the respondents to the group discussion were offered the 
opportunity to remain anonymous but all waived this right, many of them indicating 
that there was nothing they had contributed that they would not be willing to defend 
publicly. As such I have made no attempt to change their names. 
The transcript of the group discussion is presented in full in Appendix E and a copy of 
the video (DVD version) is included in Appendix F. Chapter 6 draws on verbatim 
quotes from both pieces of fieldwork. The original source of the respective quotes are 
indicated by the symbols * (which denotes an extract taken from the group 
discussion) and + (which denotes an extract taken from the video). In both instances I 
have edited out pauses and hesitations, such as 'ummh' or 'err', in order to present a 
more coherent read. I viewed such utterances as part of everyday language whose 
impact on the meanings of the words used, if any, could only be ratified by the 
speaker and so nothing significant is deemed to have been lost by editing them out. 
Scope and Limitations of the Findings 
The purpose of the group discussion and video was to generate qualitative data 
providing a detailed insight into individual negotiations of being Muslim. The use of 
small scale qualitative, or ethnographic, research methods might be recognised as 
being more aligned to the methodological stance adopted by many 'new' audience 
researchers (see pp15-17 and pp284-286). The video and group discussion, like many 
'new' audience studies, do not constitute 'ethnographies' in the anthropological sense. 
If there is anything ethnographic about them it is in the context delineated by Shaun 
Moores, that they take seriously the interpretations of the media constructed by 
consumers (or in my case, the interpretations of Islam constructed by Muslims) in 
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their daily lives, whilst not being afraid to interrogate and situate their spoken 
accounts254• In this section I want to identify the key points defining the scope and 
limitations of the data from my study on young Muslims which is presented in chapter 
6. Three points in particular should be borne in mind. 
The first point relates to the method of sample recruitment used, i.e. the snowball 
technique. Robert Burgess proposes that a main advantage of snowball sampling is 
that it 'follows the pattern of social relations in a particular setting and therefore the 
population in the sample involves individuals and relations among individuals,m. The 
respondents in my own study were strongly connected by kinship and friendship ties. 
For example, Noshin and Ayesha were sisters whilst Ishtiaq and Mustafa were both 
friends and fellow students at the same university. The benefits of such relations 
being represented in the sample is that the data elicited provides an altogether more 
detailed insight into the character and diversity of experiences of being Muslim 
amongst individuals who, because of their close relations, may be deemed to have a 
similar social and cultural outlook. Indeed Noshin and Ayesha who have grown up in 
the same family household relay very differing experiences about their past and 
present relations to Islam. Having said that this kind of clustered sample which is 
interconnected by close ties runs the risk of being over representative of individuals of 
particular backgrounds and under representative of others. This brings me to the 
second point about the profile of the respondents who took part in the group 
discussion and video. 
Table 3 summarises the age, sex and family background of each respondent and also 
includes a column indicating the type of empirical contribution made by each 
individual. 
Table 3: Respondents' Proflle 
Name Age Sex 
Ethnic and Religious Empirical Contribution 
Family Background (*group discussion; +video) 
254lnterpretin& Audiences, (London, Sage, 1993), p5 
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-
Javed 21 M Pakistani Muslim * 
Mustafa 24 M white English Christian *+ 
Ishtiaq 20 M Pakistani Muslim *+ 
Noshin 23 F Pakistani Muslim *+ 
Shagufta 21 F Pakistani Muslim *+ 
Ayesha 21 F Pakistani Muslim *+ 
Fatou 21 F Gambian Muslim + 
Imran 20 M Pakistani Muslim + 
Jameel 17 M Caribbean Christian + 
SuJayman 25 M white English Christian + 
As Table 3 confirms all the respondents who were of South Asian background came 
from Pakistan Muslim families. Thus, there are various other South Asian groupings 
that were represented in the audience survey (i.e. Indian, Sri Lankan and Bangladeshi) 
who are wholly absent from the study on young Muslims. In addition, as has already 
been noted, at the time of research all the respondents were students at higher 
educational institutions. In that sense other narratives and experiences of being 
Muslim, such as those who have recently migrated or who may be 
uneducated/unemployed are not reflected in the findings. At the same time, it is 
necessary to remember that the commonality amongst the respondents of being higher 
education students, or being of Pakistani Muslim background, did not signify a 
coherent and unified Muslim identity. As will become clear in the next chapter their 
individual negotiations of Islam were fractured by various other axes of 
25SRobert Burgess, In the Field, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p55 
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differentiation including gender, culture, migration and family and 'community' 
relations. 
Finally, as len Ang points out all empirical research is subject to a 'politics of 
interpretation' whereby the researcher does not simply uncover and relay 'objective 
truths', but, is engaged in a discursive process where he/she has to interpret certain 
'constructions of reality' which have been conveyed in a particular historical 
momene56• My study on young Muslims constitutes a partial reflection of the 
everyday realities of the respondents in two specific ways. On the one hand its 
partiality is marked by the fact that it is, in the end, my particular interpretation of 
what the respondents told me. On the other hand its partiality needs to be additionally 
acknowledged in that what the respondents told was only a fraction of their' lived 
realities' involving a process of selection and prioritisation of certain topics and 
events over others. 
2S6Livin& Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996), pp46-47 
213 
Chapter 6 
Experiences and Assertions of 'Difference' 
Among Young Muslims 
The empirical study presented in chapter 4, regarding South Asian audiences' use of 
popular/mainstream and Indian films on videotape, provided an insight into how 
multiple cultural locations may be reconciled within an individual's everyday life 
without seeming to disrupt racial and cultural hierarchies. The study thus emphasised 
that the defining feature of' culturally hybrid' identities - of being able to interact and 
meld diverse cultural forms - does not guarantee an ability to forge racially 
transgressive cultural outlooks. My aim in this chapter is to extend the line of analysis 
begun in chapter 4 and further clarify the extent to which hybridity theorists' focus on 
culturally fragmented identities as a fundamental basis from which it becomes 
possible to overwhelm racial boundaries and inequalities may be misplaced or well 
founded. 
The chapter takes as its focus my empirical research on young Muslims. As with the 
audience survey the study on young Muslims was undertaken in the early stages of 
this thesis in 1997. The findings from the study are therefore presented here 
retrospectively, but again from the perspective of what they convey about everyday 
modern experiences and negotiations of 'race' and culture. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections which are linked together by the 
common theme of 'difference' . The first two sections are concerned with examining 
respondents' experiences and expressions of mutually exclusive conceptions of 
'difference'. It is this 'difference' that is deemed to inhibit the transgressive capacity 
of 'cultural hybridity' in that the latter is dependent on the contestation and 
deconstruction of binary conceptions of identity formation2S7. These two sections offer 
an insight into differing circumstances in which 'Muslim' identities become situated 
and asserted in opposition to other identities. The first section analyses how Muslims 
are homogenised through racial stereotyping by non Muslims and begins by 
257see for example, Stuart Hall, 'New Ethnicities', in Black Film. British Cinema, edited by K. Mercer, 
(London, ICA, 1988), pp27-31 
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identifying a process of racialisation specific to Britain which has established a 
'common sense' understanding of Muslims in a manner that simultaneously 
supervenes and interweaves stereotypes of Asian. This scenario is illustrated by 
examining the empirical contributions of two non Asian respondents, Fatou and 
Mustafa, who describe how individuals outside of their immediate family find it 
difficult to acknowledge them as Muslims because of their non Asian backgrounds. 
Fatou and Mustafa's experiences are additionally shown to highlight how seemingly 
harmless ways of identifying Muslims, such as not handling pork, serve to perpetuate 
mutually exclusive conceptions of 'difference'. In more challenging circumstances 
such mutually exclusive frameworks for identifying Muslims are shown to evoke 
racially divisive relations as demonstrated by the shift in Mustafa's father-in-Iaw's 
attitude, from being wholly accepting of Mustafa's conversion to Islam to denouncing 
Mustafa's desire to live in a more densely populated Muslim area. These findings are 
seen to reinforce Ali Rattansi' s observation that modem identities are informed by a 
'complex intertwining of racism and anti-racism'. Mustafa's narrative is seen to 
underscore that contemporary experiences and negotiations of being Muslim do not 
take place in a neutral space, but in a context more akin to Brah's conception of 
'diaspora space' where the experience of 'race' and racism remains a defining feature. 
The second section shifts focus from examining how dominant discourses 
homogenise Muslims to when Muslims themselves unite because of their common 
affiliation to Islam. The section distinguishes and examines in tum the comments of 
respondents affirming a neo-conservative or 'fundamentalist' politics which promotes 
an anti-modem, anti-western, anti-democratic and anti-feminist agenda2S8, and those 
whose political assertions are predominantly focused on challenging Islamophobia. 
With regards the former I examine the video contributions of Sulayman and Jameel 
both of whom are members of the 'fundamentalist' Muslim group AI-Muhajiroun259• 
Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994) 
258Haideh Moghissi, Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism, (London, Zed Books, 1999), p70 
259 AI-Muhajiroun has been the subject of much media attention both before and after September 11th 
and has been heavily criticised by both Muslims and non Muslims for its outwardly confrontational 
approach, which is often reported as being anti-western and anti-semitic (see for example the Channel 
4 documentary Tottenham Ayatollah, broadcast on 8th April 1997). The group's own website claims 
that one of its aims is to establish Islam as a World Order (see www.almuhajiroun.com.pk). 
215 
A close examination of their comments reveals that the underlying impetus behind 
their support for a neo-conservative Muslim politics relates as much to racism 
directed at Muslims as it does to a homogenous conception of Islam. These 
observations are used to emphasise that the pernicious aspects of a neo-conservative 
Muslim politics can only be effectively resisted by developing a more complex 
approach, than hitherto, which on the one hand differentiates and accommodates its 
legitimate anger directed at racism, and on the other, opposes its divisive rhetoric 
which promotes a superior and holistic conception of Islam and Muslims. To address 
the first of these two points I identify and describe the respondents' mutual anger at 
the U.S. authorities for wrongly identifying Muslims as the perpetrators for the 
'Oklahoma bombing'260 as an example of Muslim unity against Islamophobia. I go on 
to relate such instances of unity to Paul Gilroy's notion of anti-anti-essentialism 
which emphasises that whilst ethnically absolute forms of identification must be 
resisted, it is important to maintain some notion of a 'shared essence' to be able to co-
ordinate an effective opposition to ongoing racialised forms of power and 
subordination. On the basis of these observations I propose that solidarity amongst 
Muslims be read in the context of what Hall calls 'identity politics one' in as much as 
it is overwhelmingly held together and defined by the struggle against racism. I then 
return to address the issue of how to confront and challenge the divisive features 
integral to Islamic 'fundamentalism'. In doing so I also make a decisive shift in the 
focus of discussion from examining manifestations of unified notions of Islam and 
Muslims to contesting the diversity of Muslim identities and subjectivities. This shift 
is introduced in the context of Hall's conception of the 'politics of representation' 
which he identifies as an engagement with the multiple experiences and subjectivities 
that constitute holistic categories such as 'black' or 'Muslim', and which he regards as 
essential to breaking the cycle of racial conflicts. By comparing the formal and 
somewhat rhetorical contributions of Jameel and Sulayman with the more informal 
and personal reflections of two other members of AI-Muhajiroun, Ayesha and Imran, 
I argue that the real value of a 'politics of representation' lies in its emphasis on 
2~he event known as the 'Oklahoma bombing' involved a truck bomb which destroyed a federal 
building in Oklahoma City on April 19th 1995 and killed 168 people. The U.S. authorities initially 
identified terrorist organisations from the Middle East as the perpetrators, but after more detailed 
investigations arrested Timothy McVeigh, a white American male. He was convicted and later 
executed by lethal injection on June II th 200 l. 
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engaging individual experiences and subjectivities which encourage the vocalisation 
of internal group differences that, in turn, make it possible to challenge established or 
'official' norms, practices and meanings. 
The third section of the chapter extends my analysis of the 'politics of representation' 
into the respondents' personal experiences and negotiations of Islam. The discussion 
specifically focuses on individuals of South Asian background who include Javed, 
Ishtiaq, Noshin, Imran, Ayesha and Shagufta. My examination identifies a 
transformation in the respondents' experiences of Islam whereby, the very issues that 
had provoked feelings of enmity towards Islam in childhood, such as the use of 
corporal punishment in mosques, have in more recent years been renegotiated by the 
respondents as going against the teachings of Islam. This process of reinterpretation 
of the teachings of Islam is described as resembling what Shabha calls the' act of 
cultural translation' through which 'newness enters the world'261. This connection is 
qualified by an acknowledgement that amongst the respondents, like many Muslims, 
there is an undeniable and explicit foregrounding of Islam as their primary axis of 
identification. To make sense of these complex dynamics of identity negotiation I 
draw upon Gilroy's contestation of the term 'authenticity' through which he describes 
how the theme of connectedness may be maintained without connoting a fixed 
essence. The discussion then turns to assess the possibilities of racially transgressive 
change to emerge from the respondents' narratives. I note how many of the 
respondents actively resist the nationalistic tendencies integral to their parents' 
identities which include such expectations as marrying, not just any Muslim but, a 
Muslim who shares the same country of origin. This integral aspect of the 
respondents' negotiations of being Muslim is seen to resemble Hall's description of a 
positive conception of ethnicity in which ethnicity is 'decoupled' from nationalism. 
Crucially, unlike Hall's conception in which 'decoupling' is achieved via interaction 
with multiple co-ordinates of identity, the respondents negotiate more anti-nationalist 
and racially inclusive Muslim identities by foregrounding the teachings of Islam over 
all other sources of identification. Here 'location' overrides the 'play of difference' in 
the respondents' narratives. I argue that the prominence of the dynamic of 'location' 
within the respondents' narratives is best understood in the context of Srab's 
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conception of a 'politics of location' which is not driven by a desire to reinvent the 
'past', but by the need to establish some kind of positioning in order to challenge 
established meanings, norms and codes of behaviour. To round off my interrogation 
of the respondents' narratives for their capacity to bring about racially transgressive 
change I consider the contributions of the female respondents, Noshin, Ayesha and 
Shagufta, and assess their interactions with the veil/hijab for the way in which they 
challenge or condone conventional gender roles and inequalities. The discussion notes 
how the women's interaction with the veil corresponds with Gilroy's description of a 
'changing same' in that the veil, like Gilroy's example of the twelve inch single, 
acquires new meaning and significance as it transits different social and cultural 
contexts. Moreover, the women's narratives challenge us to understand how within 
the same historical moment the veil can be a form of female oppression in one part of 
the world and a form of female empowerment in another part of the world. The 
dynamics through which the veil is able to have such contrasting impacts on women's 
lives is made sense of by applying Gilroy and Rattansi's observations that modem 
identities must be understood and contested within non-linear conceptions of time and 
space. 
I conclude the chapter by summarising the overall patterns emerging from the 
empirical data, and present the respondents' interaction with Islam as constituting two 
phases. I describe these phases as the 'distanciation from Islam' which relates to their 
childhood experiences, and an 'embracement of Islam' which is specific to their more 
recent history. Both these phases I suggest share a similarity in that they are 
characterised by a discourse of rationality and more specifically by what Rattansi 
describes as a 'heightened reflexivity' in which multiple cultural perspectives interact 
to create a tension between order and chaos. My identification of the discourse of 
rationality within the respondents' narratives positions Muslim identities as being 
distinctly modem in that rationality is a defining feature of modernity. On the basis of 
this connection the discussion ends by asserting that far from being remnants of a pre-
modern past, contemporary Muslim identities predicated on the teachings of Islam can 
be usefully read as providing an insight into the dynamics and internal contradictions 
of modernity as well as 'cultural hybridity'. 
261< How Newness Enters the World', in The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp212-
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The Racialisation of Muslims in Britain 
As was noted in the last chapter (see p 198), the vast majority of the estimated 1.S 
million Muslims in Britain have migrated from or have ancestral roots in the 
subcontinent, most notably in Pakistan, with significant numbers from India and 
Bangladesh. In fact Muslims of South Asian origin are estimated to account for 80% 
of the British Muslim population. The other 20% is largely composed of individuals 
with origins in the Middle East, Africa, Malaysia, Turkey and Cyprus262• The 
predominance of Muslims of South Asian background has been transfigured in the 
national racial imaginary in a manner which readily confuses prejudice against Asians 
with prejudice against Muslims. 
In the past, coverage of and debates about British Muslims within mainstream British 
discourses was likely to be subsumed under the category 'Asian'. Since the end of the 
Cold War attention has very much shifted to religious affiliation, in a manner akin to 
what Anthias and Yuval-Davis describe as a process of racialisation through which 
racist stereotypes of Asians have become integral to racist stereotypes of Muslims263• 
Thus, at the same time that religion has been fore grounded as the focus for anti-
Muslim feelings, constructions of 'Asian' and 'immigrant' through which Muslims in 
Britain had been previously understood have not become redundant nor lost their 
significance. As the findings of the Runnymede Commission on British Muslims 
suggest, interwoven into Islamophobic discourse in Britain is not just a hatred of 
Asian customs, but also a hatred of Arabs, the Middle East, immigrants and a 
ridiculing of anti-racist initiatives264• The centrality of stereotypes of 'Asian' within 
this trend is highlighted by the experiences of non Asian Muslims such as Fatou who, 
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262see Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain, (London, LB. Tauris, 1994), pplO-26 
The Runnymede Commission on British Muslims, Is1amQphobia a Challenae for Us All, (London, The 
Runnymede Trust, 1997b), pp 13-19 
see Steven Vertovec, • Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain', in Muslims in the West, 
edited by Y. Yazbeck Haddad, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2(02), pp19-35 
263Racialised Boundaries, (London, Routledge, 1992), see chapter 2, pp 21-60 
264Commission on British Muslims and Isiamophobia, Islamophobja. Its Features and Danaers, 
(London, The Runnymede Trust, 1997a) 
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as I now show, describes how her indigenous counterparts find it difficult to accept 
her as Muslim because of her African background. 
The exclusion of non Asian narratives in dominant conceptions of Muslim 
The close association of 'Muslim' with 'Asian' has meant that non Asian Muslims are 
often excluded from national debates and media representations. As Fatou, who is of 
Gambian Muslim parentage, explains: 
+F: I don't really identify with any of the images that you get in the media because 
they're always more or less about Asian Muslims and you don't really see 
nothing about the African Caribbean Muslims or even the white Muslims. 
For individuals like Fatou the embeddedness of notions of Asian within dominant 
perceptions of Muslims has inflicted a level of religious invisibility outside of her 
home environment. She describes how a hesitant acceptance of her religious 
background amongst fellow staff members and customers means that she has to 
constantly alert them to her Muslim status. For example, she recounts: 
+F: People assume that I'm not Muslim, [ ... J I work in Sainsbury's on the dinner 
counter and most of the stuff they sell is pork. And when customers ask me I 
have to tell them to taste the stuff because I don't eat pork, and they say, 'Well 
why is that?' And even my co-workers, no matter how long I've been working 
there they still can't believe that I'm Muslim. Which is quite strange really 
[laughs]. 
This example may be construed to be harmless enough. Certainly Fatou does not see a 
negative impact on her life emanating from the need to constantly remind people of 
her religious identity. Nor does she convey any sense of anger or irritation. If anything 
she is mildly amused by her co-workers' inability to retain the point that she is unable 
to handle or taste pork because she is a Muslim. However, the subtle and seemingly 
harmless situation experienced by Fatou illustrates how specific characteristics 
become singled out and interwoven into stereotypical caricatures. For example, 
Fatou's religious affiliation becomes a point of interaction around an issue, not 
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handling pork, which is deemed to fall outside of the boundaries of what is seen to be 
the 'norm'. Of course there is much more to being Muslim than avoiding contact with 
pork and much that is perhaps in synch with' English Christian' lifestyles. But, for her 
co-workers and customers 'not handling pork,265 has become a defining feature of 
Fatou's Muslim status and is illustrative of how Muslim identities in Britain are 
circumscribed through mutually exclusive conceptions of difference. 
Circumscribing Muslim identities through mutually exclusive conceptions of 
difference 
We might infer from Fatou's account that it is pre-dominantly those characteristics 
'alien' to the indigenous population that provide the focal points, or precursors, for 
interaction with Muslims. 'Difference' in this context can be identified as functioning 
in the oppositional sense of the term, that is as distinct irreconcilable entities. And it is 
worth emphasising that in this instance a mutually exclusive notion of difference is 
not invoked by the Muslim individual concerned, but by her non Muslim 
counterparts. Further this oppositional context is only maintained by resisting or 
filtering out all detail that invites more complex conceptions of the subject in 
question. To return to Fatou's account, when her work colleagues are confronted with 
evidence that is contrary to dominant images which associate Muslims as being of 
Asian origin, they automatically and persistently resist it. In their minds Fatou's 
African background clearly functions to mask her Muslim identity. Hence her 
comment, "no matter how long I've been working there they still can't believe that 
I'm Muslim". 
The selective way in which Fatou's work colleagues interact with her Muslim status, 
focussing on such aspects of her behaviour as 'not handling pork'. raises an important 
point regarding Hall's suggestion that for migrant political struggles to be more 
effective in challenging persisting inequalities. it is necessary to organise around a 
'new' politics of difference which exposes and responds to the multitude of 
subjectivities encompassed by specific categories such as black. Fatou's account 
265It is worth pointing out that on the issue of pork there is no universal observance amongst Muslims. 
Some argue that • avoiding pork' is not a requirement of being a Muslim but has been mistaken as such 
because at the time of the Prophet's life pork was banned from consumption due to a disease carried by 
pigs. 
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highlights that the effectiveness of such a politics - what Hall calls a 'politics of 
representation' (see pp70-71) - is as much dependent on the ability of indigenous 
Western populations to acknowledge and interact with the diversity of migrant voices 
as it is on the migrant's assertion of the complexity and heterogeneity of his/her 
identity. I return to discussion of this issue in more detail at the end of section two, 
where I also address its implications for the transgressive capacity of 'cultural 
hybridity' (see pp239-246). Here it is useful to point out that, quite apart from her 
African background, Fatou challenges the conventional stereotypes of 'Muslim' 
women in other ways. She doesn't cover her hair, she wears 'western' clothes and she 
comes across as highly articulate with a sense of self confidence. By her own 
admission she is not a 'devout' Muslim. But she is nevertheless a Muslim. And once 
popular conceptions of what constitutes a Muslim begin to include the less 
'conventional' identities of individuals like Fatou it becomes increasingly difficult to 
contain 'Islam' and' Muslims' within a racially and culturally enclosed framework. 
The manner of Fatou's co-workers' interaction with her Muslim identity indicates 
how racial boundaries are often maintained in subtle and non-confrontational ways. 
To extend understanding of how these dynamics impact on the process of racial 
interaction in negotiations of being Muslim in Britain I want to introduce the 
experiences of another non Asian respondent, Mustafa, which supports Rattansi's 
observation of how racism is often intertwined with anti-racism. This aspect of 
Mustafa's narrative is additionally interesting for its insight into how 'race' and 
racism can very easily begin to overtake individual experiences and negotiations of 
being Muslim. 
The intertwining of racism and anti-racism and its impact on tbeing'Muslim 
At the time my empirical research was conducted, only a couple of years had passed 
since Mustafa had converted to Islam. His white English Christian family background 
means that he still occupied a racial status markedly different to all but one other 
respondent - Sulayman. Mustafa recounts how, since converting to Islam, he has 
become much more conscious of the privileged position afforded by his outwardly 
'English' appearance: 
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*M: I changed my name to Mohammed and you'll be amazed you know if you're 
talking to someone on the phone and say 'yeah my name is Mustafa 
Mohammed', then they meet you and you know the treatment is totally 
different. And I was kind of like the weirdest thing, I never thought that this 
would happen to me that I was actually witnessing racism. 1 ... 1 once I was 
going for jobs, part time jobs, and I was gonna get two application forms one 
with myoid name and one with my new name on and see what ones I would 
get an interview for. I wasn't even getting interviews for Tesco's, year before I 
could you know go to Tesco's and you know get ajob straight away. It's it 
really got to that stage (laughs). 
Thus, whilst his name has become the likely cause for more cold or distant attitudes 
and even acts of discrimination, Mustafa's physical features tend to override the 
'alien' marker signified by his Muslim name. When meeting people face to face he 
still enjoys the type of neutral relations to which he was wholly accustomed before 
his conversion to Islam. But, as he later clarifies, at the point where people have to 
interact with the seriousness of his engagement with Islam their attitude can often 
become distant and racist. With respect to this Mustafa describes the dramatic shift in 
his father-in-Iaw's disposition: 
*M: I hope my own father-in-law never hears this tape [group laughs) but I've like 
known him for two or three years and he has a very, they both come from a 
Quaker background so they have a liberal 'oh we accept everyone' kind of 
attitude. But essentially it's Christian based and he was all very accepting and 
you know when my wife changed her name he was really quite okay about it. 
You know and on face value they were really accepting of us. It came about 
maybe about four months ago I'd actually arranged to move to London to be 
near Finsbury Park mosque. And this all fell through anyway but whilst this 
was going on my father-in-law was ringing me up and saying 'you're 
endangering my daughter's life, you've brainwashed her, you're going to 
brainwash your daughter', you know all the truth came out, from this liberal 
point view turned into this nasty, fascist I ... ) [group laugh loudly I you know. 
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It would appear that the initial reaction of Mustafa's father-in-law is very much a 
conditional acceptance of his daughter and son-in-law's conversion to Islam. 
Conditional in that whilst they are living within a suburban predominantly white 
community he is still able to accept them as 'one of us'. The shift to a more 
contemptuous attitude is not based on an assessment of the precise danger that 
Mustafa's religious views might pose to his daughter and granddaughter. The shift is 
simply in response to their plans to move to an area where they may have more ready 
access to a mosque and to other Muslim people. Thus, for his father-in-law, Mustafa's 
adoption of a Muslim lifestyle is okay as long as Mustafa's 'community' ties remain 
unchanged. The decision to live amongst or near a Muslim community is the moment 
when Mustafa is seen to be disloyal, the moment when he is seen to cross the 
boundary from being 'one of us' to being 'one of them', and the moment when being 
Muslim is deemed to be 'alien', dangerous and corrupting. 
Mustafa's encounter with the contradiction in his father-in-law's attitude supports two 
particular insights into the dynamics of modern relations highlighted by Rattansi and 
Brah respectively. The first is that, as Ali Rattansi notes, modern relations are defined 
by a complex intertwining of racism and anti-racism (see ppl07-108). Racism itself is 
therefore contradictorily experienced and not so easily distinguished as a wholly 
separate entity from anti-racism. This is characteristic of the reaction of Mustafa's 
father-in-law, whose initial response can be deemed anti-racist in its acceptance of 
Mustafa's conversion to Islam. By comparison, his subsequent more hostile reaction 
can be aligned to the position of racists most notably for affirming a firm racial 
boundary between a white 'civilised' community and a 'dangerous' Muslim 
community. 
As I have argued elsewhere, in Britain the intertwining of racist and anti-racist 
discourses pervades everyday relations in contexts as vastly different as the 
atmosphere on football terraces266 to party political strategies for canvassing the 
'ethnic' vote267• In that sense the commingling of racist and anti-racist discourses must 
266Bilkis Malek, • A Game of Two Halves', in Soundjnas, Issue 10, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1998), pp145-156 
261Bilkis Malek, • Not Such Tolerant Times' , in Soundjnas, Issue 6, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1997), ppl40-151 
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be recognised as a centrally defining feature of modern experiences and subjectivities, 
and as such needs to be unravelled for its specific impact on the cultural politics of 
Muslims. This is my concern in the next section, when I argue that a failure to 
appreciate the contradictory experiences of racism has meant that a blind submission 
to Islam, as opposed to challenging Islamophobia, has been wrongfully identified as 
the basis for Muslim unity during such events as the' Rushdie affair' (see pp229-246). 
As Mustafa's experiences suggest, for many Muslims racism begins to overtake anti-
racism in defining their overall experiences of living in the West and their encounter 
with Western modernity in particular. For example, once Mustafa becomes subjected 
to the racial prejudice of his father-in-law it becomes difficult to maintain his father-
in-law's earlier, or indeed any subsequent, tendency towards a liberal anti-racist 
position as being genuine. 
The second insight into modern relations provided by Mustafa's experiences relates to 
Avtar Brah's notion of 'diaspora space', in which the native is as much a diasporian 
as the diasporian is a native (see pp86-88). When his father-in-law objects to 
Mustafa's plans to move his family to a more populated Muslim area, Mustafa 
himself becomes a victim of 'white' racism. Experiences like this, as with those 
relating to his search for a job, provide Mustafa with a dual insight into white English 
identity, in that he is simultaneously positioned both inside and outside white English 
identity. In the same way that the migrant's 'sense of self' becomes fractured and 
decentred, Mustafa too undergoes the' loss of a stable sense of self' as he is drawn to 
confront and deal with the racism directed at him. I return to the notion of the 'native 
becoming a diasporian' in the conclusion of the thesis, where I argue that theorising 
'cultural hybridity' from the position of the native is crucial for a more 
comprehensive assessment of its racially transgressive potential (see pp309-31l). 
Here I want to explore Mustafa's narrative a little further to identify its ability to offer 
alternative 'routes' than those signposted by the process of racialisation for narrating 
and contesting Muslim identities. 
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Alternative 'routes' for contesting Muslim identities 
Mustafa's contribution to the group discussion and video indicates that his 
engagement with Islam bears little resemblance to that imagined by his father-in-law 
and conveyed through such words as 'brainwashed' and 'endanger'. As Mustafa 
explains, his own interest in Islam began while on a trip to India which he had 
specifically undertaken to learn more about yoga and Hinduism. During the trip he 
ended up living with a Muslim family in Kashmir, an experience which he views as 
his first real introduction to Islam. His decision to become a Muslim was by no means 
instant. In fact it wasn't for another two years after his stay in Kashmir, and while 
working in Scotland, that he converted. Two other points about Mustafa's 
embracement of Islam are worth mentioning. Firstly, although his relationship with 
his wife predated his conversion to Islam his decision to convert was taken 
independently of her. Secondly, he did not declare his own commitment to Islam with 
the expectation that his wife would automatically follow suit. With respect to her 
decision to convert, he explains: 
*M: She wasn't a Muslim. And she didn't come to it for more than a year after I'd 
been Muslim and I didn't pressurise her into becoming Muslim. She came to it 
herself. Obviously, you know I was studying Islam had pieces of paper on the 
floor where I was trying to learn [giggles) and I guess you know that affected 
her. 
It is impossible to comment on how long Mustafa's relationship with his wife would 
have survived had she not converted. But what can be stated with certainty is that 
their respective conversion to Islam is highly personal to them, both on an individual 
level and as a couple charting a life together. In that sense they do not fit popular 
stereotypes in that neither has been influenced by an affiliation to, or sympathy with, 
an 'extremist' group. Nor by having a social network of Muslim friends. Nor indeed, 
for the sake of pleasing the in-laws. It is perhaps also worth pointing out that, as a 
couple, Mustafa and his wife had experienced a wholly different lifestyle before their 
decisions to become Muslim. This is conveyed by Mustafa in the group discussion by 
sharing moments such as the following: 
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*M: My wife (and I) were watching a programme on ecstasy and it was hilarious 
because we were sat there going to each other, 'that was us once, we used to 
be like that' [group laughsl. It was you know it was really weird. 
Examples such as the above dispel the 'no fun' and wholJy 'formal' image of Muslim 
couples and Muslim homes. Some might argue that Mustafa and his wife were well 
acquainted in a very different and informal context before their adoption of a 
'Muslim' lifestyle and so cannot be taken as the 'norm'. To adopt this line of 
interpretation is to follow Mustafa's father-in-law and invoke a mutually exclusive 
conception of difference which sifts out anything that does not fit the stereotype. 
Whereas, if we take Mustafa and his wife's religious quest seriously and in the 
personalised context conveyed by Mustafa, then we are forced to review the context 
in which we situate and contest Muslim identities. It is then that it becomes possible 
to track the' play of difference' , as theorised by hybridity theorists, which emphasises 
that identities are not pre-given but are under constant negotiation and review. This 
point is the focus of discussion in the third section of this chapter (see pp246-273). 
Here I want to draw out two particular dynamics from Mustafa's account which 
suggest that the experience of being Muslim is not defined by a set of rules and 
regulations which all Muslims follow 'blindly' and in uniform fashion. 
On the one hand, Mustafa's account presents the experience of being Muslim as being 
peculiar to the individual who negotiates the teachings of Islam within the context of 
his/her own particular situation and personal needs. So, for example, when Mustafa 
makes the decision to convert he does not perceive his status as a Muslim 
compromised by being in a relationship with a non Muslim partner and vice versa. 
Rather, he is able to maintain both at the same time. Moreover, when we take into 
account Mustafa's lifestyle prior to his conversion, and also that there was no family 
or peer pressure to convert, we have to accept the capacity of Islam to be a guiding 
source which individuals at their own will can find to be a positively fulfilling 
experience, without distancing or severing ties with non Muslims. In Mustafa's case, 
his primary attraction to Islam was related to a desire to establish a stable family 
environment. He states: 
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+M: The strength of the family is very important to me 1 ... 11 come from a broken 
family but I've seen a Pakistani or Asian family as Muslim families and 
they're very strong I ... ] and I think because the children are brought up in an 
Islamic manner they're so much stronger and the love in the family is so much 
stronger than I felt 1 ... 1. I'm sure that, you know, if there was any statistics on 
it I should think that there are less Muslim children that swear at their parents 
and storm out of the house than there is, you know, western children. 
Of course it would be wrong to conclude from Mustafa's comments that within every 
Muslim home resides a 'happy family'. In fact, within the group discussion some 
individuals share some very negative experiences about the way in which their parents 
and molwees appropriated Islam in the home and mosque respectively (see pp247-
261). However, narratives like Mustafa's signal very different 'routes' through which 
to engage and evaluate the ethical qualities of Islam. His dialogue with the teachings 
of Islam is primarily about building an atmosphere of' love', and long lasting 
relations of 'respect' within the home which present very different contexts for 
situating Muslim lifestyles than 'subjugation' and 'subordination'. In engaging these 
alternative 'routes' we begin to break the process of racialisation through which 
Muslims have been dehumanised. This is precisely my concern in the third section of 
this chapter where I examine the narratives of South Asian Muslims and highlight 
how their personalised accounts challenge dominant representations which project 
Muslims as submitting to a set of beliefs that are pre-modem, barbaric, irrational and 
incapable of contributing to the 'progress' of modem societies. This brings me to the 
second dynamic shaping Mustafa's experience of being Muslim. 
As Mustafa's account shows, Muslim experiences are significantly influenced by the 
characteristics of interaction with other people. So, for example, Mustafa's feelings 
and awareness of being Muslim are significantly defined by his father-in-Iaw's 
prejudice, which generates a sense of upset and anger. And these feelings specifically 
revolve around being Muslim. Mustafa's mother too places little positive value on his 
engagement with Islam. She perhaps does not express this in the same openly 
antagonistic terms as Mustafa's father-in-law, but as Mustafa recounts in the group 
discussion: 
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*M: All through my teenage life I had this struggle and had my parents going, 
"Y ou shouldn't smoke you shouldn't do this". 
A: Yeah (laughs I 
M: And in fact now I think my mum would rather that I sat there and drank beer 
and smoked. She would feel more comfortable with that (group laugh) than 
me sitting there not drinking not smoking you know. 
Mustafa's experiences highlight that being Muslim involves a process of interaction 
that constantly requires you to justify your beliefs and challenge the low sense of 
human worth accorded to you. The pervasiveness of this trend is captured by writers 
such as Marfleet and Bjorgo, who identify the political elites of the West as the source 
for the spread of Islamophobia which features centrally in their respective civilising 
missions to create a pan-continental identity that is defined against the cultures of 
'others' - principally Muslims268• The effect of such dynamics on individuals like 
Mustafa is to heighten their sense of being Muslim in an acrimonious context. It is 
important to appreciate the full implications of this state of affairs because they have 
been central to keeping alive the current cycle of conflicts between 'the West' and 
'Islam' - a situation I now describe in more detail. 
Deconstructing Muslim Unity 
The two dynamics highlighted in Mustafa's experiences stress the need to situate and 
understand Muslim identities via interpretative frameworks foregrounding a fluid, as 
opposed to mutually exclusive, conception of 'difference'. The importance of doing 
so goes beyond the need to break down the racialisation process that has presented 
Muslims as a homogenous and backward people. It is additionally important, as I now 
argue in this section, in squeezing out the possibilities for Muslims to define 
268Phil Marfleet, 'Europe's Civilising Mission', in New Ethnicities. Old Racisms. edited by P. Cohen, 
(London, Zed Books, 1999), pp 18-36 
Tore Bjorgo, "The Invaders', 'the Traitors' and 'the Resistance Movement", in The Politics of 
Multiculturalism in the New Europe, edited by T. Modood & P. Werbner, (London, Zed Books, 1997), 
pp54-72 
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themselves in mutually exclusive terms. I address this challenge in this section by 
distinguishing and examining in turn the dynamics of unity among members of 
'fundamentalist' Muslim groups and the dynamics of unity among 'ordinary' 
Muslims. In this section I also begin to introduce and assess the five main arguments 
made by Bhabha and Said in their examinations of the cultural politics of Muslims 
(see pp54-60). 
My analysis begins by discussing Jameel and Sulayman's video contributions as 
examples of the 'fundamentalist' position, which I suggest has complex 'roots' in that 
its anti-western and anti-democratic rhetoric is intertwined with anti-racist objectives. 
The complex 'roots' of Islamic 'fundamentalism' 
As noted in the introduction, Jameel and Sulayman are both members of the London 
based group AI-Muhajiroun, which can be described as supportive of a 
'fundamentalist' Muslim politics in its commitment to promoting Islam as the 
solution to the problems faced by both Muslims and non Muslims and establishing it 
as a World Order69• Jameel and Sulayman's contributions can be described as 
markedly different from the other participants, in that they are visibly formal and 
depersonalised in a number of respects. For example, they both make direct eye 
contact with the camera lens whereas the gaze of the other participants is focused 
slightly to the right of the lens. The reason for this is that each individual was given 
the choice of either speaking directly to the camera without any involvement from me, 
or have me stand next to the camera posing the occasional question (on topics 
identified by them) or prompt to start/maintain dialogue. Only Sulayman and Jameel 
chose the former. Similarly, while most respondents had thought about what they 
wanted to say and used written notes during filming, only Sulayman and Jameel 
seemed to stick rigidly to what they had written. 
With respect to the content of their contributions, two particular characteristics stand 
out. Firstly, although they address different issues both of them place an emphasis on 
explaining and justifying the • doctrines' of Islam. Secondly, both utilise a very 
impersonal and formal register. For instance, Jameel devotes his attention to 
269see www.aJrnuh!ijiroun.com.pk 
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describing Islam as a "deen". This he explains posits Islam not as a religion but as a 
"complete system" providing guidance on all aspects of human life including social, 
economic, political as well as spiritual. He goes on to refer to Allah as a "perfect 
source" which makes his system for mankind free of contradiction and error. 
Throughout his piece Jameel makes no references to personal experiences and so his 
defence of Islam does present itself as something that has been learnt' parrot fashion'. 
The focus of Sulayman's contribution is the pejorative coverage of Islam presented by 
the media. As an example, he refers to the wholly negative reporting of the Taliban 
and the specific criticisms levelled against the closing of women and children's 
schools in Afghanistan. He puts forward the view that the Taliban were justified in 
their actions because they had not closed the schools with the intention of controlling 
and disempowering sections of their population, as suggested by the media, but had 
done so in the context of having to declare a state of emergency. For Sulayman, the 
adverse portrayal of Islamic ruling parties, whom he refers to as the "truth carriers", is 
an indication that the West feels threatened by Islam and its potential to become a 
"superpower" . 
Like Jameel, Sulayman's account also projects an engagement with Islam that is void 
of internal criticism and differentiation. His use of the phrase "truth carriers" 
resembles Jameel' s use of "perfect source". Both propose a holistic and 
undifferentiated conception of Islam and Muslims. They also situate Islam in 
'oppositional' and 'superior' terms. Further, Sulayman's defence of the Taliban is 
exemplary of the kind of neo-conservative politics identified by Haideh Moghissi in 
which, 'denouncing racist Islamophobia in the West becomes intertwined with an 
uncritical acceptance of brutal Islamist states,270. With specific reference to the 
Taliban, even allowing for the most biased media coverage, it is difficult for anyone 
committed to human freedom from subordination and oppression to defend the 
practices of that regime. The narratives of Sulayman and Jameel provide an 
appropriate context for contesting two of the five points of criticism integral to 
Bhabha and Said's commentaries of the cultural politics of Muslims. They include, 
firstly, that Islam and Muslims are racially bounded, and secondly, that the recreation 
27<peminjsm and Islamic Fundamentalism. (London. Zed Books. 1999). p46 
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of a shared 'past' through an irrational and uncritical devotion to Islam is a basis for 
Muslim unity. These two observations are intertwined in the work of Bhabha and 
Said, in that both suggest, in subtly different ways, that it is precisely the recreation of 
a shared 'past' that contains Muslim identities within racially bounded social 
networks. For Bhabha the scenario is characterised by a desire to live the modern age 
through a reinvention of the 'past', a situation he describes as 'the quarrel of the 
ancient (ascriptive) migrants' (see pp44-46). For Said, that many Muslims remain 
loyal to essentialist conceptions of Islam represents a situation where the governing 
elites of the Muslim world have succeeded in presenting the unequal relations of 
power and subordination in mutually exclusive terms, 'through the inadequate 
banners of 'Islam' and 'the West" (see pp46-49). 
There is much about the character and content of Jameel and Sulayman's video 
contributions which substantiates the critical position advanced by Bhabha and Said. 
For example, the parrot fashion manner through which Jameel presents Islam as a 
"perfect system" fits Bhabha's description of a 'fundamentalist' politics as lacking 
critical dialogue or rationale. This is further endorsed by the fact that a total 
submission to Islam is presented by Jameel as affording Muslims the moral high 
ground. This type of non-critical relationship with Islam is identified by Said as 
nurturing a political sensibility on which brutal Islamic regimes thrive and rely for 
popular support. A clear illustration of this is Sulayman' s defence of the closure of 
women and children's schools under the Taliban. However, leaving aside for the 
moment the point that Jameel and Sulayman's appropriations of Islam are not 
representative of all Muslims, I want to question the validity of Said and Bhabha's 
commentaries in the context of Jameel and Sulayman's ancestral history. 
Jameel and Sulayman, and for that matter Mustafa, disrupt the thinking behind 
Bhabha and Said's understanding of Muslim identities in that their lineal origins are 
non Muslim. We might concede some social affinity between Jameel's black 
Caribbean background and that of Muslims in that there is a common experience of 
subordination under colonial rule. But there do not appear to be any obvious features 
of Sulayman and Mustafa's genealogical history that connect them with the social and 
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historical predicament of Muslims. Thus, with respect to the 'Islam' versus 'West' 
analogy, Sulayman and Mustafa's white English Christian backgrounds suggest that 
in converting to Islam they have in fact switched 'loyalties'. In that sense Muslim 
solidarity cannot simply be reduced to a desire to recreate the 'past', because a shared 
history or past doesn't necessarily exist. The kind of neo-conservative rhetoric 
embedded in Sulayman and Jameel's comments may serve to mask this fact. Indeed 
some might argue that if Muslim converts can be shown to practice and defend a 
homogenous, pre-modern conception of Islam, then that a 'shared past' does not exist 
becomes irrelevant. However, my point is that if a 'shared past' does not exist, then 
there must be some other, or additional, source, or precursor that generates and 
maintains a sense of feeling or emotion through which the cultural politics of 
individuals like Sulayman and Jameel become allied to a neo-conservative agenda. 
If we reflect on the context in which Sulayman defends the Taliban, i.e. the 
defamatory media coverage of Islam, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that 
the process of racialisation provides a fundamental source for canvassing support and 
a sense of legitimacy for a neo-conservative politics. This is not to say that the 
racialisation process is the sole influential factor behind an individual's empathy with 
a neo-conservative position. But the fundamental problem with Bhabha and Said's 
interpretation of Muslim unity through concepts such as 'blind patriotism' and 
'irrational fundamentalism' is that they distract attention away from the racialisation 
process and place the focus back on to Islam and Muslims. This weakness is 
reinforced in the next subsection. An added problem with Said and Bhabha's 
respective interpretations is that, by constructing their arguments on events such as 
the street demonstrations during the' Rushdie affair', they have effectively blurred the 
boundary between a neo-conservative politics and the kind of Muslim solidarity 
specifically aimed at challenging Islamophobic discourse. 
The preceding discussion suggests that what is in fact required is a critical position or 
framework which is able to engage the politics of Islamic 'fundamentalism' with a 
level of complexity that, on the one hand, differentiates and challenges its 
complacency towards practices of subordination and oppression, and on the other is 
able to support and re-route its struggle against racism and the process of racialisation. 
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The first of these two challenges is addressed at the end of this section (see pp239-
246). My immediate concern here is to identify how to comprehend and support 
Muslim solidarity specifically organised to counter the effects of racist Islamophobia. 
A useful starting point from which to do this is, as I now illustrate, provided by Paul 
Gilroy's notion of anti-anti-essentialism. 
Muslim solidarity and the case for anti-anti-essentialism 
While Gilroy, like other hybridity theorists, believes that ethnically absolute 
conceptions of identity have no role in a racially transgressive cultural politics, he 
advocates an anti-anti-essentialist position in response to the fact that as long as 
racism persists it can only be effectively opposed by maintaining some notion of unity 
or 'shared essence'. Gilroy adds that such a 'shared essence' does not require belief in 
a homogenous conception of identity but is made possible by implicit feelings of 
solidarity arising from common experiences (see p90). This is a much more suitable 
framework than Bhabha's 'blind patriotism' or Said's 'irrational fundamentalism' for 
understanding public expressions of unity amongst Muslims during such events as the 
'Rushdie affair' and can be illustrated by drawing on empirical evidence from the 
group discussion. 
When The Satanic Verses was first published in 1989, the majority of respondents 
were aged between 12-15 years. Although none of them were directly involved in the 
demonstrations, their comments regarding more recent events such as the Oklahoma 
bombing highlight an affinity with the emotions of individuals who publicly 
denounced Rushdie's novel: 
*1: And do you remember the Oklahoma bombing and they thought the Muslims 
did it and then they found out 
N: 
and now that's 
A: 
given a formal apology or anything. 
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[ 
[ 
Oh yeah and now that's like 
Yeah and they haven't even 
J: 
N: 
Yeah 
and they didn't even like, they started condemning all the groups and they got 
all these professional academics to talk about how this could occur and there's 
no substance in it. 
Yeah and so, yeah and so like now if I'm wearing a hijab I'm an 
extremist. 
At the time of the discussion from which the above extract is taken, almost exactly 
two years had passed since Oklahoma City suffered a bomb blast destroying a federal 
building and killing 168 people. The initial media coverage and reaction of senior 
American politicians attributed the attack to the Middle East and Islamic 
'fundamentalists'. Later it emerged that the perpetrator was a white American 
Christian male271 • As the preceding extract suggests, respondents' ensuing reactions 
and discussion of the bombing barely last more than a few seconds. Yet even within 
this brief exchange some indication of the intensity of anger felt is visible from the 
fact that Ishtiaq has hardly begun to outline the dominant reactions to the bombing 
before three other participants become eager to interrupt with their own feelings. The 
shared infuriation evident in the tone and character of their comments does not, 
however, reveal a uniform knowledge of or detailed engagement with the incident in 
question. In fact the respondents exchange little detail about the media coverage 
surrounding the bombing and seek no clarification of possible variations in their 
individual interpretations. Unanimity of anger is almost assumed and is quickly 
confirmed by their respective reactions. The brief and impassioned conclusion to their 
dialogue about the bombing is indicative of how the current wave of anti-Islamic 
sentiments has strengthened local and transnational solidarity amongst Muslims. 
In the case of the Oklahoma bombing, although American commentators specifically 
pointed the finger of blame at terrorist organisations in the Middle East, they did so 
271Timothy Mcveigh was prosecuted and convicted for the bombing. He was executed on June 11 th 
2001. 
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by drawing on a vocabulary implicating the practices and beliefs of Muslims the 
world over72. Within Islam words such as 'fatwah', 'Ayatollah', 'jihad' and so on 
mean different things in different contexts. For some Muslims they carry important 
messages about their faith and cannot be collapsed to the notions of terror, violence 
and intolerance, which is what too often happens within dominant Western 
discourses. Such appropriations of complex religious concepts have contributed to the 
racialisation of Islam and Muslims globally, and it is in this context that 'ordinary' 
Muslims have displayed solidarity with dictatorial regimes and 'terrorist' movements. 
This point is made by Tariq Modood in his own analysis of British Muslim reactions 
to the fatwah imposed on Salman Rushdie. He writes, 'What perhaps cannot be 
denied and is worth noting is that by his intervention the Ayatollah rose in Asian 
estimation. Not because the majority wished Rushdie killed, let alone wanted to kill 
him. It was because he was considered to have stood up for Islamic dignity and 
sensibilities against the West and in contrast to Arab silence. ,273 
At this point it is possible to reinforce the weaknesses already highlighted regarding 
Bhabha and Said's suggestions that Muslim unity forged through an uncritical 
devotion to Islam invokes racial and ethnic divisions which perpetuate 'border wars'. 
On one level Modood's observation does to some extent fit Bhabha and Said's 
suggestions that the uniting of Muslims behind a common struggle reinforces racial 
boundaries. Said is also right to single out the frustration with legacies of colonialism 
and imperialism as a key impetus behind the forging of alliances across Muslim 
populations (see pp46-49). However, the shortcoming in Bhabha and Said's 
interpretations is that they do not differentiate between different modes of 
essentialism at work within the 'border wars'. To clarify this point, it is useful to draw 
on a distinction made by Pnina Werbner. She shows how, 'citizenship rights and 
multiculturalist agendas are as much dependant on collective objectifications as are 
racist murders or ethnic cleansing. It is therefore critical to establish clearly the 
difference between modes of objectification and modes of reification. ,274 
272see for example the documentary Frontline, presented by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown and broadcast on 
Channel 4 on 20th September 1995 
2'1Y[ariq Modood, 'British Muslims and the Rushdie Affair', in 'Race'. Culture and Difference, edited 
by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London, Sage, 1992), p270 
274Pnina Werbner, 'Essentialising Essentialism, Essentialising Silence: Ambivalence and Multiplicity in 
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For Werbner racist actions amount to a reification, or silencing, of internal group 
differences which become subsumed under a homogenous group identity in order to 
establish rigid racial and cultural boundaries. By comparison, acts of anti-racism 
involve the objectification of group differences in order to mobilise for action against 
oppression and subordination. Werbner's distinction between objectification and 
reification invites a different interpretation of Muslim solidarity than that proposed by 
concepts such 'irrational fundamentalism' and 'blind patriotism', as used by Bhabha 
and Said respectively. For example, commenting on the angry reactions to Rushdie's 
book, Werbner draws attention to how The Satanic Verses was 'inserted into an 
already charged political field', the historical roots of which 'can be traced back to 
British and American imperialism in Iran,m. For many Muslims who were already 
subject to hostility against their religious affiliation, The Satanic Verses, in 'mocking 
Islam and its sacred symbols', was seen to contribute and add further fuel to anti-
Islamic sentiments. Thus, the solidarity and strength of Muslim emotions against the 
novel cannot be attributed to religious fanaticism, but are an example of how 'racism 
is ontologically structured in violent polarising acts' making 'the experience of racism 
ontologically comparable in the perception of victims across cultural communities 
and beyond the historical specificities of particular racisms'276. 
Werbner's interpretation of public protests involving Muslims suggests that Muslim 
solidarity is held together, not so much by an undifferentiated engagement with Islam, 
but by a shared feeling of injustice arising from the experience of racist Islamophobia. 
Thus, Bhabha and Said's suggestions that Muslim solidarity as expressed during such 
episodes as the 'Rushdie affair' are an example of 'difference' being expressed in 
oppositional terms is not wholly wrong. However, as I illustrate in some detail in the 
last section of this chapter, beyond the public demonstrations Muslims remain as 
fragmented and discrepant in their engagements with Islam as they always have (see 
the Constructions of Racism and Ethnicity', in Debatin& Cultural Hybrldjty, edited by P. Werbner & T. 
Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), p229. Werbner's ethnographic study of Manchester Muslims 
(Ima&ined Diasporas amon& Manchester Muslims, (Oxford, James Currey, 2(02» narrates in some 
detail how ethnic mobilisation involves the interweaving of different identities such as 'Muslim', 
'Pakistani' , and' South Asian'. 
27Sibid., p231 
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pp239-245). In this regard Gilroy's notion of anti-anti-essentialism is able to 
accommodate the objectification of group differences because of its insistence that 
some notion of a 'shared essence' remains important for opposing ongoing racisms. 
Gerd Baumann makes a similar observation when he describes the discursive 
competence of ethnic minority citizens as a 'dual discursive competence', one that 
involves the contestation of 'culture' as reified by dominant discourses and culture 
performed as a process of negotiation277. I now show how these two dynamics are 
representative of Hall's distinction between 'identity politics one' and the 'politics of 
representation' respecti vely. 
The continuing purchase of (identity politics one' 
As Werbner argues, current Muslim solidarity across regional and national boundaries 
is characteristic of the early politics of the black British anti-racist movement, which 
was organised around what Stuart Hall has referred to as, an 'innocent notion of an 
essential black subject' (see pp69-72). It has generally come to be accepted that 
without the interventions made by the earlier anti-racist movement, or to use Spivak's 
term a 'strategic essentialism', the complexity and diversity of diaspora narratives 
would never have entered the arena of mainstream cultural politics in Britain. 
However, if as I am suggesting here a similar 'strategic essentialism' currently unites 
British Muslims with Muslims in the Middle East and their respective religious and 
political leaders, then a fundamental weakness can be identified in the way in which 
some proponents of hybridity have understood the 'end of the essential black subject'. 
Hall himself suggests that we are no longer in that moment where identities grounded 
in essentialism 'which naturalize and dehistoricize difference' are able to provide a 
progressive politics278• However, to interpret the 'strategic essentialism' of earlier 
anti-racist struggles as a necessary moment which strengthened the political muscle of 
minority voices, and then reject all subsequent essentialisms as redundant, is to 
overestimate the success of the 'innocent notion of the essential black subject'. For 
276ibid., p237 
m'Dominant and Demotic Discourses of Culture: Their Relevance to Multi-Ethnic Alliances', in 
Debatjn& Cultural Hybridjty, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), pp209-
225 
2780Whal is This "Black" in Black Popular Culture', in Black Popular Culture, edited by G. Dent, 
(Seattle, Bay Press, 1992), p29 
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example, Modood has documented how the anti -racism of the I 980s focused on 
colour 'to unite the victims of racism'. As such it 'excluded Asians and other victims 
of racism who did not see their primary identity and incorporation into British society 
in terms of colour'279. Modood suggests that as regards fighting racism many Asians 
placed less emphasis on colour than they did on other aspects of their identity which 
they felt were more under threat such as religion, language, national origins etc. Thus, 
the political space fought for by the 'essential black subject' was not inclusive of the 
variety of experiences of racism. 
At this point it is necessary to emphasise the need to understand, and respond to 
accordingly, the complex and differing motives embedded within current Muslim 
solidarity. In this respect, whilst it is important to recognise and support the anti-racist 
objectives of Muslim solidarity forged to oppose Islamophobia, it is also necessary to 
confront particular conceptions of Muslim unity promoted by Islamic 
'fundamentalists' which seek to establish Islam as a superior 'world order'. This is a 
challenge that can usefully be linked to Hall's conception of the 'politics of 
representation'. For Hall, internal contradictions and differences within migrant 
identities cannot be exposed and overcome through 'identity politics one', also 
referred to as the 'relations of representation', but require an engagement with the 
'politics of representation', which emphasises the diversity of voices and 
subjectivities contained within specific categories such as Asian or Muslim. The final 
section of this chapter examines the narratives of the Muslim respondents in order to 
get an insight into the diverse negotiations of Islam and being Muslim that are 
presently taking place, as well as assessing their capacity to espouse racially 
transgressive identities. I want to end this section by, firstly, establishing that amongst 
Muslims a 'politics of representation' already exists but is suppressed by dominant 
discourses. And secondly, identifying the significance of the dynamics of a 'politics 
of representation' in defeating the racially divisive and pernicious side of Islamic 
'fundamentalism' . 
The suppression of diverse Muslim subjectivities by dominant discourses 
279" Difference' ,Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism', in Pebatioa Cultural Hybridity, edited by P. 
Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), p159 
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There are many differences in the way Muslims interpret and practise Islam. Their 
absence from public view is more to do with a world media system that' has an 
institutionalised tendency to produce out-of-scale transnational images'280. Many 
Muslims feel muted by this scenario281 , as relayed by Noshin: 
*N: What I find extremely disturbing is the way you know the media they don't 
wanna listen to [ ... ] the people who aren't so outrageous, and who aren't so 
militant who don't have like extreme views, like you know violent views. So 
they get meted out and the Muslim people who are represented are you know 
extreme like terrorists stroke extremists. 
For Noshin, that Muslim identities are situated in oppositional terms is a situation that 
could change if other Muslim views and subjectivities, other than those represented 
by extremists, were given more exposure. In one sense Noshin's observation 
highlights the value of Hall's emphasis on disrupting the border wars via a 'politics of 
representation'. However, it also suggests that the 'politics of representation' can only 
be effective if it is given more weight within dominant modes of representation. This 
is a very different challenge than that posed by Hall, and needs to be emphasised as 
such. 
Hall identifies the' politics of representation' as a challenge for anti-racist 
movements, black artists and cultural workers, if they are to develop more complex 
conceptions of the 'black' subject. Noshin's comment is specific to Muslims, but it is 
asserted in the same context as Hall: that of exposing the heterogeneity and diverse 
subjectivities that compose specific categories such as Muslim. Her frustration with 
the media's preoccupation with one particular Muslim position alerts us to how more 
complex conceptions of the Muslim subject remain suppressed because of the failure 
280pDward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London, Vintage, 1993), p375 
28IWhilst many Muslims feel their views and sensibilities are excluded from mainstream Western 
media, as Sameera Ahmed's doctoral research (titled 'Young British Muslims: Social Space and Active 
Identity', Leicester University, 2(02) highlights, in recent years the growth in 'Muslim media' in 
Britain has created a new cultural space for Muslims to explore their conviction to Islam as it is 
negotiated through interaction with Asian, British and Islamic cultural norms. 
See also Gary Bunt, virtually Islamic, (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2000) 
and Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim Politics (London, Routledge, 200l) 
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of dominant discourses to recognise and represent the diversity of Muslim voices - in 
effect to centralise the 'politics of representation' as their modus operandi for 
engaging Muslim identities. This emphasis on the need for dominant discourses to 
develop more complex approaches to representing Muslims posits a whole new set of 
theoretical challenges which might be described as the redistribution of responsibility 
for the 'politics of representation'. In sum, the' politics of representation' needs to be 
engaged by both Muslims and non Muslims, 'migrants' as well as indigenous Western 
populations, and so on. This underscores the significance of the role of indigenous 
Western populations in overcoming unequal relations of power and subordination. 
Unpacking the theoretical intricacies concerning how indigenous Westerners might 
engage a 'politics of representation' is not a challenge I am able to address in any 
detail within the confines of this thesis. However, I provide some initial thoughts in 
the conclusion, within the context of what I call the 'giraffe's perspective' (see pp309-
311). 
To highlight the importance of the dynamics of a 'politics of representation', that is of 
engaging subjects as much for their differences as their similarities, for weakening the 
neo-conservative politics of Islamic 'fundamentalism', I return to the contributions of 
Jameel and Sulayman and contrast their participation in the empirical research with 
that of two other members of AI-Muhajiroun, i.e. Ayesha and Imran. 
The value of a 'politics of representation' for challenging a neo-conservative 
politics 
Jameel and Sulayman's participation in the video, along with that of Imran, was made 
possible by Ayesha, who knew them as fellow members of AI- Muhajiroun. I have 
noted above that AI-Muhajiroun have received a significant amount of media 
attention in Britain282 which has presented them as 'fundamentalist', and that the 
group itself aspires to establishing Islam as the 'world order'. The group is also 
reported to have associations with 'terrorist' organisations such as Hamas and 
alQaeda. Whether or not there is any truth in these claims, members of AI-Muhajiroun 
282see for example. Tottenham Ayatollah. broadcast on Channel 4 on 8th April 1997 
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have been unapologetic about adopting an openly 'confrontational' style of public 
debate in order to spread and publicise their cause. 
Affiliation to AI-Muhajiroun may go some way towards explaining the demeanour 
adopted by Jameel and Sulayman, which I described earlier (see pp230-234). That is, 
if a confrontational style of public debate is encouraged by AI-Muhajiroun, then as 
members of AI-Muhajiroun it is little surprise that Jameel and Sulayman arrive at and 
convey the views they do in the manner they do. In identifying this connection it is 
necessary to remember that Imran and Ayesha are also members of AI-Muhajiroun, 
but the character and content of their contributions are much less impersonal and 
confrontational. This is not to say that everything that Ayesha and Imran convey is 
contrary to the views expressed by Jameel and Sulayman. What interests me here is 
not whether one individual is more or less outwardly 'fundamentalist' than another. 
Rather, I want to identify the underlying dynamics behind their differing styles of 
contribution, as a way of exposing how the kind of neo-conservatism integral to 
Sulayman and Jameel's comments begins to lose its basis as soon as Muslim identities 
are engaged in more personalised and non-racialised contexts. 
For example, prior to the filming of the video I had established a certain degree of 
informal relations with Ayesha. This was made possible because of her involvement 
in the group discussion which provided several opportunities to 'break the ice'. In her 
contributions to both the discussion and video, Ayesha is unguarded in sharing and 
relating her personal and changing relationship with Islam - aspects of this are 
discussed in more detail in the next section. Here I simply wish to note that it is in 
these moments of personal reflection that she offers opinions that run contrary to a 
neo-conservative position. For example, she is quite frank about the unacceptable 
treatment of women in some Muslim countries, a situation which she experienced first 
hand at the age of 12: 
* A: When we moved to Saudi and seeing the way like women were treated and 
stuff and just seeing the way things were there I just really got turned off. And 
it was just like a question of well if there is a God and there is Islam then you 
know I don't wanna have anything to do with it. 
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Although now committed to a lifestyle based on the teachings of Islam, Ayesha has 
not suddenly lost her enthusiasm for fair and equal treatment of women. Indeed, as the 
following extract suggests, she remains adamant about challenging stereotypes of 
Muslim women: 
+A: I recall once my personal tutor was just like. 'It's so refreshing because not 
only are you a woman but you're a Muslim woman. and even other women 
have these like really strong ideas about what you're gonna be. But you're the 
only one in the whole lecture who decides to speak. or question. or even 
debate with the lecturer, or even in seminars and stuff.' So, you know, we're 
beginning to break the mould! 
Ayesha's informed sensibility and determined resistance towards the treatment of 
women in some Muslim societies stands in contrast to Sulayman' s casual defence of 
the Taliban's policies on women's education in Afghanistan (see p231).1t is not 
possible for me to reflect on whether within the circles of AI-Muhajiroun Ayesha and 
Sulayman would have the opportunity to exchange perspectives on the 'rights' of 
Muslim women and the character and outcome that such an exchange might take. 
However, what can be deduced is that they possess very different perspectives and 
depths of personal experience on the issue. It is perhaps worth recalling that 
Sulayman's defence of the Taliban is asserted within the context of a 'racist' media 
and not from the perspective of Muslim women's experiences under Taliban rule. 
Thus, the question must be posed, 'Would Sulayman be able, or willing, to defend the 
Taliban's treatment of women in a more personalised context, or when confronted 
with a narrative such as that presented by Ayesha, a fellow AI-Muhajiroun member?' 
One possible reason for Jameel and Sulayman's formal and 'parrot fashion' video 
presentations is that they are able to maintain their relationship with me and the 
research exercise as an entirely formal and impersonal encounter. I have already noted 
that some informality had been established with Ayesha prior to the group discussion 
and video. By comparison, there was no opportunity for personal interaction with 
Jameel and Sulayman before the day of filming. The reason for this was that their 
243 
involvement was managed by Ayesha, and, although the option had been left open, 
she had not felt it necessary to involve me in that process. The absence of such 
contact is likely to have increased the sense of distance and formality felt by Jameel 
and Sulayman with respect to their participation in the research. The significance of 
this dynamic needs further comment, in as much as I had had no direct contact with 
Imran either. 
The personal elements in Imran's contribution arise from the contrasts he describes 
between his own engagement with Islam and that of his parents. This was an obvious 
point of discussion for Imran, due to being born to Muslim parents yet only really 
taking a serious interest in his 'Islamic identity' in the couple of years preceding the 
video. Such a long term and familial association with Islam was not shared by Jameel 
and Sulayman, due to their relatively recent conversions to Islam. Of course, they may 
have spoken of the reactions of their families towards their decision to convert but 
they chose not to. However, if we take other dynamics into account (e.g. lack of 
informal contact with me; their preference for speaking directly to the camera), then it 
is not so difficult to picture how they might collectively contribute to define Jameel 
and Sulayman's involvement in the making of the video as a highly formal and 
depersonalised encounter. 
In the end the dynamics I have highlighted could be considered more speculation than 
fact. But my intention is not to offer conclusive evidence: rather, it has been to locate 
the underlying bases for the wholesale or neo-conservative defence of Islamic regimes 
which groups like AI-Muhajiroun are often portrayed as undertaking. On the basis of 
my discussion of the contributions of four of its members above, it is possible to 
suggest that what holds 'fundamentalist' groups like AI-Muhajiroun together is not 
merely a 'blind' or 'irrational' following, but an environment in which they are able 
to engage and assert their position in highly formal, antagonistic and racialised terms. 
For instance, if an Islamophobic media did not exist it is unlikely that Sulayman 
would be able to maintain his defence of the Taliban. Even if he was shown to be 
unwavering in his perception of the Taliban, we know from Ayesha's comments that 
such a neo-conservative position, which is dismissive of the subordination of women, 
is not shared by the entire membership of AI-Muhajiroun. In fact, Ayesha's comments 
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suggest that many of the inhuman practices that are associated with brutal Islamic 
regimes perhaps face their biggest opposition from Muslims, including from within 
groups like Al-Muhajiroun. It would appear that this internal diversity, the personal 
inflections of Islam - in sum a 'politics of representation' in which lie narratives 
committed to individual freedom from oppression and subordination - have become 
suppressed within 'fundamentalist' inclined groups, or are taking second place to the 
fight against Islamophobia. This appears to be Ayesha's position. For other 
individuals the internally critical debates of Islam remain a priority, but are taking 
place away from the Western gaze simply because 'the West' is not interested. 
In many ways my discussion has come full circle. I started off by emphasising the 
need to differentiate between a wholesale defence of Islam and a defence against the 
prejudices and stereotypes through which Islam is often represented and debated. 
Whilst Werbner's conceptualisation of objectification and reification has helped to 
maintain a theoretical distinction between the two, the boundary has been somewhat 
blurred by my suggestion that both types of 'defence' share a common source -
racism. Thus, the cycle of conflict between Islam and the West endures because of the 
racialised frameworks of interaction that dominate relations between Muslims and 
their non Muslim Western counterparts. Pourzand makes an important connection in 
this respect when she describes how opposition to women's education in Afghanistan 
is less to do with enforcing the teachings of Islam and more to do with its strong 
association as being 'foreign inspired' - first as part of a Western inspired drive for 
modernisation in the 19208 under the rule of Amanullah Khan, and then as part of the 
Soviet inspired socialism in the 1980s2&'3. Of course these observations do not justify 
the kind of rhetoric that ignores or condones Muslim bodies who seek to oppress and 
subordinate their populations. At the same time, as I have just argued, essential to 
weakening this neo-conservative Muslim politics is the need to replace the highly 
racialised contexts in which Muslim identities are currently represented and contested 
with the dynamics of a 'politics of representation' which prioritises the diverse and 
changing conceptions of being Muslim. It is to the' politics of representation' , the 
283Niloufar Pourzand, 'Female Education and Citizenship in Afghanistan: a Turbulent Relationship' in 
Women. Citizenship and Difference, (London, Zed Books, 1999), pp87-99 ' 
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personal negotiations and contestations of Islam, that I now tum in the final section of 
this chapter. 
Culturally Fragmented Encounters and Negotiations of Islam 
In the first section of this chapter, I established that in Britain racist stereotypes of 
Muslims have become intertwined with stereotypes of Asians. As such, 
representations which interpret Muslim lifestyles as backward are often confused with 
reductive conceptions of 'Asian' culture. Arranged marriages, subordination of 
women, and an uncritical loyalty to elders and traditional values are the themes 
referred to most often to establish the 'anti-modem' character of Muslim societies and 
Muslim homes. Bobby Sayyid makes a similar observation when he asserts that 
dominant Western discourses have tended to understand Muslims as a 'moribund' 
presence. Muslims are perceived as ghosts of the past who 'haunt' the present. 
Embedded in this proposition, Sayyid adds, is the idea that the 'modem' is in some 
sense 'western'. By implication this would posit Islam and Muslims as both anti-
modem and anti-western284• 
The notion of Muslims as an unchanging mass is difficult to reconcile with 
conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' and their central emphasis on cultural change 
through never ending processes of identity negotiation. My concern in this section is 
to contest perceptions of Islam and Muslims as static and pre-modem. The section 
focuses specifically on the contributions of respondents of South Asian background. I 
should note from the offset that all the individuals concerned are of Pakistani 
parentage, and so the discussion is not representative of all South Asian groupings. 
On the other hand, this is merely a descriptive acknowledgement and is not asserted to 
compartmentalise Pakistanis from other South Asian groupings as though they were 
mutually exclusive. Nor do I wish to suggest that Pakistani parentage confines the 
individuals concerned to this one ethnic grouping. Indeed, a particular aim of the 
section is to unpack how, in their respective negotiations of Islam, the respondents 
interact and position themselves to notions of 'Pakistani', 'South Asian', 'British', 
'modem' and so on. I begin the section by establishing the dynamics of 'critical 
284A Fundamental Fear, (London, Zed Books, 1997) 
246 
interaction' , as opposed to 'blind submission' , as the overriding feature characterising 
the process of identity negotiation presented by the respondents. 
From 'blind' faith to critical duologues 
The narratives of the six respondents being discussed in this section reveal that their 
respective interactions with Islam during childhood were experiences they had 
abhorred. For many of them a formal introduction to Islam began about the age of five 
and consisted of attending classes at mosque where they learnt to read the Quran in 
Arabic and where they also acquired knowledge about the various duties Muslims are 
expected to fulfil (such as fasting, praying five times a day, giving alms and so on). 
From their comments it can be deduced that the respondents' early introductions to 
Islam generally constituted 'parrot fashion' learning and an expectation that they 
should simply assimilate the meaning of Islam as it was presented to them by their 
elders and molweesaabs285• Some respondents expressed huge consternation at the 
manner of their indoctrination to Islam. For example, Javed recounts: 
*J: When I was younger I suppose I had blind faith. I'd go to mosque and if I 
didn't get it right my sabaq286 like I'd get battered. [ ... ] to be honest I didn't 
learn because I had so much God fear in me I was more molweesaab fear, and 
like I'd be sick and like what a person to talk to you know if you want to know 
about Islam. [ ... ] And some of the things he did to me like he'd hit me across 
the head, he'd make me sit in front of the heater, and like bruised my back 
[ ... ]. I was sore as hell like and at that stage if you wanna learn about 
something that's not the right way to be taughfS'. [ ... ] And I said to my mum 
once like, 'How come you send us there like they smack us and do this and do 
that to us and even you don't do things like that'. And my mum once said that, 
zssreachers at the mosque are referred to as 'molwees' or 'molweesaabs'. 
286, Sabaq' means the homework given by the molwee. This usually consists of learning to read a 
passage from the Quran in Arabic which is then read out to the molweesaab. Emphasis is on 
pronunciation of Arabic. 
287It should be highlighted that the kind of mosque and classroom teaching being described by Javed is 
specific to Muslim organisations that provide evening classes for children primarily for learning to read 
the Quran in Arabic. They have a very different set up and purpose than the Muslim schools in Britain. 
The latter tend to be much more professionally organised, have a certified curriculum and do not resort 
to the teaching methods of the former. 
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'Wherever they hit like fire can't touch you', or something like that. ( ... ) They 
say like 'You get more sawaab and you get more naykee288 for it'. 
It is important to point out that not all molweesaabs subject their pupils to the extreme 
physical punishment described by Javed. At the same time the significance of his 
account for, firstly, its resonance with the experiences of other second generation 
Muslims in Britain, and secondly, its contribution to perceptions of the Muslim 
character as intrinsically 'barbaric' cannot be underplayed and need to be addressed. 
With respect to the first of these concerns, it is not possible to offer firm evidence 
indicating how pervasive the use of corporal punishment in mosques in Britain is, or 
the extent to which the situation may have changed. However, many second 
generation Muslims like myself can bear witness to the fact that making mistakes in 
your sabaq was often punished with caning or a slap across the cheek. Two main 
dynamics can be identified to explain why those running the affairs of the mosque 
might assume such authority over members of their religious community as to subject 
them to treatment/practices made illegal in statutory run organisations. 
Firstly, as Tariq Modood points out, religion has been 'central to British Asian 
ethnicity' although it has by no means eroded or reduced 'the complexity and range of 
identities ' 289. Secondly, the state has not only been happy for migrant populations to 
organise their own religious and cultural activities but has also been ill prepared to 
monitor the conduct of those managing or co-ordinating the respective religious 
institutions290• As such the religious leaders, teachers and spokespeople of some of 
Britain's immigrant communities have often assumed a superior status over 'ordinary' 
members of their faith. That mosques have evolved with little direct involvement 
from statutory bodies has meant that the authority of religious doctrine has taken 
precedence over state law in guiding their overall structure and daily activities. What 
288'Sawaab' and 'naykee' are both terms used to suggest that in return for certain deeds or actions you 
will be rewarded positively in 'janat' (Le. Allah's house) or that your passage to 'janat' will be easier. 
289"Difference', Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism', in Debatina Cultural HybridilY, edited by P. 
Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), plS8 
290J'his situation perhaps came most vividly to light in the immediate period after the events of '9111' 
when the police were authorised to raid some of Britain's mosques, the most publicised being Finsbury 
Park mosque, on the suspicion they were being used to recruit and support terrorists. 
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has resulted is mutually exclusive relations between mosque and state nurtured by an 
underlying rationale which maintains the incompatibility of distinct cultures and the 
idea that it is improper to interfere with other people's way of life291 • Thus, even 
though Javed's molweesaab's actions can be shown to contradict state law on the 
behaviour of teachers towards pUpilS292, as I illustrate more clearly in a moment, they 
are given legitimacy through the authority and rule of Islamic law. Ratifying the 
precise connection between the practice of corporal punishment and Islamic law is 
crucial to my concerns in this chapter in that the use of violence as a means of 
governance is a pivotal focus of debate around which the in/compatibility between 
Islam and Western culture, and Islam and modernity, is contested. In undertaking to 
clarify the connection between Islam and corporal punishment I also address a third 
point implicit in Bhabha and Said's criticisms of Muslim lifestyles, one which 
identifies a devotion to Islam as thwarting the ability to transcend 'barbaric' forms of 
discipline and generate new modes of governance (see ppS7-58). 
There is no denying that a number of passages within primary Islamic texts may be 
interpreted as promoting forms of corporal punishment which by modern 'Western' 
standards are deemed to be uncivilised and in breach of human rights. For example, a 
section of one passage in the Quran reads, 'As for the man or woman who is guilty of 
theft, cut off their hands to punish them for their crimes ,293. This extract can be seen to 
uphold dominant media representations depicting Islam as a demonic belief system 
whose followers are both prone to, and governed by, savage and despotic 
behaviour94• Admittedly, some media coverage might be disputed for its capacity to 
act as a reliable representation of individuals unrestrained, or irrational. in their 
engagement of acts of violence and human cruelty. The public demonstrations against 
The Satanic Verses, as discussed in chapter 7, would be one such example (see 
pp280-281). But other examples, including Javed's experience of being made to sit in 
2911n the aftermath of '9/11' the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, has attempted to introduce 
procedures, such as 'citizenship tests', to increase the involvement and influence of the state on the 
activities of migrant communities. The respective measures have amounted to a reversion to 
assimilationist policies demanding that 'immigrant' communities adopt 'British' values. 
292COrporai punishment was banned from state schools in 1986 and from independent schools in 1998. 
293NJ. Dawood, The Koran, (London, Penguin, 1997), p83 
294see Edward Said, Coyerina Islam. (London, Vintage, 1981) 
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front of the heater for getting his sabaq wrong, carry an undeniable inhumane quality 
in as much as they constitute acts of torture in the context of everyday circumstances. 
And Javed's dissension towards the punishment he endures at mosque is unanimously 
shared by the other respondents. That the same respondents are now choosing to 
negotiate a Muslim lifestyle makes their narratives a relevant focus for assessing the 
connection between Islamic law and physical punishment. More to the point, what I 
want to ascertain is whether their renewed investment in Islam means that the 
respondents have become more accepting of corporal forms of discipline. 
The respondents' condemnations of imposing religious belief through physical force 
weren't simply directed at its use in mosques, but also in the context of the public 
policing of populations in Islamic countries. Noshin and Ayesha, who are sisters and 
who had spent a considerable amount of their childhood in Saudi Arabia, expressed 
their abhorrence at the manner in which the general public, and in particular women, 
were treated by the police: 
* A: When we moved to Saudi and seeing the way like women were treated and 
stuff and just seeing the way things were there I just really got turned off. 
[ ... ] 
N: It's like there's a religious police force and they go around with long sticks 
and if your face isn't covered or you know if there's a little bit of your hair 
showing they'll whack you one. It's just like you know you don't do that. 
This disdain towards the imposition of religion through physical force has not been 
compromised or weakened as the respondents' attitudes towards Islam have switched 
from disdain to reverence. For example, when Mustafa, who has converted to the 
religion more recently, learns of the personal experiences of the other respondents he 
expresses concern at sending his daughter to mosque: 
*M: Is that how they treat, I mean I've got a daughter and insallah she'll become a 
Muslim and I'll teach her Islam but do you think that if you grow up in Islam 
that's how you're taught and let's say 'If you don't do this then bad things will 
happen to you' and 'You do this God will reward you'? 
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The other respondents are quick to reassure Mustafa that such an approach is not in 
fact endorsed by Islam. Ayesha and Noshin for instance offer the following 
comments: 
*A: I think like with children, ultimately, you have to be patient. You know you 
can't smack them into it. 
[ ... ] 
N: And one thing that I like about Islam is that you're supposed to give a child as 
much respect as we're supposed to give a grown up. 
[ ... ] 
N: [in direct response to Javed's experience of being taught at mosque) And 
there's that hadith that says 'don't hit the child on the head'. 
Thus, although the respondents in recent years have preferred to negotiate their 
identities in accordance with the teachings of Islam, they have done so without 
compromising the enmity felt during childhood towards specific practices presented 
to them as Islamic. As Noshin's comment suggests, their respective appropriations of 
Islam have demanded a re-reading of key Islamic texts. This trend challenges Bhabha 
and Said's representations of Muslims who predicate their everyday lives on the 
teachings of Islam as somehow bound to pre-modern, inhumane modes of discipline 
and punishment. Furthermore, the respondents' (re)interpretations of the position of 
Islam on the use of corporal punishment refutes a fourth assumption in Bhabha and 
Said's commentaries of Muslim identities, i.e. that, as a scripted mode of thought, 
Islam is foreclosed to cultural change (see pp54-56). In fact, the culturally 
transgressive quality that Bhabha associates with The Satanic Verses, what he calls 
the 'act of translation,29s, and which he perceives to be absent from the cultural 
outlook of Muslims (see p45), can be identified as precisely the dynamic through 
which the respondents renegotiate Islam's position on corporal punishment. 
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The 'act of cultural translation' in re-reading primary Islamic texts 
As outlined in chapter 1, for Bhabha the 'act of cultural translation' produces 'new' 
modes of being and seeing and is a process ill-defined by binary opposites such as 
'past' and 'present', or, 'archaic' and 'modern'. This is also a central theme running 
across the work of hybridity theorists. Like Bhabha, the 'newness' with which the 
hybridity theorists discussed in chapter 2 are concerned is seen to 'emerge from the 
constant state of contestation and flux'. The Satanic Verses is but one example 
referred to by Bhabha to describe 'how newness enters world', where the re-reading 
of the Quran through the medium of the novel unveils other enunciatory positions. A 
similar 'act of cultural translation' might be located within the narratives of the 
respondents. 
With respect to the use of corporal punishment, we can identify a vivid shift from 
Javed's mother's stance of 'wherever the molweesaab hits you fire can't touch you', 
to Noshin' s reference to the hadith to emphasise that in Islam' it is wrong to hit the 
child on the head'. In effect, by returning to original Islamic scriptures and re-reading 
specific passages to challenge the particular appropriations of Islam which in 
childhood made them averse to Muslim lifestyles, the respondents have exposed the 
'textual superfluity of the folds and wrinkles'296 present in key Islamic texts, and the 
potential for Islam itself to shift with the times. A more profound insight into this 
'textual superfluity' can be provided here by returning to my earlier quote from the 
Quran recommending that the crime of theft be punished by the dismembering of 
hands. The full paragraph reads, 'As for the man or woman who is gUilty of theft, cut 
off their hands to punish them for their crimes. That is the punishment enjoined by 
God. God is mighty and wise. But whoever repents after committing evil, and mends 
his ways shall be pardoned by God. God is forgiving and merciful.m , The 
opportunity for 'repenting' one's crimes that is built into this passage might also be 
translated as an opportunity for those enforcing the law to avoid the need for physical 
punishment. In other words, the possibilities for systems of repenting and pardoning 
29.5'How Newness Enters the World', in The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), pp212-
235 
296ibid., p227 
297NJ. Dawood, The Koran, (London, Penguin, 1997), p83 
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become bounded only by human vision and will and the weight accorded to being 
'forgiving and merciful' as opposed to 'mighty and wise'. 
The peculiarity of the transition from 'blind' faith to critical appropriations of Islam 
described by the respondents necessarily disrupts the static and pre-modem status 
often accorded to Islam and Muslims. But their narratives achieve much more than 
promote Muslim identities as inconstant, open to contestation and review. They also 
highlight how the relationship between Islamic law and British law need not be 
framed in mutually exclusive terms. The respondents' (re)interpretation of Islamic 
texts as discouraging the use of corporal punishment is compatible with both British 
law and Islamic law and so can be seen to represent a bridging of the 'law of the state' 
and the 'law ofthe mosque'. This is an important observation with respect to ongoing 
debates about protecting the rights of minority groups and campaigns for a pluralist 
legal system that allows minority groups communal autonomy to govern themselves. 
Such an approach, as Samia Bano suggests, runs the real danger of encouraging 'the 
creation of separatist politics. ghettoising minority communities outside the 
mainstream legal system and thus defining them as the 'other,,298. In this respect the 
respondents' renegotiation of Islamic practices in a manner that is compatible with 
both Islamic and British law presents a more viable alternative. It encourages a 
mutually informative dialogue between distinct cultures to establish common 
precedents in legal/judicial processes, thereby avoiding ghettoisation and the 
arrangement of cultures along superior/inferior continuums.299. 
In as much as the respondents are overwhelmingly reliant on Islamic texts for 
defining their identities, but at the same time are reinterpreting the teachings of Islam, 
their narratives can be shown to resemble the model of identity formation developed 
by Gilroy which emphasises that identities should neither be seen as 'a fixed essence' 
298'Muslim and South Asian Women: Customary Law and Citizenship in Britain', in Women. 
Citizenship and Difference, edited by N. Yuval-Davis & P. Werbner, (London, Zed Books, 1999), 
p175 
see also Bhikhu Parekh, 'British Citizenship and Cultural Difference', in The Riahts of Minority 
Cyltures, edited by W. Kymlicka, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 
2'»fhe academic and Muslim activist Tariq Ramadan, who has been recognised as a leading Muslim 
reformer, has devoted much of his work to promoting the practice of it jihad which encourages the 
reinterpretation of sacred Muslim texts. See his, Western Myslims and the Future of Islam. (Oxford, 
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nor 'a wholly contingent construction'. There is, however, a notable difference 
between Gilroy'S model and the process of identity formation relayed by the 
respondents. In Gilroy's model there is an undeniable recognition of the influence of 
multiple cultural locations in the formation of modern diaspora subjectivities and 
identities. This plurality sits alongside an implicit theme of connectedness, which 
Gilroy retains through a reworking of the concepts of unity, authenticity and tradition 
(see pp97-1(0). By comparison, the narratives of the Muslim respondents explicitly 
foreground one particular axis of identification, Islam, whilst the influence of 
additional axes of identification, though not denied, are seen to be secondary. This 
aspect of the respondents' narratives might be described as the desire to authenticate 
Islam which I want to outline more clearly before unpacking how cross-cultural 
identity negotiation within the confines of Islamic doctrine takes shape and its 
implications for a progressive cultural politics. 
Theorising the desire to 'authenticate'Islam 
The ethnic background of the individuals under discussion cannot be confined to one 
grouping but comprises multiple ethnic locations including British, Muslim, 
Pakistani, South Asian and so on. These categories acquire meaning through the 
particular ways in which each is experienced and negotiated by the individual. With 
respect to this many of the respondents openly declared a conscious decision to single 
out Islam, and more specifically primary Islamic texts, as the medium through which 
to engage the multiple co-ordinates of their identities. 
The specific contexts in which each respondent has become drawn to foregrounding 
Islam over and above all other axes of identification are many and varied - contexts 
which will become clear as the rest of this section unfolds. However, the peculiarities 
are bound by an overall trait of identifying the original source for particular cultural 
practices, customs and traditions. For example, Imran states: 
+Im: It's only until about three or four years ago when I really noticed and 
understood the difference between Islamic culture and Asian culture. And this 
distinction is so important, every Muslim must bear this distinction in mind. 
Oxford University Press, 2004), and To be a European Muslim, (Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 
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Because the fusion of Asian culture and Islamic culture has led to the 
blackening of the name of Islam. You know there's been so much, so many 
foreign things which have been attributed to Islam which in actual fact are not 
part of Islam at all. 
The propensity to circumscribe Islam in a manner redeeming it from 'other' cultural 
influences might be interpreted as a desire to protect the authenticity of Islam. This 
line of interpretation is supported further by the clear sense amongst the respondents 
of wanting to be recognised as simply 'Muslim': 
* A: I mean [holds up discussion handout referring to the title (see Table I, chapter 
5, p201)1 you know Young British Muslims you know should the focus be on 
the British, or should it be on the Muslim because it's just like for me I'm just 
a Muslim in Britain. I'm not you know 
[ 
M: Same for me I totally agree. 
A: Yeah I mean if I moved to like say Gambia or like Russia or like Pakistan I'm 
not going to be Pakistani Muslim, or a Gambian Muslim. I should just be a 
Muslim in Pakistan or a Muslim in Gambia or whatever. And I think 
N: 
1998) 
I just like, I 
was just about to say you know like when especially if you're like second 
generation in England or whatever you have a fragmented vision of home 
anyway right. But for me like when you asked me [referring to Bilkis1 'Are 
you from London?' I was just 'Err I moved here three years ago', I didn't 
know what to say. 'Cause if someone asks me 'what I am?' you know I'll say 
well originally I'm from Pakistan and I do realise what an emotional and 
cultural investment I have in the place. But for me I'm not really anything. I 
really just see myself as a Muslim more than say Pakistani. 
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Taken at face value the respondents' disapproval of being described in hyphenated 
terms might be interpreted as precluding the kind of free flowing cross-cultural 
dialogues identified by many hybridity theorists as the 'democratic' strength of a 
diaspora cultural politics. But considering the empirical data as a whole it would be 
difficult to arrive at such a conclusion. 
There are some very particular features about the way in which the respondents have 
sought to authenticate their Muslim lifestyles that sets their narratives apart from the 
idea of authenticity as a recovery and preservation of the 'past'. In that sense, within 
the respondents' negotiations of Islam, although the play of authenticity functions 
more explicitly than that envisaged in Gilroy's model (see p98) the two are similar in 
that neither denotes a 'fixed essence'. For instance, in direct response to their 
expressed desires to be recognised as 'just Muslim', I asked the respondents if being 
in Britain shaped their experiences of being Muslim any differently than if they were 
living in another country. Noshin and Ayesha replied: 
*N: Yeah I think it is like culture specific. Like for example, like me being the 
way, or behaving the way and practising the way that I do here would be 
totally different than in Pakistan. I think like you know the reactions that you 
get may be just like you know it's usually from like the dominant [culture] 
that you're living in. So I think that if you were say in Pakistan it'd be 
different. I think that is culture like culture specific. 
A: I think it's really funny because like over here like you tend to look at things 
in kind of like states of humanist and liberalist you know. And like over here 
as a practising Muslim I have to watch for things like, oh you should say this 
or you should say like buy this. or buy that blah blah blah. Whereas out say for 
instance in Pakistan yeah, they would probably see us as being really liberal 
even though we may be more Islamic in practise than them. Because of 
Different cultures. You see like 
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N: Yeah. Yeah like when we go, my aunt's just like 'You really come 
home in seven in the night?' And I'm like, 'Yeah'. 'You really go to 
University?', 'Yeah.' Like they just think I'm like this mod con woman like 
goes round doing whatever she wants and really independent. 
These comments suggest that the possibilities for cultural intermixing have not 
necessarily been foreclosed by the conscious foregrounding of Islam. And as the 
reaction of Noshin and Ayesha's aunt would suggest, Muslim identities in Britain 
have taken shape in quite different ways to those in Pakistan. Her nieces present 
themselves as more liberal and independent than Muslim women in Pakistan even 
though the former "may be more Islamic in practice". 
In unearthing these dynamics I am not proposing that the respondents are in some sort 
of denial about the cultural interplay impressed upon the structure and character of 
their everyday lives. Rather, the respondents present something of a theoretical 
challenge to current debates about the formation of migrant identities and 
contemporary experiences of 'cultural hybridity'. On the one hand their narratives 
defy essentialist conceptions of identity in that they do not represent a homogenous 
and fixed notion of the 'Muslim' subject. At the same time, the pluralist perspective, 
with its emphasis on the unbounded or infinite possibilities of cross-cultural fusion, is 
rendered equally inadequate by the fact that the respondents' engagement of different 
cultures is constantly tempered by the teachings of Islam300• In Noshin's words, "It's 
okay to have your own culture as long as it doesn't go against Islam". In making a 
judgement about whether these dynamics of cultural interplay carry progressive or 
regressive implications for the (trans)formation of cultures, it is useful to examine 
how they have manifested themselves in the lived experiences of the respondents. 
Here I turn my attention to how the respondents' particular negotiations of Islam have 
3<Xln his research on 'Southallians' Gerd Baumann also identifies a dual aspect to the character of 
identity negotiation amongst local South Asians. He differentiates the two aspects as cultural 
negotiation through 'dominant discourse' where individuals reify identities to specific categories such 
as Asian, Punjabi or Sikh, and cultural negotiation through 'demotic discourse' where individuals 
create new cultural meanings and expressions through interaction with multiple cultural locations. See 
Baumann's, The Multicultural Riddle, (London, Routledge, 1999); 'Dominant and Demotic Discourses 
of Culture: Their Relevance to Multi-Ethnic Alliances', in Debatioi Cultural Hybridity. edited by P. 
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impacted on their relations with their immediate family as well as non Muslims. My 
analysis suggests that, when positioned against the identities of their parents/elders, 
the process of identity negotiation going on amongst second generation Muslims in 
Britain can be perceived to be racially transgressive in that it resembles Hall's 
description of the 'decoupling of ethnicity from nationalism' (see p71). 
Inter-generational differences and the 'decoupling of ethnicity from nationalism' 
For many respondents, their personal interaction with Islamic texts has provided an 
empowering position from which to transcend cultural traditions constricting personal 
relations to racially bounded groups. Perhaps the most vivid example of this is 
provided by Shagufta with respect to her parents' expectations about marriage. She 
asserts: 
+8: I am quite proud to be a Pakistani I enjoy the food, the clothes, whatever. But I 
don't let it restrict me. I think culture should be a pleasure thing, shouldn't 
make life more difficult. [ ... ] And I don't understand why our parents they 
bring the oppression on themselves. They find the culture oppressive, like in 
terms of dowry and, you know, why reproduce the traditions that you're 
finding hard to live with anyway. 
[ ... ] 
I've found that Islam gives me a lot more freedom than my Pakistani culture 
ever did. And like if I try and tell my parents something that they're imposing 
on me is not religious, like Islam actually gives me the right to marry another 
Muslim whether he's black or white or whatever, they won't like it. [ ... J I 
mean I try and assert myself and say, 'No mum I don't have to wear red on my 
wedding day, it's not Islamic' • she just can't understand it. 
This process of re-reading Islamic scriptures to resist parental expectations on aspects 
of personal behaviour resembles the earlier discussion on corporal punishment. In 
both instances the respondents can be shown to have negotiated a position which is 
Werbner & T. Modood. (London. Zed Books, 1997), pp209-225 and Contestiol Culture, (Cambridge, 
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simultaneously in synch with Islam, and yet directly opposed to another position also 
legitimated as 'Islamic' by their parents/elders. 
In terms of identity politics, these empirical findings highlight very different 
conceptions of ethnicity embedded in the Muslim identities being negotiated by the 
respondents, as compared with those asserted by their parents/elders. The latter have 
appropriated Islam to re-establish national and cultural boundaries that have been 
disrupted by migration, thus representing what Hall describes as a culturally 
constructed sense of ethnicity nurtured by regressive ideas of nationalism30I • The 
pressure placed on Shagufta to marry another Pakistani is one example of this. Other 
examples openly condemned by the respondents encroach into some of the most 
rudimentary aspects of being Muslim. For instance, the respondents scorn at how the 
congregation of many local mosques tends to be dominated by individuals and 
families who share the same country of origin. Similarly, they object to the deliberate 
manipulation of calculating the day on which Eid is celebrated302, one of the most 
important dates in the Muslim calendar: 
*M: You know when Eid is let's say you know. 
N: Yeah, like fi ve different days. 
M: I was in Scotland for Eid. And in Scotland they 
celebrated Eid when they sighted the moon and that decides whether they're 
gonna do it on the 30th day, you know say if the moon is not sighted on the 
29th then we have to do it after the 30th because there are only 30 days in a 
lunar month. I found I phoned up down South and they'd I was told they'd 
taken their information from Saudi Arabia. Which I was told was really 
dodgy because 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
301'New Ethnicities', in Black Film. British Cinema, edited by K. Mercer, (London,ICA, 1988), pp26-
31 
302If the moon is sighted on the 29th day of Ramadan then Eid is celebrated on what would have been 
the 30th fast. If the moon is not cited on the 29th then an extra day of fasting is required and Eid is 
celebrated the day after. 
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N: 
A: 
Oh yeah. 
Oh my God yeah, 'cause Saudi 
Arabia a few days ahead had said that we're going to celebrate on that day 
anyway. 
M: Yeah 
N: This was a huge bone of contention in our house this Eid. We were just like 
'we're ... 
A: Yeah 'cause Nosh and I 
N: ... not, we're not gonna celebrate Eid until someone actually sees the moon. 
We're not going to go by calculation'. And my parents were just like 'Well the 
whole family's going to do it and your not going to do it', and blah blah blah 
and, 'how can you do this' , and' just do it' . And like we were just like' No' , 
and we're just like 
L 
A: It's just like completely missing the point like we could be missing a day 
of fasting you know. 
N: And we're just like, 'Well hey if you wanna do it we're not stopping you, 
we're just saying that we don't wanna do it'. 
By adhering to the directions of the Quran and hadith, it has been possible for many 
young Muslims to dissociate themselves from the nationalist rhetoric and tensions that 
are played out between different Muslim communities, and which members of their 
own families might be associated with. Here, ethnicity is, in effect. decoupled from its 
equivalence with nationalism. In that sense the cultural politics of the newly emergent 
Muslim subjectivities can be deemed to be analogous to the politics of 'new 
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ethnicities'. However, decoupUng in the two instances is achieved via distinctly 
different cultural routes. 
Hall envisages 'new ethnicities' as emerging from an engagement with the multiple 
co-ordinates of identity and not 'by marginalising, dispossessing, displacing and 
forgetting other ethnicities'303. By comparison, it is precisely by pronouncing the 
authority of Islamic scriptures over all other sources defining human behaviour that 
the respondents have re-negotiated a Muslim identity which is anti-nationalist and 
more racially inclusive than that asserted by their parents/elders. It is appropriate here 
to note Sayyid's observation that it is precisely the transnational, or anti-national, 
emphasis of current Muslim subjectivities that defines them as both diasporic 
formations as well as an interruption to the global, specifically Western, hegemonic 
order which is built on the logic of the nation. From this comparison Sayyid suggests 
that current Muslim (and diaspora) subjectivities, with their emphasis on transnational 
identifications, are built on the principle of inclusion, which transcends the logic of 
the nation which is based on exclusion304. 
The transnational identifications emphasised in the respondents' identities suggest 
that the foregrounding of one axis of identification need not impede the racially 
transgressive transformation of cultures. Having said that, it would be too simplistic 
to conclude that the narratives of the respondents refute the emphasis placed by Hall, 
and other hybridity theorists, on the 'play of difference' as a key catalyst to the 
emergence of a positive conception of ethnicity. Here lies the more intricate 
theoretical challenge: that of being able to conceive the significance of the 'play of 
difference' in the context of an unashamed and explicit assertion of just being 
Muslim. This connection can be illustrated more clearly by reflecting on the 
narratives of Javed and Shagufta. 
The 'play of difference' in 'being' explicitly Muslim 
303'New Ethnicities', in Black Film. British Cinema, edited by K. Mercer, (London,ICA, 1988), p29 
304S. Sayyid, 'Beyond Westphalia: Nations and Diasporas - the Case of the Muslim Umma', in 
Un/settled Multjculturalisms. edited by B. Hesse, (London, Zed Books, 2(00), pp33-50 
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Once we begin to get to grips with the underlying dynamics that draw someone like 
Javed to question the use of corporal punishment at mosque, or someone like 
Shagufta to resist the code for female behaviour prescribed by her parents, it is clear 
that the 'play of difference' is of immense significance to the constitution of the 
Muslim identities under discussion. For it is precisely from the position of being 
simultaneously located in two 'distinctly different cultural assemblages,30S, in the 
form of the school and the mosque, that Javed can compare, ask questions and make 
judgements about different styles of pedagogic practice. Similarly, being able to have 
meaningful personal relations with people of non Pakistani background without 
compromising her status as a Pakistani Muslim becomes an issue that Shagufta needs 
to resolve the moment she encounters people of 'other' backgrounds and begins to 
feel like an outsider at both home and school: 
+8: At school it was like, there was a lot of things which I couldn't do because I 
was a Muslim which the other children could [ ... ) plus I grew up in quite a 
racist area. So I mean I always felt different I didn't fit in exactly with my 
family, didn't fit in exactly at school and this difference was always justified 
through Islam. 
Interestingly, Shagufta's words represent an almost carbon transposition of Salman 
Rushdie's argument, as presented by Bhabha, that 'the migrant's survival depends on 
discovering 'how newness enters the world"306. Shagufta's survival depends on the 
ability to manoeuvre in the social spaces claimed by both her parents and the racists 
without condoning their respective cultural outlooks. In effect, Shagufta has to find a 
'new' cultural outlook in order to survive. In the course of negotiating a successful 
resolution to her predicament, culture ceases to "make life more difficult" and 
becomes a "pleasure thing". 
The' play of difference' then can be identified as the stimulus behind the particular 
questions that the respondents pose in the course of renegotiating their Muslim 
3°Spaul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993) 
306Homi Bhabha, 'How Newness Enters the World', in The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 
1994). p227 
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identities. As such the respondents' expressed desire to be recognised as just Muslim 
does not mean that they have suddenly stopped being' British', or 'Pakistani' or 
'Asian', and so on. Rather, these mUltiple co-ordinates inform and disrupt the 
respondents' whole sense of being Muslim and are themselves transformed in the 
process. For example, in Shagufta's appropriation of Islam marrying a non Pakistani 
does not constitute an act of betrayal to her Pakistani culture, nor does it dilute her 
status as a 'Pakistani Muslim'. And this is a transformation of the particular 
conception of 'Pakistani Muslim' conceived by her parents, in which 'Pakistani' and 
'Muslim' are locked in a reciprocal relationship. In Shagufta's outlook the two axes of 
difference begin to function more independently of each other, but not in a mutually 
exclusive sense. The two still collide and meld, hence informing the character and 
meaning of one another. At the same time, the reciprocal relationship is unlocked, in 
as much as being a 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim' no longer restricts personal interaction to 
individuals of' Pakistani Muslim' background. These intergenerational differences 
alert us to the complex and contradictory ways in which the dynamics of 'cultural 
hybridity', and more specifically multiple cultural locations, are experienced and 
negotiated. This point is re-emphasised at the end of the next subsection (see pp26S-
266), and developed further in the conclusion of the thesis (see pp30S-308). 
The specific relationship between ethnicity and difference emerging from the 
respondents' narratives suggests that the authentication of their Muslim identities 
cannot be accurately described as an act of essentialism, in that they cannot be 
collapsed into an unchanging, homogenous conception of the 'Muslim' subject. The 
relationship is perhaps better encapsulated by Brah's conception of a 'politics of 
location' which I now describe. 
The signifICance of a ipoliJics 0/ location' 
In her examination of diaspora cultural formations Brab introduces the term a 'politics 
of location', in which the experience of location commands as much weight as 
dispersion and dislocation in the constitution of diaspora identities and subjectivities 
(see pp8S-86). The incisiveness of Brah's observation for the analysis of young 
Muslim identities is underscored by Ishtiaq and Noshin: 
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+1: Before I was like thinking about Islam I was just trying to be like a good 
person, you know I thought 'oh well if I don't do anything wrong and cause 
any harm to anyone, and I just do good things that I'll be okay'. But then I 
think I realised that, you know, 'how do you define good and bad?'. It's like 
we can change our, you know man tends to change what is good when it suits 
him better and what is bad when it suits him better, it's just natural. So I think 
I realised that we need some kind of moral code or something you can follow 
you know. That's what I think led me to you know look in further in that 
sense. 
+N: Maybe perhaps you can link this to sort of postmodern fragmentation of 
systems of belief, or you know secularisation and the emphasis on the material 
rather than the spiritual. And perhaps like you know, in this sort of increase in 
secularisation we don't have the sort of perceptions, we don't have the 
perceptual tools to gauge with, you know, there not being one unified truth or 
what have you. So perhaps like young Muslims feel, or, they tum to Islam, or 
Islamic fundamentalism, as a sort of anchorage. You know as a sort of like 
thing to hold on to, a sort of certainty. 
The desire to locate oneself represented in the search for a moral code, for certainty or 
anchorage, highlights a significant uneasiness with feelings of fragmentation and 
chaos. More importantly, this uneasiness has not arisen out of an unwillingness to 
interact with multiple axes of difference, but from within the process of engaging 
difference itself and at the specific point where the boundaries between good and bad 
begin to blur. Here the desire for' location' can be distinguished as being driven by a 
wholly different set of dynamics and objectives than those associated with a return to 
a homogenous' past'. In sum the return to a homogenous' past' is a means through 
which to erect rigid boundaries of 'race', whilst the desire for 'location', as relayed by 
the respondents, is a means through which to overcome established boundaries of 
'race'. This is illustrated more clearly by the ongoing generational conflicts between 
the respondents and their parents/elders. 
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The foregrounding of Islam may have provided the respondents with more stability 
and direction to their lives, but it hasn't lessened the conflicts around personal 
conduct between them and their parents. Interestingly, where once respondents may 
have been described as being too Western or betraying their religion/culture, they are 
now more likely to be accused of being too religious or going over the top: 
*J: It's like my brother like he's like 18 and like he observes Islam and practices 
as much as he can. But I'm sure there's times when my parents wish they 
could switch him off I really really do. 'Cause like before they were like sort 
of would hassle him but then like when he would observe certain issues and 
they won't feel happy about it I can see it. And like then that's when they 
think "Oh no right we can't push them", and I've noticed since like he's 
become more sort of more religiously minded my parents won't like hassle us 
like so much. Igroup snigger expectantly I 
B: Oh 
right. 
s: I think they want you to be religious but through Pakistani kind of culture. 
[ 
J: Yeah definitely. 
l 
A: Yeah. 
[ 
N: Yeah. 
roo. ] 
N: I was just about to say that a couple of weeks ago we had guests and there was 
one well we hadn't seen them since for like ten years and she walks in, she 
comes in sits down and we all sit down and she goes to Ayesha 
A: No the first thing she 
says, the first thing she says to Nosh, 'You look so different! You look so 
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N: 
different!' and then when Nosh and me, Nosh just went (mimics N giggling I 
(group laughs) and she goes 'Ha to' (Urdu words) like she say's she goes, 'Oh 
so since when did you put the you know put the hijab on?' and stuff and I 
went, we said 'Ah well it's been about two years'. 
Yeah and then she was like, 'Well it's a bit much 
isn't it?' 
A: Yeah, 'Its a bit too much isn't itT (laughsJ. 
N: And it's like, 'Look your dressed how you want to 
dress and I'm not making any sort of judgements, I'm not saying anything to 
you, that's your business. I'm wearing a piece of cloth and it's covering 
something, it's not showing anything it's just a piece of cloth'. And it's such a 
big deal I just don't understand what a big deal it is. 
That the respondents are now being challenged by their own families not to be too 
religious confirms that their engagements of Islam have not been driven by a desire to 
restore solidarity within the family or community. These generational disputes are 
crucially significant in their revelations of the multi-faceted outcomes of the dynamics 
of 'cultural hybridity'. On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is possible to 
suggest that the identities of both the respondents and their parents/elders involve 
interaction with and negotiation of more than one cultural location. However, the 
cross-cultural identities negotiated by their parents result in the interdependency of 
axes of difference, such as Pakistani and Muslim, in a manner that creates more and 
more racially exclusive identities. By comparison, as my analysis of Shagufta's 
narrative shows, whilst the identities of the respondents are also informed by more 
than one axis of difference they have managed to overwhelm the racially exclusive 
notion of 'Pakistani Muslim' invoked by their parents by breaking the reciprocal 
interdependency of 'Pakistani' and 'Muslim'. I return to these observations in the 
conclusion of the thesis, when I try to identify and differentiate between the dynamics 
through which the negotiation of multiple cultural influences results in the assertion 
of more exclusive identities and, the dynamics through which the negotiation of 
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multiple cultural influences contests and overwhelms rigid boundaries of 'race' and 
culture (see pp305-308). 
I should be careful not to paint an impression of Muslim families as two constantly 
warring factions of younger and older generations. Their differences aside, many of 
the respondents maintain strong and valued relations with their parents and elders. 
Also the actual points of conflict or disagreement between the generations vary 
considerably in each case. For example, Shagufta's parents perceive her educational 
aspirations as incompatible with being Muslim, whereas Noshin and Ayesha are 
positively encouraged by their parents to pursue further education. I note these points 
to emphasise that whilst overall generational trends can be identified they cannot be 
collapsed into one unified experience. 
I want to end this section by narrowing my concern with describing constantly 
evolving and culturally complex Muslim identities, to focus on contesting the capacity 
of Islam to provide a framework for identity negotiation through which individuals 
may effect progressive cultural change. I undertake this examination with specific 
reference to the position of Muslim women. This is an appropriate context for 
investigating the progressive qualities of Islam because the position of women in 
Muslim societies and Muslim households is a principal theme in dominant Western 
discourses, as well as in Bhabha and Said's commentaries, for adjudging the 
inherently inferior and anti-modem status of Islam. My analysis interrogates the 
contributions of three female respondents, Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta, and presents 
their relationship with the veil/hijab as a 'changing same' as theorised by Gilroy. 
The veil as a 'changing same' 
Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta convey a shifting and culturally relative attitude 
towards Islam and its capacity to offer a framework for establishing gender equality. 
In the course of recognising the potential of Islam as a means for empowering their 
own lives, they confront both Western stereotypes as well as the oppressive reality of 
women's existence in some Muslim societies. All three respondents present their 
earliest experiences as an ongoing battle to resist particular codes for female 
behaviour prescribed by Islam. For example, Noshin and Ayesha recount: 
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*N: I remember when we actually went to Jeddah we were so adamant. We were 
just like, 'We hate it here, we're not going to like it, we can't like it'. 
A: lin a comically pitched voicel'There's no way that you're going to make us 
wear hijab!' 
Of all the traits borne by Muslim women, the one that has undoubtedly received the 
most attention and scrutiny is veiling. In some Muslim societies it remains the 
primary mode through which gender divisions are affirmed and men assert their 
control and ownership of women. This is the context that fuels Noshin and Ayesha's 
objections to being expected to wear the hijab. The ferocity of women's 
powerlessness under Islamic dictate to exercise control over their own bodies is felt 
by Noshin on her first day at school in Jeddah: 
*N: What happened was the first day I actually went there I was in my tight jeans 
and hairspray in my hair and everything [group laughl. [ ... 1 And you can't 
leave the campus unless your, someone comes to the gate tells your name to 
the watchman he announces it over the mic and then you leave through this 
really tiny like passage thing. And so what happened was my driver came and 
my name was announced and as I'm leaving I get this whack [describes with 
hand J on the back. And I turned round and this woman goes' Are you 
Muslim?', and I go 'Yes I am'. She goes 'Why isn't your hair covered where's 
your abayah?' you know the black thing you wear, and I'm just like, I go 'My 
God', I go 'Look I'm really sorry I didn't know it was part of the school 
regulations. There's no need for you to hit me'. You know and I was like 
'From tomorrow I'll wear one' . 
These experiences uphold the 'submissive' character associated with women who 
wear the veil. In Noshin's case, voluntary submission to the veil is not forthcoming 
and so coercive submission supervenes. 
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Individuals like Shagufta, who have spent all of their lives in Britain, do not share 
Noshin and Ayesha's experience of having to conform to veiling under the sanctioned 
authority of the state. The pressure on Shagufta to cover her hair comes from her 
parents. And it constitutes what might be described as a diluted version of veiling in 
that she is not expected to "wear the proper thing": 
*8: When I was younger when people used to come round my mum used to give 
me like a duppattajust a thin piece of cloth (A laughsl and which you could 
see through and she'd be like 'Wear this when people come round'. But if I 
was to actually put on a proper thing she would have freaked out, she'd be like 
'What you doing?' 1M laughsJ. You see you're supposed to be Pakistani you 
know like= 
J: ::: Yeah and even though wearing the proper thing would be more right than 
just wearing something that's 
8: Yeah, even if I was to do it now she'd be like 'What you 
doing?' [group laughs I She would be like that you know. You know 'Why 
can't you be normal?' 
Shagufta's experience is important for understanding the complex relationship 
between the veil and its oppressive impact on women's lives. Her narrative highlights 
that the garment itself doesn't function to constrict Muslim femininity. In Shagufta's 
case the duppatta provided by her mother ceases to fulfil the purpose of veiling 
defined by Islam - i.e. to keep the hair, curves and flesh of the body, except face and 
hands, covered when in the presence of men outside of the immediate family. Yet, the 
diluted version of veiling imposed on Shagufta does not lessen any of the female 
predicaments that are commonly perceived to be the direct outcome of the practice of 
veiling. She remains under considerable pressure from her parents to confine her 
social activities to the family environment; to refrain from pursuing education beyond 
secondary school; to marry someone from within the family circle; and so on. As 
such, Shagufta's experiences emphasise the need to disassociate the veil as the 
'actual' agency of oppression. Moreover, disconnecting the veil from its firm 
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association as a symbol of women's subordinate status is crucial to making sense of 
how the veil might be seized and reappropriated for the purposes of female 
empowerment. This is precisely the position achieved by the respondents. 
Throughout their teenage years the women had vehemently objected to veiling, using 
their personal experiences to expose its fallacy as a practice to protect female 
sexuality and gender equality. At the time of the interview, and now in their early 
twenties, Noshin and Ayesha, who had reluctantly covered their hair in Jeddah, have 
in Britain sought to increase their sense of empowerment and control over their own 
femininity by incorporating the hijab into their dress code. The decision 'to cover' by 
the sisters was taken independently of each other and at different times of their lives. 
Shagufta, who was not observing the practice of veiling at the time of the interview, 
has in subsequent years also adopted the hijabJ07. 
As previous extracts have shown, the women's chosen style of veiling is berated by 
members of their immediate families. It is also reviled by British society and Western 
feminism. The women are therefore under no social obligation or pressure to wear the 
hijab and as such it is difficult to refute their claims that the decision 'to cover' is 
wholly one of personal choice and free will. The only possible grounds, then, for 
conceiving the women as 'oppressed creatures' is if in wearing the hijab they have 
individually opted to suppress or compromise their independence and freedom of 
movement. That conclusion too is thwarted by the women's stated aspirations and 
outward demeanour. As covered women, Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta bear no 
resemblance to any of the negative connotations commonly associated with the 
'veiled woman'. Ignorance and docility neither feature in the manner in which they 
interact nor in the personal ambitions and goals that they have set for themselves. 
Their short video biographies are evidence of young. educated, career seeking women 
who exude a confidence and desire to debate and express their opinions openly. And 
this is typical of the majority of women who have taken the hijab in Britain. 
3071 stumbled across this information upon reading a Guardian article on Muslim women in which 
Shagufta had participated as an interviewee and was pictured wearing the hijab. see 'Can Islam 
Liberate Women?' by Madeleine Bunting. in The Guardian Weekend magazine. ppI6-20. December 
8th 2001 
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As individuals who remain opposed to the practice of veiling being forced on women, 
Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta's active renegotiations of the veil and its central 
positioning within more liberated notions of Muslim femininity challenge dominant 
Western conceptions which perceive the veil as a symbol of female oppression. The 
women's narratives suggest that it is more appropriate to situate and examine the 
practice of veiling in a similar context to what Gilroy describes as 'a changing same'. 
Using the example of how different versions of the same song can be created by 
dubbing, scratching and mixing of the twelve inch single, Gilroy argues that the 
emphasis of 'a changing same' is to highlight an implicit connection of unity in that 
the cultural styles or meanings created by each version are significantly different even 
though their common connection is easily identifiable by the use of the same song on 
a twelve inch single (see p98). In a similar way, the practice of veiling might signal a 
shared identity amongst Muslim women living in different parts of the world but in 
fact the meaning and impact of the veil on their lives may be vastly different. In the 
case of Shagufta, Ayesha and Noshin, their relationship to the veil has constituted a 
journey in which the role of the veil as an affirmation of patriarchal relations has been 
reinscribed as a form of female empowerment. This shifting significance and meaning 
of the veil, or to use Noshin's phrase 'the polyvalency of the veil', can be attributed to 
changing temporal and spatial dynamics which I now describe. 
Changing temporal and spatial dynamics and the 'polyvalency of the veil' 
For many Muslim women in Britain the veil has become an autonomous expression of 
female identity through which to explore and negotiate their position in society, in 
particular in relation to notions of sexuality and gender relations. For Shagufta, 
Ayesha and Noshin, and other Muslim women, wearing the hijab is an important part 
of that negotiated position and the one that makes them feel the most liberated and at 
ease in the environment in which they live. At the same time, the women do not 
profess to have overcome the oppressive connotations of the veil for all women in all 
times and all places. In that respect, their narratives do not constitute a wholesale 
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endorsement of the veil, but expose what Noshin describes as 'the polyvalency of the 
veil '308. 
That in this historical moment the veil holds such contradictory and changing 
significance on Muslim women's lives underlines Gilroy and Rattansi's respective 
observations that modem identities disrupt linear conceptions of time and space (see 
pp99-I00 and pp 103-105). It is only by applying a non-linear conception of 
time/space dynamics that we can begin to understand why the veil may oppress 
women in one part of the world whilst providing a sense of independence and 
freedom for women in another part of the world. For example, in some Muslim 
societies the veil remains an expression of male domination. The earlier quotations of 
Noshin and Ayesha's recollections of living in Jeddah reveal how the veil can 
function as a means through which women's movement and participation in society is 
monitored and controlled. But in Britain the veil is inserted into a distinctly different 
cultural context. It exists independently of the state; alongside dominant expressions 
of femininity it is in a minority; and it resides in a social situation where public, and 
for that matter private, contact between the sexes is not restricted to immediate family 
members. It is in this context that for many Muslim women the veil's intended 
purpose, to adorn women with a sense of privacy, respectability and independence 
from male jurisdiction, begins to come to fruition. As such, the respondents' adoption 
of the veil in Britain can be read as a response to their personal experiences of the 
limitations of Western conceptions of femininity as a position from which to establish 
freedom from male control. On this point it is useful to note the work of Reina Lewis, 
whose examination of the fiction writing of Ottoman women reveals that, '[t1he West 
was central to [Ottoman) women's consideration of female emancipation too, 
although it figured as a disappointment just as often as it did as a positive model,309. 
At this stage it is possible to evaluate the final point of criticism highlighted by my 
examination of Bhabha and Said's commentaries, a point which relates specifically to 
Bhabha's suggestion that Islam cannot provide a framework for furthering women's 
3~Noshin Ahmad, • Hijabs in Our Midst' , in YOUDa Britajn, edited by J. Rutherford, (London, 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), p77 
309. Writing the Racialised Self? Ottoman Women Writers and Western Feminism', in New Ethnjcjtjes. 
Old Racjsms, edited by P. Cohen, (London, Zed Books, 1999), pp63-81 
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rights (see pp59-60). Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta's changing relations with the veil 
indicate that the principles of Islam cannot be seen to have one outcome for all 
women in all times and all places. In that sense the weakness in Bhabha's position is 
that it imposes a linear framework of time and space which consigns Islam and 
specific practices such as veiling to a pre-modem past. Crucially, the 'alternative' 
qualities of the veil being highlighted by Muslim women in Britain have failed to 
make much impression on dominant Western perceptions, including amongst Western 
feminists31O• As Ayesha's mimicking summary suggests, an articulate, assertive, 
intelligent woman wearing a hijab is still very much deemed a contradiction: 
+A: A major problem in British society is that there's a huge huge demonisation 
of Muslims and there's a tendency to put us in uniformed categories. Like, 
Muslim woman, dressed in black. Covers her face, covers her hair. No 
identity, isn't allowed to speak. So, when you're sitting on the train and you're 
reading a newspaper or a good book or even if you're writing, people sort of 
look and they're just like, "Ugh, she can write, and she can read. And she 
reads intelligent stuff! And oh my God!" 
Reflecting on the section as a whole, the ethnic identities of the respondents have a 
chameleon like quality. Ayesha provides the most metaphorically striking example in 
her transition from being 'part of the drugs rave culture with purple hair, hundred 
thousand earrings and dressing really hip', to being 'all covered up'. Ayesha's 
personal narrative is representative of overall trends emerging from the empirical 
study - trends which present the respondents' interaction with Islam as constituting 
two distinct phases. These can be simply distinguished as a 'distanciation from Islam' 
and an 'embracement of Islam'. But, there is a prevailing idiosyncrasy that structures 
both these phases - an engagement of rational discourse which is centrally driven by 
what Rattansi describes as a 'heightened reflexivity'. This connection between the 
discourse of rationality and the narratives of the respondents makes it possible to read 
contemporary Muslim identities as distinctly modem. 
310see Sara Ahmed's StraoKe Encounters, (London, Routledge, 2(00) 
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Rational interpretations of Islam and the distinctly modern status of Muslim 
identities 
In the first stage of the respondents' interaction with Islam, the phase that I have 
called the 'distanciation from Islam', rational discourse is deployed to call into 
question the reasoning behind specific cultural practices, customs and traditions 
which feature significantly in defining childhood experiences. The play of rationality 
is specifically characterised by a 'heightened reflexivity' in which, according to 
Rattansi, the interaction of multiple axes of identification creates a tension between 
order and chaos (see pI02). For example, chaos ensues when the respondents witness 
the different policies on the use of corporal punishment at mosque and at school. 
Other examples discussed earlier include the freedom to develop social relations with 
individuals outside the family circle, and women's right to control their own 
movement in public spaces. The respondents associate the contrasting rules and codes 
of behaviour with specific institutions or cultures, such as the mosque or school, and 
Western culture or Islamic culture. A rational resolution is sought which culminates in 
the rejection of Islamic strictures to guide personal behaviour and outlook on life. In 
the second phase, what I have termed the 'embracement of Islam', the 'heightened 
reflexivity' is reconfigured in the desire to locate oneself, as the chaos ensuing from 
multiple locations begins to confuse the boundaries between good and bad. Again a 
rational choice is made and personal stability is restored through the reinstatement of 
Islam as the defining source for locating and negotiating identity. 
I should make clear that the connection between rational discourse and the 
respondents' interaction with Islam is not being made to suggest that the 'right' 
choice has necessarily been made. In this regard it is useful to recall Gilroy's 
exposition of how rational actions in modern history have not always resulted in 
progressive human relations (see pp93-95). Consistent with Gilroy's explanation, the 
concept of 'rationality' is applied here to describe strategic and calculated choices in 
response to personal needs and experiences. In that sense I am not proposing that 
religion, or more specifically Islam, be simply accorded the status of a rational mode 
of thought. Rather it is the character of the respondents' engagement with Islam that 
resembles a discourse of rationality. Once deployed to resist the power of Islamic 
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dictate to control their behaviour, the discourse of rationality is now being played out 
inside the very meaning of Islam. 
Quite distinct from the audience survey the study on young Muslims has afforded an 
opportunity, albeit again within a historically specific context, to position the work of 
hybridity theorists within an increasingly visible identity formation, sometimes 
referred to as the 'revival of Islam', that is all too often associated with pre-modern 
lifestyles. Further, the identification of rationality as the central organising feature of 
the narratives under discussion begins to open up the possibility of reading 
contemporary Muslim identities as distinctly modern experiences - rationality being 
one of those distinguishing features recognised as marking the shift from pre-modern 
to modern systems of thoughf II. The added connection to Rattansi' s notion of a 
'heightened reflexivity' opens up a further possibility of reading Muslim identities as 
in a sense postmodern. For Rattansi a 'heightened reflexivity' positions individuals as 
being both inside and outside modernity, and this is what distinguishes the 
postmodern subject from the modern (see pl02). It is not appropriate here to contest 
the particular definition of postmodern proposed by Rattansi. However, his argument 
that a 'heightened reflexivity' provides a critical insight into the principles of 
modernity, as well as its contradictions and limitations, can be clearly associated with 
the particular course that the respondents' identities take. This applies specifically to 
their awareness of the limitations of rational thought and its inability to unearth a 
unified truth. Such is the discovery that has led many respondents back to religion, a 
discovery that is encapsulated in Ishtiaq's concern with "how do you define good and 
bad" or Noshin's assertion "there not being one unified truth". At the same time, as I 
have consistently tried to highlight in the course of this chapter, the appropriation of 
Islam amongst young Muslims embraces the dynamics of critical interaction and 
cultural change. In that sense their identities need not be associated with the kind of 
'blind' submission to religion associated with a pre-modem mode of being and 
seeing, nor need they be regarded as resisting the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity'. 
3 11 For more focussed and detailed case studies illustrating that ethnic or religious separatisms in 
contemporary societies are best interpreted as integral to the history of modernity. as opposed to relics 
of the pre-modern. see Dipesh Chakrabarty. 'Modernity and Ethnicity in India', in Multicultural States. 
edited by D. Bennett, (London. Routledge. 1998). pp91-110. Also in the same volume, Susan 
Mathieson and David Attwell. 'Between Ethnicity and Nationhood: Shaka Day and the Struggle Over 
Zuluness in Post-Apartheid South Africa'. ppl 1 1-124 
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The 'return' to religion is perhaps best interpreted as a response to what Gilroy calls 
the 'antinomies of modernity' i.e. of modernity's inability to fulfil its promise to 
uncover universal truths (see pp93-95). 
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Chapter 7 
The Importance of Empirical Investigation to Understanding 
Everyday Cultural Realities 
My adoption of an empirical approach in this thesis as a means of examining 
the work of hybridity theorists has enabled me to contest, review and expand their 
respective conceptions of identity in the context of social and historically specific 
everyday realities. As I summarise in the conclusion, my empirically grounded 
examination has highlighted how the most debated features of 'cultural hybridity', 
such as 'cultural fragmentation', may unfold in real life to uphold, rather than 
transgress, racial and cultural hierarchies. At the same time my analysis has also 
brought more into view some of the less debated aspects of theories of 'cultural 
hybridity', such as 'location', as being centrally significant to individual negotiations 
of diverse cultural forms. The purpose of this final chapter is to underline the 
importance of empirical research for advancing theories of 'cultural hybridity' in the 
direction intended by hybridity theorists themselves, i.e. of identifying a framework 
for cultural relations that can be productively mobilised as a basis from which to 
overwhelm racialised structures of power and subordination. 
The chapter consists of four sections. In the first, my concern is to highlight the 
limitations of analyses and commentaries that offer judgements about people's 
cultural and political outlooks without any process of interaction with their everyday 
lives. To do this, I return to Bhabha and Said's commentaries on the cultural politics 
of Muslims and argue that the vulnerability of their respective interpretations, as 
highlighted in chapter 6, can be linked to a 'distanciation from the subjects' they write 
about, i.e. the absence of direct dialogue or interaction with Muslims themselves. I 
link the empirical shortcomings in Bhabha and Said's commentaries to the work of 
hybridity theorists, by noting Jonathan Friedman's observation that contemporary 
theories of 'cultural hybridity' remain removed from everyday reality because they 
are in the main abstract theorisations based on analyses of creative art forms such as 
film and literature - in effect a kind of textual analysis312. 
312'G1obal Crises, The Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Pork.barrelling', in Debatio8 
Cultural Hybridjty, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 1997), pp70-89 
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The implications of Friedman's observation as regards the suitability of applying 
theories of 'cultural hybridity' to everyday cultural relations are addressed in the 
second section, when I examine the methodological debates central to the emergence 
of 'new' audience research. I describe how the work of 'new' audience scholars 
develops from a critique and rejection of textual analysis as an adequate basis for 
predicting and interpreting people's behaviour and actions. I use this critique to 
establish the importance of empirical investigations for advancing theories of 'cultural 
hybridity' as a position from which to challenge essentialist conceptions of 'race' and 
their impact on people's lives. 
In the third and fourth sections of the chapter, I address what type of empirical 
methods are most appropriate for examining people's everyday lives313. I confine my 
analysis to the overall distinction between qualitative and quantitative techniques, and 
take as my starting point the arguments made by 'new' audience scholars for 
preferring qualitative methods. In the third section I use Morley's criticisms of the 
four ceteris paribus assumptions underlying quantitative research to summarise the 
methodological position of 'new' audience researchers. My discussion underlines that 
preference for qualitative ethnographic methods among 'new' audience researchers is 
based less on a self-reflexive analysis of individual applications of the ethnographic 
approach and more on a critique of quantitative techniques. I go on to suggest that the 
work of the American anthropologist James Clifford provides a useful basis for 
bridging the methodological gap between empirical 'new' audience studies and 
abstract theories of 'cultural hybridity'. 
31~here are a number of established methods for conducting empirical research including 
questionnaires, interviews and participant observation and debates about their usefulness are well 
established in the social sciences, in particular in the fields of sociology and anthropology. The aims of 
my discussion are more modest, given preliminary acknowledgement of the need for more empirically 
grounded inquiries of • cultural hybridity' has yet to take place. for key debates about research methods 
in sociology. see for example. Emile Durkheim. The Rules of Socioloaical Method. (New York, The 
Free Press. 1938); Harold Garfinkel. Studies in Ethnomethodolo8),. (Englewood Cliffs. Prentice-Hall. 
1967); Pierre Bourdieu.ln Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Socioloay. (Cambridge. Polity 
Press. 1990). For key debates about research methods in anthropology. see for example. Alfred 
Reginald Radcliffe-Brown. The Andaman Islaoders. (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1922); 
Clifford Geertz. The IntelJ)retation of Cultures: Selected Essays. (New York. Basic Books. 1973); 
H. Russell Bernard. Research Methods in Cultural AnthmpolQ8Y. (Newbury Park. Sage. 1988); Ruth 
Behar, The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropol08Y That Breaks Your Heart, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1996) 
278 
In the fourth section I offer a more critical evaluation of the methodological stance of 
'new' audience studies. My analysis presents Morley's criticism of the ceteris paribus 
assumptions underlying quantitative research as simplistic in that its focus is the 
'passive people meter' which is hardly representative of the variety of quantitative 
methods. More importantly, I suggest that quantitative research is invaluable in 
identifying how detailed qualitative insights relate to overall social and cultural 
trends. My discussion concludes that, instead of an outright preference for one 
technique over another, it is more productive to explore ways in which qualitative and 
quantitative methods may complement and accommodate each other's strengths and 
weaknesses, thereby providing a more comprehensive insight into the structure and 
significance of everyday social relations. 
Empirical Limitations of Said and Bhabha's Interpretations of Muslim Identities 
In chapter 6 I drew on my own empirical research into Muslim identities to refute the 
five main themes through which Said and Bhabha present Muslims as homogenous 
and unchanging in their cultural outlooks. I now return to Bhabha and Said's 
commentaries to develop four observations which demonstrate that the vulnerability 
of their interpretations arises from a lack of empirical rigour. 
Firstly, in response to Said and Bhabha's assertions that submission to a unified 
notion of Islam is the binding feature of Muslim unity, I have already argued that 
displays of solidarity amongst Muslims are more the result of struggles against racist 
Islamophobia than on account of an uncritical devotion to Islam (see pp229-246). 
Moreover, many of the divisions and contentions amongst distinct Muslim groups and 
individuals can be linked to differences in their interpretations and conceptions of 
Islam. That there are multiple interpretations of Islam is a point which Said himself 
acknowledges314, and one which is further reinforced by the fact that it wasn't the U.S. 
or the allies who 'won the war in Afghanistan'. Rather, it was a predominantly 
314http://observer.guardian.co.uklcommentlstory/O,6903,552764,OO.html('lslam and the West are 
Inadequate Banners', in The Observer, September 16th, 2001 issue). See also essays in Yvonne 
Yazbeck Haddad, ed., Muslims in the West, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2(02). Pnina Werbner 
challenges the emphasis on 'local' interpretations of Islam, and more specifically Sufi Islam, 
suggesting that the underlying logic implicit in Sufism is the same logic whether in Morocco, Pakistan 
or Indonesia. See Werbner's, Pil&rims of Loye, (London, C. Hurst & Co., 2(03), p290 
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'Muslim' army, the Northern Alliance, with help from the u.s. led alliance that 
overturned the governing Muslim body the Taliban. Thus, it is only by glossing over 
or, as argued in Chapter 1 (see pp52-54), by 'silencing' the diversity of Muslim 
voices and sUbjectivities that Said and Bhabha are able to promote and maintain the 
notion that Muslims are bound together by their common affiliation to Islam. 
Secondly, the angry demonstrations 'on the street' involving Muslims appear to be the 
sole evidence given by Bhabha and Said to suggest that 'ordinary' Muslims support 
the anti-Western and anti-modern agenda ofthe 'terrorists'. In Said's case, the focus 
on public demonstrations as an indication that 'ordinary' Muslims are supportive of 
the 'terrorists" objective of establishing Islam as a superior power is all the more 
surprising given his own acknowledgement that, 'to most people in the Islamic and 
Arab worlds the official US is synonymous with arrogant power, known for its 
sanctimoniously munificent support not only of Israel but numerous repressive Arab 
regimes [ ... J. Anti-Americanism in this context is not based on a hatred of modernity 
or technology envy: it is based on a narrative of concrete interventions'31!!. Said's own 
comments suggest that if there is a common political objective of the 'terrorists' and 
'ordinary' Muslims it is not a wholesale opposition to all things 'Western' or 
'modern', but the contradictory foreign policies and interventions made by the West 
led principally by America. 
Thirdly, although 'symbolic violence' has undoubtedly become a feature of 'Muslim' 
protests, the most publicised perhaps being the burning of The Satanic Verses, it does 
not, as some commentators suggest, link the thinking and actions of 'ordinary' 
Muslims (whom Said refers to as the 'untutored' religious populations316, and Bhabha 
the 'ancient ascriptive migrants,3J7) with the 'primitive' passions of the 'terrorists'. 
Here it is useful to reflect on Bhikhu Parekh's insightful discussion of the 'Rushdie 
affair' in which he puts the symbolic burning of The Satanic Verses into ~ 
contexf18. Parekh notes that the book burning which secured national publicity on 
315jbid. 
31tScuiture and Imperialism, (London, Vintage, 1993), p371 
317'How Newness Enters the World', in The Location of Culture, (London, Routledge, 1994), p225 
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January 14th 1989 had in fact been preceded by another public burning of the book 
about six weeks earlier. Both incidents had been preceded by 'noisy but peaceful 
protests' which had gone unreported. The second book burning had been organised 
following advice from a solicitor who had suggested that if national interest was to be 
aroused, then prior notice should be given to the media. The succession of events 
charted by Parekh depicts gradual escalation from 'peaceful' to 'dramatic' protests 
driven by despair at not being taken seriously. From this perspective, the protests do 
not show a 'primitive' or 'blind' acceptance of religious doctrine, but are the actions 
of a people who are finding their voices increasingly alienated from 'civilised' debate 
and 'secular' pOliticg319. 
Fourthly, both Said and Bhabha suggest that religious quests for emancipation and 
freedom are self-contained and do not afford the kind of critical freedom provided by 
secular politics, which is necessary for establishing mutual emancipation. Religion is, 
therefore, deemed more appropriate for the public as opposed to private realm. Some 
of the vulnerability of the secularist argument can be highlighted by reflecting on 
Bhikhu Parekh's reservations towards containing religion within the 'private' sphere 
and denying it any role in politics. 
Firstly, Parekh draws attention to the fact that even in the most advanced Western 
societies religious persons constitute a majority. This observation draws us to enquire 
'why the poSition of the secular is often asserted more vehemently in relation to 
Muslim societies?' It is implied that somehow Muslim societies are the last to 
separate religion from political activity. Such an association can be shown to have 
little basis when we consider, as Parekh reminds us, that 'ninety per cent of US 
Congressman claim to consult their religious beliefs before voting on important 
318Rethinkina Multiculturalism, (London, MacMillan, 2(00), see chapter 10, pp295-335 
31~he particular interpretation of 'symbolic violence' being proposed here can be further underlined by 
Said's own participation in the act of stone throwing at the Lebanon-Israeli border. This incident, 
which took place in July 2000, generated much publicity and controversy about the integrity of Said's 
status as an intellectual and critic. It is not necessary here to assess the rights and wrongs of Said's 
actions. What is important to ask is • whether the act in question, which Said described as a 'symbolic 
gesture of joy' and 'what tourists do', can be taken as a measure of the critical worth of his scholarly 
activities'? The simple answer to this is that a lifetime's work cannot be judged on the basis of one 
single incident. In the same vein, the political allegiances of 'ordinary' Muslims cannot be deduced 
from the anger or 'symbolic acts ofviolence' displayed 'on the streets'. 
281 
issues,no. Secondly, in light of the fact that science has not been able to fulfil its 
promise of unearthing 'rational' solutions to 'modern' problems then religion may 
have a valuable role to play in the political quest to improve social and economic 
inequalities. Related to this is a third observation cited by Parekh. That 'religion has 
been a source of many an emancipatory movement', including 'anti-slavery, anti-
laissezJaire capitalist, anti-fascist, 1 ... 1, India's struggle for independence under 
Gandhi, the 1960s civil rights campaigns in the United States, the anti-apartheid 
struggle in South Africa'321 and so on. Fourthly, 'arguments have no weight of their 
own'. Rather, arguments gain weight or support if individuals feel they can 'reason' 
with them. This will depend on their personal values, experiences, common sense and 
judgement. In that sense the stren&Jh of an argument is always relative. Hence, Parekh 
asserts, it is naive to assume that 'secular' reasons are neutral or that they are more 
neutral than religious ones. For Parekh, given the continued popularity of religion 
amongst modern populations, it is both pointless and undemocratic to alienate it from 
the political system. It is far more viable to acknowledge it as a valuable medium 
through which people make sense of their lives, and to allow it a political voice which 
is subjected to the same scrutiny as any other form of political representation. Finally, 
on the question of morality Parekh suggests that, 'at its best' religion can make an 
immense contribution to the 'rigours of moral life' . In the context of its concern with 
the 'human soul' religion can act as a 'counterweight' to the very 'modem' pursuits of 
self-interest and material gain. It thus fulfils a vital function of' nagging our 
consciences, requiring us to reflect publicly and critically on our moral practices, and 
forcing us to consider issues we would happily prefer to ignore ,322. 
Parekh's discussion is more comprehensive in its assessment of the secularist thesis 
than I am able to do justice here. However, his main counter-arguments to the 
secularist position that religion should be 'scrupulously' excluded from political life 
suggests that to undermine or deny religion a role in politics is to discriminate against 
a significant, perhaps even a majority, of citizens thereby creating a 'crisis of 
legitimacy'. In connection with this it useful to note Tariq Modood's observation that 
320 Retbinkin& Multiculturalism, (London, Macmillan, 2000), p323 
321ibid., p328 
322jbid., p329 
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racism has been complicated still further by contemporary Muslim experiences which 
have posed an unforeseen challenge to liberal secularism323• In the end the secular 
disdain towards religion does not appear to be based on detailed empirical assessment 
of the ability, or inability, of the religiously inclined to embrace the principles of 
democratic politics. 
My four overall criticisms suggest strongly that the limitations of Bhabha and Said's 
commentaries emanate from an absence of critical engagement with the internally 
differentiated identities and views of the subjects, i.e. Muslims, under discussion. This 
is not to say that isolated actions or events cannot be commented on without 
consulting the variety of perspectives of the individuals concerned. However, the 
problem with Bhabha and Said's commentaries is that they take isolated events such 
as public demonstrations as indicators of everyday cultural realities without any 
corroborating process to confirm that their particular interpretations of the street 
demonstrations are an adequate basis for reflecting on the cultural identities and 
subjectivities of the protestors. This 'distanciation from the subject' is a criticism 
more generally levelled at the work of hybridity theorists by Jonathan Friedman. He 
notes how the work of theorists of' cultural hybridity' overwhelmingly centres around 
'the analysis of literature, of intellectuals, of films, and - not least - of music' thus, 
'identity is entirely abstracted from the subject,324. In other words, much of the work 
of hybridity theorists is based on a kind of textual analysis32S, which for Friedman is 
an inadequate basis for theorising about the cultural exchanges and negotiations 
taking place in people's everyday lives. Friedman's concern can be more forcefully 
substantiated by referring to methodological debates that have been central to the 
emergence of 'new' audience research. 
323Multicyhural Politics, (Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press, 2(05) 
324'Global Crises, The Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Porkbarrelling', in Debatina 
Cultural Hybridity, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood (London. Zed Books, 1997), pp74-76 
mAvtar Brah's Cartoaraphies of Diupora might be regarded as an exception because of its inclusion 
of empirical research. But even in Brah's examination the discussion of empirical findings, (into 
unemployment amongst South Asian youth and South Asian Muslim women's economic activity), is 
conducted in separate chapters from the more detailed exposition of the dynamics characterising 
modem social and cultural formations. There is little direct cross referencing between Brab's empirical 
findings and her delineation of concepts such as 'difference', 'diaspora' and 'location'. The latter is 
developed largely through reference to academic texts and personal experience. 
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Preferring Empirical Research Over Textual Analysis for Understanding 
Everyday Cultural Realities 
I noted in chapter I that David Morley's study of The 'Nationwide' Audience326, 
which highlighted detailed ethnographic research as the way forward, is commonly 
recognised as marking the beginning of a 'new' era in audience research (see piS). 
Since the Nationwide study there has been a profusion of empirical enquiries into 
audience consumption. They have ranged in their focus on different types of media as 
well as different types of audiences. Dorothy Hobson's research into housewives' use 
of radio and television327; Janice Radway's study of women's interaction with 
romance novels328; and David Buckingham's work on children's readings of popular 
television329, constitute just a few of the more well known. Two elements bind these 
studies together: firstly, their understanding of the process of meaning construction as 
a two way process - an outcome of the specific interaction between text and viewer; 
and secondly, their adoption of qualitative research techniques as the most effective 
way of getting an insight into the meanings negotiated by individual viewers. With 
respect to the first of these two characteristics, I noted in chapter I that the position of 
hybridity theorists can be seen to be in synch with the position of 'new' audience 
researchers (see pp18-19). In sum, both fields of work reject the notion that cultural 
outlooks and identities can be adequately represented by holistic categories such as 
male/female, working class/middle class, black/white etc., without examining what 
those categories mean to the individual concerned. Despite this common ground the 
two fields of work have advanced from different sides of the methodological spectrum 
which brings me to the second defining feature of 'new' audience research, i.e. its 
preference for empirical research. 
326London, BA, 1980 
m'Housewives and the Mass Media', in Culture. Media. WaUlae, edited by S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. 
Lowe & P. Willis, (London, Routledge, 1980), ppl05-114 
328Readjna the Romance, (London, Verso, 1984) 
329ppblic Secrets, (London, British Film Institute, 1987) 
Children Talkina Teleyjsion, (London, Falmer Press, 1993) 
'Boys' Talk: Television and the Policing of Masculinity', in Readjoa Audjences. edited by D. 
Buckingham, (London, Manchester University Press, 1993), pp89-115 
Moyjoa Imaaes, (London, Manchester University Press, 1996) 
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In the previous section I noted that the work of hybridity theorists might be likened to 
textual analysis. By comparison, it is precisely a departure from textual analysis and 
the adoption of empirically grounded research that is recognised as one of the 
hallmarks of 'new' audience studies. For 'new' audience scholars textual analysis is 
inadequate for examining the meanings arising from the encounter between texts and 
viewers. Textual analysis, they claim, does not take into account a number of 
variables which are an integral part of the process through which individuals negotiate 
meanings from particular texts. The variables range from the social and cultural 
background of individuals (such as gender, age, class and ethnicity); the context of 
viewing (such as the company in which texts are viewed)330; other activities that may 
be simultaneously engaged (such as housework)331; and past experiences of the act of 
viewing and/or the subject matter of particular texts332. The criticism of 'new' 
audience researchers that the position of the subject cannot be deduced from an 
analysis of individual texts is precisely Friedman's point when he suggests that, 
cultural exchanges and negotiations taking place in people's everyday lives cannot be 
properly understood through an examination of specific cultural texts, be they written, 
visual or audio. 
It is important not to confuse the textual analysis criticised by 'new' audience 
researchers and that conducted by theorists of 'cultural hybridity'. Such analyses 
differ in that the former, as exemplified by Screen theory, is indiscriminate. both in 
terms of the variety of texts that might be selected for analysis - in that they do not 
have to fit any particular genre or criteria, as well as its comprehension of the 
audience as an 'undifferentiated mass'. By comparison, theorists of 'cultural 
hybridity' have been much more calculating in their choice of films, music, novels 
and academic literature. Their work intentionally draws on texts which explore the 
330see for example, Marie Gillespie, 'From Sanskrit to Sacred Soap: A Case Study in the Reception of 
Two Contemporary TV Versions of the Mahabharata', in Readina Audiences, edited by D. 
Buckingham, (London, Manchester University Press, 1993), pp48-74 
Marie Gillespie •• Soap Opera. Gossip and Rumour in a Punjabi Town in West London', in National 
Identity and Europe. edited by P. Drummond. R. Paterson &. J. Willis, (London, BA, 1993) 
331see for example, Ann Gray. Video Playtime. (London. Routledge 1992) 
Dorothy Hobson. 'Housewives and the Mass Media'. in Culture. Media. wauaae, edited by S. Hall. 
D. Hobson. A. Lowe &. P. Willis. (London. Routledge. 1980). pp 1 05-114 
332see for example, Jacqueline Bobo, Black Women as Cultura) Readers, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1995) and Philip Schlesinger et ai, Women vjewjna Vjolepce, (London, BA, 1992) 
285 
fragmented and heterogeneous aspects of modem identities, and more specifically 
migrant identities. In addition, unlike Screen theory, such analyses are not conducted 
to identify how a 'homogenous mass' responds to a particular message, but to gain an 
insight into the dynamics of modem relations and cultural fonnations. These 
qualifications, however, do not invalidate Friedman's point. He is right to pose the 
question 'how much can we learn about the 'everyday problems of identity' from the 
analysis of a novel, a song or a film?' - or indeed public protests. 
My own reflections above on Bhabha and Said's commentaries suggest that it is 
precisely the' distanciation of the subject' from the focus of analysis that limits their 
respective insights into the cultural politics of Muslims. In pointing this out, I agree 
with Friedman that the relevance of contemporary theorisations of 'cultural hybridity' 
to the 'micro-processes of everyday life', and as a way of understanding 'other 
people's realities', cannot be substantiated without an engagement with' ordinary' 
people's lives. Thus, I am arguing that in order for theories of 'cultural hybridity' to 
advance in the direction intended by their own authors, (i.e. to identify a cultural 
politics that overwhelms unequal relations of power and subordination), it is 
imperative that empirical interrogation and methodological scrutiny form an integral 
part of its debates. 
The Strengths of Qualitative Research Methods for Examining Complex 
Cultural Realities 
In the two remaining sections of this chapter I address the issue of which empirical 
research methods are most appropriate for gaining an insight into everyday processes 
of meaning construction and identity negotiation. I begin by examining the arguments 
of 'new' audience researchers who advocate qualitative ethnographic, as opposed to 
quantitative, research methods as the most suitable for examining the complexity of 
everyday cultural realities. 
The arguments for preferring qualitative methods within 'new' audience studies have 
been well documented by, amongst others, Ang, Lull, Morley, and Moore~33. The 
333Ien Ang, Desperately Seekins the Audience, (London, Routledge, 1991) 
James Lull, Insjde Family Vjewjna, (London, Routledge 1990) 
David Morley, TeleYision. AudienceS and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992) 
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main thrust behind the choice of in-depth qualitative research is the perception that 
the act of viewing cannot be reduced to a series of quantifiable units. As Morley 
asserts, it is 'methods of investigation such as participant observation and 
ethnography, traditionally associated with the discipline of anthropology' which 
enable' a close understanding of the processes through which communication 
technologies, such as television, acquire meaning, and of the variety of practices in 
which they are enmeshed'334. 
Beyond this more general 'methodological consensus,33S regarding the suitability of 
the ethnographic approach for investigating media consumption, the actual application 
of this method across the various 'new' audience studies is vastly different from its 
more established usage in the field of anthropology, where it was first pioneered by 
Malinowski in his participant observation study of the Tobriand Islanders336. 
Ethnographic studies undertaken by anthropologists place much emphasis on 
researchers fully immersing themselves 'in the field' which involves living full-time 
among the individuals being studied. Another significant feature is the length of 
observation with most studies lasting between one to two years. In this regard, many 
'new' audience studies represent a departure from the type of ethnographic research 
undertaken by anthropologists. As Moores notes: 
[ ... J new audience ethnography has relied mainly on audio-taped conversations 
with viewers, listeners and readers which may not last much more than an 
hour each. The inquiries can sometimes incorporate short periods in the 
company of media consumers, [ ... J nevertheless sessions spent talking about 
television in the sitting room I ... ] are evidently quite different from two years 
living amongst the Tobriand Islanders337. 
Shaun Moores,lntecpretin& Audiences, (London, Sage, 1993) 
3:wreleYision. Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992), ppl73 - 174 
33SIen Ang, UYine Room Wars, (London, Routledge, 1996), p36 
336Bronislaw Malinowski, Areooauts of the Western Pacific, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922 
(1964» 
337Inte'llretin& Audiences, (London, Sage, 1993), p4 
287 
Moores goes on to defend the use of the term ethnography to describe the methods of 
data collection within 'new' audience research. He argues that, although the precise 
methodologies differ, qualitative audience studies and anthropological research share 
the same aims in that they are fundamentally concerned with charting and critically 
analysing the production of meanings in particular social contexts. An important point 
to note in this respect is that justification for preferring qualitative ethnographic 
methods has been based more on a critique of the limitations of quantitative 
techniques, as opposed to self-reflexive analyses of the strengths of individual 'new' 
audience studies. In the next section I return to address this lack of attention to 
evaluating the application of the ethnographic approach and its implications as 
regards inhibiting methodological debates within 'new' audience research (see pp292-
297). On the issue of why 'new' audience scholars deem quantitative methods 
unsuitable for understanding the behaviour of media audiences, the various 
commentaries list a number of reasons. I do not wish to rehearse these in any detail338 
but some indication of their range and arguments can be provided by noting Morley's 
identification of the ceteris paribus assumptions governing statistical methods of data 
collection. 
From the specific perspective of studying audiences Morley identifies four 
contentious premises of quantitative research methods. Firstly, he argues that 
quantitative measurements of audience activity reduce the act of viewing to the 
subject being in the same room as the television set being switched on. This, Morley 
suggests, is not a reliable association for deducing that an act of viewing has been 
engaged. Secondly, desire or willingness to view a programme cannot be inferred 
from an individual tuning into a particular channel. The television may simply be 
switched on for background noise, or, the viewer's concentration on a programme 
may be fragmented by other activities, such as reading the newspaper or ironing. 
Thirdly, quantitative techniques tend to reduce the viewer's relationship with the text 
to an 'individual decision-making process'. In relation to this, Morley comments, 
338see for example, James Halloran, ed., The Effects of Television, (London, Panther, 1970) 
len Ang, Desperately Seekina the Audience, (London, Routledge, 1991) 
John Fiske, 'Moments of Television', in Remote Control, edited by E. Seiter, H. Borchers, G. 
Kreutzner & E. Warth, (London, Routledge, 1989), pp56-78 
Stuart Hall, 'The Rediscovery of "Ideology'" , in Culture. Society and the Media, edited by M. 
Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran & J. Wollacott. (London, Routledge, 1982), pp56-90 
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'much viewing is, in fact, done in groups, where power is unequally distributed and 
choices must be negotiated,339. Fourthly, viewers' decisions are simply differentiated 
by whether or not they watch a programme and are, therefore, treated as context-free 
and equivalent. There is no appreciation of the contextual and material disparities 
across households which invariably impact upon such issues as access, purpose, and 
significance of media texts and technologies for different viewers. For example, 
income levels may vary the significance of media consumption in relation to other 
leisure activities. 
For Morley, these ceteris paribus assumptions indicate that research methods 
concerned with systematic data collection tend to approach 'watching television' as 'a 
one-dimensional activity which has equivalent meaning for all who perform it'340. On 
the basis of these observations Morley supports the argument of academics such as 
Towler, Lull, Ang, and Scannell 'that if interpersonal and mass communications are 
to be read as texts, the surrounding context is the necessary foundation of meaning ,341. 
Thus, what is required is 'close-up' research focused on making 'qualitative 
distinctions' in audience behaviour. 
As I have already noted, debates about methodology and concern with empirically 
grounded examinations of cultural interaction have not been accorded anywhere near 
the same level of significance in contemporary theorisations of 'cultural hybridity' as 
they have in 'new' audience studies. A useful basis from which to ~ to bridge this 
methodological distance is, I suggest, provided by current debates within American 
cultural anthropolog~2. Here the work of James Cliffor<f43 might be singled out, for 
it has already attracted a notable degree of attention from 'new' audience scholars and 
hybridity theorists alike. The former have been drawn to Clifford's work for its 
contribution to opening up a series of questions about the power dynamics inherent in 
33'Televjsion. Audiences and Cultural Studies. (London. Routledge. 1992). p17S 
:34<ljbid .• P 176 
341ibid .• pl75 
342see collection of essays in James Clifford and George Marcus (eds). WrjtjO& Culture: The Poetjcs 
and Politics of Ethnoamphy. (Berkeley, University of California Press. 1986) 
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ethnographic writini44• They ('new' audience scholars) have tended to cite Clifford's 
assertions about issues of subjectivity and their impact on the process of observing, 
documenting and writing up observations made 'in the field' to emphasise the need 
for more self-reflexive audience ethnographies34s• Hybridity theorists have found 
Clifford's work valuable for another reason: his exploration ofthe metaphor of 
'travel' to emphasise the cosmopolitan character of contemporary cultural formations 
as well as the unequal relations of power through which they are represented. 
Clifford's conception of 'culture as a site of travel' is noted by hybridity theorists in 
support of their own concern with understanding modem cultures as constantly 
evolving through interaction with 'other' cultures346• 
The different angles from which 'new' audience research and hybridity theorists 
approach Clifford's writings can be linked to the differing priorities and positions 
from which the two bodies of work proceed. 'New' audience studies devote much 
attention to debating issues of methodology, while hybridity theorists are 
predominantly concerned with narrating modem cultures in terms of their fragmented 
status. This difference does not detract from my own observation of the potential for 
Clifford's works to provide an avenue through which hybridity theorists may begin to 
raise questions of method fundamental to their respective enquiries347• For this to 
materialise, what is required is a shift from a focus on the 'travelling' aspects of 
cultures, that is clearly documented by Clifford, to an equally significant aspect of his 
343see his 'Travelling Cultures', in Cultural Studies, edited by L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. Treichler, 
(London, Routledge, 1992); and Routes: Travel aud Translation in the Late Twentieth CentuO', 
(London, Harvard University Press, 1998) 
344'fhe concern with dynamics of power in ethnographic research is an overall feature running across 
contemporary critiques of 'classic ethnography'. In addition to James Clifford's contributions see also, 
George Marcus and Michael Fischer, Anthropoloay as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in 
the Human Sciences, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986) 
Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthmpoloaist as Author. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988) 
345see for example, Shaun Moores, Interpretina Audiences: The EthnQamphy of Media Consumption. 
(London, Sage, 1993),pp62-65 
David Morley, Television. Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London, Routledge, 1992), ppI89-190 
Marie Gillespie. Teleyisjon. Ethnicity and Cultural Chauae. (London, Routledge, 1995), pp74-75 
346see for example, Avtar Brah, Cartoaraphies of DiasPOra, (London, Routledge, 1996), p208 
Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), p17 
34There is also a potential for 'new' audience studies to expand its critical dialogue with Clifford's 
contributions by paying more attention to his insights into the evolving (travelling) nature of cultures. 
This may help overcome the ethnocentric character of much 'new' audience research. 
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works which (and to which 'new' audience studies is attracted) is concerned with 
advocating more self-reflexive studies of cultures that openly address the issue of 
'how cultural analysis constitutes its objects - societies, traditions, communities, 
identities - in spatial terms and through specific spatial practices of research '348. I 
should note, of course, that Clifford's work is not without its critics349, but its 
usefulness lies in efforts to balance empirical observation with cultural theorisation, 
whilst contesting the parameters and limits of each. 
I want to end this chapter with a more critical discussion of the methodological 
position advocated by 'new' audience researchers in their preference for qualitative 
over quantitative techniques. To contextualise and delineate my argument, it is useful 
to consider briefly the origins of quantitative research before assessing 'new' 
audience critiques. 
Re-situating the Quantitative Survey as a Serious Mode of Investigation 
Positivist sociologists are generally acknowledged as the first to develop quantitative 
approaches for studying human behaviour. Central to their investment in quantitative 
techniques is a belief that the logic, methods and procedures of the natural sciences 
(such as chemistry, physics and biology), can be adapted to study human beings. 
Positivists argue that, in the same way that the natural scientist isolates, controls and 
measures natural variables, so the social scientist can do the same with social 
variables. 
One of the earliest studies applying the principles of natural science to understanding 
human behaviour was that of Emile Durkheim3so• In summary, Durkheim's study 
undertook a detailed examination of official suicide statistics from various countries 
in Europe. He observed that the suicide rate in each society was fairly constant, but 
348James Clifford, 'Travelling Cultures', in Cultural Studies, edited by L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. 
Treichler, (London, Routledge, 1992), p97 
349see for example, van der Veer, 'The Enigma of Arrival: Hybridity and Authenticity in the Global 
Space', in Debatin& Cultural Hybrldity, edited by P. Werbner & T. Modood, (London, Zed Books, 
1997), pp92-93. Also in the same volume, John Hutnyk, 'Adorno at Womad: South Asian Crossovers 
and the limits of Hybridity-Talk', pp127-128 
3.50Suicide: A Study jn Socjolo&y, (Glencoe, Free Press, 1897 (1951» 
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that rates of suicide were significantly different between societies and between 
different social groups. For example, rates were higher among urban populations, 
Protestant communities, adults and unmarried individuals, and lower amongst rural 
populations, Catholic communities, young people and married individuals. By 
establishing various statistical correlations between suicide rates and the social 
situations of individuals, Durkheim concluded that suicide was less likely to be 
committed by individuals with strong community and/or family ties. Durkheim 
viewed his investigation into the causes of suicide as a clear illustration that social 
forces can be isolated and treated as observable facts. By identifying consistent and/or 
irregular patterns between various observable phenomena social behaviour could be 
explained in terms of cause and effect relationships. 
The work of Durkheim and other positivists deems psychological factors or non-
observable phenomena, such as people's opinions and motives, unimportant as 
regards the causes of human behaviour. Because of positivists' emphasis on directly 
observable behaviour and their belief that social science, like natural science, can be 
objective and value free, they prefer research methods concerned with quantification 
and systematic data collection such as questionnaires and structured interviews. 
From this brief outline of the rationale underlying quantitative techniques, it is easy to 
see why 'new' audience researchers have felt little need for structured questionnaires 
and interviews within the trajectory of their work. For it is precisely the subjective 
elements in the process of meaning construction, disregarded by positivists and 
immeasurable through methods geared to collect standardised quantifiable responses, 
that 'new' audience researchers openly seek to identify and interpret However, the 
limitations of quantitative research cannot be overcome by simply adopting 
qualitative methods. I illustrate this by, firstly, questioning Morley's criticisms of the 
ceteris paribus assumptions underlying quantitative techniques, and secondly, by 
reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the application of the ethnographic 
approach within 'new' audience studies. 
In summary, the four ceteris paribus assumptions identified by Morley constitute a 
simplistic critique of quantitative methods. This is because Morley fails to 
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differentiate between the variety of statistical data gathering techniques. The 'passive 
people meter' is the focus for Morley's criticisms, which are presented as though they 
apply to all quantitative methods. This is misleading. It is not appropriate here to 
engage in a comprehensive evaluation of the relevance of Morley's comments to each 
method (e.g. postal survey; telephone questionnaire; head-counting; structured 
interview) emerging from the 'positivist tradition'. However, two general 
observations indicate the weakness of Morley's critique. 
Firstly, the phrase 'passive people meter' has been coined, as Morley observes, 'to 
refer to a computerised, camera-like device attached to each set in the household, 
which uses an 'image recognition' system to identify who is actually present in front 
of which sets, and when'351. The device is equipped to count nothing else other than 
the number of people in the room when the television is switched on, and is, therefore, 
open to all of Morley's criticisms. But the singular concern of the 'passive people 
meter' cannot be taken to be representative of all quantitative techniques. This can be 
easily illustrated by referring to the questionnaire deployed in my own survey (see 
Appendix C). It incorporated questions to elicit such varied information as the 
respondent's personal income (see question 45(b» and type of household in which 
they were residing (see questions 47 and 48), as well as the number and type of 
domestic technologies within the home (see questions I and 2) and the company in 
which individual texts were likely to be consumed (see questions II and 23). In 
chapter 4, some of the responses to my questionnaire were crosstabulated to identify 
trends and irregularities in respondents' usage of films on videotape. My own survey 
is thus evidence of how it is possible for quantitative techniques to contextualise and 
measure audience behaviour as a complex activity which is unequally affected by a 
number of variables. Being able to obtain this type of information gives rise to a 
second doubt about Morley's criticisms: that quantitative surveys need not treat 
viewers as isolated units and their decisions need not be presented as wholly 
independent of all other factors. 
I draw attention to these points not in order to call for a wholesale endorsement for 
quantitative methods, but to encourage ongoing critical engagement with quantitative 
351Televjsion. Audiences and Cultural Studies, (London. Routledge. 1992). pl74 
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techniques. Such an engagement needs to be undertaken without losing sight of the 
different qualities afforded by in depth ethnographic work compared to statistical 
correlations. In this respect, I do agree with Morley and others that quantitative 
techniques can only establish associations between variables, and that qualitative 
inquiries enable a more detailed insight into the precise relationship between different 
variables, such as, for example, how exactly income levels affect the significance of 
particular media technologies and texts in people's everyday routines. This admission 
may be highlighted by 'new' audience scholars as evidence that, because uncovering 
the specific meanings and reasons for particular audience behaviour and viewer 
reactions is precisely the objective of their work, quantitative techniques should 
accordingly be rejected. My response to this is that the particular objective of 'new' 
audience researchers does not lessen my comments about the reductive way in which 
they have tended to criticise quantitative methodologies. Nor does it detract from my 
overall argument that, 'new' audience research, and cultural studies in general, would 
benefit from a more serious critical engagement with statistical data collection 
techniques, which I now establish with more force. 
Ang points out that, 'studying media audiences is not interesting or meaningful in its 
own right, but becomes so only when it points towards a broader critical 
understanding of the peculiarities of contemporary culture,3s2. Ang's comment is 
clearly constructed to clarify the purpose and value of studying what might be 
considered everyday mundane activities such as 'watching television'. She reasons 
that the audience is not an 'object of study' but along with other routine non-audience 
practices is a 'discursive trope' which can offer detail insights into the structures of 
contemporary cultural formations, and therefore. also, the cultural dynamics of 
contemporary societies. In other words, individual stories or actions are meaningless 
unless they can be shown to tell us something about the bigger picture. With regard to 
this it is perhaps useful to point out that most 'new' audience studies make some 
reference to overall trends. These are sometimes based on anecdotal evidence. as in 
Hobo's identification of 'black women's overwhelming positive response to !he... 
Colour Purple,3S3. At other times they draw on actual quantitative data. as in Ang's 
3S2Livina Room Wars. (London. Routledge. 1996). p4 
3S3Black Women as Cultural Readers, (New York. Columbia University Press. 1995) 
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albeit implicit reference to audience ratings in order to establish the 'worldwide 
popularity of Dallas,354. In this sense qualitative research is more generally put into 
context by reference to quantitative studies or observations. It would therefore be 
much more appropriate to establish a methodological debate which is not governed by 
a dismissal of one mode of research in the course of promoting another, but is 
informed by Gillespie's reasoning that, the methodological aim must be 'to overcome 
the polarity between qualitative and quantitative methods and to assess their 
compati bility ,355. 
There is another fundamental reason why ongoing critical dialogue with quantitative 
methods would be of benefit to practitioners engaging in qualitative study. It may help 
them avoid reproducing, in their own work, the limitations and weaknesses levelled at 
'positivist' approaches. For example, in spite of their emphasis on documenting the 
complex and dialogic relationship between text and audience, many qualitative 
studies have failed to identify and articulate the different readings and positions 
occupied by individuals in relation to the media beyond the confines of the essentialist 
categories of age, gender and ethnicity. The weakness permeating a number of studies 
is aptly summarised in Brunt's commentary on Morley's Nationwide work, 
[ ... J while Morley presents the groups he researches as real social entities with 
an unstructured empirical mix of gender, age and ethnic identity, he also 
insists on formally categorising each group for the purposes of analysis in 
terms of one homogenous class identity - with the result that the real 
complexity of each group and its collective decodings of the television text is 
not an object to be investigated, but a problem to be circumvented in order to 
discover "consistency and similarity of perspective within groups'u~. 
Brunt's observation underlines the fact that the drawbacks of quantitative research are 
not simply or automatically overcome by adopting qualitative techniques. The 
354WatchioK Dallas, (London, Metheun, 1985) 
3s!]'elevisjon. Ethnjcity and Culluml Chanle, (London, Routledge, 1995), pS2 
356Rosalind Brunt, 'E~gaging with the Popular: Audiences for Mass Culture and What to Say about 
Them', in Cultural Studjes, edited by L. Grossberg, C. Nelson & P. Treichler. (London. Routledge. 
1992), p74 
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ordering and categorisation of individual responses is something that ethnographic 
data also has to undergo, and therefore requires as much methodological scrutiny as if 
it were produced by quantitative methods. 
The more specific criticisms Brunt directs at Morley's study indicate a wider 
methodological complacency pervading' new' audience research. As Gillespie notes, 
'much audience and reception research in cultural studies 1 ... 1 pays too little attention 
to methodological issues 1 ... 1 with little or no reference to how data was gathered, in 
what type of contexts, from what kind of subjects,3S7. One of the consequences of this 
is that much of the empirical work within' new' audience studies may not always be 
in synch with the fundamental research principles advocated by its leading scholars. 
For example, Ang, Morley and others repeatedly criticise quantitative audience 
studies for divorcing the subject from the actual or 'natural' context of viewing and 
argue that empirical audience studies should be conducted in the physical setting 
where viewing is engaged. Yet, as Women Viewin~ Violence and Bobo's study 
testify, conducting research in its 'natural' setting is not a feature shared by all 'new' 
audience studies. In this respect another critical observation to be made is that the 
emphasis on the 'natural' setting is perhaps simplistically borrowed from the field of 
anthropology, without any serious assessment of its relevance for measuring audience 
activity. For instance, although much television consumption is undertaken in the 
sitting room, a significant amount of critical interaction around television programmes 
takes place outside of the domestic context, in places as varied as the playground, 
office or public house. Interestingly Lynn Schofield Clarke in her review of Ellen 
Seiter's book Television and New Media Audiences358 notes how Seiter in her own 
empirical research doesn't adequately address her own criticism of many 
ethnographic 'new' audience studies not meeting the standards of ethnography as it is 
applied in cultural anthropology. As Clarke points out, Seiter herself relies upon 
repeated interviews with parents, preschool teachers and day care providers. Clarke 
argues that this should not be viewed as a weakness but a strength in that' Seiter 
perhaps inadvertently enables media scholars to move away from the geographically-
35Television. Ethnicity and Cultural Cbanae, (London, Routledge. 1995). p55 
358(Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2(00) 
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limited notions of "culture" as the ideal boundaries within which an ethnography must 
be conducted'359. Thus, the process of meaning construction cannot be confined to the 
specific moment and space in which the act of viewing takes place. It occurs both 
before and after the act of viewing, and with individuals who may have been involved 
in acts of viewing communally, separately, or not at all. 
Despite its shortcomings, the methodological stance of 'new' audience studies has 
provided a useful basis for underscoring the importance of empirical investigation to 
advancing abstract theories of 'cultural hybridity' as an ideological framework for 
understanding everyday racial and cultural relations. This is not to suggest that 
abstract theorising is wholly redundant. The strength of theorising in the abstract lies 
in the capacity to occupy a creative space to think freely which, in the end, is vital for 
generating new vocabularies, new perspectives and new outlooks that offer the real 
possibility of overwhelming already exhausted and often obsolete concepts and 
structures of interaction and debate. This is in fact one of the strengths of 
contemporary theories of' cultural hybridity', in their explicit attempts to break out of 
the tiresome 'mutually exclusive' terminology for debating dynamics of 'race' and 
difference. Nevertheless, to exploit the potential of theories of 'cultural hybridity' for 
disrupting existing structures and relations, such theories cannot remain in the 
abstract. For them to do so is to run the risk of ambiguous interpretations and 
judgements about everyday cultural realities. Nowhere is this illustrated more clearly 
within the content of this thesis than in the vastly different interpretations of Muslim 
cultural politics offered by Bhabha and Said, two leading advocates of 'cultural 
hybridity', compared with my own empirical analysis, presented in chapter 6. 
359see www.co\orado.eduljournaJism/ mcmlword_paperslselter-tv-audience-review.doc -
Conclusion 
This thesis has contested contemporary theoretical conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' 
in the context of two contrasting aspects of cultural interaction and identity 
negotiation integral to the everyday lives of sections of the South Asian population in 
Britain. Although the empirical data drawn upon was generated some eight to ten 
years ago it has provided a useful context for situating and contesting abstract 
conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' within contemporary processes of identity 
formation and negotiation. Moreover, the contrasting nature and focus of the two 
empirical enquiries, into the use of Indian and popular/mainstream films on videotape 
and negotiations of being Muslim, has brought to light the contradictory and complex 
ways in which the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' are experienced and negotiated in 
everyday contexts. 
With respect to my central concern in this thesis of assessing the potential for 
mobilising a countercultural politics built on the principles of 'cultural hybridity', one 
that disrupts fixed boundaries of 'race' being used as a basis for unequal relations of 
power and subordination, the empirical findings across the two case studies highlight 
three fundamental observations. Firstly, they emphasise that there are no guaranteed 
racially transgressive outcomes arising from the process of hybridisation. It is 
possible, as underscored by the audience survey presented in chapter 4, that cultural 
outlooks and subjectivities negotiated through the process of hybridisation may 
reinforce, as much as overwhelm, racial and cultural hierarchies360• Secondly, these 
contradictory outcomes demand that to identify and exploit the transgressive potential 
of 'cultural hybridity' it is necessary to look beyond its most debated and celebrated 
feature, i.e. the ability to feel at ease and interact with culturally distinct forms. What 
is required is a more complex understanding of the precise structure and dynamics 
characterising individual experiences and negotiations of multiple cultural influences 
- an understanding which is alert to and able to distinguish between, the kind of cross-
360Shalini Puri also makes a similar conclusion in her recent examination of caribbean cultural 
formations. Puri contests abstract cultural forms, e.g. novels, theatre productions and carnival, not just 
as expressions of hybridity but also for their contribution to, what she describes as a 'politics of 
equality'. Her analysis highlights an irresolvable dialectic between discourses of 'complicity' and 
'resistance'. See her book, The Caribbean Postcolonial, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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cultural dialogues that reinforce a hierarchical ordering of racial and cultural 
differences from the kind of cross-cultural dialogues that oppose and disrupt 
processes of racialisation and their ideological bases. Thirdly. the empirical 
contestation of theoretical conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' undertaken in this thesis 
has brought to light the inadequate attention given to the position and outlook of 
dominant 'others'. Ultimately a racially transgressive cultural politics can only be 
effective if it is supported and advanced by individuals in both dominant and 
subordinate positions. 
These three observations are the focus for this concluding section. I take and expand 
on each in turn to draw out the strengths and limitations of using the work of 
hybridity theorists as a framework for understanding contemporary dynamics of 'race' 
on the one hand, as well as identifying a transgressive cultural politics on the other. 
The Process of Cultural Hyridisation and the Circumvention of Racial and 
Cultural Hierarchies 
The two empirical studies presented in this thesis both generated evidence 
highlighting how racial and cultural hierarchies may be circumvented through the 
process of hybridisation. In the case of the audience survey. it was found that across 
the sample of respondents there was a relatively high rate of consumption of both 
Indian and popular/mainstream films. However, there was also a tendency to view 
Indian films as aesthetically inferior to popular/mainstream films. As such the overall 
patterns of critical interaction and perceptions of the two categories of film were 
identified as reinforcing dominant Western discourses which perceive cultures of the 
East as being inferior to those of the West The second case study examining young 
Muslim identities presented a somewhat different, but no less explicit, arrangement of 
superior/inferior cultures which the respondents were actively trying to distance 
themselves from. Many of the individuals participating in the second case study 
expressed dissent towards the ethnically divisive constructions of being Muslim 
asserted by their parents/elders for whom religious affiliation and country of 'origin' 
were inseparable markers of identity formation creating an even more exclusive 
identity (i.e. Pakistani Muslim) than one defined simply by religion or country of 
'origin'. In this instance whilst there was no endorsement of the West as a superior 
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entity there was nevertheless a pattern of identity formation upholding mutually 
exclusive boundaries of group differences which seek to resist inter-ethnic group 
mixing. 
Both these trends, it could be argued, do not correspond to the kind of negotiations of 
'cultural hybridity' charted by hybridity theorists. For instance, as I pointed out in 
chapter 4, the arrangement of Indian and popular/mainstream films along a 
superior/inferior continuum relates to individual responses to cultural forms produced 
by other people as opposed to personal cultural expressions or outlooks forged 
through interaction of multiple cultural locations (see pl94). With reference to the 
exclusive conceptions of' Pakistani Muslim' identified in the second case study, I 
established in chapter 6 that this particular identity formation was more akin to Hall's 
description of ethnicity based on regressive ideas of nationalism (see p259). However, 
both these respective interpretations of the research findings promote a reductive 
conception of 'cultural hybridity'. The respective findings should not be viewed as 
being external to the dynamics of 'cultural hybridity' but as providing a critical 
insight into the inescapably complex and contradictory ways in which the process of 
hybridisation unfolds. Here it is useful to present the respective empirical findings in 
the context of Paul Gilroy's assertion that modern black cultures can be read as both a 
response to and a reflection of the' antinomies of modernity'. By doing so it will be 
possible to begin to identify the dynamics underlying the circumvention of racial and 
cultural hierarchies within hybrid cultural expressions. 
Modem black cultures and the 'antinomies of modernity' 
Gilroy's work highlights both the strengths and limitations of positioning modem 
black cultures as a 'counterculture' to modernity and, more specifically, the dynamics 
through which systems of racial subordination and discrimination are maintained in 
contemporary societies. He writes, '[ t Ihe intellectual and cultural achievements of the 
black Atlantic populations exist partly inside and not always against the grand 
narrative of Enlightenment and its operational principles,)61. This emphasis on 
understanding modern black cultures as both a response to and a reflection of 
modernity's inability to establish freedom and equality for all, what Gilroy calls the 
361The Black Atlantic, (London, Verso, 1993), p48 
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'antinomies of modernity' (see pp93-95), invites an interrogation of black cultural 
expressions as providing an insight into those features and dynamics of modern 
relations which continue to suppress narratives of emancipation. In this regard the 
empirical research presented in this thesis provide an opportunity to single out 
particular features of modernity which circumvent racial and cultural hierarchies - in 
sum from the audience survey it is the 'new' logic of capital, and from the study of 
young Muslim identities it is systems of classification and order which impose a 
linear arrangement of time/space dynamics. 
'New' logic of capital 
In chapter 4 I noted that the dynamics behind the greater visible presence of an Indian 
film culture in Britain supported Hall's observation of the role of advanced 
capitalism, and in particular its predisposition to satisfy rather than suppress cultural 
differences. The available evidence reviewed indicated that amongst South Asians in 
Britain, like other minority ethnic groups, the purchase of new media technologies 
was significantly higher than the indigenous population. The popularity and pattern of 
usage of new media technologies amongst migrant populations was specifically linked 
to the ability to access culturally diverse programmes not satisfied by terrestrial 
broadcasting but made possible by such technologies as the video recorder and 
cable/satellite television. However, my observations about the changes in the 'cultures 
of interaction' surrounding Indian films suggests that the 'new' logic of capital should 
not simply be applauded for accommodating cultural differences but, recognised and 
examined as the central terrain on which cultural differences are being articulated and 
experienced in modern societies. In this regard the particular direction of change 
currently taking place with regards to the production and consumption of popular 
Indian films on videotape suggests that the dynamics of capitalism do not afford a 
space where cultural differences can be articulated without any limitations on their 
capacity to challenge or disrupt the dominant order. 
My analysis specifically identified how the working practices and structures of film 
production in Hollywood were being used as a framework for introducing changes to 
the Indian film industry (see pp 182-188). Whilst these particular trends did not 
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threaten the distinctive narrative style of Indian films, such as the centrality of musical 
and dance sequences, their impact on changing the 'cultures of interaction' 
surrounding Indian films was more easily discerned. In sum, changes such as the 
contract secured by Twentieth Century Fox to market and distribute Indian films as 
well as plans endorsed by the Indian government to introduce multiplex screens could 
be seen to encourage the cultures of production and consumption of Indian films to 
become increasingly like the cultures of production and consumption of 
popular/mainstream films. The likely impact of these trends was linked to a kind of 
celebratory multiculturalism where aspects of migrant cultures, such as food and 
clothes, become increasingly visible within mainstream society without disrupting the 
status quo. The significance of these findings for the process of hybridisation is that as 
Sanjay Sharma observes, 'cultural difference is being articulated in a capitalist social 
formation which controls and neutralizes counter-cultural movements,362. As such the 
logic of capitalism itself can be singled out as imposing a certain framework of 
interaction which controls and limits the ability of migrant cultures to evolve in a 
manner that intervene specifically Western modes of economic and social interaction 
as the primary driving force behind cultural change. 
The circumvention of superior/inferior continuums within culturally fragmented 
identities and subjectivities underscores the point that debates about the transgressive 
capacity of 'cultural hybridity' cannot be confined to simply identifying interaction 
with distinct cultural forms. This unfortunately has been the popular take-up of 
'cultural hybridity' and is reflected in Ashwani Sharma's concern that '(u]nder the 
rhetoric of hybridity, new forms of ordering have emerged with their own implicit 
liberal value judgements about cultural hierarchy,363. Sharma's concern that an 
uncritical celebration of hybrid ethnic cultures leaves new forms of exploitation and 
social suffering (re)produced by the logic of contemporary capitalism unchallenged, is 
an appropriate point to highlight two other features of modernity that suppress racially 
transgressive cultural change. These can be identified from my study on young 
362'Noisy Asians or 'Asian Noise'?', in Dis-Qrjentina Rhythms, edited by S. Sharma, J. Hutoyk & A. 
Sharma, (London, Zed Books, 1996), p55 
363'Sounds Oriental', in Dis-Orjentina Rhythms, edited by S. Sharma, J. Hutoyk & A. Sharma, 
(London, Zed Books, 1996),p29 
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Muslim identities and relate to systems of classification and order which impress a 
linear conception of time/space dynamics on modern relations. To illustrate this I 
want to refer to differences between Shagufta, Ayesha and Noshin's negotiations of 
the veil and dominant perceptions of veiled women. 
Systems of classification and the imposition of linear conceptions of time and space 
Popular conceptions which associate the veil as a form of female oppression offer a 
static interpretation that does not accommodate the 'polyvalency of the veil' - i.e. the 
veil's meaning and impact on women's lives changes as it is positioned and 
negotiated in different social and historical contexts. In chapter 6 I reflected on 
Shagufta, Ayesha and Noshin's changing relationships to veiling and highlighted how 
their most recent negotiations of the veil, as providing them with a sense of 
independence and control over their own bodies, stood in contrast to earlier 
experiences where they had witnessed the use of the veil/hijab in some Muslim 
societies and households as a means of controlling women's behaviour. 
Shagufta, Ayesha and Noshin's narratives further highlighted how dominant reactions 
to their decisions to wear the hijab represented a tendency to draw on stereotypes 
through which the veiled woman's identity is predetermined by the act of wearing the 
hijab and not the personal meaning she herself invests in wearing it. The positioning 
of the veil as having the same meaning and impact for all times and all places is 
representative of a system of classification and order which imposes a linear 
conception of time and space and can be shown to be centrally significant in 
maintaining ongoing conflicts between 'Islam' and 'the West'. Because on listening 
to Noshin, Ayesha and Shagufta what emerges is a set of narratives that represent 
alternative experiences, views and responses to not just the veil, but to the challenges 
of the modern world. Yet, instead of engaging this difference, which could form the 
basis for drawing new alliances and fresh insights into modem societies, dominant 
Western discourses dictate that veiled women are remnants of an oppressive past. In 
effect what starts off as a highly personal modem encounter with the veil, or being 
Muslim, becomes inserted into a common sense, modem versus premodern, 
framework of debate. The result being that veiled women are denied the opportunity 
to explore their relationship to the veil in critical dialogue with women of other 
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cultural and political persuasions as most of their time is spent justifying their 
existence and convincing others they really are not oppressed. The more these 
dynamics intensify, veiling becomes a matter of principle, and 'unveiling' becomes an 
act of conforming or submitting to Western conceptions of femininity. And so the 
cycle of conflict between Islam and the West goes on. Ayesha asserts the point 
succinctly when she says: 
+A: I personally believe that the postmodern really really does reinforce orientalist 
stereotypes. You know, particularly with globalisation and mass media and 
consumerism. It reinforces this sort of, yes freedom and restrictiveness, you 
know freedom is good, restrictiveness is bad, you have the choice, you have 
the this. But, it's just like, oh ironically when I have made the choice to choose 
Islam as my way of life I am shunned for it 
This cycle of interaction whereby alternative experiences of the veil are suppressed by 
linear conceptions of time/space dynamics was a key observation identified in chapter 
6 running across the experiences of the respondents participating in the second case 
study. The respondents relayed a huge distance between their personal negotiations of 
a Muslim lifestyle and dominant perceptions of what constitutes being Muslim. This 
distance often resulted, as Mustafa's narrative vividly highlighted (see pp222-22S), in 
personal and alternative 'routes' (such as love and respect as opposed to blind 
submission) to foregrounding Islam as the primary axis of identification being 
undermined by a highly racialised framework of interaction. Thus, experiences of 
being Muslim become predominantly framed in an acrimonious context, of constantly 
challenging racial stereotypes of Muslims which overshadow the diverse and 
culturally fragmented negotiations of being Muslim. 
The above observations about the circumvention of racial and cultural hierarchies on 
the one hand, and the suppression of racially transgressive identities by dominant 
discourses on the other, pose two challenges for identifying and advancing the 
transgressive capacity of' cultural hybridity'. The first is to distinguish between 
negotiations of multiple cultural influences that reinforce superior/inferior continuums 
of racial differences from those that disrupt mutually exclusive boundaries of 'race'. 
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And the second is to break the power of dominant discour es to uppress the impact 
of contemporary social and cultural formations that disrupt established boundaries of 
' race ' . I address these two challenges in turn. 
Distinguishing Two Structure of Cross-Cultural Interaction 
I have already noted that a fundamental observation emerging from the two pieces of 
empirical research is that ' cultural hybridity ' does not guarantee racially transgre sive 
outcomes because just as it is possible for the negotiation of mUltiple cultural 
influences to transgress racial boundaries it is also po ible for the negotiation of 
multiple cultural influences to result in more exclu ive boundarie of ' race ' . Having 
said that, the contrasting outcome provide a po ition from which to make a 
theoretical distinction between dynamic of hybridi ation that open up pos ibilitie 
for racially tran gressive cultural outlooks to emerge from those that circumvent a 
hierarchical organisation of racial and cultural difference. To unpack thi distinction 
I want to reflect on the overall generational difference emerging from the second 
case study with respect to the positioning of I lam in relation to other axes of 
identification. The generational differences and what they tell u about different 
structures of cross-cultural interaction are best illustrated through two Venn diagrams. 
The first Venn diagram (see Diagram I) repre ent the re pondent ' de criptions of 
the process of identity negotiation engaged by their parent lelders in which 
'Pakistani ' and 'Muslim' are in eparable marker of identification. 
Diagram 1 
Muslim 
Pakistani- Muslim 
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In the above illustration, interaction of the two axes of difference is organised such 
that being 'Pakistani Muslim' becomes confined to the exclusive space marked by the 
overlapping of the two entities. Specific instances relayed by the respondents such as 
affiliations to local mosques being determined by 'country of origin'; or, celebrating 
Eid on a particular day because the rest of the family is going to do it; or, restricting 
choice of marriage partners to 'Muslims' whose family share the same national 
heritage as one's own, expose how the interdependency of axes of difference can 
actually function to establish more exclusive identities. The process is perhaps best 
described as a kind of cultural merger which, as the Venn diagram vividly exposes, 
establishes an 'inner' circle. And this is the structure of cultural interaction being 
imposed on the respondents by their parents. The introduction of additional axes of 
difference within this particular structure would simply create more and more 
exclusive identities - i.e. the presence of additional sets simply decreases the 
overlapping space. 
With this background in mind it is possible to present the respondents' objections to 
being described in hyphenated terms as a direct outcome of their struggle to resist 
more exclusive cultural boundaries. Beyond this their own negotiations of being 
Muslim signify a reorganisation of the particular structure of cross-cultural interaction 
being imposed upon them. The respondents' desires to authenticate Islam and free it 
from 'foreign' influences, as described in chapter 6 (see pp254-258), enables the 
category Islam, or Muslim, to float more independently amidst a variety of other axes 
of difference. The Venn diagram is thus revised in that sets no longer overlap, but as 
illustrated in Diagram 2, manoeuvre independently in an expansive space where 
cultural collision and fusion is possible but not pre-determined. The meaning of 
Islam, and hence the experience of being Muslim, then takes shape depending on the 
axes of difference with which it collides and has already collided, and the character of 
the actual collisions. 
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Diagram 2 
The contrasting structure and outcomes of cross-cultural interaction described above 
reinforce a main argument running acro s my analy is of the two case tudies that the 
popular take lip of 'cultural hybridity' with it focll on identifying the fu ion of 
distinct cultural forms has perhap detracted attention away from where our focus 
should be in as essing the tran gressive qualitie of hybrid cultural formations. This 
was, in fact , a main weakne identified in aid and Bhabha ' commentarie on the 
cultural politic of Mu lim (ee pp279-283). Their respective interpretation of the 
public unity expre sed by Mu lims a symboli ing a homogenous conception of Islam 
failed to acknowledge the internal difference and negotiation of being Mu lim 
among t the Muslim prote tor . More importantly, a the empirical finding of the 
second ca e tudy empha ise, the foregrounding of one overriding axi of 
identification ueh a I lam doe not foreclo e the po ibilitie of cro -cultural 
dialogue or racially tran gre ive cultural outlook . In that en e the value of u ing a 
trueture of cro -cultural interaction a pre ented in Diagram 2 i that it draw the 
focu of emphasi away from establi hing that axe of identification have overlapped , 
or fu ed, and on to tracking the preci e character of how different axe of 
307 
identification may have intermingled and how they may have transformed each 
other's meanings. 
Ultimately the racially transgressive qualities of hybrid cultural expressions must be 
measured by the extent to which racialised forms of power and subordination are 
challenged and replaced by non-racialised frameworks of interaction. In this regard 
the final observation emerging from this thesis that I wish to highlight is the role of 
the identity politics of indigenous Western populations in advancing the capacity of 
'cultural hybridity' to disrupt unequal relations of power and subordination. 
Identity Politics of Indigenous Western Populations 
The delineation of a 'progressive' cultural politics has been a central motivating factor 
behind the work of Hall, Gilroy, Rattansi, Brah and other theorists of 'cultural 
hybridity'. Thus, although their focus has predominantly been on migrants settled in 
the Wesf64, the underlying objective of hybridity theorists has been to theorise ways 
in which racially diverse populations might reside and converse with each other in a 
manner that embraces 'cultural difference' and at the same time renounces practices 
of oppression and discrimination. For example, Brah's conception of the 'universal' 
within the particular; Gilroy's vision of global emancipation; Rattansi's call for the 
de-essentialisation of ethnicity; and Hall's identification of 'new ethnicities' as central 
to the erosion of racial hierarchies, all advance the notion of shared values, or in 
Brah's words 'commonalty of conditions', amongst people of different backgrounds 
and status. In this regard there is a very important part of the objective set by 
hybridity theorists that has yet to be seriously interrogated within their work i.e. the 
identity politics of indigenous Western populations. 
In making this point it should be noted that specific aspects of the work of the writers 
examined in this thesis were drawn upon in preceding chapters (such as Gilroy's 
description of the 'frog's perspective' (see ppI69-172); and Rattansi's observation 
about the 'intertwining of racist and anti-racist discourses' (see pp222-225» to pose 
critical questions about the impact of dominant Western identities and subjectivities 
3640n this point, as was noted in chapter 1, Rattansi's work can be differentiated from the other writers 
in that his postmodem frame does not foreground the experiences of migrants. Having said that, even 
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on the process of 'cultural hybridisation'. It is also fair to acknowledge that Brah's 
concept of 'diaspora space' in which the native becomes a diasporian as much as the 
diasporian becomes a native, and Rattansi's 'postmodern frame' which is careful not 
to foreground the position of one ethnic group over another to make sense of modern 
relations, both seek to balance the weight of emphasis between 'coloniser' and 
'colonised', according each a significant role in shaping a future where an 
individual's position in society is not determined by categories of 'race'. However, 
these theoretical concessions within the respected works have not resulted in any 
decisive shift in contemporary debates of 'cultural hybridity' which addresses the fact 
that a more comprehensive insight into the racially transgressive potential of 'cultural 
hybridity' can only be gleaned by expanding the current focus on the 'migrant 
condition' to include contestations of 'cultural hybridity' from the position of the 
dominant 'other'. The importance of this point was underscored in the second case 
study which highlighted how diverse Muslim subjectivities and identities signifying 
Hall's conception of a 'politics of representation' were being suppressed by dominant 
discourses (see pp239-245). These findings drew attention to the fact that if we are to 
emphasise the 'drawing of alliances' between two opposing positions, i.e. dominant 
and subordinate, then we need to be able to theorise 'shifts' from the perspective of 
both those positions. This is a complex and contradictory task to grasp, let alone begin 
to engage with. Its complexity might be best illustrated through reference to Gilroy's 
appropriation of the 'frog's perspective' and the development of a new notion - the 
, giraffe's perspecti ve' . 
The signifICance of the 'giraffe'S perspective' to the transgressive potential of 
'cultural hybridity' 
Gilroy utilises the notion of the 'frog's perspective' to describe the position of blacks 
as 'looking from below upward' (see pp96-97). Using this analogy it might be argued 
that the position of 'whites' reflects that of a 'giraffe's perspective', looking from 
above downward. A cultural politics committed to establishing non-racialised and 
more equal relations must be able to envisage how these two positions, whose 
historical outlook and foresight has been shaped from opposite ends of the 'colonial 
encounter', can arrive at a shared conviction to overcoming ongoing racisms. That the 
in Rattansi's work there is a tendency to focus on the migrant perspective to identify progressive 
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'migrant condition' has been the predominant focus for contemporary theorisations of 
'cultural hybridity' indicates an overriding gap within this work if indeed it is to 
provide an avenue through which to advance racially transgressive cultural change. 
Even if, 'migrants' or diaspora formations can be referred to as 'prototypes' for 
developing more democratic relations and a progressive cultural politics, theorising a 
transgressive cultural politics from the perspective of migrants can only be effective if 
it can be shown to have resonance with the identities and subjectivities of indigenous 
Western populations. In reality there are obvious contradictions involved in 
foregrounding one perspective as a position from which to chart the journey of two 
opposing positions to a shared political location - one cannot simply acquire the 
insight of the other. What is in effect required is a contestation and understanding of 
'cultural hybridity' from both the 'frog's' and 'giraffe's' perspectives charting their 
respective 'routes' to a shared political location. And it is more than likely that as the 
journey to a progressive cultural politics is charted from the position of the 'giraffe's 
perspective' that there is recourse to identify and develop new notions that are vastly 
distinct from 'double consciousness'~ 'dislocation' and perhaps even 'hybridity' and 
'diaspora' . 
The notion of the giraffe's perspective indicates that contemporary conceptions of 
'cultural hybridity' provide an incomplete framework for envisaging a transgressive 
cultural politics built on the principles of hybridity. Moreover, the current work on 
'cultural hybridity' may have encouraged more complex conceptions of the black 
subject but the focus has still very much remained on the 'migrant' for charting a 
future where people's life chances are not defined by categories of 'race',36S. In that 
notions of culture and politics as in his support for Hall's conception of 'new ethnicities'. 
36SAs some writers have argued (see for example, Richard Dyer 'White', in ~ (vol. 29, no.4, 
Autumn 1988); Stuart Hall, 'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities', in Culture. 
Globalisation and the World System, edited by A. D. King, (London, Macmillan, 1991), pp41-68; and 
Clare Pajaczkowska & Lola Young, 'Racism, Representation, Psychoanalysis', in 'Race', Culture and 
Difference, edited by J. Donald & A. Rattansi, (London, Sage, 1992), ppl98-219», the dearth of 
material describing European cultures and identities, and more specifically notions of 'Englishness' 
and 'whiteness', is not because the indigenous populations of Europe are any less ethnic, racial or 
cultural than people from Africa, Asia or the Caribbean. Rather, it is due to a "denial of imperialism ... 
the blankness of the identity of empire covers an ambivalence which is often unconscious, and which, 
consequently, can most readily be perceived in the representations it creates of the colonial 'other'" 
(Pajaczkowska & Young, 1992: p.202). The steady growth in literature examining historical 
constructions of white identity in recent years may provide a useful resource to begin to expand 
conceptions of 'cultural hybridity' from the perspectives of white people. See for example, Catherine 
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sense the foregrounding of the 'migrant condition' has perhaps inadvertently 
reinforced mutually exclusive experiences of 'race' and culture which is precisely the 
scenario that contemporary theories of 'cultural hybridity' have been trying to 
overcome. 
The empirical research presented in this thesis has underscored that whilst the work of 
hybridity theorists provides a framework through which to conceive how 'races' and 
cultures do not, and need not, evolve in mutually exclusive ways, their work has been 
unable to make any significant interventions to the everyday racialised realities of 
blacks living in the West. The primary focus on the creative cultural expressions of 
the children of post-war migrants whose visibility in mainstream Western discourses 
has been encouraged by the 'new' logic of capitalism has proved an inadequate 
position from which to respond to alternative narratives of modernity and also 
crucially of 'hybridity'. The subtle ways in which the process of hybridisation 
unfolds, as highlighted by the recreation of an Indian film culture by post-war 
migrants as well as the reinterpretation of the teachings of Islam amongst young 
Muslims, have not only failed to attract attention in the work of hybridity theorists but 
sometimes (as in Gillespie's interpretation ofthe desire of Asian elders to recreate 
cultural traditions, and Bhabha and Said's commentaries of the cultural politics of 
Muslims) been read as antagonistic to the principles of 'cultural hybridity'. Moreover, 
it is these more subtle negotiations of cultural differences that have been shown in this 
thesis to hold the most promise for overcoming unequal relations of power and 
subordination. In that sense to appreciate the racially transgressive character of 
hybridity it is necessary to move attention away from identifying the ease with which 
individuals may interact with multiple cultural influences to examining how 
individuals define/negotiate the meanings of specific axis of identification. 
Hall, Ciyilisjna Subjects. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2(02); Ruth Frankenberg, ed., 
DjspJacioa Whiteness, (North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1997); Richard Dyer,~, (London, 
Routledge, 1997); Vron Ware and Les Back, Out of Whjteness. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
2(02) 
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In essence, this thesis has highlighted that negotiations and experiences of 'cultural 
hybridity' are much more complex and contradictory than envisaged in current 
debates. Borne out of the critical limitations of the anti-racist and multicultural 
initiatives of the 1970s and 80s (as signified by Hall's notion of the 'end of the 
essential black subject') the body of work examined in this thesis remains a very 
second generation black British conception of 'cultural hybridity'. The limitations 
emanating from this for identifying and exploiting the racially transgressive potential 
of 'cultural hybridity' are only partially touched upon by the observations above about 
the 'giraffe's perspective'. For, the effectiveness of 'cultural hybridity' to disrupt 
racialised structures of power and subordination once and for all is dependant upon 
the ability to respond to and politically unite a variety of perspectives and positions 
from which the modern condition of 'cultural fragmentation' is experienced. This 
would require contestations of 'cultural hybridity' from not just the position of both 
blacks and indigenous populations of the West but also non-migrants/indigenous 
populations of the East, Western migrants settled in the East, twice migrants and so 
on. 
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APPENDIX A 
Pilot Questionnaire 
SOUTH ASIAN FILM I VIDEO AUDIENCES 
ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
MIDDLESEX 
UNIVERSITY 
This questionnaire is part of a three year research project funded by Middlesex University 
and the British Film Institute. 
The purpose of the research is to identify the ways in which people of South Asian descent 
make use of video tapes. The kind of things we want to find out about South Asian audi-
ences includes the type of films watched on video tape; the effects of cable and satellite 
television on the use of video tapes; the use of video tapes in relation to watching televi-
sion or going to the cinema and so on. 
The questionnaire does not ask you to give your name and address and so COMPLETE 
CONFIDENTIAUTY IS GUARANTEED. 
COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
When filling in the questionnaire it is important that you answer the questions as they apply 
to YOU, even though you may live with people whose choice and preferences of films and 
television programmes may differ from yours. 
Most of the questions require you to answer by ticking the appropriate box or boxes. 
Please read the small print in brackets which will tell you whether you are allowed to tick 
more than one box. 
There are a few questions which require you to provide more detailed answers. You can 
answer these questions by writing in the space provided. 
On completing the questionnaire place it in the pre-paid provided envelope and post it to 
us as soon as possible. 
If you require further information or would like to be kept informed on the progress of this 
research then please write to: 
Bilkis Malek 
Middlesex University 
White Hart Lane, 
London 
N17 aHR 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR nME AND CO-OPERATION. 
Date: 
1. Age: ___ years 
2. Sex: 
3. Marital Status: 
SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS 
male 
female 
o 
CJ 
(please tick one) 
CJ married 
single 
divorced 
co-habiting 
separated 
widowed 
CJ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
4. (a) Where were you born? 
(please tick one) 
o 
(b) Ethnic Group: 
England 
Bangladesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
East Africa 
o 
o 
o 
CJ 
o 
Other 0 
(please tick one) 
Bangladeshi 0 
Indian 0 
Pakistani 0 
Sri Lankan CJ 
Other 0 
5. Which languages do you speak fluently? 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
(please tick all that apply) 
6. Religion: 
English 0 
Bengali 0 
Urdu 0 
Gujerati 0 
Punjabi 0 
Hindi CJ 
Tamil 0 
Other 0 
Hindu 
Muslim 
Sikh 
Buddhist 
Christian 
None 
Other 
(please tick one) 
CJ 
CJ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
CJ 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
7. In which area do you live? 
(please specify the borough and postcode only) 
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8. What is your highest educational qualification? 
(please tick one) 
C.S.E.'s 0 
16+ Q 
o level Q 
G.C.S.E. Q 
A level 0 
B.T.E.C. 0 
G.N.V.Q. 0 
H.N.D. 0 
B.A.lB.S.C. 0 
M.A.IM.S.C. 0 
Ph.D 0 
Other 0 
(please specify) 
9. Which political party do you vote for? 
(please ticIc one) 
Conservative 0 
Labour 0 
Uberal Democrats 0 
Green 0 
None 0 
Other 0 
(please specify) 
10. (a) \MIat is your occupational status? 
(please ticIc one) 
employed full time 0 
employed part time 0 
self-employed 0 
government training scheme 0 (go to question 11) 
unemployed 0 (go to question 11) 
housewifeJhousehusband 0 (go to question 11) 
full time student 0 (go to question 11) 
part time student 0 (go to question 11) 
retired (J (go to question 11) 
other 0 
(please specify) 
Psge2 
(b) Take a look at the following categories and tick the box which best describes your main occupation: 
(please tick one) 
higher managerial I professional 
ego managing director; barrister; professor; 
principal; doctor; chief executive CI 
Intermediate managerial I professional 
ego lecturer; social worker; teacher; estate 
agent; computer programmer; journalist; 
ward sister; police inspector; bank 
manager; shop owner / manager 
Jtmior managerlall professional 
ego factory supervisor; research assistant; 
police constable; nurse CI 
skilled manual workers 
ego engineer; plumber; painter/ decorator 
semi and unskilled workers 
ego shop assistant; postmen/women 
waiter/ waitress; cleaner I:l 
If you are not sure which category best describes your occupation then write down your job title here: 
11 . (a) What type of accommodation do you live in? 
12. 
(please tick one) 
own private houselflat 0 
guardian/parents' private houselflat I:l 
rented council houselflat 0 
rented private houselflat CJ 
hostel 0 
other Cl 
(please specify) 
(b) How long have you lived at your present address? 
(a) How many people (including yourself) live in your household? 
(b) Please provide the following details of members of your household: 
list each persons 
relationship to you (eg. father, 
daughter, friend, partner) 
Key (for Occupation) 
male female 
(please tick one 
(or each pefSon) 
I:l 
o 
o 
o 
(J 
I:l 
o 
o 
o 
I:l 
o 
(J 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1 . higher managerial I professional 
their age 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
their occupation 
(please enter the appropriate 
mmbet from the key below) 
ego managing director; barrister; professor; principal; doctor; chief executive key continued on page 4 
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2 . Intermediate managerial I professional 
ego lecturer; social worker; teacher; estate agent; computer programmer; journalist; ward sister; police 
inspector; bank manager; shop owner I manager 
3. Junior managerlaV professional 
ego factory supervisor; research assistant; police constable; nurse 
4. skilled manual workers 
ego engineer; plumber; painter' decorator 
5 . semi and unskilled workers 
ego shop assistant; postmen' women; waiter 'waitress; cleaner 
6. other 
student; retired; housewife I househusband; government training scheme; unemployed 
If you are not sure which category beat describes the persons occupation then write 
down their Job title Instead of 8 number. 
SECTION B: NEWSPAPERS I MAGAZINES I RADIO 
13. Take a look at the following list of newspapers. 
Tick one box for each newspaper you read to indicate how often you read each paper. 
Use the blank spaces at the end of the list to write the names of any other newspapers that you may read. 
Don't forget to tick a box for each addition you make. 
Newspaper 
Daily Express 
Daily Mail 
Daily Mirror 
Daily Sport 
Daily Star 
Daily Telegraph 
Evening Standard 
The Guardian 
The Independent 
The Sun 
The Times 
Today 
Asian Times 
Eastern Eye 
Gujerati Samaacha 
Independent on Sunday 
Observer 
Sunday Express 
Sunday Telegraph 
Sunday Times 
Weekend Guardian 
The Voice 
(please tick one box lor each newspaper }W read) 
every more than once fort- once a 
day once a week a week nightly month 
Q Q Q Q Q 
o 0 000 
o 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 0 
Q 0 Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
o 0 0 0 0 
o 0 0 0 Q 
o 0 000 
Q Q Q Q Q 
o Q Q Q 0 
o 0 000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
Q 0 Q 
o 0 0 0 0 
o 0 DOD 
o 0 0 0 0 
occas-
ionally 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
Q 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
14. Please write the names of the magazines you read regularly (if you do not read any then please write 
'none' next to 1.): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
P8ge4 
15. Take a look at the following list of radio stations. 
Tick one box for each radio station you listen to, to indicate how often you listen to each station. 
Please use the blank space at the end of the list to write the names of any other radio station(s) that you 
may listen to. Don't forget to tick a box for each addition you make. 
16. 
(please tick one box tor each radio station you listen to) 
most at least occas-
days once a week ionally 
BBCRadio 1 0 
BBCRadi02 0 
BBC Radio 3 0 
BBCRadi04 Q 
BBCRadi05 0 
Capital FM 0 
Sunrise 0 
Spectrum 0 
JazzFM 0 
ClassicFM 0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
SECTION C: VIEWING/LISTENING EQUIPMENT 
How many of the following pieces of equipment do you have in your home? 
(please tick one per column) 
satellite cable 
television video radio hi-fi/stereo computer receiver box 
none 0 0 0 0 0 0 
one 0 0 0 0 0 0 
two 0 0 0 0 0 0 
three 0 0 0 0 0 0 
four 0 0 0 0 0 0 
more than four 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17. If there is a computer (or computers) in you home, what do you use your computer(s) for? 
(please tick all that apply) 
There are no computer(s) in my home 0 
I do not use the computer 0 
word processing 0 
computer games 0 
desk top publishing 0 
accounts 0 
music 0 
other(s) 0 
(please specify) 
18. Please specify how many of each type of equipment are: 
(p/eBse enter the number) 
satellite cable 
television video radio hi-fi/stereo computer receiver box 
rented 
bought 
gifts 
borrowed 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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1 9. Please specify how many of each type of equipment are in which rooms: 
(please enter the number) 
satellite cable 
television video radio hi-fi/stereo computer receiver box 
lounge 
sitting room 
own bedroom 
other bedrooms 
kitchen 
bathroom 
other rooms 
SECTION D: FILMS & VIDEOTAPES 
20. Do you ever watch films on video tape? 
Yes CJ (complete the rest of this section) 
No CJ (go to section E) 
21. (a) Do you ever rent or borrow films on video tape? 
Yes CJ 
No CJ (go to question 22) 
(b) Do you or any member(s) of your household have membership for any of the following? 
(please tick one for each category) 
Yes No 
public library with 
video section CJ CJ 
video shops specialising 
in Indian films CJ CJ 
mainstream video shops 
ego Blockbusters CJ CJ 
local shops 
ego grocers / newsagents CJ 
other(s) CJ 
(please specify) 
(c) How often do you rent or borrow films on video tape from each of the following categories? 
every 
day 
family or friends CJ 
public library with CJ 
video section 
video shops specialising CJ 
in Indian films 
mainstream video shops CJ 
eg. Blockbusters 
local shops CJ 
ego grocers I newsagents 
other(s) (J 
(please specify) 
(please tick one for each category) 
more than once fort-
once a week a week nightly 
CJ CJ CJ 
CJ CJ CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ (J (J 
CJ (J 
once a 
month 
0 
CJ 
CJ 
(J 
occas-
ionally 
0 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
never 
CJ 
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22. (a) Do you ever buy films on video tape? 
Yes 0 
No 0 (go to question 23) 
(b) Where do you buy films on video tape from? 
(please tick all that apply) 
video shops 0 
local shops 
ego grocers I newsagents 0 
High Street Stores 
ego W H Smiths 0 
video shops specialising 
in Indian films CJ 
mainstream video shops 
ego Blockbusters CJ 
other(s) Cl 
(please specify) 
(c) Please give the titles of the films on video tape you have bought in the last twelve months: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
23. How often do you watch films on video tape? 
(please tick one) 
everyday 0 
more than once a week 0 
once a week 0 
2-3 times a month 0 
less than once a month 0 
occasionally 0 
24. Which days of the week are you most likely to watch films on video tape? 
(please ttck all that apply) 
weekdays Cl 
Saturday 0 
Sunday Cl 
no specifiC day 0 
25. What time of day are you most likely to watch films on video tape? 
(please tick all that apply) 
morning (9am to 12pm) CJ 
afternoon (12pm to 5pm) 0 
early evening (5pm to 8pm) 0 
evening (8pm to 11pm) 0 
after 11pm 0 
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26. (a) What factors influence your choice offilm? 
(please tick all that apply) 
actors/actresses Q 
director Q 
themeslissues Q 
storyline Q 
language Q 
(please specify) 
other(s) Q 
(please specify) 
(b) What type of films do you like to watch? 
(please tick all that apply) 
horror 0 
science fiction Q 
romance Q 
action Q 
comedy Q 
true stories Q 
musicals 0 
western Q 
thriller 0 
fantasy Q 
cartoon 0 
martial arts Q 
others 0 
(please specify) 
27. With reference to Indian and mainstream Hollywood films on videotape which of the following statements 
applies to you? 
I only watch Indian films and never watch mainstream Hollywood films 
I only watch mainstream Hollywood films and never watch Indian films 
I watch mainly Indian films and occasionally mainstream Hollywood films 
I watch mainly mainstream Hollywood films and occasionally Indian films 
I watch about the same number of both Indian and mainstream Hollywood films 
I never watch Indian films and I never watch mainstream Hollywood films 
28. How often do you watch films on video tape classified as: 
(please tiel< one per category) 
most at least occas- don't 
days once a week ionally never know 
U Q 0 0 Q a 
PG Q Q a Q a 
12 Q Q Q (J Q 
15 Q a a Q Q 
18 Q Q Q (J Q 
29. Who are you most likely to watch films on video tape with? 
(please tick one) 
on your own Q 
spouse/partner (J 
parents (J 
children (J 
other family Q 
friend(s) (J 
other(s) (J 
(please specify) 
depends on type of film Q 
(brlefIyexplaln) 
(please tick one) 
Q 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
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30. (a) Do you ever watch films on video tape at someone else's home? 
Yes 0 
No o 
(please specify who) 
(go to question 31) 
(b) Do the films on video tape you watch in your own home differ in any way from those you watch 
elsewhere? 
Yes 0 
No 0 (go to question 31) 
(c) If Yes, briefly explain how they differ: ________________ _ 
31 . (a) What other types of videos do you watch, other than films? 
(please ttck aI/lIlat apply) 
I don't watch any other type of videos CJ (go to question 32) 
music videos CJ 
keep fit videos CJ 
sports videos CJ 
cartoons CJ 
television programmes CJ 
other(s) CJ 
(plasse specify) 
(b) Tick the box which best describes how often you watch these videos: 
(please ttck one box for each t)Ipe of video )OU walch) 
every more than once fort- once a occas-
day once a week a week nightly month ionally 
music videos 0 0 0 0 0 0 
keep fit videos 0 CJ 0 0 0 0 
sports videos 0 0 0 0 0 0 
cartoons 0 0 0 0 0 0 
television programmes 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other(s) 0 CJ 0 0 0 0 
(pleaSe specify) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
(p19as6 specify) 
0 0 0 CJ 0 0 
(please specify) 
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32. Do you ever use your video recorder to record programmes from: 
(i) television? Ves Cl ~~~~~ ~ ______________________________ _ 
(What SOft of prograrrmes) 
No Cl _______ ~~~ _______________________________ ~~ 
(briefly explain whY}lOu don't record programmes off televfsion) 
(ii) cable/satellite tv? Ves D __ ~_~ ___________________ . __ ~~ ________ _ 
(What SOft of programmes) 
No Q 
(briefly explain why}lOU don't record programmes off cable/satell/te tv) 
SECTION E: CABLE/SATELLITE TELEVISION 
33. Is your area wired for Cable? 
Yes D 
No Q 
Don't know Q 
(go to Section F) 
34. Does your household subscribe to cable/satellite television? 
Yes Q 
No Q 
(go to question (a» 
(go to question (b» 
(a) If yes, briefly outline the reasons why you or members of your household decided to subscribe to 
cable/satellite television (and then go onto question 35): 
(b) briefly outline the reasons why you or members of your household decided not to subscribe to cablel 
satellite television (and then go onto section F): 
Page 10 
35. How long has your household been subscribing to cable/satellite tv? 
(please tick one) 
less than 6 months 0 
6 months 0 
1 year 0 
2 years 0 
3 years 0 
4 years 0 
more than 4 years 0 
36. Which additional channels are purchased by your household? 
(please tick all that apply) 
none 0 
Sky Movies 0 
Sky Movies Gold 0 
The Movie Channel 0 
Home Video Channel 0 
TV Asia 0 
Other(s) 0 
(please specify) 
37. Which channels do you use the most? List up to 4 starting with the most frequently viewed: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
38. How has cable/satellite tv affected your use of the following? 
(please tick all that apply) 
(a) television stopped watching specific programmes 0 
watch less television in general 0 
video tape more television programmes 0 
has had no effect Q 
(please tick all that apply) 
(b) video tapes purchase fewer Indian films on video tape 0 
purchase fewer mainstream/Hollywood films on video tape Q 
rent fewer Indian films on video tape 0 
rent fewer mainstream/Hollywood films on video tape 0 
has had no effect 0 
(please tick all that apply) 
(c) cinema make fewer visits to the Cinema 0 
make same number of visits but watch fewer Indian films Q 
make same number of visits but watch fewer mainstreamlHollywood films 0 
has had no effect 0 
39. On averaae how many films do you watch on cable/satellite tv? 
(please tick one) 
more than one per day 0 
one per day 0 
3-4 per week 0 
2-3 per month 0 
less than one per month 0 
hardly ever/never 0 
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40. What kind of films are you most likely to watch on cable/satellite tv? 
(please tick aJllhat sppIy) 
Indian films 0 
mainstreamJl-lollywood films 0 
other(s) 0 
(please specify) 
SECTION F: CINEMA 
41. On averaae how often do you go to the cinema? 
(please tick one) 
more than once a week Q 
once a week 0 
2-3 times a month 0 
once a month 0 
occasionally 0 
twice a year 0 
once a year 0 
never 0 (go to section G) 
other 0 
(please specify) 
42. Who are you most likely to go to the cinema with? 
(please tick one) 
on your own Q 
spouse/partner 0 
parents 0 
children 0 
other family 0 
friend(s) 0 
depends on type of film 0 
(brieRy explain) 
43. What kina of films are do you tendto watch at the cinema? 
(please tick aJllhat sppIy) 
Indian films (J 
mainstreamJl-lollywood films (J 
other(s) (J 
44. Which cinema(s) are you most likely to go to? 
(please tJcIc one) 
Iocalcinema(s) (J 
West End cinema(s) (J 
other(s) Q 
depends on type of film (J 
(plellB8 specify) 
(brtetlyexplaln) 
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SECTION G: TELEVISION 
N.B. The questions In this section are related to British terrestrial television I.e. BBC1, BBC2, 
lTV and Channel 4, NOT cablalsatellite television. 
45. On averaae how much time do you spend watching television in a week? 
Tick one box for each of the three days: 
(please tick one for each column) 
None 
less than 1 hour 
1 to 2 hours 
2 to 3 hours 
3 to 4 hours 
4 to 5 hours 
more than 5 hours 
weekday 
o 
o 
o 
CJ 
o 
o 
o 
46. Who are you most likely to watch television with? 
Saturday 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
CJ 
(please tick one) 
on your own 0 
spouse/partner 0 
parents 0 
children 0 
other family 0 
friend(s) 0 
depends on the programme and time of day 0 
(briefly explain) 
47. Which television programmes do you watch regularly? please list: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
48. Are there any programmes which you choose never to watch? please list: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Sunday 
o 
CJ 
o 
CJ 
o 
CJ 
o 
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SECTION H: GENERAL 
49. Where are you most likely to get your information on films from? 
(please tick all that apply) 
advertsltrailers on video tape Cl 
poster(s) Q 
friendslfamily Q 
television Q 
(please specify which tvprogrammes) 
cable/satellite tv Q 
(please spedfy which channels) 
radio Q 
(please specify which stallon) 
newspapers Q 
(please state which) 
magazines Q 
(pieasestate which) 
other(s) Q 
(please specffy) 
50. Which of the following offers you the widest choice in your taste of films? 
(please tick one) 
video shops Cl 
the cinema Q 
British terrestrial television (J 
ownlfamily video collection (J 
friend(s) video collection Cl 
cable/satellite tv Cl 
(please spedfychBIJneI(s)) 
other Q 
(please specffy) 
51. (a) Where do you prefer to watch films? 
(please tick one) 
at home Cl 
someone else's home CJ 
at the cinema CJ 
other CJ 
(please specify) 
(b) Briefly outline the reasons for your preference: 
52. (a) Please write the names of up to 5 films you have seen in the last six months and tick the box which 
indicates where you saw them: 
(please lick one for each calBgofy) 
cable/ 
Film Title video satellite tv cinema British tv 
1. (J Cl Cl (J 
2. Cl Cl Cl Cl 
3. (J CJ Cl (J 
4. Cl Cl Cl Cl 
5. (J Cl Cl (J 
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(b) Who did you watch each of these films with? 
(please t#ck all that apply) 
spousel other 
alone partner children family friends 
Film 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Film 2 0 0 0 0 CJ 
Film 3 0 0 CJ Q Q 
Film 4 CJ Q CJ 0 Q 
FilmS 0 0 CJ CJ CJ 
53. Please write the names of up to five of your all time favourite films and how many times you have seen them: 
title number of times 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
54. Please write the names of up to five actors/actresses who you particularly like: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
PLEASE USE THE SPACE BELOW TO WRITE DOWN ANY OTHER 
COMMENTS OR INFORMATION YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD: 
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APPENDIXB 
Community Organisations for 
Pilot Survey 
Group A - a drop in centre for 14-25yr olds held in a youth club. 
Sessions are held every day of the week except Saturdays. All the 
activities are held in one room and include pool; chess; table top football 
and there is also a TV and video available. On Sundays a number of the 
users play for the same football team and tend to use the Sunday session 
as an after game social. Over 95% of the users are male most of whom 
are of Bengali background. 
Group B - also a drop in centre for young people though the users are 
of a slightly older age range (18-30yrs) than Group A and reflect a 
more diverse ethnic make-up (Indian, Pakistani and Bengali being the 
main ethnic composition). The group is based in a centre that is used by 
a number of local groups throughout the week. Facilities include a gymn 
(used mainly to play badminton); outdoor tennis courts and football 
pitch (these can only be used in the summer as there are no floodlights); 
a table tennis and pool room. A further two rooms are available for 
discussion based activities. There is only one session a week which is 
held on Sundays 5.30-9.30pm. Once again the majority of users are 
male. 
Group C - runs one weekly session (Sundays 2-5.30pm) in the same 
venue as Group B and offers the same facilities and activities to its 
users, the only additional activity being a drama class. The group is 
aimed at families with the children mainly engaged in sports and play 
activities whilst the parents use the time to chat to each other and plan 
the occasional social/cultural event. The majority of families attending 
the group are of Bengali origin and the average age group of the 
children is 7-16yrs. 
Group D - runs typing and word-processing courses aimed at the local 
South Asian population. The classes are held every Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday and are attended solely by women mainly of 
Indian, Pakistani and Bengali background. The average age group of the 
women is 18-35yrs. This group is part of a larger organisation which 
also offers courses related to Indian arts / culture. 
Group E - has its own centre and functions primarily as a luncheon 
club. Although it is aimed and mainly used by middle-aged and elderly 
people of South Asian descent the luncheon club also attracts individuals 
from various employment / professional and ethnic backgrounds. Some 
older members of the South Asian population also use the centre for 
basic advice as well as a meeting place for a chat. 
APPENDIXC 
Revised Questionnaire 

SOUTH ASIAN FILM I VIDEO AUDIENCES 
ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
MIDDLESEX 
UNIVERSITY 
This questionnaire is part of a three year research project funded by Middlesex University 
and the British Film Institute. 
The purpose of the research is to identify the ways in which people of South Asian descent 
make use of films on video tapes and to highlight any gaps and absences perceived by 
them. The kind of things we want to find out about South Asian audiences includes the 
type of films watched on video tape; the effects of cable and satellite television on the use 
of video tapes; where video tapes are obtained from and so on. The questionnaire is 
aimed at individuals aged 16 and above. 
The questionnaire does not ask you to give your name and address and so COMPLETE 
CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED. Please be assured that the Information In this 
questionnaire will be used solely for the research project and for no other purposes. 
COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
When filling in the questionnaire it is important that you answer the questions as they apply 
to you, even though you may live with people whose choice and preferences of films may 
differ from yours. 
Most of the questions require you to answer by ticking the appropriate box or boxes. 
Please read the small print in brackets which will tell you whether you are allowed to tick 
more than one box. 
There are a few questions which require you to provide more detailed answers. You can 
answer these questions by writing in the space provided. 
On completing the questionnaire return it to the organisation or group where you received 
it. 
If you require further information or would like to be kept informed on the progress of this 
research then please write to: 
Bilkis Malek 
Middlesex University 
White Hart Lane, 
London 
N17 aHR 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND CO-OPERATION. 
SECTION A: VIEWING EQUIPMENT 
1. (a) How many television sets do you have in your home? 
(please tic/( one ) 
none 10 
one 20 
two 30 
three 40 
four 50 
more than four 60 
(b) How many video recorders do you have in your home? 
(please tiel< one) 
none 10 
one 20 
two 30 
three 40 
four 50 
more than four 60 
(c) How many cable boxes do you have in your home? 
(please tick one ) 
none 10 
one 20 
two 30 
three 40 
four 50 
more than four 60 
(d) How many television sets are connected to a satellite receiver in your home? 
(please tick one) 
none 10 
one 20 
two 30 
three 40 
four 50 
more than four 60 
2. Which of the following pieces of equipment do you have in your own bedroom? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
television 
video recorder 
cable box 
Yes No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
television connected to a satellite receiver 1 0 20 
none of these 1 0 20 
SECTION B: FILMS " VIDEOTAPES 
Part 1: Indian Films on Videotape 
When filling in this questionnaire please feel free to consider both earlier and more recent Indian films ego 
Pakeeza; Kagaaz Ke Phool; 1942 A Love Story; Mohra; Baazigar and so on. 
3. Do you ever watch Indian films on video tape? 
Yes 10 
No 20 (go to Question 15) 
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4. On a v er age how often do you watch Indian films on videotape which have been rented and I or 
borrowed from: 
(a) family or friends? (please tiel< one) 
everyday 1 Q 
more than once a week 2 Q 
once a week 3 Q 
fortnightly 4Q 
once a month 5 Q 
occasionally 6Q 
never 7Q 
(b) public library with video section? 
(please tick one) 
everyday 1 Q 
more than once a week 2 Q 
once a week 3 Q 
fortnightly 4Q 
once a month 5 Q 
occasionally 6 Q 
never 7Q 
(c) video shops specialising in Indian films? 
(please tick one) 
everyday 1 Q 
more than once a week 2 Q 
once a week 3 Q 
fortnightly 4 Q 
once a month 5 Q 
occasionally 6 Q 
never 7Q 
(d) mainstream video shops (eg. Blockbusters)? 
(please tick one) 
everyday 10 
more than once a week 2 Q 
once a week 3 Q 
fortnightly 4Q 
once a month 5 Q 
occasionally 6 Q 
never 7Q 
(e) local shops (eg. grocers I newsagents)? 
(please tic/( one) 
every day 1 0 
more than once a week 20 
once a week 30 
fortnightly 40 
once a month sa 
occasionally 6a 
never 70 
5. Are you generally satisfied with the rental price of Indian films on videotape? 
(please tic/( one) 
Yes 1a 
No 2 a _--::""-:-::-_~-:-_-.".---:-~...".-.,--__ (brIetIy _sin )'IV dissatisfaction) 
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6. Are you generally satisfied with the picture and sound quality of Indian films on videotape? 
Yes 10 
No 20 _---::---:-::_-:-:_---::---:;-;-----:;--;--__ (briefly explain your dissatisfaction) 
7. (a) Do you ever buy Indian films on video tape? 
Yes 10 
No 20 (go to question 8) 
(b) Where do you buy Indian films on video tape from? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
Yes No 
high street stores 
ego Virgin Megastore, HMV, W H Smith 10 20 
mainstream video shops 
ego Blockbusters 10 20 
local shops 
ego grocers I newsagents 10 20 
video shops specialising 
in Indian films 10 20 
other(s) 10 
(please specify) 
(c) Please give the titles of the Indian films on video tape you have bought in the last twelve months: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
8. (a) List the names of any actors/actresses (past or present) who you particularly like to see in Indian 
films (if there aren't any please write 'None'): 
(b) List the names of any Indian film directors (past or present) whose films you particularly like to see (if 
there aren't any please write 'None'): 
9. (a) Which of the following factors are moat likely to influence you to actually watch an Indian film? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
dance 
music 
songs 
special effects 
themeslissues 
storyline 
actors I actresses 
director(s) 
other(s) 
Yea No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
1 (J 2(J 
10' 20 
10 20 
10 
(please specify) 
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(b) Do you like to see any of the following in Indian films? 
(please tick one box for each category) 
Ves No Don't Mind 
violence 10 20 30 
romance 10 20 30 
comedy 10 20 30 
fighting 10 20 30 
fantasy 10 20 30 
other(s) 10 
(please specify) 
10. On averaae how many Indian films do you watch on videotape (bought and lor rented)? 
(please tick one) 
more than one a day 1 0 
oneaday 20 
3-4aweek 30 
one a week 40 
2 - 3 a month 50 
1-6ayear 60 
less than this 70 
never 80 
11 . Who are you most likely to watch Indian films on video tape with? 
(please tick one) 
on your own 1 0 
spouse/partner 20 
parents 30 
children 40 
other family 50 
friend(s) 60 
other(s) 70 _~ ___ -::--:--______ _ 
(please specify) 
depends on type of film 80 
(briefly explain) 
12. Which days of the week are you most likely to watch Indian films on video tape? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
weekdays 
Saturday 
Sunday 
no specific day 
Ves No 
10 
10 
10 
10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
13. What time of day are you most IIkelv to watch Indian films on video tape? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
morning (9am to 12pm) 
afternoon (12pm to 5pm) 
early evening (5pm to 8pm) 
evening (8pm to 11 pm) 
after 11pm 
Ves No 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
14. (a) Do you reaularly watch Indian films on videotape in places other than your own home? 
(please fIcI( Yes or No for each categoly) 
community centres 
arts centres 
library with video viewing facilities 
friends I neighbours home 
other(s) 
Ves No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 
Page 4 
Part 2: Popular I Mainstream Films on Videotape 
When filling in this questionnaire please feel free to consider both earlier and more recent popular I 
mainstream films ego Terminator; Four Weddings And A Funeral; Gandhi; Bhaji On The Beach; Gone With The 
Wind; The Magnificent Seven and so on. 
15. Do you ever watch popular I mainstream films on video tape? 
Yes 1 CJ 
No 2 CJ (go to Question 27) 
16. On averaAe how often do you watch popular I mainstream films on videotape which have been 
rented and lor borrowed from: 
(a) family or friends? 
(please tick one) 
every day 1 CJ 
more than once a week 2 CJ 
once a week 3D 
fortnightly 4CJ 
once a month 5 CJ 
occasionally 6 CJ 
never 70 
(b) public library with video section? 
(please tick one) 
every day 1 CJ 
more than once a week 20 
once a week 3 CJ 
fortnightly 40 
once a month 50 
occasionally 60 
never 70 
(d) mainstream video shops (eg. Blockbusters)? 
(please tick one) 
everyday 10 
more than once a week 2 CJ 
once a week 3D 
fortnightly 40 
once a month 5 CJ 
occasionally 60 
never 7CJ 
(e) local shops (eg. grocers I newsagents)? 
(please tick one) 
every day 1 CJ 
more than once a week 2 CJ 
once a week 3 CJ 
fortnightly 40 
once a month 50 
occasionally 60 
never 70 
17. Are you generally satisfied with the rental price of popular I mainstream films on videotape? 
Yes 10 
No 2 0 _---::-~_~----::-__:-:-:-_:;__:__--(brletIyexplsin )'011 dlssalisfBCtJon) 
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1 B. Are you generally satisfied with the picture and sound quality of popular' mainstream films on 
videotape? 
Ves 10 
No 2 0 _--::--:-::-_-;....,.._--;;--.:-;--:;--~ __ (briefly explain your dissatisfaction) 
19. (a) Do you ever buy popular' mainstream films on video tape? 
Ves 10 
No 20 (go to question 20) 
(b) Where do you buy popular 'mainstream films on video tape from? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
Yes No 
high street stores 
ego Virgin Megastore, HMV, W H Smith 10 20 
mainstream video shops 
ego Blockbusters 10 20 
local shops 
ego grocers' newsagents 10 20 
other(s) 10 
(please specify) 
(c) Please give the titles of the popular' mainstream films on video tape you have bought in the last 
twelve months: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
20. (a) List the names of any actors' actresses (past or present) which you particularly like to see in 
popular' mainstream films (if there aren't any please write 'None'): 
(b) List the names of any popular I mainstream film directors (past or present) whose films you 
particularly like to see (if there aren't any please write 'None'): 
21 . (a) Which of the following factors are moat likely to influence your choice of popular' mainstream 
films? 
(please tJcIc Yes or No for each category) 
dance 
music 
songs 
special effects 
themeslissues 
storyline 
actors' actresses 
director(s) 
other(s) 
Yes No 
10 20 
1(l 20 
1Q 20 
10 20 
1(l 20 
1(l 20 
1Q 20 
1(l 2Q 
1(l 
P8{J86 
(b) What type of popular / mainstream films do you like to watch? 
(please tick one box for each category) 
Ves No Don't Mind 
horror 10 20 30 
science fiction 10 20 30 
romance 10 20 30 
action 10 20 30 
comedy 10 20 30 
true stories 10 20 30 
musicals 10 20 30 
western 10 20 3D 
thriller 10 20 30 
fantasy 10 20 30 
cartoon 10 20 30 
martial arts 10 20 3D 
other(s) 10 
(please specify) 
22. On averaae how many popular / mainstream films do you watch on videotape (bought and / or 
rented)? 
(please tick one) 
more than one a day 1 0 
one a day 20 
3-4 a week 30 
one a week 40 
2-3 a month 50 
1-6ayear 60 
less than this 70 
never SO 
23. Who are you most likely to watch popular / mainstream films on video tape with? 
(please tick one) 
on your own 1 0 
spouse/partner 20 
parents 30 
children 40 
other family SO 
friend(s) 60 
other(s) 70 _~ ___________ _ 
(please specify) 
depends on type of film SO 
(brleflyexplain) 
24. Which days of the week are you most likely to watch popular / mainstream films on video tape? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
weekdays 
Saturday 
Sunday 
no specifiC day 
Ves No 
10 2(J 
10 2(J 
10 2(J 
10 20 
25. What time of day are you most likely to watch popular I mainstream films on video tape? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
morning (9am to 12pm) 
afternoon (12pm to 5pm) 
early evening (5pm to 8pm) 
evening (8pm to 11 pm) 
after 11pm 
Ves No 
10 20 
10 2(J 
10 2(J 
10 2(J 
10 20 
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26. (a) Do you regularly watch popular / mainstream films on video tape in places other than your own 
home? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
community centres 
arts centres 
library with video viewing facilities 
friends / neighbours home 
other(s) 
Yes No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 
(please specify) 
SECTION C: CABLE I SATELLITE TELEVISION 
27. Does your household subscribe to cable and/or satellite television? 
Yes 1 0 _---::---:-:::--=--~----:-:--:--::_:_~-----(briefly outline the reasons for subscribing) 
(go to Que.tlon 28) 
No 20 _---::---:-:::--____ --,-_:--:---::-:-:--___ _ 
(briefly outline the reasons for !19.!. subscribing) 
(go to Que.tlon 33) 
28. How long has your household been subscribing to cable/satellite tv? 
(please tick one) 
less than 6 months 1 0 
6 months - 1 year 20 
1-2years 30 
2-3years 40 
3- 4 years 50 
more than 4 years 60 
29. Which additional channels are purchased by your household? 
(please tICk Yes or No for each category) 
Sky Movies 
Sky Movies Gold 
The Movie Channel 
Home Video Channel 
TV Asia 
Other(s) 
Yea No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 2Cl 
10 2Cl 
1 Q _~.,..-__ ...,,...,..... _______ _ 
(please specify) 
30. Which channels do you use the mo,t? List upto 4 starting with the most frequently viewed: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
31 . What kind of films do you watch on cable / satellite tv? 
(please tJcIc Yes or No for each category) 
Indian films 
popular / mainstream films 
other(s) 
Yea No 
1Q 2Q 
1Q 2Cl 
10 __ ~~--~~--------------(please specify) 
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32. How has cable / satellite tv affected your use of films on videotape? 
(please tick Yes or No for each category) 
I purchase fewer Indian films on video tape 
I purchase fewer popufar / mainstream films on video tape 
I rent fewer Indian films on video tape 
I rent fewer popular / mainstream films on video tape 
SECTION 0: GENERAL 
Yes No 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
10 20 
33. Do you regularly watch films other than Indian or popular / mainstream films. 
(please tick one box for each category) 
Yes No ' '": - - . 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
African 
European 
Japanese 
Manga 
Art House 
other(s) 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
~asespeciM--------------------------
34. Which of the following offers you the widest choice in your taste of films? 
(please tick one) 
video shops 1 0 
the cinema 20 
British terrestrial television (BBC, ITV,Ch.4) 30 
ownlfamily video collection 40 
friend(s) video collection 50 
cable/satellite tv 60 __________________________ _ 
(pleasespecifychannel(s)) --
other 70 _______________________________ _ 
(please specify) 
3S. (a) Where do you preferto watch films? 
(please tick one) 
at home 10 
someone else's home 20 
at the cinema 30 
other 40 
--(p1ease~~)----------------
(b) Briefly outline the reasons for your preference: ____________ _ 
----------------------------------------------------------------
36. Please write the names of upto five of your all time faVOurite films and how many times you have seen 
them: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
number of times 
37. Please write the names of upto five of your all time favourite actors/actresses (past or present): 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
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SECTION E: PERSONAL DETAILS 
38. Which age group do you belong to? 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Sex: 
Marital Status: 
(please tick one) 
16-19 10 
20-24 20 
25-29 30 
30-34 40 
35-39 50 
40-44 60 
45 -49 70 
SO-54 ao 
55 -59 90 
60-64 100 
65+ 110 
male 
female 
married 
single 
divorced 
co-habiting 
separated 
widowed 
10 
20 
(please tick one) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
(a) Where were you born? 
(please tick one) 
England 10 
Bangladesh 20 
India 30 
Pakistan 40 
Sri Lanka 50 
East Africa 60 
Other 70 
(b) Ethnic Group: 
(please tick one) 
Bangladeshi 10 
Indian 20 
Pakistani 30 
Sri Lankan 40 
Other 50 
Which languages do you speak fluently? 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
(please specify) 
(please tick Yes or No tor each category) 
V .. No 
English 10 20 
Bengali 10 20 
Urdu 10 20 
Gujarati 10 20 
Punjabi 10 20 
Hindi 10 20 
Tamil 10 20 
Other 10 
(please specify) 
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43. Religion: 
Hindu 
Muslim 
Sikh 
Buddhist 
Christian 
None 
Other 
(plesse tick one) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 _____________ _ 
(plesse specify) 
44. What is your highest educational qualification? 
none 
16+ 
G.C.S.E. 
A level 
G.N.V.Q. 
10 
31:) 
50 
70 
90 
110 
(please tick one) 
C.S.E. 20 
Dlevel 40 
D.N.D. 60 
B.T.E.C. 80 
H.N.D. 100 
Higher Degree (MA I MScI PhD) 120 Degree (BA IBSc) 
Other 131:) _-:-;-___ ;:-: _______ _ 
(please specify) 
45. (a) What is your job status? 
(please tick one) 
employed full time 1 I:) 
employed part time 2 I:) 
self-employed 30 
government training scheme 40 
unemployed 50 
housewife/househusband 60 
full time student 70 
part time student 8 I:) 
retired 90 
other 100 
(plesse specify) 
(b) What is your personal gross annual income (including benefits) before stoppages? 
(please tick one) 
none 10 
upto£5,ooo 20 
£5,000 - 14,999 30 
£15,000 - 24,999 40 
£25,000 - 34,999 50 
£35,000 - 44,999 60 
£45,000+ 70 
46. In which area do you live?_---:-:--__ :-:--::-~--:--~---:---:----:-:--------
(please specify the borough IIIId postcode onty) 
47. (a) What type of accommodation do you live in? 
(please tick one) 
house 10 
flat 20 
bed sit 30 
hostel 40 
student residence on campus 50 
other 60 _____________ _ 
(please specify) 
(b) Is your household: 
(please tick one) 
owner-occupied 10 
rented 21.:) 
other 31.:) _______________ _ 
(please specify) 
Page 11 
(c) How long have you lived at your present address? 
(please tick one) 
less than 1 year 1 0 
1- 5 years 20 
6-10years 30 
11 - 15 years 40 
16 - 20 years 5 CI 
21 - 25 years 60 
more than 25 years 70 
48. (a) How many people (including yourself) live in your household? -:--:-__ -::-:-_ 
(please specify) 
(b) Do you live with members of your family? 
Yes 10 (go to (c» 
No 20 (go to (d» 
(c) Who lives with you? 
(please tick Blilhat apply) 
spouse 10 
mother 20 
father 30 
brother(s) 41:3 
(please specify how many) 
sister(s) 50 
(please specify how many) 
son(s) 60 
(please specify how many) 
daughter(s) 70 
(please specify how many) 
grandparent(s) 80 
(please specify how mww) 
grandchildren 90 
(please specify how many) 
other(s) 100 
(please specify how many) 
(d) If you do not live with members of your family, who do you live with? 
(please tick Bli that apply) 
I live on my own 1 1:3 
partner 20 
students 30 
(please specify how many) 
professionals 40 
(please specify how mlll/y) 
other(s) 51:3 
(please specify how many) 
(e) What is the gross annual income (including benefits) of your household (approximate calculations 
are okay)? 
(please ticIc one) 
none 11:3 
upto£5,QOO 21:3 
£5,000 - 14,999 31:3 
£15,000 - 24,999 40 
£25,000 - 34,999 50 
£35,000 - 44,999 60 
£45,000+ 70 
Thank you for completing thl8 que8tlonnalre. 
Please use the space overleaf to write down any other comment8 you would 
like to add. 
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APPENDIXD 
Graphical Illustrations of 
Survey Data 
I Figure 1: Area of residence 
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Figure 2: Proportion of responses from various groups 
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I Figure 3: Sex Breakdown 
Valid cases: 311 
Male 
49.8% 
I Figure 4: Age Breakdown 
Val id cases: 312 
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IFigure 5: Ethnic Groups 
Valid cases: 311 
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APPENDIXE 
Transcript of Group Discussion 
Date: 9th April 1997 
Time: 2p.m. to 3.45p.m. 
Venue: The Chapel, Middlesex University, Tottenham campus 
Participants: I (lshtiaq Hussain); J (Javed Iqbal); N (Noshin Ahmad); A (Ayesha Ahmad); 
S (Shagufta Y aqub); M (Mustafa Mohammed), 
Interviewer: B (Bilkis Malek) 
The discussion began with each individual introducing themselves. A handout was then circulated 
to each respondent which listed five possible themes for discussion (see chapter 5 p201 in main 
text). The group was informed that it was not necessary to follow the themes on the handout but to 
use them as possible points for dialogue and that other themes could be discussed as respondents 
feZt appropriate. At the end of these introductory points the respondents' permission was sought 
and obtainedfor tape recording the discussion. 
B: Does anyone want to volunteer to start or should= 
M: =1'11 start if you want 
B: Yeah sure= 
M: = Just to get it going. Well I mean I'm a I'm a convert or a revert. You know when I said 
this to someone once, they said 'what you were a Muslim and then you went away from 
Islam and you came back', and I said no no no! [group laugh] I'm a convert and I come 
from err a British family. And Islam for me is life, its the way I live my life. I can't, I don't 
have a western perspective where I erm to hold. Err sociology, psychology, politics, 
business, as a Muslim and everyone probably knows this, its all as one. 
B: How did you get introduced?= 
M: =To Islam? 
B: Yeah. 
[ 
M: I went to err India and I went to find out about yoga as I was very much into Hinduism 
and I ended up living in Kashmir in a Muslim community with a Muslim family. That was 
my first erm introduction to Islam which is very err a bit different to say now which, it's 
fundamentalist. And I didn't become a Muslim for nearly two years. I converted in 
Scotland [laughs], of all places [laughs]. 
B: Why Scotland? 
M: Err, I was working, I went there to go and work on a wolf sanctuary up there. 
B: A wolf sanctuary? 
M: Yeah, yeah. I did and I ended up doing what I always used to do, I used I used to sell arts 
arts graphics equipment and I ended up working for a company. And whilst I was there I 
went to the mosque. I went to the mosque and err I said that I know about Islam and he 
said to me 'Well why don't you become a Muslim' . I met with this most friendly person 
who invited me back to his house and it was from there. 
I 
N: With when you were in Kashmir like did you have any erm, like what was your sort of 
view of Islam? 
M: I guess I probably very similar to the err ideas I get today. I mean I didn't have like err, I 
had no contempt for Islam. I was so naive to what Islam was, I didn't kind of see it as an 
~stem religion and not say err you know culture or monotheistic religion, I was very 
natve. 
J: When you became a Muslim why do you think that this was the religion for you? 
M: Just because, you know I used to study a lot of magic. Before I got into religion I used to 
study magic. And I started looking at where these say forms of meditation came from and it 
would come down to Hinduism or Buddhism. Err, and you know so many people people 
would claim that it's magic and even today it is a great way of meditating today and 
workshops. But really they all come from religion. Just the fact that even when studying 
Hinduism it came back to the concept of one God, and even though there's may be what 32 
deities they all still believe that you do achieve Moksha, or become Brahma, or are 
considered one, considered one entity. It's like err something that's just telling you you 
know that 'Oh you believe in one God'. So really the truth is like you know become 
blinded. And Islam is something where you can go, 'well why do you do this then?'. You 
know you really come in to grill some, you say 'well why do you do this then?' and they 
give you an answer. And they've got so many acceptable answers. You know it doesn't 
come down to things like people going 'oh well you just have to believe that'. Or, 'oh you 
know you just have to believe that bit'. You know, the most important bit 'you just have to 
believe that! [laughs]. You know you don't get any decent proof. 
N: How did your erm family and friends react? 
M: I I've had various different reactions. I mean a lot of my friends were like my friends were 
like changing their names to Passable, err you know they've all become very celtic 
orientated. And you know they err most of my friends organised parties and raves and 
things like that and err, so cause they knew me they knew that I was crying spiritually for 
something. And so many of them found it surprising that I took on Islam and this is when I 
started seeing popular err kind of views as to what Islam was about. People would start 
saying 'Oh aren't they really oppressive to women', or you know 'Aren't they those 
people that smash their heads and cause themselves to bleed'. And and so you know 
through this it kind of it helped my growth. People will always ask me. My mumjust 
thought it was a fad and I think she's kind of changing her mind now. She thought it... 
[ 
N: That's parents really. 
M: ... was a fad and I'd kind of grow out of it. And it went from having Ganesh and things 
like this cycle before and havingjossticks and stuff, I donna know [M and N laugh]. So 
she quite happily kind of felt in that way. 
B: And has she, have they your family accepted you as a Muslim? 
M: They do, I mean like they make, they know that if they shout out, I mean I don't like, you 
know I have a wife and child and I live quite far away from my parents. But they know that 
if I go to their house and they shout out and they can't hear me, they know that I'm 
praying. You know its got to that stage. And they don't, you know now, my brother won't 
come in you know and try and put me off and go [laughs while mimicking brother with 
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sarcastic expression and waving of index finger] [M]. My mum took a picture once of me 
prostrating you know it was that kind of like, but yeah they are. 
B: But your immediate family 'cause your wife's also converted to Islam hasn't she? 
M: Yeah she erm she wasn't a Muslim. And she didn't come to it for more than a year after I'd 
been Muslim for a year and I didn't pressurise her into becoming Muslim. Erm she came to 
it herself. Obviously, you know I was studying Islam had pieces of paper on the floor 
where I was trying to learn [giggles] and I guess you know that affected her. 
B: What about other people and their experience of Islam? Has it changed in any way or has it 
kind of remained the same? 
N: Well like I was erm my parents are, we [referring to A] were born in Pakistan, we're 
sisters by the way= 
M: Are you sisters? Ahh right. 
[ 
N: Yeah, and ummh, the thing is that my dad doesn't like we were never 
kind of forced into any sort of like 'Oh you have to do this' or 'You have to cover your 
hair' or 'You have to you know can't get it cut' or whatever. But I think that for me what 
happened is we moved to Saudi Arabia and because I wasn't going to school over there I'd 
got like lots of time on my hands. And just like you know erm hearing the prayer call and 
just watching like people walking to the prayer err to the mosque from all directions, you 
know it just really really stirred my curiosity. So I just started reading up and erm erm yeah 
just reading books on different things. And that's basically how I developed my interest. I 
mean like it wasn't anything that my parents said, 'You have to do this' or 'Don't do that'. 
B: And this is while you were in Saudi? 
[ 
N: In Saudi yeah, in Jeddah. 
A: And it's like like my reaction was completely the opposite. I mean before I went to Saudi I 
was a bit I was like really into mysticism, I was really into 
[ 
N: reincarnation and= 
A: =Yeah and like I was looking into Buddhism and stuff like that. But fundamentally I would 
have defined myself as a humanist erm because I didn't necessarily believe in God but I 
didn't necessarily reject God. Ummh 'cause I remember like when I was about twelve 
thirteen I used to ask a lot of questions all the sort of like like fundamental questions about 
me being here. I never really got answers that satisfied me. And then like when we moved 
to Saudi and and seeing the way like women were treated and stuff and just seeing the 
way things were there I just really got turned off. And it was just like a question of well if 
there is a God and there is Islam then erm you know I don't wanna have anything to do 
with it. 
N: Yeah that was a big part I was just like hang on something's not right. You know and like 
you know 
[ 
A: But whereas like Nosh sort of went out and found found out what Islam essentially was 
toward women I just took it at face value and I rejected it then and there. 
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N: 
B: 
N: 
J: 
N: 
M: 
N: 
A: 
M: 
N: 
A: 
Its like there's a religious police force and they go around with long sticks and if your if 
your face isn't covered or you know if there's a little bit of your hair showing they'll 
whack you one. It's just like you know you don't do that. 
Really? Do they really do that? 
Yeah, yeah they'll come up to you and and I remember what happened was I went to 
school there [ 
[ 
can I just ask how long you were there for? 
Can I, sorry, 
Well I was in Saudi for about 5 years altogether but two was in the Arbir and three years in 
Jeddah. But I'd been, we'd been in Bahrain for eight and a half years which is off the coast 
of Saudi. . 
Is there a big difference between say Bahrain and err 
[ 
[nodding head] Doh yeah yeaah. 
[ 
Yeaah= 
=That big!? [A and M laugh] 
Bahrain, Bahrain is like this really really tiny island. And erm its there's a huge expatriate 
population there and you have like your nightclubs and your alcohol and everything going 
on. [ 
it's quite cosmopolitan. 
[ 
And 
N: Yeah it's very dynamic very cosmopolitan. Whereas Jeddah you have everything going on 
in Saudi but its just all underground= 
A: =Yeah. 
N: You've got your your drug culture you've got your alcohol you've got everything. It's just 
all underground. Anyway so erm, what was I saying? 
B: You were talking about your different experiences that you reacted by 
[ 
N: Dh yeah oh yeah 
[ 
A: You see Nosh sort of 
started gaining a lot of knowledge about Islam she started going to circles and stuff and I 
was sort of got on to the drug culture and stuff like that. And also I think it had to do with 
the fact that I was at school and I was going to this ex-missionary school which you know 
no Saudi's were allowed, mainly overseas and Americans coming there. Whereas Nosh 
was sort of like 
N: I went to this school for three months. What happened was the first day I actually went 
there I was in my tight jeans and hairspray in my hair and everything [group laugh]. And I 
went there and erm the first day I, what happens is the girls aren't, the erm playground's 
totally covered right. So, you've got your walls and then you've got this huge corrugated 
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stuff going up like that [describes shape of roof with hands] and erm you can't leave the 
campus unless your your, someone comes to the gate tells your name to the watchman he 
announces it over the mike and then you leave through this really tiny like passage thing. 
And so what happened was my driver came and my name was announced and as I'm 
leaving I get this whack [describes with hand] on the back. And I turned round and this 
woman goes and she goes' Are you Muslim?' , and I go 'Yes I am'. She goes 'Why isn't 
your hair covered where's your abayah?' you know the black thing you wear, and I'm just 
like, I go 'My God', I go 'Look I'm really sorry I didn't know it was part of the school 
regulations. There's no need for you to hit me'. You know and and I was like 'From 
tommorrow I'll wear one'. 
M: How old were you then? 
N: I was [to A] how old was I? Sixteen? yeah. 
[ 
A: Yeah sixteen. 
N: But I remember when we went actually went to Jeddah we were so adamant we were just 
like, 'We hate it here, we're not going to like it, we can't like it'. 
A: [in a comically pitched voice] There's no way that you're going to wear err make us wear 
er erm hij ab! 
N: Yeah and we weren't we were just like yeah come on 
[ 
A: Like the first time we got there it's really horrible 'cause everyones 
wearing one. 
N: Yeah and you just stick out like a sore thumb. Anyway, if your if your with your wife and 
the these religious police they come up to you and they say 'Where's your marriage 
certificate?' If you don't have it on you your chucked into jail. It's like,just like that. 
B: Really? 
N: Yeah, honestly its ridiculous. And it's like if you don't carry your certificate around 
everywhere with you it's erm, I remember once erm I went to a compound to spend the 
night at my friends house. And when you go into the compound you have to leave your 
1.0. at the gate. And because they had my LD. overnight they were just like 'What were 
you doing? Who were you with?', basically implying that I was you know. It's just really 
ridiculous and I was just like this isn't right and I've got to sort out you know sort out 
some answers. 
B: So you started to kind of read about it? 
N: Yeah and I went to circles to talk to other Muslim women. 
B: [to Ayesha] Whereas actually you rejected it? 
A: Yeah I distanced myself more. 
D: But how did your parents, did your parents react in any way to your differing experiences? 
A: Well I think my parents sort of like 
[ [ 
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N: Ummh well Her sort of she covered it very very well. But at the same 
time they were just like 
[ 
A: My parents were really worried about me. 
N: Yeah but erm they didn't know half the stuff that she got up to. 
[ 
A: They didn't know half the stuff that I got up to. 
But they were sort of concerned that my friends weren't Muslim. Erm particularly since my 
parents were sort of getting into religion themselves. And they were mixing with Muslims 
who sort of were saying that she needs to be like you know a better Muslim and blah blah 
blah. And erm I think as far as my political views were concerned my parents were like 
highly reactive you know I had, I was reading a lot of erm very liberal literature like on 
lesbianism and stuff like that. Erm but it was only when I came here that that they really did 
start worrying 'cause like I dyed my hair purple and I had like hundred thousand earings 
and I dressed really hip and whatever but erm an and that was when they sort of like really 
started seriously being concerned about me. Erm and so when I did get into Islam and I felt 
like in retrospect I find that I found out quite recently that they weren't convinced that it 
would stick that it was just a fad. And erm even like my erm parents' friends would say 
like one of my mum and my dad's friends she was just like you know [laughs] 'What you 
doing?' 
N: The hijab would come up 
[ 
A: The hijab would come up and 
J: "Dh your up to something else and this is just a" 
[ 
A: Yeah oh yeah. yeah= 
N: =Yeah. 
B: Which was err a lot of women have the reaction they've had isn't it? like its really just a 
front to get out and have freedom [ 
[ 
N: Like it's 
for yeah yeah. 
[ 
A: Yeah. The thing is in Islam 
[ 
M: I think that's quite amazing. [to Ayesha] Sorry. I think that's amazing that 
you know my all through my life my teenage life I had this struggle and had my parents 
going "You shouldn't smoke you shouldn't do this. 
[ 
A: Yeah [laughs] 
M: And infact now I think my mum would rather that I sat there and drank beer and smoked. 
She would feel more comfortable with that [group laugh] than me sitting there not drinking 
not smoking you know. 
A: I mean initially I had I sort of had confidence in that respect because erm obviously like 
Islam sort of changed my whole lifestyle, yeah. And there were certain issues at home erm 
like collectively which we sort of had to come to a balance. And admittedly I had to look at 
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my own faults but I had to sort of compromise on a lot of issues where certain 
circumstances with my mum, circumstances in which Islam says no, maybe its just to make 
my life easier which doesn'tjustify it no way. Erm but I think that makes my parents life 
easier as well because when I would say cover my hair with family guests they'd say 'Oh 
but it doesn't matter you've known him for years"or 'it doesn't matter they're friends' or 
'family' or whatever, you know. And maybe that's erm maybe that's to do with personal 
circumstance or whatever. But erm there was quite a lot of contention from my fathers side 
that erm the way I got into Islam was quite political. And I mean 
[ 
B: And your parents weren't? Their relationship with Islam wasn't political? 
A: Well perhaps it was more political than he would erm than my dad would erm believe. Erm 
because for me I mean Islam I think he thought that Islam for me was quite a rash job 
because as is, as I said, for me it was just I mean once I was intellectually convinced that 
there was a God and intellectually convinced that the Qur'ran was the word of God then 
that was it [clicks fingers] within a week I I had the hijab on. I would not erm I didn't even 
know how to pray very well and I just started practising you know for me it was just like 
okay I'll just get along now I can gain knowledge as I go along. You know erm and I think 
that was quite shocking for my parents 'cause it was literally a case of one day she's a 
mixed kid and the next day she's all covered up you know. Erm and and I've always 
been quite political buterm. One of the reasons why I got this reaction was 'cause I I'djust 
started a new semester and I was talking to like some other students and stuff. And there 
was this one guy and he was like the most ordinary Muslim person you've ever met the 
nicest person you've ever met who actually believed in fascism as the world's solutions. 
And that was like really shocking for me. And like erm and like we got into a debate once 
about, I, I for some reason for some emotional reason I was defending err saying 'Well no 
Islam has got all the solutions'. 'Cause you sort of like when you're growing up you sort 
of have this thing from people you know your parents or whoever telling you that 'Well no 
Islam is not just a religion it's a complete way oflife'. And you sort of boast about it but 
you don't always understand it completely. So at that point that's what I was doing. And 
then I was just thinking hold on I haven't got a clue what I'm talking about you know I 
should find out more about it. And essentially it came down to a thing of erm well Allah's 
created me therefore he knows me better than anyone else. Therefore you know he's the 
one who knows which way to make the most of my life, there are certain things that I 
won't like which I have to do and there are certain things that I like that I can't do. And at 
the end of the day Allah knows best. And you know it was sort of like erm submitting 
myself to to that which wasn't really easy but 
B: And now your parents, what's your parents' attitude towards your 
A: Well I think my parent's attitude, I think, I think even after I'd been practising my parents 
had had reasons to like we, I've had quite a few contentions with my parents and they've 
had quite a few contentions with me. Erm and I don't blame them for seeing me the way 
they do. Erm but as far, I mean I think my dad thinks I'm a bit extreme in my in my views 
because you know I might support hamas or whatever yeah, my political view. Erm like I 
don't know if you saw the programme yesterday on Channel 4. 
B: I've recorded it but I've read the Guardian article. 
[ 
A: Right, okay. Well I mean I can confirm that a 
lot of that was just not true because I remember discussing all of that with the producer. 
And erm you know I I knew those guys quite well in the sense that they followed us 
around everywhere and erm they came from one angle they projected us from another 
angle, can't expect anything less. But my parents don't necessarily, well my dad, when I 
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discussed it with my dad he doesn't necessarily believe that enn in al Muhajiroun he 
doesn't necessarily want so it seems to me to to like see a comprehensive view of what al 
Muhajiroun or what Omar Bakiri has to say. Enn also, I donna know I I don't like to 
impose Islam on my parents, on my life at home with if it concerns my parents and they 
don't they don't really subject to it. But enn that makes my life a bit difficult. 
B: How about kind of your friends' responses, you know given that your parents' reaction? 
N: All my friends have just been really supportive and the thing is that I have like erm, I have 
like gay friends and erm you know black friends and like a wide a wide a diverse group of 
friends and it's just kind of with me it's just and and vice versa its just a kind of like live 
and let live. You know whereas maybe other people wouldn't agree with that. 
B: So you haven't really lost any friends? 
N: Not at all, not at all. And sometimes the occasional like acquaintance would be like, like 
that I made after enn erm that I wore hijab would like go 'Yeah you're alright you know' 
it's like 'what am I not meant to be alright?' [group laughs]. You know what I mean. But I 
mean the thing is like I think initially like when I first started my post grad erm it was really 
horrible for me. Because I think people have so many preconceived ideas like I would bash 
them on the heads with the Qur'an and 'ray hey hey hey' do you know what I mean. And 
so people find it very very difficult, if I I had to like literally go up to people and start 
talking to them because no one would approach me= 
B: =Really? 
N: Yeah. Because they have so many preconceived ideas. 
A: Yeah, that's just it I mean when I started SOAS erm you know you're in a lecture room of 
like 60 70 people and everyone would be talking to each other and no one wanted to know 
me 'cause I was like a little covered girl you know. But enn like it was after like a few 
weeks 'cause I was quite vocal in the lectures and that and erm like in like seminars aand 
stuff and enn you know they sort of saw that I'm not just a dumb Muslim woman or 
whatever. You know erm that I could speak that I was open to exchanging my views and 
stuff like that. So like enn, I think it was more like the men rather than the women who 
were open to talking to me. And erm I, as far as like my erm friends were concerned erm 
my friends were sort of part of part and parcel of the drug rave culture, you know erm 
whether it was like the Asian friends or the English friends or whatever. So to them like me 
covering up was a real taboo it was just like 'Okay we're not going to know you now'. But 
enn err= 
M: =You might have been better off having a you know smoking marijuana [group laughs] 
and then they'd understand you [ 
[ 
A: Yeah [laughs]. 
Yeh but so I'd pretty much had to like to start getting, I'd started hanging out with different 
people anyway because for me it was a thing of 'Okay well I'm I'm trying to be a 
practisingMuslim now and I don't want to be associated with those people'. You know 
'cause I'm trying to you know I'm trying to submit myself to something completely 
different. 
N: Also there's that tension between culture and religion where you know culture says women 
can't cut their hair and you know blah blah blah and then you know because religion says 
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otherwis~ they thiuk., th~y tak~ religion for cultur~ amI you g~t that whole like and then if 
you tdl them otherwis~ th~y don't like it. 
A: Yeahyeh. 
N: You know what I mean. Like you try and say 'W~ll I can CUl my hair' you know ana lh~y 
say' No but no you can \' ana iC s j USl. 
A: SOII1~lim~s mai.'s a problem within the families reaHy as welL 
B: Really? 
A: Yeah. 
N: Yeah. 
S: I think thaf s what it was for me you know, as I grew up and I started iike looking into it 
myself and found that weB I can do ibis, you know. Yeah alright it might not be Pakistani 
culture or its not part of Asian culture but it's nothing to do with Islam. And you know if I 
speak up like that with my parents they go 'Oh you know you're going to college now 
[group laughs] and you don't respect us anymore' and rmjust iike I'm just trying to prove 
a point you know. 
B: That' s an interesting point both of you have made about erm how peopie being surprised 
that you're so articuiate in asserting your points about Isiam. And in that article in the 
Guardian the guy (referring to the journalist jon Ronson] actualiy says thai! one of the 
things that reaiiy surprised me is that the women that I met were the most articulate people 
in ihe group' , you know that they could actually speak have mese really err kind of 
assertive kind of identities and stuff. Erm but I mean is that a gender ibing do men not gel 
that kind of reaction. 
1\'1: Yeah i think I mean I can omy speak from personal you know erm, I've come here and i 
came here from a very kind of wen to do area and then I came to London and I was in 
London for sometim~ and i didn't see another IViusiim. But met Ish I think was probably 
one of the first Muslims I met and I'm like 'I'm a Muslim too', and Ish [referring to 
Ishtiaq] was like, 'Yeah I'm a Muslim', you know [group laughs]. I'm going 'Yeah come 
on lets' you know [I and M laughl. Erm err and I and I think that you know as I saw err 
women in the classrooms erm the Musiim women in the hijab, for me because i was so 
enthusiastic I didn't have any of these white middie class cultural rather than the religion 
they were the culture, and because they were Musiims, for me being a Musiim you know I 
was thinking you know whole of mankind instead of we shouldn't be splitting over you 
know cuhures and things iike this. So r d go up to a Iviusiim woman, r d go up to them and 
say 'Assaiamoaiaikum', to a iviusiim a woman and she'd have lO look round Lwice and you 
know jUSllO check that I'd said 'Assaiamoaiaikum', Not just because I was white but 
because she'd been sitting there all the time in these lessons for two weeks and no one had 
bothered to talk to her. 
A: I think, I was just reading this book on the Lrctin enn but it it just seems that with Muslims 
and as with many people nowadays its just you know, the focus of their conscience and 
priorities in their identities seems to be first ethnicity yeah then race and then religion, I 
mean [holds up discussion handout drawing attention to tide J you know Young British 
Muslims you know is should the focus be on the British or should it be on the Muslim 
because it's just like for me I'm just a Muslim in Britain, I'm not you know 
[ 
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M: Same forme I 
totally agree. 
A: Yeah I mean if I moved to like say Gambia or like Russia or or like Pakistan I'm not going 
to be Pakistani Muslim or a Gambian Muslim I should just be a Muslim in Pakistan or a 
Muslim in Gambia or whatever. And I think 
[ 
N: Erm I just like I was just about to say you know 
like when especially if if your like second generation in England or whatever you have 
fragmented vision of home anyway right. But for me like when you asked me [referring to 
Bilkis] 'Are you from London?' I was just went' Err I moved here three years ago', I 
didn't know what to say. 'Cause if someone asks me what I am you know 1'111'11 say well 
originally I'm from Pakistan and I do realise what an emotional and cultural investment I 
have in the place. But for me I'm not really anything. 1 really really just see myself as a 
Muslim more than say Pakistani or= 
J: =It's like even Islam says that you shouldn't be nationalist. 
B: But does being in Britain kind of have erm an impact on the way that you erm the reactions 
you get for being a Muslim is that kind of a different experience from being in another 
country? You know like you were describing earlier 
[ 
N: Yeah 1 think it is culture like culture 
specific. Like for example, like me being err acting the way, or behaving the way and 
practising the way way that I do here would be totally different than in Pakistan. 1 think like 
you know the reactions that enn that you get maybe just like you know it's usually you 
know from like the dominant that your that your living in. So I think that if you were say in 
Pakistan it'd be different. I think that is culture like culture specific. 
A: I think it's really funny because like erm over here like you tend to look at things in kind of 
like states of humanist and liberalist you know and like over here as a practising Muslim I 
have to watch for things like oh you should say this or you should say like buy this or buy 
that blah blah blah. Whereas out say for instance in Pakistan yeah they would probably see 
us as being really liberal even though we may be more Islamic in practise than them. 
Because of different cultures. You see like 
[ 
N: Yeah. Yeah like when we go, my aunt'sjust like 'You 
really come home in seven in the night?' And I'm like, 'Yeah'. 'You really go to 
University?', 'Yeah'. Like they just think I'm like this mod con woman like goes round 
doing whatever she wants and really independent. 
A: And it's like, it's divisions of like it's divisions of Muslims right that you get from 
stereotypes of the shackled Muslim woman you know blah blah blah. But in essence you 
have to define you have to judge Islam, you can't judge Islam by Muslims you have to 
judge Muslims by Islam. And they're two separate things. 
M: Yeah. 
A: You see Islam is a separate entity to the Muslims rather than say for instance in other 
religions you know like for instance the church yeah. The institution of the church 
acknowledges that Christianity goes through paradigm changes and that all of those can like 
thats an accepted thing in defining Christianity right. But you can't apply that to Islam 
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because Islam defines itself. And errn you know I I don't blame the West or the East or the 
world or whatever to have these stereotypes right because in essence all stereotypes have 
got a basis. I mean like what Nosh was talking about what happens in Saudi Arabia. You 
know and you've got books corning out like DeatJl of a Princess and ummh this is the 
document that tells you what Muslim woman life is all about you know 
[ 
M: Yeah, I had errn I had a girl 
turn round to me once and she said 'What about this book?' [mimicks holding book up and 
waving it in an imposing way], you know 'What about this?' you know [group laughs] 'I 
read it I read it'. And it turned out that it was nothing. 
[ 
A: Oh the most authoritative book on Islam, [laughs], isn't 
it? 
M: You know I said I couldn't understand. 
[ 
N: You know this one woman speaks out for all the women of 
Arabia let's like homogenise and essentialise and all the rest of it. 
B: How about you two guys [to Ishtiaq and Javed] like your experience of Islam, has it 
changed in any way? 
J: The way it is for me is that I'm not so much you know don't practise so much as I could 
you know I might go to jumma namaz but I mean I don't do as much as I should do or I 
could. Errn like I mean going back to what you said earlier, the way it was with our parents 
is that I see their response as culture and only like it's Pakistani culture. Like my brother 
who is younger than me he's come into Islam and before my parents were like 'Yeah' [in a 
dismissive tone] and whatever. Then he started learning about things that they'd taken as 
given, 'cause to be honest like my parents I wouldn't say they are as religiously minded as 
they could be. It's it's like with me errn I only really know what I was brought up with. I 
don't I haven't really sort out, keep the knowledge and that so like they know like they'd 
say to my brother, 'Oh well you can't do that like its gunnah' or whatever and my 
brother'd say, 'Where does it say that, that's a controversial issue'. Recently he's said that 
and this in response to something and they're like 'Oh, okay'. And like they won't even 
like they won't even like to those sort of matters they won't discuss it with him. So like I 
think its I mean what I know, the age especially we are, sort of my age generation and my 
family roots come from are more culturally bound than anything else. 
A: I think particularly with Pakistanis because like its an issue of 'Oh Pakistanis established 
errn you know the properly Islam' and you know that whole thing. And Islam is sort of 
part of nationalism in Pakistan rather than you know a way of guiding your life. 
M: I think that's a really major major factor is nationalism;;; 
J: ;;;Yeah, yeah you see what it is like errn on Eid you're just stood outside the mosque or 
whatever and everyone, like waving the Pakistani flag and saying Allah-u-Akbar out loud 
it's like they're waving a nationalist symbol yeah and saying Allah-u-Akbar. I mean it's 
like I donna know a lot of people seem to like:: 
M: ;;;That's something that I'm gradually becoming used to. Like I went once to this mosque 
and it was great because there were lots of different nationalities there. The more and more 
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I went there the more I kind of realised that the the people were say that I met were mainly 
Pakistanis. And then further and further down the line as I checked out there seemed to be 
this continuos like erm and then along would come sort of a load of Arabs who'd say and 
then they'd say 'Well look hang on a minute you know your dominating this and this is a 
lot of nationalist, nationalism going on' and it starts affecting you know let's say you know 
when Eid is lets say you know. 
[ 
N: Yeah, like five different days. 
[ 
M: I was in Scotland for Eid. And in Scotland they celebrated Bid err 
when they sighted the moon and that decides whether they're gonna do it on the 30th day, 
you know say if the moon is not sighted on the 29th then we have to do it after the 30th 
because there are only 30 days in a lunar month. I found I phoned up down South and 
they'd and they'd taken I was told they'd taken their information from Saudi Arabia. 
Which I was told was really which was really dodgy because 
[ 
N: Dh yeah. 
[ 
A: Dh my God yeah, 'cause Saudi Arabia a few days ahead had said that we're going to 
celebrate on that day anyway. 
M: Yeah 
[ 
N: This was a huge bone of contention in our house this Bid. We were just like 'we're ... 
[ 
A: Yeah' cause Nosh and I 
N: ... not, we're not gonna enn celebrate Bid until someone actually sees the sees the moon. 
We're not going to go by calculation'. And my parents were just like 'Well the whole 
family's going to do it and your not going to do it', and blah blah blah and, 'how can you 
do this', and 'just do it'. And like we were just like 'No', and we're just like 
[ 
A: It's just like completely 
missing the point like we could be missing a day of fasting you know. 
N: And we're just like, 'Well hey if you wanna do it we're not stopping you, we're just 
saying that we don't wanna do it'. 
M: I think that's what erm you know national nationalism you knoW people say 'Dh well it's 
from Saudi Arabia you know it must be true' . 
N: Yeah. 
A: Yeah. At the end of the day we're all Muslims and you know the questioning of all of us 
should be there whether its, I mean the problem with nationalism you've got it in so many 
places. Like in Pakistan there's a nationalism, there's Turkish nationalism ... 
[ 
N: Exactly that's exactly true. 
A: ... the prophet was an Arab you know Mecca and Medina they're in Arabia, so there's 
all these different like nationalisms and like that's such a cause of fragmentation amongst 
Muslims themselves. You know I mean like there's so much fragmentation as it is like erm 
you know practising, like there's this, I don't know where this comes from but there's this 
really erm err powerful err phantom relationship a negative relationship between practising 
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and non practising Muslims. You know, I mean Javed sitting here saying you know he 
prays on Jumma but I don't you know that shouldn't that shouldn't make a difference. 
[ 
N: That's between 
him and you know. 
[ 
A: Yeah that's between him and Allah. At the end of the day he's still a Muslim and I 
still have the same affection for him as I do to say Mustafa who is a practising Muslim. It 
shouldn't make a difference. You know and that is something that is so harped on about 
you know and that is something that causes divisions. 
M: People always ask me this and they say, 'Well are you a practising Muslim?' , and the fact 
is I mean someone told me early on to me and said, 'Really there's no such thing as a 
practising muslim and a non practising Muslim'. Because alright okay I might pray six 
times a day yeah and do as much, as much as I can. And someone might do more than me 
and someone might do less than me. For me it doesn't make them any less of a Muslim. 
[ 
N: Yeah, 
~~ [ 
[ 
M: Exactly. 
A: It's like when you [referring to B] said to me on the phone yesterday 'I'm a non 
practising Muslim', I wanted to say 'Bilkis that doesn't matter to me'. 
B: But you see that's the that's the kind of again cultural thing. I think it's that it's like your 
brought up to constantly define precisely how you relate yourself to certain things. You 
know it's kind of when people say, 'Well that's a Muslim name', and there's a whole kind 
of connotations related to that but it is 
[ 
N: I don't have a Muslim name. Erm, my name's not 
Muslim and when people find out they're just like 'Oh my God' blah blah blah. [M laughs] 
B: Noshin isn't a Muslim name? 
A: It's Persian. 
B: Oh right so Noshin isn't Muslim. 
N: No it's not. But then its funny 'cause then people go to the total other extreme where they 
erm [to A in a slightly lowered tone] you know like Nadia eating out of erm clay erm 
plates. [to the whole group] Like our erm like you know we have this cousin and she'll 
she'll eat out of mud erm clay plates. She goes 'Because the prophet did so we can't err we 
should like we have to'. And it's just like okay well that's that's good but like you know. 
A: The thing is that there are certain things that are like so many you know that apply to the 
prophet. The prophet like he didn't like to eat rabbit. Doesn't mean it's haram for us to eat 
rabbit. He didn't like onions doesn't mean its haram or even naqlee it's like for us it's just 
an issue of well if you want to eat it you can but there's no sin or reward related to that. 
N: Yeah it's just like you can like okay you know there's nothing to say that you can't have 
your own culture providing that it doesn't go against Islam. And I think people sometimes 
get that mixed up. 
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[ 
A: Also, yeah. But there's also the thing of people talk as if in culture people talk ofhalal 
things as haram when they might just be 
[ 
N: They keep you know erm making halal things haram 
and haram things halal. . 
M: I've always wanted to ask Ish the question about about like err you know you were born in 
England you know and err you were you don't kind of say wear Pakistani clothes or your 
family clothes, you wear English clothes. And I would have thought you know I wondered 
how you thought about sunna and things, like you know sunna and if the prophet liked . 
modem shirts. And I mean I always I you see I don't have any concept at all of what it's 
like to be say second generation or in a Pakistani family anything I don't come from one. 
So I don't you know I'm just interested in what you think. 
I: When I was young my dad sent me to mosque and its like you know the molwees like 
you know what they're like ... , 
[ 
N: Yeah 
[ 
S: Ohyeah 
[ 
A: Oh yeah 
[ 
B: Oh yeah 
[ 
J: Yeah 
[group laughs] 
I: ... and I used to like start skiving off from mosque and I'd go somewhere else with my 
friends. Once my dad caught me he said 'Alright, how you doing?' [facial sarcasm 
indicates that a more scornful / confrontational affair resulted] [group laughs]. And I think 
its like I think we were like about seventeen and they took bets with my sister how old she 
was, young pretty and single [group laughs]. And I was going like 'Yeah right yeah right 
yeah'. But I was really into music then and all that kind of stuff and erm I come to 
University.I don't really like talking too much about the past, but anyway, I come to 
University at Middlesex and I met a brother I think he was a Hizb-ut-Tahrir and he showed 
me this flag like you know the black flag and he said this and this and this erm you know 
it's an Islamic flag and he explained to me what it was. Anyway, so once I put that on my 
door I got all these people knocking on my door saying 'Oh are you one of those Muslims 
that hates the Jews' [group reacts with tutting and shaking of heads] and 'Oh are you one 
of them Muslims that wants to kill all the Hindus' and I'm like 'What?!!' you know. And 
err you know heard all these people and their funny ideas. 
B: Absolutely, and I think the interesting thing that some of you have just pointed out is that 
reward thing and as Javed mentioned about gunnah and also about how certain behaviour 
or actions get linked to being err haram or halal. 'Cause I think I'd had that and a lot of my 
generation whose introduction to the mosque was kind of linked to the reward thing like 
'Just think of all the good things that will happen to you when you grow up'. And it's kind 
of err that cultural thing as well. 
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wi: Is that how they treat erm I mean rve got a daughter and insaUah she 'U become a Musiim 
and I'll teach her Islam but do you think that you know that's the way that you know if you 
grow up in Islam do you think that's how your taught and let's say 'if you don't do this 
then bad things will happen to you' and 'You do this God will reward youT Do you 
thiM [ 
[ 
N : I think that 
there should be a balance. Because so many kids are like you know are they're like erm 
erm you know 'You'll you 'n have 60 years of hell if you don't do this and that'. And they 
get so scared, they're just like 'Okay, okay'. You know they're they're up there but that's 
not the right way. I think like you have to explain and give them a balance of you know 
both sides. 
A: I think like with children ultimately you have to be patient you know you can't smack them 
into it. And it's just like maybe before teaching them about erm getting rewards for this and 
this, maybe it's just like maybe you just have to teach them fundamentally what Islam is 
and you know things like erm maybe a doctrinal perspective you know erm. 
N: And one thing that I like about Islam is that erm you know you're supposed to give a ... 
[ 
A: You see we've g.ot we've got 
N: ... child as much respect as we're supposed to give a grown up. And the thing is that 
sometimes grown ups don't realise but children need reasons as well. You know if you say 
to a child 'Don't touch that glass, don't touch that glass!', they'll keep on touching it. But 
if you say' don't touch that glass because you could break it and hurt yourself' you know 
then maybe they'll listen to you. 
M: I was just err I was reading this book [holds book up] and it's you know on the 
methodology of the call to Islam and it's about you know I think it comes into this thing 
that the you know the ways that you teach Islam is very important. You know and it keeps 
kind of saying that you know you can you can say to people, you know might have some 
dower group asking you know telling Muslims they should do this and they shouldn't be 
drinking, they shouldn't be smoking, they shouldn't be wearing this and der de der de der 
de der, lets say. But what they're not doing is like say getting down to the fundamentals of 
you know the talib and things like this you know. And really it's kind of futile you know 
in dealing with this [ 
[ 
N: Yeah. 
[ 
J: You see 
that's what, I mean like you know when I was younger I suppose I I I had blind faith. I'd 
go to mosque and if I didn't get it right my sabaq like I'd get battered= 
B: =1 did as well. 
J: Yeah, I mean like to be honest I didn't learn because I had so much God fear in me I was 
more molweesaab fear and like I'd be sick and be and like what a person to talk to, you 
know if you want to know about Islam. And like as I got older I mean like he was the 
person like if you wanted to know more you should be able to ask. I was that scared of him 
you know. And some of the things he did to me like he'd hit me across the head, he'd 
make me sit in front of the heater, and like bruised my back and bum like the heater like 
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burned my back. I was sore as hell like and at that stage you if wanna learn about 
something that's not the right way to be taught. 
N: And there's that hadith that says, don't hit the child on their head. 
J: Yeah, and like err and I said to my mum once like, 'How come you send us there like they 
smack us and do this and do that to us and even you don't do things like that'. And my 
mum once said that, 'Wherever they hit like fire can't touch you', or something like that. 
So I mean I donna know I mean this is like things and like like sometimes they'd make me 
clean up and again they say like 'You get more sawab and you get more naykee for it'. 
N: It's like they they justify it. 
J: Yeah. 
M: And the Qur'ran talks about coming to people gently you know bringing Islam to people 
gently not in err say you know [ 
[ 
N: Yeah exactly. 
8: The mosque I used to go to, I have to tell you this story 'cause erm, I don't know how 
yours [referring to J] was organised but we had lots of little classrooms and we all had to 
sit like with our knees bended for like two hours. 
[ 
J: Yeah, yeah. 
B: And erm just like these you know there were these benches and it was just like you know 
the gymn benches, they were exactly like that but made kind of knocked together by ... 
[ 
N: Yeah. 
8: ... people. And what the molweesaab used to do was to come round and if you got anything 
wrong he'd have the stick ready and he'd just whack you one on the knees. 
N: Ooooh! 
B: And what you [referring to Javed] were saying earlier about erm the heater and you know 
erm that kind of physical abuse, there was one guy whose arm was broken and there was 
police in and out of that mosque on a few occasions. And I think it's interesting listening to 
some of your [referring to M, N and A] experiences of how you've come erm how you've 
in a sense introduced yourself and learnt about Islam and kind of that you've not just 
accepted things that to you have not made sense. And I think that's something a kind of 
important message for people to hear. 'Cause you know people will like you [referring to 
N] said, people will look at you and think 'oh yeah, you know, you're going to shove this 
thing down my throat and expect me to accept it'. And it's I just think that a lot of kind of 
really a lot of kind of good points are coming out. 
N: Dh in Islam it says there's no compulsion in religion. You can't have faith through force. 
You know what I mean and it's you can't have like you can't have Islam by forcing 
someone. If they don't have the faith then they're not going to believe in it. So you know I 
went to a talk once and erm erm there was this there was erm there was a guy talking and ' 
there was a translation of it in Urdu. And the man who was speaking in Urdu he had the 
most beautiful voice and he was speaking so politely and and nicely. And my urdu is really 
bad. But the guy who was speaking in English he was screaming and pointing his finger 
16 
and "you don't do this and that and that" and he was he just went mental. And rather than 
listen to I completely switched off. And I just listened to the translation then which 'cause 
he said it you know the way it like it, the way you propagate Islam has like so much to do 
with people listening. People don't listen if you shove it down their throat. 
M: That's like when you know you are ·or when I was a kid if I was really told off and told not 
to do things I'd do the total opposite. You know that kind of continual thing you know I've 
had all of my most of my life. I mean hopefully insallah I'll teach Islam to my daughter and 
I'll teach her Islam but you know their's no compulsion to religion. And I think in a lot of 
cases a lot of people I know have been forced Islam you know from when they were a kid 
until they get to the age of sixteen they've been to the mosque every whenever every 
Friday, they've learnt Qur'an and the they're off. They don't they just leave it it's like part 
of their childhood. And then maybe later on, 'Yeah maybe I'll check out this', and they 
remember bits from when they were kids and then they start really learning 'cause they 
they're looking at it from 
[ 
I: I think everyone thinks about it some time or another like all their lives about God 
and everything. I remember once going to a gig standing there and just watching everyone, 
I was thinking what's going through their minds you know its like do they care. Just 
started looking at them and thinking and got me thinking as well you know people about 
this thing = 
A: =1 think I mean the thing with children is that erm you know for instance I remember when 
me and Nosh that when we studied or started reciting the Qur'an we used to go home and 
say [in childish voice] 'What is the point of reading this we don't even understand what 
we're saying'. [ 
[ 
N: Yeah, 'We don't even understand 
what we're saying'. [group laughs] 
A: And that was like highly controversial. 
[ 
N: Yeah like, 'How can you say that' . 
A: You know and and I think that there's certain= 
I: =[to A] Is your parents practising Muslim? 
A: I think they were more practising in Saudi than they are here. 
N: Yeah. 
A: I think I mean one thing that my dad regularly says to me is that he's got the faith and he 
knows he does a lot of things that he shouldn't do and he knows that his life isn't Islamic 
but for him he's too much influenced by the environment that he's in. 
M: I think it'd be great if we all went into Islam and didn't treat take anything else seriously 
or remained uninfluenced by things around us you know. [ 
[ 
N: I that's definitely, I think with 
my parents that I think they know what Islam is but it's just it comes down to this thing of 
weakness. Yeah because my dads quite knowledgeable and like erm you know he can 
recite he he knows a lot of things off by heart in Arabic and English' cause he studied 
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Arabic so that he could erm he could read and understand it. But it's just your weaknesses 
really. 
I: [to Nand Al Since you've been covering up yeah. do they ever say to you 'Oh are you 
. . d?' gettmg marne .. . 
N: Yeah, ahh well the thing is I started covering in Jeddah but I didn't cover properly, I just 
wore the scarf around my head. And because my mum wasn't, one day we went to err a 
dinner party, it was segregated and a woman actually said there she goes that '0 dek', eon 
I was just going to say it in Urdu, 'The girls covered up and her mothers not' . And that 
really upset my mum in the beginning but then then I think it was just that and then like she 
just kind of got into it herself and just started herself. 
I: 'Cause like when my sister covered most people were like 'No one's going to marry 
you'. 
A: I think inevitably you're going to get a lot of pressure and a lot of prejUdice erm but at the 
same time your gonna get a lot of people respecting you as well. 
N: Yeah. 
A: And I think one thing that my dad says that to me is that erm once I did start practis I I 
wasn't getting any proposals and he wasn't getting any proposals for me then after I did 
start covering up and my dad just sort of worried that is it you know is it all= 
I: = What about your cousins and that you know did they start 
[ 
A: They haven't actually met with us since 
we started covering. 
[ 
N: But they've seen photographs and they've they've apparently they're they say 
they're happy to my parents but then you'd never really know do you? Because the thing is 
that I think that when when when you're covered and people think they should be covered 
but they're n~t it brings out the guilt factor. And I think and I think that sometimes brings 
up some tensIOn. 
A: I think also like I think in different places the symbol of the hijab is quite different. You 
know for instance for me the hijab isn't a symbol of modesty or whatever. It's a symbol 
that I wear hijab because I'm Muslim and I follow ofIslam you know be it a political thing 
or whatever, you know it's complete submission for me. Whereas in Pakistan it's like err 
erm a respectable thing. So we've got one cousin who lives there and he when I put When I 
wore the hijab he thought it was good but then everything became focused around it. He 
used to sort of like shun me for it sometimes 'Oh it doesn't matter if you you know if he 
looks at you' or whatever and you know stuff like that. So I think 
[ 
J: Yeah I think yeah, [to Al 
sorry. I think that's for me I think it's so true. Like in terms of actual like you know 
parents and like they say yeah you should be more religious and you should be this and 
you should be like that. And that's they've got certain conceptions of how they think we 
should be religious. And it's like my brother like he's like 18 and like he observes Islam 
and practices as much as he can. But I'm sure there's times when my parents wish they 
could switch him off I really really do. 'Cause like before they were like sort of would 
hastle him but then then like when he would observe certain issues and he's and and the 
like they they won't feel happy about it I think I can see it. And like they and then that's 
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when they think "Oh no right we can't push them", and I've noticed since like he's become 
more sort of more religiously minded my parents won't like hastle us like so much. [group 
snigger expectantly] [ 
[ 
B: ~ 
right. 
S: I think they want you to be religious but through Pakistani kind of culture. 
[ 
J: Yeah definitely. 
[ 
A: Yeah. 
[ 
N: Yeah. 
S: When I was younger when people used to come round my mum used to give me like a 
dupppatta just a thin piece of cloth [A laughs] and which you could see through and she'd 
be like 'Wear this when people come round'. But if I was to actually put on a proper thing 
she'd she would have freaked out, she'd be like 'What you doing?' [M laughs]. You see 
you're supposed to be Pakistani you know like= 
J: =Yeah and even though wearing the proper thing would be more right than just wearing 
something that's 
[ 
S: Yeah, even if I was to do it now she'd be like 'What you doing?' [group 
laughs] She would be like that you know. You know 'Why can't you be normal?'. 
N: I was err 
[ 
B: Just kind of, [to N] sorry you were going to say? 
N: Ahh no I was just about to say that err a couple of weeks ago we had guests and erm there 
was one well we hadn't seen them since for like ten years and she walks in, she comes in 
sits down and we all sit down and she goes to Ayesha 
[ 
A: No the first thing she says, the first thing 
she says to Nosh, 'You look so ddifferent! You look so different!' and then when Nosh 
and me, Nosh just went [mimicks N giggling] [group laughs] and she she goes 'Ha to' 
[Urdu words] like she says she goes, 'Oh so since when did you put the you know put the 
hijab on?' and stuff and I went, we said. 'Ah well it's been about two years'. 
[ 
N : Yeah and then she was like, 
'Well it's a bit much isn't it?' 
[ 
A: Yeah, 'Its a bit too much isn't it?' [laughs]. 
[ 
N: And it's like, 'Look your dressed how you 
want to dress and I'm not making any sort of judgements, I'm not saying anything to you, 
that's your prob. that's your business. I'm wearing a piece of cloth and it's covering 
something, it's not showing anything I'm not rebuk. its just a piece of cloth'. And it's such 
a big deal I just don't understand what a big deal it is. 
M: It's like I was reading this err Leila Ahmed book erm, is that how you pronounce her 
name? 
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N: Leila Ahmed, yeah. 
M: I think it's really interesting she's the chapters she.'s written, one of her chapters is is 
primarily on Egypt and err colonialism and and she's saying the how you know all the kind 
of polemics that went on. In in a sense I guess she was suggesting that we still suffer from 
them. That you know you you have this country colonising going round the world 
colonising places and they had to justify say why their religion is better. So they ended up 
with things like, 'Oh you know the women are oppressed, they have to cover their heads', 
and stuff like this and they you know are actually taking this negative side. 
N: Yeah, Frantz Fanon has written stuff on Algeria and there about erm you know how it is 
how err the colonialists came in and they they tried, to try and destabilise the culture of 
Algeria they got their attacks on the institution and the veil and the women and tried to get 
them off, but how they again you know used that against them. And then they err=: 
I: =Is it true that they banned people wearing them in France? 
A: Yeahit'slike= 
M: =And even then you know I've heard stories that kids go to school with the hijab on and 
they just pull take them off their heads. 
[ 
A: That's just it, recent recent recently erm a friend of mine 
she's she's Muslim and basically I mean erm Islamic dress, there's you know different 
opinions about it, but Islamic dress you have to cover your hair but also but also you have 
to wear erm a garment that doesn't show the parting of your legs right, which doesn't 
show your ankles either. And and erm and this friend of mine she went to school shes only 
about like fourteen you know and and err they said to her that her skirt was too long. So 
basically the teacher got a pair of scissors and cut her skirt. 
B: You're joking? Just there and then? 
[ 
A: Yeah. 
N: Well they they they tug at their skirts. It's just ridiculous. 
A: And that's happening a lot. 
[ 
I: Also in Regents Park I've seen some girls who wear like skin tight jeans and 
they've got a hijab on as well. They like they you know wear really tight clothes and 
they've got a hijab on on top of that or a bandana or something you know like covering 
it up. 
[ 
N: Yeah thats like a different err, yeah I think like erm I guess everyone just does it. .. 
[ 
A: The thing is like at the end of the day 
N: ... differently and that's their own business. Like for example Ayesha Ayesha wouldn't 
wear like a skirt that's not up to her knees and that won't show the palm of her legs but say 
I would. So it's just 
[ 
I: What about when you when you lot cover do some people think sometimes 
that 'oh she's probably done something really bad and now she's trying to make up for it'. 
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N: Ahhmm, no, no I don't think so= 
I: =What about in the streets the way people look at 
[ 
N: Well enn I, well this happened I 1 was 
walking down the street. 1 was crossing the road at a zebra crossing and I tripped over. 
And and 1 I fell on my knees and there was this really old woman, she could barely walk 
and she err she was English 1 think and she comes up to me and goes, [mimicking a high 
pitched croaky voice] 'Stop praying in the middle of the road' [group laughs]. And 1 was 
just like, 'I fell' [laughs), you know. I mean down the street yeah people sometimes do 
say make comments. 
[ 
A: I think on the tube, 1 think on the tubelike when when they see me like and they've 
got this certain image of me and they think of me in a certain way and then they see me 
reading a newspaper or reading a really sort of academic book and it's just like [mimicks a 
shocked I surprised facial expression). 
N: I 1 was reading David Eddings' cause 1 love David Eddings and someone looked at the 
book, looked at me, looked at the book and kept looking at me. It's like people have so 
many preconceived ideas. 
I: It's like Pakistani women right, I've seen these Pakistani women they don't cover like 
when we walk past them they put their scarves on, when we've gone past they take them 
off again. You know and they start walking around as soon as they see a Pakistani man 
they cover. They'll walk around town and not cover do you know what I mean. 
[ 
N: That's culture that's what they've been like 
socialised in. Like for example when we go to Pakistan enn the the normal behaviour for 
us would be that when someone older than my dad like an err a Male erm respectable 
member of the family walks into the room we should put the like we should cover our hair 
then. Even if he's my mehram like you know. So, I think it's a lot to do with culture and 
J: It's not only to do with culture it's like racial as well= 
N: =Oh yeah definitely= 
J: =like I remember when I was working on security over the summer and there was a one of 
the like other security guards he like for the whole of the two months that I was working 
there he could not sort of comprehend in his head that I did not drink. Like what it was 
with him was that 'Oh you don't drink what a sad life you must be leading. Oh you such an 
unhappy person I bet you spend all the time in the mosque don't you?' And I'm like, 
'What?! You you're just are not able to comprehend that that like, 'Oh yeah I'm going 
down the pub now. Oh shouldn't I have mentioned it", and things like that. [group laugh] 
N: Y'know the worst is say if erm if I swear. like you know if a swear word comes out and 
someone'll go [in a shocked expression] 'Ah!'. The whole like you know the whole room 
will just stop and look at me and I'll just be like 'Okay' [laughs] you know. It's err you 
know your just supposed to be prim and proper and docile, can't make any mistakes and 
what not and it's just= 
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M: =1 think in a sense that, [to J] like you say about you know 1 got that the entire well you 
know I won't go into it, but when I was err first became a Muslim a school friend was err 
stood in a pub waiting for me to come and go and get one, you know [group laughs]. I 
mean I used to be a real heavy drinker as well yo1J. know. They'd be on their first and I'd 
be on my third you know. 1 think 1 mean it's weird that there is that they have this concept 
of because they can drink, because they can kill themselves with alcohol and they can kill 
themselves with smoking and they can kill themselves with crack or whatever you know, 
they're you know to them it's like a gift. I mean the way I see it is that I got more of a gift 
because if 1 don't do these things then I'm not gonna suffer from these diseases. Like 
Aisha and I, my wife, were watching a programme on ecstasy and it was it was 
hilarious because we were sat there going to each other 'that was us once, we used to be 
like that' [group laughs]. It was you know it was really weird. And and people were you 
know saying 'Well people have stopped drinking' but they were taking ecstasy. 
B: [Jokingly suggests] Would you reenact that for the voxbox you know that scene with your 
wife? 
M: Yeah [laughs]. 
B: Ermjust to kind of move on to a point that we haven't covered that much erm which is kind 
of around the idea of fundamentalism and how you'd define that and does it have a role to 
play in Islam? Erm how do people feel about how the media has= 
I: =It's like I watched a film the other day it was Executive Decision. There was a part 
where that this guy's playing and he goes he's praying and goes Allah u Akbar and he 
starts in to one and 1 was thinking where did that come from you know. 
[ 
M: Yeah 1 saw that. 
I: It's from True Lies, yeah. 
[ 
J: True Lies. 
M: And they're on this plane and they're all of and you know most of them have got these 
beards, they're all= 
J: =Yeah but there's err the reason for that isn't there that it's supposedly because the Cold 
War was over the West needed a new enemy and it's like 
[ 
N: Yeah 
[ 
A: Yeah 
[ 
B: Yeah that is the kind of new theory. I mean 
do people genuinely feel that that has been the case? 
N: Erm I think well it well I think it sort of goes back to Orientalism as well you know the 
despotic erm Muslim leaders type thing. Erm again I don't know how much you guys have 
talked about this but 1 1 for 1 mean it depends a lot of it depends on how you define 
fundamentalism you know. [to A and B] Have you did you guys talk about that? 
B: Not in the discussion. 
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N: Well like for you know a lot of people if you believe in the fundamentals of Islam which 
are you know one God, the five pillars and you they they consider themselves 
fundamentalists. But like then there's this other view that fundamental fundamentalists 
equals terrorism. 
A: Or that fundamentalism fundamentalists 
[ 
J: Yeah the reason that terrorists function is thats extremists like Muslim extremist= 
N: = Yeah but like see in media representation that's considered like fundamentalism. 
[ 
I: Yeah. 
[ 
A: The thing is like I think 
there's like three issues concerned' cause there's like fundamentalists is believing in 
terrorist experience etc etc. Fundamentalist can also be erm erm mixing religion with 
politics, say for instance certain Muslim family going to the mosque, Christian families 
to the mosaleum, and then fundamentalism which you know as Nosh said it I mean 
what does the word fundamentalist mean you know it's timely it's you know religion or 
going back to your roots stuff like that. Now within Islamic fundamentalism all three 
positions exist, yeah. There are certain groups who do erm in the name of Islam who do 
terrorist attacks on schools and stuff like that. Erm but again what defines these things as 
terror and extreme and and or mixing politics with Islam or being fundamentalist is Islam. 
M: Yeah or one person' s soldier is another person's terrorist. 
A: Yeah, exactly. I mean like say for instance Hamas in in Palestine yeah or Israel yeah I mean 
I consider them to be Mujahid but my dad considers them to be terrorrists as does the 
media. You see it's to do with your understanding of Islam. And essentially the reason 
why I think they're Mujahid is because they're fighting their defence of jihad in large erm 
Israeli occupied land. You know erm 
N: I think also erm what I find extremely disturbing is the way erm well you know the media 
they don't wanna listen to they they mete out like you know this the people who aren't so 
outrageous and who don't aren't so militant who don't have like extreme views like you 
know err violent views. So they get meted out and the Muslim people who are represented 
are you know extreme like terrorists stroke extremists. 
I: And do you remember the Oklahoma bombing and they thought the Muslims did it and 
then thy found out [ 
[ 
N: Oh yeah and now that's like and nowthat's 
[ 
A: Yeah and they haven't even given a 
formal apology or anything. [ 
[ 
J: Yeah and they 
didn't even like, they started condemning these groups all the groups and they got all 
these professional academics to talk about how this could occur and there's no substance 
~~ [ 
[ 
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N: Yeah and so, yeah and 
so like now if I'm wearing hijab I'm err I'm an extremist. You know because I think that I 
think the media has a lot to do with erm a lot of prejudice. 
[. 
I: Did any of you watch that Public Eye 
programme once about a year ago. Public Eye about 
[ 
A: I saw one of them where 
I: Yeah that one yeah where they try to get them to talk about the holocaust and everything 
you know= 
A: =Yeah I mean the thing is right is that the media like say for instance erm the issue of 
homosexuality okay, now that opinion does not come from Hizb-ut-Tahrir that opinion 
comes from the Qur'an. And there's I mean amongst Muslims 
[ 
I: Even the Bible. You know ask Christians 
about what they think of homosexuality and they always say [Muslims erm 
[ 
A: Yeah and Judaism you 
know as well. And why should we as Muslims be apologetic about that. You know enn I 
mean like erm it it comes as I said the freedom and restrictiveness thing we're defining 
things in terms of freedom and restrictiveness and me I'm not apologetic about that. You 
know I mean I I think there's huge contention amongst the al Muhajiroun and I'm quite an 
active member of al Muhajiroun, but again I can say that the media distortion of al 
Muhajiroun is huge right. I mean yesterday's programme I was sitting laughing through 
half of it because like a lot of it was inaccurate. But I think also within the Muslims there's 
like a huge misunderstanding because although we say that we don't take everything from 
the media in essence it seems like we like a lot of people do. Erm as far as like styles and 
views is concerned you know I agree Islam should be propagated in a gentle way but that 
doesn't mean that that's the only style that Islam can be got through. I mean the prophet 
salala hoo wassalam, he was being mocked by Abu Talib and Abu Jahid and and he said to 
them you know eventually he reached his peak and he said to them I've come for the 
slaughter. That's not very gentle but it's it's enigmatic it's charismatic it gets the message 
across yeah. And I think that there is a very sort of defensive and apologetic attitude within 
the Muslims that just because and we're not anti Jew. I mean it's within the Islamic state 
that the Jews prospered that that their sanctity was saved. 
[ 
I: Spanish inquisition= 
A: =Yeah exactly. We're not we're not anti Jew. You know and as far as homosexuals are 
concerned they can do whatever they want in their own thing err in their own enn err 
privacy or whatever that's got nothing to do with us right. But on a public level we're not 
going to say it's okay because Allah Allah says that it's not okay. It's like erm 
[ 
M: What's ironic is that the 
people who have done the most damage to say to Jews are actually Christians: 
A: =Yeah Yeah. 
[ 
M: And you know on their way to slaughter Muslims they slaughter Jews. It goes 
hand in hand. 
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N: It'sjust like when people's you know like I don't like seeing erm homosexual= 
A: =acts= 
N: =enn like representation on tv. Just like I don't like seeing heterosexual activity on tv. I 
think there's no need for it. So it, does that make me like what does that make me? Do you 
understand? It's like yeah but I mean I think that like as far as like erm spreading Islam 
through force or whatever I just think people have different opinions but I also think that 
one opinion is basically represented in the media. Like for example I'm sure that erm 
[ 
A: You see the thing is 
that like for= 
N: =[to Ayesha] can I finish what I was saying? 
A: Sorry yeah. 
N: I'm sure that a lot of people a lot of Muslims whan they saw the erm err the the programme 
last night I mean I I thought that it was biased yes but I thought that Omar did a pretty good 
job of you know making himself look like a complete fool as well. I don't think that I mean 
he cracked a lot of jokes that I don't think he could afford to crack those jokes. I mean if 
he's in such a high situation in such a high position where he's got so much media attention 
I think that you need to deal with that extremely sensitively and extremely delicately. 
Because basically what's gonna happen is that erm you're going to be erm you know used 
as being spokesman for the Muslim people. And I just think that should be I just think that 
sort of situation where you have six hundred .and twenty reporters after you I just think you 
need to deal with that very very sensitively. And I don't think that's 
A: What what I was saying to Mustafa today was that virtually what I said to you that in the 
beginning what how the programme was actually meant to be. Erm I think Omar realised 
that they did make him out a fool of him. And I think that really needs to be subjective erm 
because he did try to get it banned and he did try to do a lot of things that he didn't know 
how to do and he basically ended up letting us down. Erm but basically what what 
happened was that erm he he had been approached by Jon and the cameraman Saul about a 
year ago. And and it was in response to the accusation that al Muhajiroun had funded six 
million to Hamas. That was like the reason behind it which was all fallacy anyway you 
know. Erm and they were basically saying that 'Oh we'd like to present you with more 
feeling and and like so that your message is more like comes across', blah blah blah. 
Anyway, Omar did it with the intentions that whatever comes across comes across for the 
sake of Islam anyway, yeah. Erm 'cause he believed like most of us believe that all 
publicity is good publicity in the sense that if it gets the message of Islam across any more 
one more whoever then that's the truth passed yeah. And it's up to like whoever receives it 
to go out and find out more. Now as as Muslims we all have a sense of duty towards like 
spreading the word blah blah blah. Erm I it's I won't go, actually you know I don't want it 
to sound like I'm sitting here defending Omar Bakiri, but at the end of the day I think the 
programme yeah, it did make him out to be a fool yeah. And it did make erm the Islamic 
cause to to appear quite an insignificant non threatening one yeah. But at the same time the 
amount of concepts that were passed through yeah that highlighted certain Islamic concepts 
and certain things that could like erm cause Muslims to go out and fmd out more were so 
many and I think it's subjective as to like to say which what's more important than the 
other you know. I mean= 
M: =But this is the whole problem with with the the media the way it's used in in England. 
[ 
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A: Yeah exactly. 
M: It's used in the way that you know just just the actual act of sitting there and watching there 
is very passive and you can just be applying anytlJing you want. And you don't have to go 
you just you just take it in, you just you know, and so someone interviews I mean I've 
seen interviews with you know famous sheikhs and that like that people that are err running 
an organisation an organisation. Camera shots to them, AK47, Qur'an next to the AK47 
[ [ 
I: Yeah. [ 
[ 
A: Yeah. 
M: And the book showing you it's this image it's completely you know it's that's what you're 
seeing and I think the media is so it is just so the media in this country is just so corrupt. 
Walk down the street and and in pictures and adverts and things there's just so much 
subliminal you know that's going on you know it's so 
A: The thing is I mean admittedly you know I mean you can say something right and you say 
it with conviction and your saying the truth. Now whether it gets misconstrued or not that's 
beyond your control. Like as Nosh mentioned like she used the words violence and 
militancy and force yeah, now I mean I was I was quite perceptive in listening to what Jon 
Ronson was saying and the amount of times he he like took bits out of what Omar was 
saying and decontextualised them was so many. Like he was saying that Omar was calling 
for a violent jihad in Britain and and and against the Jews and it'sjust like yeah but as far 
as jihad is concerned' cause as far as jihad is concerned I'd call for a violent jihad in Israel. 
You know 'cause jihad that's the way it is when it's fighting and and it's defending your 
land. But as far as in Britain it's concerned it's simply an ideological jihad. Jihad is so 
many different types. [ 
[ 
N: There were 
so many times like err I don't know what his name is but like the narrator the guy who 
was= 
A: =Jon. 
N: Jon. There were so many times I think like a few he goes like erm like 'Omar believes in 
killing the Jews' , but I never once heard it from his mouth. 
B: But you did you read the article in there and it said towards the end like the last day or 
something erm someone asked erm Jon Ronson, 'Oh are you know you're a Jew aren't 
you?' And erm 
[ 
A: Well Omar, no he basically said to Omar he was just like erm he said that erm 
he goes, 'Oh I'm a Jew' ,and Omarjust said 'Yeah I knew'. And then erm someone he 
claims someone in the background said 'Well that's worse than being', I can't remember 
what it was but erm but again you know that was err apparently that didn't happen. The 
same thing with Saatchi and Saatchi. Omar actually came and he was just like 'What is 
Saatchi and Saatchi?'. You know there were so many things that he had put in from 
himself. 
B: I think the interesting point was that Omar did know, he did know that Jon Ronson was a 
Jew from the very beginning and yet he kind of you know he accepted him. 
[ 
N: Yeah that's that yeah. 
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B: And the article that message is I mean okay it's embedded within lots of other things but 
that could have like you were saying could have developed an understanding that doesn't fit 
into all that other stuff about well you know 'he wpuldn't even look at Jew'.He's actually 
allowing him to follow him. 
N: Exactly. 
B: He also knew that he was keeping it secret all that time and yet still. 
J: I think if anything the media they want to show Islam in a bad light because I think a lot of 
the times that in terms of what takes place it's not necessarily Islamic it's more political= 
N: = Yeah, yeah. 
[ 
J: It's definitely like that what because they happen to be Muslim you know they or 
most people think that err a taken for granted assumption that that's what is expected of 
Muslims. 
B: Well it's like with the Bradford riots I mean not even all of those youth were Muslim 
anyway, but it was like this was a fundamentalist Islamic activity and it wasn't all even to 
do with religion. [ 
[ 
J: Yeah, yeah that's what 
Imean= 
M: ='Oh that's what they do everyday!' [laughs]. I've I've read like a lot of articles about err 
Bradford and Salman Rushdie and they were saying that they some of the worst like it was 
actually one of the worst things that happened due to the Brad. the liberal err the liberal 
people and and it was like you know it was like in newspaper coverage and things like this 
that were doing a lot of damage to err Islam. You know this kind of err liberal libertarian 
became very err infact they were kind of put to the test in that that they wouldn't they didn't 
erm they weren't liberal. And they started they were put on the spot and the liberal views 
turned into really dangerous like right wing you know the truth came out. 
[ 
N: It's like liberal 
fundamentalism= 
M: =Yeah oh yeah, well that's right [laughs] kind of err it's such a thing that I think it's a 
total massive 
[ 
N: But err I I just wanted to err you know erm during the Bradford book burnings were there 
actually riots? Or was it just a peaceful book burning? 
B: Well there were kind of some incidents which were kind of then taken out of proportion but 
there were kind of incidents of kind of activities between the police and it's a bit like the 
Notting Hill coverage there's always always going to be a riot and many times it's just a 
small scale incident, but one camera can shoot two scenes and make it look like you know 
[ 
N: Yeah and 
because there's fire involved and fire means danger and whatever. 
[ 
M: I mean I I a major problem for 
me now that I have with sort of that I discuss often with my wife is that you know' Are we 
going to stay in this country? • or 'Are we going to stay in this community?' At the moment 
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I live in a community where there's there's that I know maybe two families Muslim 
families, there's no mosque there's no nothing. Come to London to go to the mosque. The 
fact is that you know wherever you tum and I don't think I think the situation is going to 
get worse and worse I think that this situation of media representation of Muslims is going 
to get worse and worse and I think really really violently in terms of you know the real 
outcome and I'm not running away from it, but the question I ask myself is 'Do I stay 
here?' And and I everyone I meet learns something about Islam by talking about things 
which they could doubt which I do and which is a good point. Another one is that you 
know I I wanna bring up my family in a Muslim in an Islamic community so do I move to 
somewhere like Bradford, North Yorkshire where there's you know where there's more 
Muslims, where my child's going to get an Islamic education and not a biased western you 
know for me a sick you know really twisted education. 
N: It it it does tend to make you a bit paranoid as well because we [referring to herself and 
Shagufta] went to a restaurant before coming here and the woman just threw the napkins on 
the table, she just threw the cutlery in front of me. I'm like 'she saw the programme last 
night she hates me'. [group laugh] You know just you just think really confusing things 
like yeah. 
M: I changed my name to Mohammed and err and you'll be amazed you know if you're talking 
to someone on the phone and say 'yeah my name is Mustafa Mohammed', then they meet 
you and you're you're you know and the treatment is totally different. And I was kind of 
like the weirdest thing, I never thought that this would happen to me that I was actually 
witnessing racism. That that it was stupid because it you know if they'd seen me they 
wouldn't be they wouldn't react you know and that really really does bring it home to 
which then I thought once I was gonna I was going for jobs, part time jobs, and I was 
gonna do get two application forms one with myoId name and one with my new name on 
and see what ones I would get an interview for. I wasn't even getting interviews for 
Tesco's, year before I could you know go to Tesco's and you know get ajob straight 
away. It's it really got to that stage [laughs]. 
N: Actually when when I first started wearing the hijab a lot of people actually said to me 
about erm you know its really difficult for you to get a job and you know. And I went to 
err I went to like a women's class and I said they were just like 'Yeah so what are you 
doing?' And I was like 'I'm doing my Masters and afterwards I would think about doing a 
PGCE?', 'Why?', "Cause I want to teach English Lit'. 'No, no you can't do that you're 
wearing a bijab, the system will be against you', and you know blah blah blah. And it's 
just like okay even if that's true then maybe I should challenge that system maybe I 
should do something about that. [ 
[ 
A: Yeah that's 
just it you can't be defeatist, you shouldn't be defeatist you should always challenge things 
like that. 
N: But erm plus like it's not like this is a new thing I mean like you know there's established 
discourses upon you know like people who suffer discrimination. 
M: I hope hope my my own father in law never hears this tape [group laughs] but I've like 
known him for two or three years and he has avery, they both come from a quaker 
background so they have a liberal 'oh we accept everyone' kind of attitude. But essentially 
it's Christian based and and he was all very accepting and you know he'd when when my 
wife changed her name he was really quite okay about it. You know and on face value they 
were really accepting of us. It came about maybe about four months ago I'd actually 
arranged to move to London to be near Finsbury Park mosque. And err and this all fell 
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through anyway but whilst this was going on my err father-in-law was ringing me up and 
saying 'you're endangering my err my daughter's life, you've brainwashed her,.yo.u're 
going to brainwash your daughter', you know all the the truth came out, from this hberal 
point view turned into this nasty, fascist bast. [group laugh loudly] you know. And I was 
thinking hang on hang on you know this guy's attacking me you know. I was really upset I 
was I was almost in tears. After the phone I'd you know I'd defended Islam and and then 
afterwards I was so upset. This guy who had been so kind and err and good and the truth 
had you know the truth had come out and really upset me. And I kind of thought this is 
when it gets nasty, this is the truth you know. You know on face value people can be so 
accepting and Ii bera! and 
J: Yeah that's really contentious area like you know when people go, 'Oh you're like being 
paranoid and that', but we've got every reason to be paranoid, it's not like just imaginary 
you know. I donna I suppose there are 
A: It's like you know when you [to Javed] were behind me when we got on the train 
J: Yeah= 
A: =Right. Did you see that the the guard was talking to the people in front? [J has blank 
expression on face] Well like he was really friendly blah blah blah and then I sort of went 
up to him and said 'Excuse me could you confinn which train goes to White Hart Lane?'. 
And first of all he ignored me [M and B laugh sarcastically] and then like I was just like 
'Hello' and then he goes, [n a short sharp tone] 'This one'. And then I go, 'Okay is it 
six or seven?' and then he finally looks at me and he's just like, [again in a short sharp 
tone] 'Seven'. And I was just like [shakes her head with expression indicating 'What Have 
I done wrong?']. 
N: And we have friends who have been spat on. You know who it's just terrible. 
[ 
A: Yeah. 
B: I think I said to Ayesha there's this thing in the Runnymede Trust report there's this letter 
that err a 15 year old girl sends to the Runnymede Trust and she recently discovered Islam 
for herself. And she said you know I started wearing a hijab and it was a choice for me. 
And it was like why all of a sudden all these teachers started behaving really differently 
towards me. And she goes, 'I have to go to great lengths to tell people I haven't turned into 
a terrorist'. You know like this fifteen year old going to school and it's= 
N: =Like she's carrying a machine gun with her. 
M: Yeab under her hijab or something. 
[ 
A: Under her hijab. [group laughs] 
M: I I think I think it's a major major problem and I don't think err I think it happens all the 
time. [ 
[ 
N: I think so too. 
M: Especially to practising Muslims. You know the fact that they are practising Muslims who 
are trying their best to live by Islam which is considered like you know you can live Islam 
anywhere in the world. The fact is that if you've got someone that's totally opposite and is 
defying everything that you believe in and the essentials you know the fundamentals that 
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you believe in it's a problem in this country it's a problem. You know if you've got one 
culture teaching freedom in the in the sense that women can run around with nothing on 
and go to raves and drop ecstasy and stuff like this you know its just a great conflict it 
really it's like. And then on the other hand you've.got people teaching them teaching them 
edu. education you know and modesty you know some really great great you know you 
know ethics. There's going to be a problem. 
B: It's kind of about twenty to and we've gone on longer than planned. I should finish by just 
thanking you all for a very interesting discussion and some of you have already expressed 
an interest in taking part in the video so I look forward to seeing you again for that. I'll get 
in touch with err more information about that soon. Obviously help yourselves to more 
refreshments before going and feel free to stay for a while for a more informal chat 
amongst yourselves. 
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